UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
AT  LOS  ANGELES 


A     HISTORY 

OF 

MODERN    PHILOSOPHY 


A    HISTORY 


OF 


MODERN    PHILOSOPHY 


(FROM  THE  RENAISSANCE  TO  THE  PRESENT) 


BY 


B.   C.   BURT,  A.M. 


AUTHOR  OF  A  "BRIEF  HISTORY  OF  GREEK  PHILOSOPHY,"  OF  TRANSLATIONS  OF 

ERDMANN'S  "GRUNDRISS  DER  GE=CHICHTE  DER  PHILOSOPHIE  DBS  NEUN- 

ZEHNTEN  JAHRHUNDERTS,"  AND  HEGEL'S  "  RECHTS-,  PFLICHTEN-, 

UNO  RELIGIONSLEHRE;"  SOMETIME  DOCENT  (LECTURER) 

IN  THE  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY  AT 

CLARK  UNIVERSITY 


En  3to0  Uolumes 
VOL.  I. 


773 


CHICAGO 

A.   C.   McCLURG   AND    COMPANY 
1892 

MAY    1908 


COPYRIGHT 
BY  A.  C.  MCCLURG  AND  Co. 

A.  D.    1892 


"335 
v.l 


PREFACE. 


UNDERTAKING  only  to  a  limited  extent  the  higher  logico- 
genetic  development  and  the  complete  and  final  valuation 
of  ideas  and  systems  of  thought,  the  present  work  aims 
primarily  merely  to  present  with  considerable  fulness,  and 
as  simply  and  clearly  as  may  be  consistent  with  scien- 
tific accuracy,  the  principal  content  of  the  leading  systems 
(and  partial  systems)  of  philosophy  in  modern  times, 
together  with  a  reasonable  amount  of  information  re- 
garding philosophical  authors  and  works.  It  aims  to  be 
something  more  than  a  mere  "  chronological "  account  of 
systems,  authors,  and  works ;  to  show,  in  a  general  way, 
at  least,  the  actual  historical  connections  of  systems,  — 
i.e.,  to  exhibit  the  historical  continuity  of  modern  philo- 
sophical thought,  and,  further,  to  furnish  materials  and 
stimulus  to  the  student  for  the  study  of  the  higher  genesis 
and  final  values  of  ideas  and  systems.  The  paragraphs  of 
characterization  (marked  Result)  are  of  course  intended 
rather  as  helpful  suggestions  than  as  complete,  absolute 
statements  of  final  truth.  It  seems  not  out  of  place  to 
remind  the  reader  that  where,  as  almost  necessarily  in  a 
case  like  the  present,  a  work  contains  numerous  quota- 
tions, direct  and  indirect,  and  adaptations  from  a  great 
variety  of  authors,  a  certain  heterogeneity  and  lack  of 
smoothness  in  style  is  inevitable.  The  apparently  dispro- 
portionate length  at  which  certain  recent  systems  are 
treated  will  find  sufficient  excuse,  it  is  assumed,  in  the 
fact  that  they  have  not  as  yet  become  commonly  known 
through  other  histories  of  philosophy.  For  the  benefit  of 


VI*  PREFACE. 

readers  unfamiliar  with  German  and  Italian,  the  titles  of  the 
principal  philosophical  works  in  these  languages  have  been 
translated. 

In  the  preparation  of  the  present  work  the  following- 
named  authorities  have  been  chiefly  depended  upon  :  — 

WORKS    OF    THE    PHILOSOPHERS 
(ORIGINALS  AND  TRANSLATIONS). 

Noack's    "  Historisch-biographisches    Handworterbuch    zur 

Geschichte  der  Philosophic"  (1879). 
Zeller's  "  Geschichte  der  neuern  Philosophic   seit  Leibniz " 

(1873)- 

Erdmann's  "  Grundriss  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophic." 
(Also  the  translation  of  the  same,  made  in  part  by 
the  present  writer.) 

"  Dictionnaire  des  Sciences  Philosophiques,"  etc.,  edited 
by  M.  Adam  Franck  (1875). 

Volumes  in  "  Blackwood's  Philosophical  Classics,"  edited 
by  Professor  Knight. 

Volumes  in  Griggs's  "  Philosophical  Classics,"  edited  by 
Professor  Morris. 

Volumes  in  "  English  Philosophers,"  edited  by  Professor 
Monck. 

Articles  in  the  "  Encyclopaedia  Eritannica." 

Ueberweg's  "History  of  Philosophy"  (Morris's  transla- 
tion, vol.  ii.,  containing  also  histories  of  English  and 
of  American  Philosophy,  by  Ex  President  Porter,  and 
a  "History  of  Italian  Philosophy,"  by  Professor  Botta). 

Fischer's  "  Geschichte  der  neuern  Philosophic  "  (also  trans- 
lation of  vol.  i.  of  the  same  by  J.  P.  Gordy). 

Stockl's  "  Lehrbuch  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophic"  (1870). 

Schwegler's  "  Handbook  of  the  History  of  Philosophy " 
(Stirling's  translation). 

Morris's  "British  Thought  and  Thinkers." 

McCosh's  "Scottish  Philosophy." 

Articles  in  "Journal  of  Speculative  Philosophy." 

To  some  extent,  also,  the  Histories  of  Hegel,  Michelet, 
Lewes,  Morell,  Fortlage,  Windelband,  and  Willm  and 
Erdmann's  larger  work,  have  been  used. 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS. 


FIRST   PERIOD   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

PACK 
§  i.  THE  GENERAL  CHARACTER  AND  THE  MAIN  DIVISIONS 

OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY 15 

§  2.  GENERAL  CHARACTERISTICS  OF   THE    FIRST  PERIOD  OF 

MODERN  PHILOSOPHY 16 

I.  §     3.   The  Rehabilitation  of  Ancient  Systems  of  Philosophy  .  17 
(i)§     4.  Platonists  and  Neo-Platonists 17 

§     5.  Pletho 18 

§     6.  Bessarion 18 

§     7.  Ficinus .  18 

§    8.  Pico,  Reuchlin,  Agrippa,  Bovillus 19 

(2)§     9.  Aristotelians 20 

§  10.  Averroists 21 

§  it.  Alexandrists  (Pomponatius,  etc.) 21 

(3)  §  12.  Ciceronians  ( Valla,  Agricola,  Vives,  Nizolius,  Ramus)  23 

(4)  §  13.  Stoics 25 

(5)  §  M-  Sceptics  (Montaigne,  Le  Charron,  Sanchez,  and  others)  25 

(6)  §  1 5.  lonicist 27 

(7)  §  16.  Epicurean  (Gassendi) 27 

II.  §  17.   The  Association  of  Philosophy  with  (Protestant)  The- 

ology.    Semi- Rationalists 29 

(1)  §  18.  Philip  Mdanchthon  (Works;  Philosophy)  .     .     .      29,31 
§  19.  Nicolaus  Taurellus  (Works;  Philosophy)  ....  31 

(2)  §  20.  Mystics :  Sebastian  Franck 32 

§  21.    Valentin  IVeigel 33 

§  22.  Jacob  Boehme  ( Works;  Philosophy) 33.34 

III.  §  23.    The  (Relatively)  Independent  Cultivation  of  Philos- 
ophy as  such 35 

(i)§  24    Natural  Philosophers 35 

§  25.  Nicolaus  Cusanus  (Works;  Philosophy)      ....  39 
§  26.   Theophrastiis   Bombastus  Paracelsus   (Works;    Phi- 
losophy)        37 

§  27.  Hieronyinus  Cardanus  (Works ;   Philosophy)  .     .      38.39 


Viii  CONTENTS. 

PACK 

§  28.  Bernardinus  Telesius  (Works ;  Philosophy)  ...  40 
§  29.  Frandscus  Palritius  ( Works  ;  Philosophy)  ....  41 
§  30.  Thomas  Campanella  (Works;  Philosophy)  .  .  .  41,42 
§  31.  Pompeio  Ucilio  Vanini  (Works ;  Philosophy)  ...  44 
§  32.  Giordano  Bruno  ( Works ;  Philosophy)  ....  45-47 

(2)§  33.  Ethical  Philosophers 51 

§  34.  Nicole)  Macchiavelli 52 

§  35-   Thomas  More 52 

§  36.  Johannes  Oldendorp 52 

§  37.  Nicolaus  Hemming 53 

§  38-  Jean  Bodin 53 

§  39.  Albericus  Gentilis 54 

§  40.  Benedict  Winckler 55 

§  41.  Hugo  Grotius  (Works ;  Philosophy)    .  .      55,56 

§  42.  Richard  Hooker  ( Works ;  Philosophy)     .  .      56-60 

SECOND   PERIOD   OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

§  43.   CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE  SECOND  PERIOD  OF  MODERN 

PHILOSOPHY 61 

§  44.  Francis  Bacon  (Works;  Philosophy;  I.  The  Survey 
of  the  Sciences:  Introduction;  History;  Poesy; 
Philosophy  (Philosophia  Prima) ;  Divine  Philoso- 
phy; Natural  Philosophy;  Human  Philosophy; 
Divine  Learning;  II.  The  New  Method  of  the 
Interpretation  of  Nature  :  Introduction  ;  The  Idola 
of  Human  Knowledge;  The  Positive  Side  of  the 
Interpretation  of  Nature;  III.  Natural  and  Exper- 
imental History ;  "  Principles  and  Origins ; "  Result, 
— Bacon's  Position  and  Rank  as  a  Philosopher)  .  61-77 

§  45.  Thomas  Hobbes  (Works;  Philosophy:  Problem, 
PaTts,  and~End  of  Philosophy;  First  Philosophy; 
Geometry ;  Doctrine  of  Motion ;  Physics  ;  "  Moral 
Philosophy ;"  Civil  I  hilosophy;  Result)  .  .  .  77-87 

§  46.  Lord  Herbert  of  Cherbury  ( Works  ;  Philosophy)  .      87-90 

§  47.   The  Cartesians 90 

§  48.  Descartes  (Works;  Philosophy;  Standpoint  and 
Method  ;  Metaphysics  :  First  Principle ;  Knowl- 
edge of  other  Existences  than  Self;  (i)  God; 
(2)  Existence  of  External  World;  Substances; 
Physics;  God;  Result) 90-100 

§  49.  Arnold  Geulincx  (Works;  Philosophy)    .     .     .     .  100-102 
50.  Nicolas  Malebranche  (Works  ;  Philosophy)  .     .     .  102-104 

§  51.  Baruch  de  Spinoza  (Works;  Philosophy;  Motive 
and  Genesis  of  Spinoza's  Philosophy;  Doctrine 
of  God ;  The  Attributes  of  Thought  and  Extension  ; 


CONTENTS.  ix 

PAGE 

Origin  and  Nature  of  the  Emotions ;  Human  Ser- 
vitude, or  the  Power  of  the  Emotions ;  The  Power 
of  the  Intellect,  or  Human  Freedom ;  The  State ; 
Religion;  Result) 104-116 

§  5  A  The  Cambridge  Plalonists,  and  Richard  Cumber- 
land (Anti-Hobbean,  Anti-Cartesian)  .  .  .  .116,117 

§  53.  Benjamin  Whichcote 117,118 

§  54.  John  Smith  ( Philosophy ;  Knowledge  ;  Stages  of 
Spiritual  Attainment ;  Immortality  ;  God  ;  Re- 
ligion)    118-120 

§55.  Nathaniel  Culverwel 12O,  121 

§  56.  Ralph  Cudworth  (Works;  Philosophy;  Problems; 
Existence  of  God ;  God  in  Relation  to  Matter ,  The 
Plastic  Nature ;  Eternal  and  Immutable  Morality  ; 
Liberty  and  Necessity) 121-125 

§  57.  Henry  More  (Works;  Philosophy;  Problems;  Mat- 
ter and  Spirit;  The  Soul  of  Man  and  the  World- 
Soul;  Morality) 125-129 

§  58.  Richard  Cumberland  (Philosophy) 129,  130 

§  59-  John  Locke  (Works;  Philosophy;  Human  Under- 
standing: Introduction:  Scope,  Value,  and  Method 
of  the  proposed  Investigation ;  Innate  Ideas ;  Spec- 
ulative Principles ;  Practical  Principles ;  Mere 
Ideas  ;  Origin  and  Sorts  of  Ideas ;  Ideas  of  Modes ; 
Ideas  of  Substances ;  Ideas  of  Relations ;  Ade- 
quateness  in  Ideas  ;  Association  of  Ideas  ;  Words ; 
Knowledge :  its  Nature  and  Kinds ;  Degrees  of 
Knowledge  ;  Extent  of  Knowledge  ;  "  Improvement 
of  Knowledge  ;  "  Reason  ;  Wrong  Assent ;  Division 
of  the  Sciences.  II.  Natural  Philosophy.  III. 
Ethics;  Morality;  Education;  Politics;  Religion; 
Result) 130-159 

§  60.  Critics  and  Defenders  of  Locke  (Stillingflfet,  Bur- 
thogge,  Lee,  Browne,  Mayne,  Perronet,  Bold,  Cock- 
burn)  159-161 

§  6l.  English  Deism 161-164 

§  62.  George  Berkeley  (Works;  Philosophy;  Result)  .     .  164-169 
/'  &  63.  English  Moralists  of  the  Eighteenth  Century      .     .     .     169 
.S    ./§  64.  Anthony  Cooper,  Earl  of  Shaftesbury  ( Works  ;    Phi- 
losophy ;  Metaphysics  :  God ;   Ethics  ;   Esthetics ; 

,  Result) 169-173 

\/|  65.  Francis  Hutcheson  (Works ;  Philosophy ;  Psychology 

.            and  Metaphysics ;  Ethics;  ^Esthetics;  Result)  .173-17? 
V§  66.  Joseph  Butler  (Works;  Philosophy;  Theory  of  Re- 
ligion; Ethics;  Result) 177-182 

§  67.  Samuel  Clarke  (Works;  Philosophy;  Being  and  At- 


C  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

tributes  of  God ;   Foundation  of  Morality ;   Free- 
dom; Result) 182-184 

J  68.  Richard  Price  (Works  ;  Philosophy ;  Result)   .     .  184,  185 

*/%  69.  Adam  Smith  (Works;  Philosophy) 185-187 

^  ./§  70.    William  Paley( Works;  Philosophy) 187,188 

§  "jL^f/ume  (Works;  Philosophy;  Importance  and  the 
Method  of  the  Science  of  Human  Nature ;  Origin 
of  our  Ideas ;  The  Ideas  of  Space  and  Time,  Num- 
ber, Existence,  and  External  Existence  ;  The  Rela- 
tion of  Cause  and  Effect ;  The  Relation  of  Identity ; 
Objective  Existence ;  The  Passions ;  Morals ; 

Religion;  Result) .188-201 

Leibnitz  (Works;  Earlier  Doctrines;  Final  Stand- 
point; Substance  and  the  Monad;  Representa- 
tions; Ideas;  Appetitions;  The  External  World; 

God;  Result) 201-214 

§     73-   Walther    Ehrenfried,     Count    von     Tschirnhausen 

y  (Works;  Philosophy) 214-216 

§     74.  Samuel  Puffendorf  (Works;  Philosophy)    .     .     .216,217 
§     75.  Christian  Thoniasius  (Works;  Philosophy)     .     .217-219 
§     76.   Christian   Wolff  ( Works ;    Philosophy  ;    Standpoint 
and  Method  ;  The  Divisions  of  Philosophy  ;  Ontol- 
ogy;. Cosmology ;  Psychology;  Natural  Theology ; 

Practical  Philosophy;  Result) 220-229 

§     77.    Woljfians  and  Anti-Woljfians 229-232 

/§     78.    The  French  "Illumination" 232 

y/ §     79-_  Voltaire  (Works;  Philosophy;  Result)  .     .     .     .233-235 

§     80.  Montesquieu  (Works;  Philosophy) 235-237 

§  8l.  fean  Jacques  Rousseau  (Works;  Philosophy;  God 
and  Nature ;  The  State ;  Morality  and  Educa- 
tion; Result) 277-242 

§     82.  Charles  Bonnet  (Works  ;  Philosophy)     ....  242,  244 

§     83.  Jean  Baptiste  Robinet  (Philosophy) 244,245 

§     84.  Etienne  Bonnot  de  Condillac  (Works;  Philosophy; 

Origin  of  Ideas  ;  Method  of  Knowledge)  .     .     .  245-247 
%$.  D^stutt  de   Tracy    (Works;    Philosophy;    Problems 

of  Philosophy;  Ideology;  Morals) 247-249 

86.  Claude  Adrien  Helvetius  (Works;  Philosophy)    .249-251 

87.  Denis  Diderot  (Works;  Philosophy)  .     .     .     .     .251-253 

88.  Julien  Offray  de  Lammettrie  (Works  ;  Philosophy)  253,  2^4 

89.  Baron  D'Holbach     (Works;  Philosophy)   .     .     .254-256 

90.  Pierre  Jean  Cabanis  (Works ;  Philosophy) .     .     .256-258 

91.  The    German    "Illumination"     (Reimarus,    Sttlzer, 

Tetens,    Feder,    Meiners,    Basedow,    Mendelssohn, 
Lessing) 258-260 

92.  Mendelssohn  (Works;  Philosophy) 260-262 


CONTENTS.  xi 

PAGB 

§     93.  Lessing  (Works;  Philosophy) 262-265 

§     94.  Italian  Philosophy 265 

§     95.   Giovanni  Battista   Vico  ("Work;  Philosophy)  .     .     .     269 
§     96.  American  Philosophy,  (Jonathan  Edwards  and  oth- 
ers)      266,  267 

THIRD   PERIOD   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

§  97.  CHARACTERISTICS  (AND  DIVISIONS)  OF  THE  THIRD  PE- 

/        RIOD  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY 268 

§  v/9.8.  Scotch  Systems 269 

§     99.   Thomas  Reid  (Works;  Philosophy;  Standpoint  and 
Method ;      Sensation    and    Perception ;     Common 
/             Sense;  The  Powers  of  Man;  Result)   .     .     .     .269-274 
^f  too.  Dugald  Stewart  (Works;  Philosophy)    .     .     .     .274-276 
§   101.   Thomas  Brown   (Works;  Philosophy;  Result)    .276-278 
§  102.  Sir   William  Hamilton    (Works;  Philosophy;  Gen- 
eral Conception  of  Philosophy ;   Phenomenology ; 
Natural   Realism   and   Natural   Dualism ;   Latent 
Modifications ;  Necessary  Cognition  ;  The  Law  of 
the    Conditioned   and    its    Applications;     Causa- 
tion)    278-287 

§  103.  James  Frederick  Ferrier  (Works;  Philosophy;  In- 
troduction :  Conception  and  Method  of  Philosophy; 
Epistemology ;  Agnoi'ology ;  Ontology  ;  Result)  287-293 

§   104.   French  Systems 293 

§  105.  Maine  de  Biran   (Works;  Philosophy;  Result)   .294-297 

§   106.  Pierre  Laromiguitre 297-298 

§  107.  Pierre  Paul  Royer-Collard  (Philosophy)      ....     298 
§  108.    Victor  Cousin    (Works;    Philosophy;     Genesis    of 
Cousin's  System;   Divisions  of  System;   Method; 
Psychology  ;  Ontology  ;  Ethics  ;  History  of  Philos- 
ophy ;  Result) 298-303 

§  109.   Theodore  Jouffroy  (Works;  Philosophy)      .     .     .303,304 
§  1 10.  Robert  de  Lamentiais  (Works;  Philosophy;  Earlier 

Standpoint ;  Later  Standpoint) 304,  305 

§  in.  Auguste  Comte  (Works;  Philosophy;  Law  of  Hu- 
man Development ;  Characteristics  and  Problem 
of  Positive  Philosophy;  Advantages  of  the  Positive 
Philosophy ;  The  Hierarchy  of  the  Positive  Scien- 
ces; Sociology ;  Religion  of  Humanity ;  Result)  305-312 

§  112.  German  Systems 312,313 

§  113.  Immanuel  Kant  (Works;  Kant's  Earlier  Develop- 
ment and  Works  ;  Kant's  Later  Works  ;  Philoso- 
phy ;  Introduction  ;  The  Critique  of  Pure  Reason; 
Problem ;  Transcendental  Esthetic ;  Transcen- 


xii  CONTENTS. 

PAGH 

dental  Logic;  The  Analytic  of  Notions;  The 
Categories;  The  Transcendental  Deduction  of  the 
Categories;  Analytic  of  Judgments ;  Schematism 
of  the  Categories ;  The  System  of  Principles  of  the 
Pure  Understanding;  Ground  of  Distinction  of 
Phenomena  and  Noumena ;  Transcendental  Dia- 
lectic ;  Conceptions  on  Ideas  of  Pure  Reason; 
Syllogisms ;  Dialectical  Conclusions  of  Pure  Rea- 
son ;  Transcendental-  Paralogisms ;  Criticism  of 
Rational  Psychology ;  Antimony  of  Pure  Reason ; 
Criticism  of  Rational  Cosmology ;  The  Ideal  of 
Pure  Reason ;  Criticism  of  Transcendental  The- 
ology ;  Transcendental  Theory  of  Method ;  Cri- 1 
tique  of  Practical  Reason ;  The  Notion  of  Prac- 
tical Reason;  The  Analytic  of  Pure  Practical 
Reason ;  The  Notion  of  an  Object  of  Pure  Prac- 
tical Reason  ;  The  Motives  of  Pure  Practical  Rea- 
son ;  Dialectic  of  Pure  Practical  Reason  ;  Metho- 
dology of  Pure  Practical  Reason ;  Critique  of 
Judgment ;  Introduction ;  Critique  of  ^Esthetical 
Judgment;  Analytic;  Dialectic  of  the  ./Esthetic 
Faculty;  Critique  of  Teleological  Judgment:  An- 
alytic; Dialectic  of  Teleological  Judgment;  The- 
ory of  Method;  Moral  Proof  of  the  Existence  of 
God;  The  Metaphysical  Foundation  of  Natural 
Science ;  Introduction  ;  Phoronomy ;  Dynamics  ; 
Mechanics;  Phenomenology;  The  Metaphysics  of 
Morals ;  Introduction  ;  Theory  of  Right ;  Theory  - 
of  Virtue ;  Religion  within  the  Limits  of  Mere 

Reason;  Result) 3I3-368 

§  114.  Reception  of  the  Kantian  Philosophy 368 


A 

HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 


INTRODUCTION. 

§  i. 

The  General  Character  and  the  Main  Divisions  of 
Modern  Philosophy.  —  Modern  Philosophy,  as  distin- 
guished from  Mediaeval  Philosophy,  is  occupied  with  the 
immanent  and  concrete,  rather  than  the  transcendent  and 
abstract ;  with  the  natural  and  the  human,  rather  than  the 
supernatural  and  the  superhuman.  As  distinguished  from 
Ancient  Philosophy,  it  is  occupied  with  the  subject,  rather 
than  with  the  object ;  with  thought,  rather  than  with  being. 
It  may  be  quite  easily  divided  into  three  great  periods,  as 
follows  :  i .  A  period  predominantly  of  reception  and  appro- 
priation (though  with  considerable  self-assertion  as  against 
medievalism)  ;  2.  A  period  of  original  effort  very  largely 
destructive  or  negative  (towards  previous  philosophy  as 
well  as  the  object  of  thought  generally)  ;  3.  A  period  of 
equal  originality,  and  more  constructive  or  synthetic  effort. 
Psychologically  speaking,  these  periods  may  be  viewed  as, 
respectively,  periods  of  (receptive)  sense,  (analytic)  under- 
standing, and  (synthetic)  reason;  logically,  as  periods  of 
thesis,  antithesis,  synthesis.  The  first  period  extends  from 
the  middle  of  the  fifteenth  century  to  the  beginning  of  the 
seventeenth ;  the  second,  from  the  beginning  of  the  seven- 
teenth century  to  the  third  quarter  of  the  eighteenth ;  and 
the  third  from  the  third  quarter  of  the  eighteenth  century, 
onwards. 


1 6  A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 


DIVISION    I.      FIRST   PERIOD    OF    MODERN 
PHILOSOPHY. 

§  2. 

General  Characteristics  of  the  First  Period  of  Mod- 
em Philosophy.  —  The  beginnings  of  Modern  Philosophy 
formed  a  part  of  the  general  human  awakening  in  Europe 
in  the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth  centuries.  This  awakening 
was,  as  every  one  is  well  aware,  an  awakening  from  a  sort 
of  "  dogmatic  slumber,"  in  which  human  thought  was 
wrapped  up  in  the  idea  of  a  supra- mundane  world,  an- 
swering, as  it  now  seems,  to  fancy  and  mere  feeling,  rather 
than  to  active  sense,  healthy  understanding,  and  reason ;  in 
which,  along  with  logical  acuteness,  there  existed  a  certain 
enslavement  to  preconceived  ideas,  and  to  authority  in 
intellectual  things.  At  the  beginning,  Modern  Philosophy 
was,  on  the  one  hand,  a  revolt  against  a  philosophy  which, 
both  by  its  content  (which  was  constituted  by  the  abstract 
and  transcendental)  and  by  its  form  (which  was  either 
mystical  or  else  pedantically  logical)  had  come  to  be  want- 
ing in  power  to  satisfy  a  real  human  interest ;  on  the  other 
hand,  an  endeavor  to  substitute  for  that  barren  philosophy 
something  more  worthy  of  a  strong  consciousness  of  human 
dignity  as  such,  and  of  the  wealth  and  grandeur  of  visible 
Nature.  This  double  character  attaches  to  almost  every 
form  of  early  Modern  Philosophy,  until,  so  to  say,  it 
reaches  its  majority,  and  even  after  that  time ;  so  that 
every  new  system,  whatever  else  it  may  also  be,  is  a  protest 
against  mere  Scholasticism.  The  substitutions  made  for 
Scholasticism  were  in  various  directions,  and  of  various 
degrees  of  completeness  and  originality.  The  revival  of 
ancient  learning  and  literature  placed  within  the  reach  of 
the  new  impulse  to  philosophic  thought  —  accompanying 
and  supporting  like  impulses  in  literature,  the  arts,  and  the 
sciences  —  a  noble  wealth  of  ancient  philosophical  literature, 
which  was  eagerly  seized  upon  and  made  the  basis  for 


GENERAL   CHARACTERISTICS.  IJ 

various  schools  of  rehabilitated  ancient  philosophy.  The 
new  religious  movement,  Protestantism,  found  in  ancient 
thinking  (but  to  some  extent  also  in  mediaeval  though  non- 
scholastic  mysticism)  a  stimulant  and  possible  helper,  which 
it  associated  with  itself  and  adapted  to  its  need.  The 
cultivation  of  the  natural  sciences  by  both  empirical  and 
speculative  methods  furnished  material  and  basis  for  a  phi- 
losophy of  Nature ;  the  actual  political  conditions  of  the 
period,  and  the  revival  of  the  political  doctrines  of  the  an- 
cients (particularly  of  Plato  and  Aristotle),  presented  occa- 
sions for  the  framing  and  putting  forth  of  systems  of  political 
philosophy.  It  is  possible  to  distinguish  definite  degrees 
(three  in  number)  of  originality  or  independence  of  philo- 
sophical effort  in  this  first  period  of  Modern  Philosophy. 
There  is  ( i )  the  relatively  passive  reception  of  the  ancient 
systems,  as  such ;  (2)  the  adaptation  of  ancient  and  medi- 
aeval systems  to  religious  or  theological  uses;  (3)  a  rela- 
tively independent  cultivation  of  philosophical  conceptions 
into  systems  of  Nature-philosophy  on  the  one  hand,  and 
political  philosophy  on  the  other.  We  have,  then,  in  the 
treatment  of  the  first  period  of  Modern  Philosophy,  three 
grand  divisions,  which  may  be  denoted  as  follows :  The 
Rehabilitation  of  Ancient  Systems  ;  The  Association  of 
Philosophy  with  (Protestant)  Theology;  The  (Relatively) 
Independent  Cultivation  of  Philosophy  on  its  own  Account. 

§3- 

I.  THE  REHABILITATION  OF  ANCIENT  SYSTEMS  OF  PHILOS- 
OPHY. —  The  ancient  systems  of  thought  rehabilitated  were, 
naturally,  principally  those  of  (i)  Plato  and  the  Neo-Pla- 
tonists;  and  of  (2)  Aristotle.  Other  systems  rehabilitated 
were  (3)  Ciceronianism ;  (4)  Stoicism;  (5)  Scepticism; 
(6)  lonicism;  (7)  Epicureanism. 

§4- 

(i)    Platonists  and  Neo-Platonists.  —  Chief  among  the 
revivers   of  Platonism  and    Neo-Platonism  were  Georgius 
VOL.  i.  —  2 


1  8  A    HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Gemistus  Pletho  (circa  1355-1450),  who  was  a  learned 
Greek  at  the  court  of  Cosmo  de'  Medici  in  Florence  ; 
Bessarion  of  Trebizond  (1395-1472),  likewise  a  Greek, 
and  a  pupil  of  Pletho  ;  Marsilius  Ficinus,  or  Marsilio  Ficino 
(1433-1499)  ;  Giovanni  Pico,  of  Mirandola  (d.  1533)  ; 
Johannes  Reuchlin,  the  renowned  German  humanist  (1455- 
1522)  ;  Agrippa  of  Nettesheim  (1487-1535)  ;  Carolus 
Bovillus,  or  Charles  Bouille"  (1470-1535)  ;  and  Jacques 
Lefevre  (1455-1537),  professor  in  the  University  of  Paris. 

§5- 

Pletho.  —  Pletho  not  only  enthusiastically  expounded  and 
defended  Platonism  and  Neo-Platonism,  but  vigorously  at- 
tacked Aristotle  and  his  doctrine.  Unlike  most  of  the 
revivers  of  ancient  systems,  Pletho  was  non-  Christian  in  his 
theology,  and  desired  to  substitute  Platonism  for  Christianity. 
Two  works  of  Pletho  bear  the  titles  "  De  Platonicse  et  Aris- 
totelicae  Philosophise  Differentia  "  and  No/*o>i> 


§6. 

Bessarion.  —  Bessarion  was  a  more  temperate  admirer 
of  Plato,  though  he  too  combated  (discreetly)  the  doctrines 
of  Aristotle,  as  maintained  by  George  of  Trebizond.  He 
considered  Plato  more  in  accord  than  Aristotle  with  Chris- 
tian dogma.  He  rejected  the  Platonic  doctrines  of  the 
pre-existence  of  the  soul,  the  plurality  of  gods,  and  the 
world-soul.  The  chief  work  of  Bessarion  is  entitled  "  In 
Calumniatorem  Platonis." 

§7- 

Ficinus.  —  The  lectures  of  Pletho  upon  Platonism  led  to 
the  founding  at  Florence  by  Cosmo  de'  Medici  of  a  Platonic 
Academy.  Of  this,  Ficinus,  who  had  been  a  successful 
translator  of  the  works  of  Plato,  Plotinus,  and  others  of  the 
same  general  school,  was  made  the  first  director.  Ficinus, 
it  is  related,  had  in  his  private  apartments  but  a  single  pic- 
ture, that  of  Plato,  —  before  which  a  light  was  continually 


PICO,   REUCHLIN,   ETC.  19 

kept  burning.  He  advocated  the  reading  of  the  works  of 
Plato  along  with  the  Hebrew-Christian  Bible  in  church. 
The  chief  work  of  Ficinus  is  "  Theologia  Platonica  de 
Animorum  Immortalitate  "  (1482). 

§   8. 

Pico,  Reuchlin,  Agrippa,  Bovillus.  —  Pico,  Reuchlin, 
Agrippa,  Bovillus,  "  blended  with  the  Neo-Platonism  Jewish 
Cabalistic  doctrines,  —  took  a  step  in  the  direction  of  what 
was  almost  pure  nature-philosophy."  Pico  taught  that  the 
"  bond  of  union  between  God,  man,  and  the  world  in  their 
common  perfection  is  Christ,  the  God-man ;  that  man 
knows  and  possesses  God  the  more  perfectly  the  more  he 
employs  the  powers  of  knowing  and  willing  natural  to  him  ; 
but  this  natural  happiness  is  merely  a  shadow  of  the  super- 
natural which  man  attains  to  through  the  in-working  of 
God."  Works  of  Pico  are  "Apologia"  (1489),  "  Oratio 
de  Hominis  Dignitate  "  (1496),  "  Disputationum  adversus 
Astrologos  "  (1496).  —  Reuchlin  opposed  Aristotelianism 
and  Scholastic  supersubtleties ;  and  maintained  that  there 
is  no  knowledge  of  the  supersensible  without  faith.  Works 
of  Reuchlin  are  "  De  Arte  Cabalistica"  (1517);  "De 
Verbo  Mirifico"  (1494).  —  According  to  Agrippa,  the  high- 
est branch  of  philosophy  is  Magic.  This  is  of  three  sorts  : 
natural  magic,  which  teaches  the  miraculous  use  of  earthly 
things ;  heavenly  or  celestial  magic,  which  has  to  do  with 
the  drawing  down  to  earth  of  the  influences  of  the  stars ; 
and  religious  magic,  which  teaches  the  art  of  obtaining 
from  supernatural  sources  miraculous  appearances.  Magic 
controls  the  secret  powers  of  the  universe.  Besides  natural 
endowment  in  man,  faith  and  a  laborious  study  of  theology, 
physics,  and  mathematics  are  prerequisites  to  the  acquire- 
ment of  the  powers  of  the  magician.1  The  chief  work  01 
Agrippa  is  entitled  "De  Occulta  Philosophia"  (1510); 
other  works  are  "  De  Triplici  Ratione  Cognoscendi  Deum," 

i  Noack. 


2O  A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

"  De  Vanitate  et  Incertitudine  Scientiarum.  "  —  Bovillus 
teaches  that  philosophy  leads  to  self-knowledge  and  union 
with  God,  that  science  is  union  of  subject  and  object,  that 
intelligence  is  the  perfection  of  faith,  that  the  universal  is 
prior  to  the  particular  in  knowledge,  that  the  highest  knowl- 
edge of  God  is  ignorance,  that  the  soul  and  matter  and  the 
visible  world  are  immortal,  that  matter  is  the  middle  term 
between  being  and  not-being,  that  creation  is  a  free  act 
flowing  from  the  pure  goodness  of  God.  Works  of  Bo- 
villus are  "Liber  de  Sensibus,"  "Liber  de  Intellectu," 
"  Ars  Oppositorum,"  etc.1 

§  9- 

(2)  Aristotelians. — The  attacks  of  Pletho  and  Bessarion 
on  Aristotle  called  forth  replies  from  Gennadius,  Patriarch 
of  Constantinople  (died  circa  1454),  and  George  of  Trebi- 
zond  (1396-1486),  both  of  whom,  besides  being  expoun- 
ders of  Aristotle,  were  defenders  of  traditional  Christianity. 
There  were  various  other  scholars  in  the  fifteenth  century 
who  translated  or  commentated  the  works  of  Aristotle. 
Jacques  Lefevre  (the  Platonist  already  mentioned)  is  said 
to  have  gone  directly  to  the  original  sources  for  his  Aris- 
totelianism.  In  northern  Italy  —  at  Padua,  Venice,  and 
Bologna  —  Aristotelianism  was  taught  and  defended  by  two 
rival  schools  of  philosophers  known  as  Averroists  and  Alex- 
andrists  (followers  of  Alexander  Aphrodisias,  of  the  second 
century  A.  D.).  The  rise  of  the  Alexandrist  school  was 
doubtless  owing  to  existing  sympathy  with  increasing  hu- 
manism and  naturalism,  as  opposed  to  the  mystical  panthe- 
ism of  Averroes.  An  important  point  of  difference  in  the 
controversy  between  the  schools  was  that  the  Averroists 
maintained  that  the  active  reason  in  man  was  an  emanation 
from  the  Deity,  and  the  Alexandrists  that  it  was  not  so, 
but  a  part  of  the  universal  reason,  both  schools,  however, 
denying  immortality. 

1  Noack. 


A  VERROIS  TS.  —  ALEXANDRISTS.  2 1 

§    10. 

Averroists.  —  Among  the  Averroists  were  Alexander 
Achillinus  (d.  1512),  professor  of  medicine  and  philosophy 
at  Padua  and  Bologna;  Augustinus  Niphus  (\$i2-circa 
1550),  physician  and  astrologer;  Giacomo  Zabarella  (1533- 
1589),  professor  of  philosophy  at  Padua;  Cesare  Cremonini 
(1552-1631),  successor  of  Zabarella  at  Padua.  —  Zabarella 
is  sometimes  described  as  an  "  Averroist  in  physics,  and  an 
Alexandrist  in  psychology."  Sensible  knowledge,  he  says,  is 
confused,  and  must  be  subjected  to  logical  tests  or  a  scien- 
tific method  to  become  certain  and  true.  The  existent  is 
always  individual,  though  the  principium  individuationis  is 
form,  and  not  matter.  Eternal  motion  presupposes  an 
eternal  mover  separate  from  all  matter.  The  active  intel- 
lect is  not  one  in  all  men.  Works  of  Zabarella  are  "  De 
Rebus  Naturalibus Libri  triginta"  (1594),  "Opera  Logica" 
(1579),  "  Commentaria  in  Aristotelis  Libros  Physicorum  " 
(1602),  "In  Aristotelis  Libros  de  Anima."  Zabarella  has 
the  credit  of  having  had  a  truer  appreciation  of  the  impor- 
tance of  scientific  method  than  any  other  Aristotelian  of  his 
time.  —  Cremonini  has  been  called  the  last  of  the  "  Aris- 
totelians in  Italy."  He  cannot  be  credited  with  the  true 
scientific  or  (for  that  matter)  philosophic  spirit,  since  he 
refused  to  look  through  the  telescope,  because  he  feared 
the  upsetting  of  his  physical  theories  as  a  consequence  of 
doing  so. 

§  it. 

Alexandrists.  —  Of  the  Alexandrists,  the  following  seem 
the  most  worthy  of  mention:  Leonicus  Thomseus  (1456- 
1533),  professor  of  philosophy  at  Padua;  Andreas  Caesal- 
pinus  (1519-1603),  a  professor  of  natural  history;  Petrus 
Pomponatius,  or  Pietro  Pomponazzi  (1462-1524),  said  to 
have  been  the  "  most  influential  professor  of  philosophy  of 
his  age."  —  Thomaeus  went  to  the  original  Aristotle,  and 
strongly  advocated  the  doing  so.  His  philosophical  intel- 
ligence appears  in  his  teaching  the  substantial  agreement  of 


22  A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  doctrines  of  Plato  and  Aristotle. — Caesalpinus  tries  to 
explain  Aristotle  apart  from  the  commentators.  His  doc- 
trine is  briefly  stated  as  follows :  Knowledge  is  of  the 
universal  definite  conception,  which  is  knowledge  of  sub- 
stance, unites  matter  and  form.  All  things  are  medi- 
diately  or  immediately  living.  God  is  the  universal  mind, 
above  human  comprehension  :  he  is  pure  spirit.  The  soul, 
which  unites  the  parts  of  the  body,  is  pure  form :  it  is 
immortal.  After  death,  it  remains  joined  to  the  pure  uni- 
versal matter.  The  perception  of  the  One  in  all  things 
is  true  divine  happiness.  Works  of  Caesalpinus  are 
"  Quaestiones  Peripateticae  "  and  "  Dsemonum  Investigatio." 

—  Pomponatius 3    (born  at  Mantua)  studied  medicine  and 
philosophy   at   the   University   of   Padua,  and   afterwards 
occupied  the  chair  of  philosophy  there.     Among  the  works 
of  Pomponatius  are  the  following :  "  Tractatus  de  Immor- 
talitate  "  (1516), "  De  Incantationibus  "  (1520),  "  De  Fato, 
libero  Arbitrio  et  Praedestinatione  "  (1523),   "Apologia" 

—  against  Contarini — (1517),  "  Defensorium,"  —  against 
Niphus,  —  the  last  two  having  special  reference  to  the  doc- 
trine of  immortality.     Pomponatius  expresses  the  highest 
reverence  for  the  philosopher  in  general,  and  for  Aristotle 
in  particular :  the  philosopher,  he  says,  is  to  the  ordinary 
human  being  as  a  real  man  is  to  a  painted  one,  —  he  is  a  god 
among  men.     The  philosophy  of  Pomponatius  is  principally 
occupied  with  the  three  problems,  —  of  the  immortality  of 
the  soul,  of  the  influence  of  the  spiritual  world  upon  the 
material,  and  of  the  relation  of  divine  providence  to  human 
liberty  and  destiny.     Pomponatius  asserts  that,  on  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  philosophy  of  Aristotle  (which  he  accepts), 
the  doctrine  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul  cannot  be  main- 
tained, —  the  soul,  as  the  entelechy  of  the  body,  cannot  be 
active  without  the  body ;  and  thought,  in  the  proper  sense, 
cannot  be  carried   on  without   sensible  images.      On  the 
whole,  Pomponatius  thinks  "  the  question   of  the  immor- 
tality of  the  soul,  like  that  of  the  immortality  of  the  world, 

1  Franck. 


CICERONIANS.  2$ 

is  a  question  which  reason  cannot  decide  either  affirma- 
tively or  negatively,  upon  which  God  alone  can  afford  us 
certain  knowledge.  For  myself,"  he  adds,  "  it  suffices  that 
Saint  Augustine,  who  is  of  higher  authority  than  Plato  and 
Aristotle,  believed  in  immortality."  That  is,  Pomponatius 
professed  "  as  a  philosopher  "  not  to  admit  the  doctrine  of 
the  immortality  of  the  human  soul,  but  "as  a  man"  to 
accept  it,  —  a  position  sufficiently  significant  as  to  the  con- 
ceived relation  of  philosophy  to  theology  in  his  age.  (The 
mere  "  consistency,"  or  want  of  "  consistency,"  of  such  a 
position  is  perhaps  best  shown  up  by  a  reply  made  by  the 
satirist  Boccalini  to  this  saying  of  Pomponatius :  "  It  is 
necessary  to  absolve  Pomponatius  in  so  far  as  he  is  a  man, 
but  to  burn  him  as  a  philosopher.")  Pomponatius  explains 
the  "  universality  "  of  the  belief  in  immortality  as  an  effect 
wrought  by  priests  in  the  interest  of  religion ;  but  he  thinks 
the  appeal  to  the  future  an  unscientific  one,  since  virtue 
should  be  its  own  reward.  Pomponatius  attempts  to  justify 
his  dualistic  philosophical  attitude  by  means  of  a  distinction 
between  speculative  and  practical  reason,  —  the  former  of 
which  (as  well  as  the  latter)  belonging  to  the  philosopher 
alone ;  the  latter  (only)  to  men  in  general.  If  reason  is 
thus  absolutely  dualistic,  the  position  of  Pomponatius  was  a 
natural,  though  an  uncomfortable  and  compromising,  one, 
as  he  himself  seems  to  have  felt. 

§  12. 

(3)  Ciceronians.  —  The  fact  of  a  newly-arisen  life  of 
thought,  as  opposed  to  the  dryness  of  the  Scholastic  under- 
standing, had,  as  a  natural,  though  not,  perhaps,  a  very 
profound,  consequence,  the  coming  into  existence  of  a 
school  of  thinkers  who  hated  and  vehemently  antagonized 
Scholastic  logicism  in  general,  —  its  over-refinement,  or 
false  subtlety,  and  its  barrenness.  This  is  the  school  of 
the  Ciceronians,  —  Laurentius  Valla,  Rudolph  Agricola,  Lu- 
dovicus  Vives,  Marius  Nizolius,  Petrus  Ramus,  and  others. 
—  Laurentius  Valla  (1407-1459)  affirmed  that  "dialectic" 


24  A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

(logic)  is  merely  an  aid  to  rhetoric,  which  should  be  sub- 
stituted for  it ;  that  virtue  is  really  virtue  only  when  sought 
for  the  sake  of  pleasure ;  that  human  freedom  and  divine 
providence  are  merely  matters  of  faith.  —  Rudolph  Agri- 
cola  (1442-1485)  combated  Scholastic  subtleties,  and  ad- 
vocated a  philosophy  of  "  common  sense."  The  only  rule 
of  knowledge,  he  affirmed,  is  the  rule  of  probability. 
Ethics  is  the  principal  part  of  philosophy.  Our  ultimate 
resort  must  be  to  Scripture.  —  Vives  (1492-1540)  advo- 
cated humanism  as  opposed  to  Scholasticism,  and  the  rule 
of  probability  as  opposed  to  demonstration  so  called. 
The  Nominalists  and  Realists,  he  thought,  occupy  sub- 
stantially the  same  ground.  Of  the  soul  we  can  know  only 
the  attributes  and  the  operations,  not  the  nature.  The  exis- 
tence of  God  is  for  us  a  moral  need,  not  a  theoretical  cer- 
tainty. We  must  interrogate  Nature  :  "  only  through  direct 
investigation,  by  way  of  experiment,  can  Nature  be  known." 
Works  of  Vives  are  "De  Prima  Philosophia"  (1531),  "  De 
Anima  etVita"  (1538).  —  Marius  Nizolius  (1498-1575), 
likewise,  opposed  Scholasticism  and  advocated  the  substi- 
tution of  rhetoric  for  metaphysics  and  dialectic,  and  the 
employment  of  empirical  methods  —  "  induction  "  —  in 
the  search  for  truth.  A  work  of  Nizolius,  "De  veris 
Principiis  et  vera  Ratione  philosophandi  contra  Pseudo- 
philosophos  Libri  quatuor"  (1553),  was  reissued  by  Leib- 
nitz in  the  seventeenth  century.  —  Ramus  (1517-1572) 
graduated  from  the  Sorbonne,  and  (in  1551)  received  the 
appointment  ot  professor  of  philosophy  and  eloquence  in 
the  College  de  France.  Violent  opposition  on  his  part 
to  Scholasticism  brought  upon  him  theological  odium,  to 
which  he  fell  a  victim  in  the  celebrated  massacre  of  St. 
Bartholomew.  Ramus's  works  number  upwards  of  fifty : 
among  them  are  "  Aristotelicae  Animadversiones "  (1543), 
"Dialectics  Partitiones"  (1543),  "Institutions  Dialecticae" 
(1547), — nearly  the  same  as  the  one  preceding.  Ramus 
was  a  special  student  of  the  works  of  Cicero,  Quintilian, 
Plato,  and  an  avowed  follower  of  Valla,  Agricola.  Nizolius, 


STOICS.  — SCEPTSCS.  2$ 

and  Vives.  He  denounced  the  Aristotelian  logic  as  arti- 
ficial, and  without  value  for  a  real  dialectic,  and  sought  to 
merge  logic  into  rhetoric.  He  laid  stress  upon  the  theory 
of  judgment,  which  he  viewed  as  also  a  theory  of  memory 
and  its  right  use.  There  are,  according  to  him,  three 
stages  of  judgment :  i.  Syllogistic  inference;  2.  Combina- 
tion and  arrangement  into  a  self-consistent  whole  of  propo- 
sitions of  like  kind  and  import  (a  process  which  involves 
some  uncertainty  in  the  result)  ;  3.  The  reference  of  the 
scientific  truth  obtained  by  these  forms  of  judgment  to  God, 
and  the  attempt  to  see  God  in  all  things,  —  to  the  end  that 
we  may  be  incited  to  the  praise  of  God.  Ramus's  im- 
provements (  ?)  upon  the  old  logic  have  (unfortunately)  been 
largely  followed  by  modern  logicians.  He  had  many  fol- 
lowers, and  excited  much  opposition ;  and  for  a  century  or 
more,  logicians  as  a  class,  throughout  Europe,  were  divided 
into  Ramists,  Anti-Ramists,  and  Semi-Ramists,  —  chief 
among  the  Anti-Ramists  being  a  certain  Antonius  Goveanus, 
colleague  of  Ramus  at  Paris.  In  conclusion,  it  has  to  be 
remarked  that  the  "  Ciceronians  "  present  traits  which  make 
them  forerunners  of  Francis  Bacon,  generally  regarded  as 
the  founder  of  modern  empiricism. 

§  13- 

(4)  Stoics.  — As  revivers  of  Stoicism  may  be  mentioned 
Justus  Lipsius,  or  Joost  Lips  (1547-1606),  teacher  in  the 
universities  of  Leyden  and  Louvain,  and  author  of  works 
entitled  "  Manductio  ad   Stoicam    Philosophiam  "   (1604) 
and   "  Physiologic   Stoicorum    Libri    III."    (1610)  ;    and 
Caspar    Schoppe,    or   Scioppius    (1576-1649),    author   of 
"Casparis  Scioppii  Elementa  Stoicae  Philosophic   Moralis 
quae  in  Senecam,  Ciceronem,  Plutarchum,  aliosque  Scriptores 
Commentarii  Loco  esse  possunt  "  (1608). 

§  14. 

(5)  Sceptics.  —  Revivers  of  Scepticism  were  Michel  de 
Montaigne  (1533-1592),  Pierre  Le  Charron  (1541-1603), 


26  A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Francois  Sanchez  (1552—1632).  —  According  to  Montaigne, 
the  true  philosophy  is,  not  to  depend  too  much  on  philos- 
ophy. Human  knowledge  as  such  is  bounded  by  the 
senses ;  which  are,  obviously,  unreliable  guides  to  sub- 
stantial truth,  since  they  are  contradictory  and  variable  in 
their  reports.  The  more  we  learn,  the  more  ignorant  we 
become.  Human  reason  must  be  supplemented  by  faith, 
acceptance  of  Revelation.  The  first  virtue  of  man  is  sub- 
mission and  obedience  to  God.  The  Scepticism  of  Mon- 
taigne did  not  (Erdmann  thinks)  include  the  ataraxy,  or 
impassivity,  of  Pyrrho,  but  was  rather  a  part  of  that  general 
tendency  towards  the  practical,  as  distinguished  from  the 
mediaeval,  worldliness.  For  Montaigne's  views,  see  Book  I. 
Essay  XII.  of  his  celebrated  Essays.  —  Le  Charron  —  an 
advocate,  theologian,  famous  pulpit  orator,  and  friend  of 
Montaigne  —  teaches  that  knowledge  comes,  not  through 
the  senses,  but  from  the  inner  depths  of  the  soul,  in  "  which 
are  implanted  the  germs  of  science  and  virtue."  The  mere 
understanding  is  the  source  of  all  human  evils.  Human 
welfare  depends  on  the  will  solely.  To  attain  wisdom  man 
must  free  himself  from  passion  (which  originates  in  the 
sensible  region  of  the  soul),  must  desire  little,  and  that 
only  which  accords  with  nature,  must  hold  his  judgment 
always  open  for  the  reception  of  new  light,  since  human 
knowledge  is  never  more  than  a  greater  or  less  degree  of 
probability.  Le  Charron's  views  are  contained  in  a  work 
entitled,  "De  la  Sagesse "  (1601,  2d  edition  1604). — 
Sanchez  —  a  graduate  in  medicine,  a  superintendent  of  an 
infirmary,  teacher  of  medicine  and  philosophy  —  combats 
Scholastic  subtlety,  preaches  the  vanity  of  human  knowl- 
edge, and  advocates  a  "  Christian  Philosophy."  We  can 
know  nothing,  since  things  are  infinite  in  number,  and  even 
if  they  were  numerically  finite,  their  connections  are  infinite. 
So-called  universals  are  creations  of  the  fancy :  only  in- 
dividuals really  exist.  Through  the  senses  we  learn  only  of 
the  accidents  of  things,  not  of  their  essence.  By  self-con- 
sciousness we  apprehend  merely  mental  phenomena,  — not 


IONICIST,  —  EPICUREAN:    GASSENDI.  2"J 

the  essence  of  the  soul  itself,  —  and  these  only  imperfectly, 
since  they  are  continually  varying  and  without  definite  out- 
lines. Reflection,  too,  can  give  only  confused  and  uncertain 
results.  Our  only  recourse  is  "  Christian  faith."  Works  of 
Sanchez  are  "Tractatus  de  multum  nobili  et  prima  uni- 
versali  Scientia, — quod  nihil  scitur"  (1581),  his  chief 
work ;  "  De  Divinatione  per  Somnum  ad  Aristotelem  :  " 
"  De  Longitudine  et  Brevitate  Vitae."  —  In  addition  to  the 
foregoing  Sceptics,  may  be  barely  mentioned  Francois  de  la 
Mothe  le  Vayer  (1586-1672),  Simon  Foucher  (1644-1696), 
Joseph  Glanvil  (died  1680),  Hieronymus  Hirnhaym  (died 
1679),  Pierre  Daniel  Huet  (1633-1721),  and  Pierre  Bayle 
(1647-1706),  author  of  the  celebrated  "  Dictionnaire  his- 
torique  et  critique  "  (1696). 

§  15- 

(6)  An   lonicist.  —  The    early    Ionic   philosophy   was 
revived  by  Claudius  Berigard  (15927-1663?),  professor  in 
Pisa  and  Padua,  in  a  work  entitled  "  Circuli  Pisani  seu  de 
Veteri  et  Peripatetica  Philosophia  Dialogi"  (1643). 

§   16. 

(7)  An  Epicurean.  —  Epicurean  doctrines,  blended  with 
Christian  theology,  were  taught  by  Pierre  Gassendi  (1592— 
1655).     Gassendi   took   courses  in  the  College  of  Digne 
and  the  University  of  Aix,  and  afterwards  lectured  in  these 
institutions  of  learning.     Later  he  was  professor  of  mathe- 
matics in  the  College  Royal.     He  entered  the  priesthood, 
and  was  at  one  time  provost  of  the  cathedral  of  Digne. 
Gassendi  numbered  among  his  friends  some  of  the  most 
eminent  scientists  of  his  age,  —  among  them  Descartes  and 
Galileo,  —  was  himself  well  informed  in  the  early  modern 
sciences,  and  may  be  regarded  as  a  link  between  the  first 
and  second  eras  of  modern  philosophy.    Philosophical  works 
of  Gassendi   are,  —  "  Exercitationes   paradoxicae  adversus 
Aristoteleos  "  (1624),  "  De  Vita,  Moribus,  et  Doctrina  Epicuri 
Libri  octo "  (1647),  De  Vita,  Moribus,  et  Placitis  Epicuri, 


28  A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

seu  Animadversiones  in  X.  Librum  Diogenis  Laertii " 
(1649),  "  Syntagma  Philosophise  Epicuri "  (1649),  the  last- 
named  being  his  principal  work.  He  was  the  author  of 
works  in  physical  science  possessing  some  value.  At  one 
time  inclined  towards  the  revived  Aristotelianism,  Gassendi 
was  prevented  from  remaining  an  Aristotelian  by  the  study 
of  the  natural  sciences  in  their  modern  character.  He 
sought  reconciliation  between  "  science  and  religion,"  and 
found  it,  as  he  thought,  in  a  modified  Epicureanism. 
Philosophy,  according  to  Gassendi,  is  the  pursuit  of  wisdom. 
Its  parts  are  Physics  (whose  object  is  truth)  and  Ethics 
(whose  object  is  virtue),  Logic  being  merely  propaedeutic  to 
philosophy  proper.  The  path  of  knowledge  lies  between 
scepticism  and  dogmatism.  There  are  no  innate  ideas. 
All  knowledge  originates  in  sense-perception,  from  the 
data  proceeding  from  which  reason  deduces  causes  and 
arrives  at  universal  ideas.  The  first  principle  and  matter 
of  things  is  the  atom.  Atoms  differ  in  magnitude,  weight, 
and  form.  The  number  of  atoms  is  not,  as  Epicurus  taught, 
infinite,  but  finite  :  the  same  is  true  of  the  extent  of  space. 
Atoms  are  not  eternal  a  parte  ante,  but  were  created  by 
God;  the  world  formed  of  atoms  is  not  a  product  of 
chance,  but  a  work  of  providence.  The  world  and  mankind 
were  created  to  receive  and  manifest  the  goodness  of  God. 
All  creation  culminates  in  man,  who  alone  is  capable  of 
leading  the  world  or  creation  back  to  God.  In  all  men 
there  is  a  certain  presentiment  of  a  divine  nature  and  a 
providence  sustaining  all  things,  —  a  doctrine,  we  may 
observe,  not  quite  consistent  with  the  denial  of  "  innate 
ideas."  Man  possesses  both  a  material  and  a  rational  soul, 
having  a  joint  seat  in  the  brain ;  the  rational  soul  is  not,  as 
Epicurus  taught,  composed  of  minute  fiery  atoms,  but  is 
simple  and  immaterial,  and  immortal,  since  it  possesses  a 
knowledge  of  the  supersensible  and  universal,  etc.  Freedom 
of  will  is  indifference  of  choice,  resulting  from  indifference 
in  the  understanding.  The  object,  directly  or  indirectly,  of 
all  our  effort  is  pleasure,  or  painlessness  of  body,  and  peace 


MELANCHTHON.  2p 

of  soul :  the  virtues  are  merely  safeguards  against  hindrances 
to  pleasure  or  happiness. 

§   17- 

II.  THE  ASSOCIATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  WITH  (PROTESTANT) 
THEOLOGY.  —  Next  after  the  revivals  of  ancient  systems  of 
thought,  and  before  the  first  original  and  independent  efforts 
coincident  in  time  with  them,  we  may  consider  the  efforts  of 
philosophical  thought  in  the  service  of  and  at  the  same 
time  aided  by  the  at  least  would-be  free  spirit  of  the  Protes- 
tant religion.  Protestantism,  a  religion  of  "  faith,"  felt  the 
need  of  a  certain  basis  in  "  reason."  The  chief  Protestant, 
Martin  Luther,  abhorred  philosophy,  whether  Scholastic  or 
ancient ;  but  Melanchthon,  the  associate  leader  of  the 
Protestant  movement,  was  clearly  convinced  that  without 
positive  method  and  dogma,  as  educational  instrumentalities, 
Protestantism  as  a  practical  movement  must  succumb  to 
confusion,  to  want  of  organization ;  and  he  taught  and 
wrote  energetically  and  thoroughly  in  accordance  with  this 
conviction.  Besides  Melanchthon,  have  to  be  treated  in 
the  present  connection  Nicolaus  Taurellus,  and  the  so- 
called  "  Mystics  "  Sebastian  Franck,  Valentin  Weigel,  and 
Jacob  Boehme.  For  distinction's  sake,  we  may  style 
Melanchthon  and  Taurellus  Semi-Rationalists. 

§   18. 

(i)  Philip  Melanchthon  (1497-1560),  the  "teacher  of 
the  whole  German  world  in  philosophy,  as  well  as  in  the- 
ology," was  educated  at  the  Academy  of  Pfortzheim  and  at 
the  Universities  of  Heidelberg  and  Tubingen,  at  which  lat- 
ter university  he  studied  law,  medicine,  and  theology.  Bril- 
liant scholarship  secured  for  him,  soon  after  graduation,  a 
professorship  in  Greek  in  the  University  of  Wittenberg. 
Here  he  taught  in  the  spirit  of  the  Renaissance,  and  especial- 
ly labored  to  make  Greek  philosophy  a  source  of  advantage 
to  Protestantism.  As  a  teacher  of  Greek  he  awakened  the 
admiration  of  Luther,  and  became  associated  with  him  in 


30  A   If  IS  TORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY, 

the  revision  of  his  translation  of  the  Bible  and  the  carrying 
on  of  the  Reformation  so-called,  his  objective  intellectual 
equanimity  and  conservatism  supplementing  the  subjective 
moral  intensity  and  radicalism  of  Luther.  He  has  been 
called  the  scribe  of  the  Reformation,  as  having  drafted 
"  most  of  the  public  documents  "  of  the  "  Reformers." 

Works.  —  Melanchthon's  philosophical  works  (mostly 
text- books)  are,  —  "  Dialecticae  Libri  IV."  (1520),  "  De 
Anima "  (1520),  "  Initiae  Doctrinae  Physicae"  (1547), 
"Epitome  Philosophise  Moralis"  (1538),  "  Ethicae  Doc- 
trinae Elementa"  (1550),  and  "  Declamationes "  (1544- 
1586),  which  consists  of  discourses  on  ancient  philosophy, 
the  practical  value  of  philosophy,  etc. 

Philosophy.  —  Melanchthon  taught  a  somewhat  modified 
Aristoteliarrism.  He  seems  to  have  adopted  in  full  the 
Aristotelian  logic,  adding  to  it  certain  principles  borrowed 
from  Cicero  and  Christian  theology,  as  that  the  sources  and 
criteria  of  knowledge  are,  besides  logical  inference,  univer- 
sal experience,  or  consensus  gentium,  innate  ideas,  and  the 
truths  of  Revelation.  With  a  perceptible  leaning,  in  meta- 
physics, towards  Plato  (with  whom,  however,  he  regarded 
Aristotle  as  in  substantial  accord),  he  adopted  the  Aristo- 
telian physics  (except  as  to  the  doctrine  of  the  eternity  of 
the  world),  the  Aristotelian  psychology  (except  as  to  the 
doctrine  of  the  future  life),  and  the  Aristotelian  Ethics, 
Christianized  somewhat.  In  Melanchthon's  Christianized 
Aristotelian  Ethics,  the  moral  law  is  God's  will ;  virtue  is 
the  knowledge  of  God  and  obedience  to  him ;  Revelation 
(the  Decalogue  in  particular)  the  highest  statement  of 
moral  truth ;  natural  right  comprises  innate  universal  prin- 
ciples (together  with  their  consequences),  and  is  based,  as 
"  regards  duties  to  God,  upon  the  dependence  of  creature 
on  the  Creator,  as  regards  duties  to  fellow-men,  upon  the 
necessity  of  human  society;  "  positive  right  consists  of  the 
enactments,  depending  on  circumstances,  of  civil  authority ; 
civil  authority  is  directly  of  and  from  God ;  the  state, 
though  not  to  be  ecclesiastically  ruled,  must  cherish  religion, 


TAURELLUS.  31 

enact  no  laws  contrary  to  the  divine  commandments,  and  be 
subject  to  the  condition  that  religious  necessity  may  make 
it  right  that  the  citizen  resist  authority,  and  even,  in  case  of 
tyranny,  murder  the  civil  ruler.  It  has  been  maintained, 
apparently  with  perfect  justice,  that  except  in  the  depart- 
ments of  natural  and  civil  law,  Melanchthon's  philosophy 
was  entirely  borrowed ;  that  by  his  "  substitution  of  the 
Bible  for  canon  law"  he  helped  to  promote  the  evolution 
of  the  philosophy  of  law.1 

§   19. 

Nicolaus  Taurellus  (1547-1606). — Taurellus  studied 
theology  and  philosophy  at  the  University  of  Tubingen,  and 
took  the  degree  of  doctor  of  medicine  at  the  University 
of  Basel.  He  was  successively  physician  to  the  Duke 
of  Wiirtemburg,  professor  of  philosophy  and  medicine  at 
Basel,  and  professor  in  the  same  sciences  at  Altdorf. 

Works.  —  Works  of  Taurellus  are  "  Philosophise  Tri- 
umphus,  seu  metaphysica  philosophandi  Methodus  "  (1573), 
"  Synopsis  Aristotelis  Metaphysices  ad  Normam  Christiana? 
Religionis  Explicatse,  Emendatse  et  Complete"  (1596), 
"  Cosmologia  "  (1603),  "  De  Rerum  ^Eternitate  "  (1604), 
etc. 

Philosophy.  —  Taurellus  seeks  to  "  free  philosophy  from 
the  fetters  of  (Scholastic)  Aristotelianism  and  to  bring  it 
into  harmony  with  the  fundamental  doctrines  of  Chris- 
tianity." Philosophy  is  a  propaedeutic  or  intellectual  prepa- 
ration for  theology :  it  shows  men  their  spiritual  ignorance, 
and  points  the  way  to  that  which  alone  is  capable  of  satisfy- 
ing their  spiritual  needs.  It  is  that  "  knowledge  of  things 
human  and  divine  which  we  obtain  by  the  inborn  power  of 
thought,"  —  a  power  which  is  the  "  same  in  all  men,  and 
subsists  without  increase  or  diminution ;  "  it  is  knowledge 
through  conceptions,  which  are  "  not  something  coming  to 
us  from  without,  but  produced  by  us  from  within."  It  is 

1  See  Erdmann,  §  232,  3. 


32  A   HISTORY  OF-  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

concerned  with  necessary  and  eternal  truths.  "  General 
notions "  are  abstractions  from  individual  things,  which 
alone  are  real.  Everything  has  a  cause,  and  at  the  head  of 
all  causes  is  a  First  Cause,  God.  In  his  pure  essence.  God 
is  mere  causa  sui,  not  the  cause  of  anything  else.  Every 
cause  is  more  perfect  than  its  effect;  and  the  activity  of 
God  in  going  out  of  himself  becomes  less  than  perfect,  —  /.  e., 
becomes  finite.  Hence  the  world  is  finite,  and  must  have 
had  a  beginning.  The  like  holds  of  matter.  The  eternal 
as  such  is  unchangeable,  and  from  it  no  world  of  atoms 
could  have  been  formed  :  the  created  world  must  have  been 
formed  from  nothingness.  Further,  infinite  power  needs  no 
such  thing  as  matter  for  the  bringing  forth  of  finite  things. 
Though  philosophy  discovers  necessary  and  eternal  truths, 
it  cannot  attain  to  the  knowledge  of  the  will  of  God;  hence 
the  necessity  of  a  revelation  for  man.  But  of  the  truths 
commonly  supposed  to  be  merely  revealed  truths,  some  — 
e.  g.  those  of  the  resurrection  and  the  Trinity  —  are  philo- 
sophically necessary.1 

§  20. 

(2)  Sebastian  Franck  (1500-1545).  —  Franck  studied 
at  Heidelberg,  and  afterwards  became  a  historical  writer  of 
eminence.  He  had  a  profound  acquaintance  with  the  works 
of  the  German  Mystics  of  the  fourteenth  century.  Works 
of  Franck  are  "Paradoxa"  (1542),  "  De  Arbore  Scientiae 
BonietMali"  (1561).  According  to  Franck,  God  is  the 
only  good.  He  created  things,  not  at  any  particular  time 
and  once  for  all,  but  eternally  creates  and  sustains.  Apart 
from  him,  things  are  nothing :  he  is  in  everything,  and 
constitutes  the  being  of  everything.  Man  is  free  in  will, 
though  limited  in  act.  He  is  truly  himself  when  he  wills 
God  :  otherwise  he  is  nothing.  All  men  are  one  man.  In 
every  man  both  Adam  and  Christ  exist,  and  redemption  is  not 
something  that  began  to  be  just  fifteen  hundred  years  ago. 
He  who  is  dead  to  his  individual  self  and  serves  his  spiritual 

1  See  Erdmann,  §  239,  14. 


WEIGEL.  —  BOEHME.  3  3 

self  or  God,  is  a  Christian  —  a  member  of  the  Holy  Church 

—  even  though  he  never  believed  on  Christ.  —  Franck  was 
by  the  Lutherans  persecuted  for  his  philosophical  opinions.1 

§   21. 

Valentin  Weigel  ( 1 533-1 588).  —  Weigel,  after  many  years 
of  study  at  the  universities  of  Leipsic  and  Wittenberg,  spent 
his  life  as  pastor  of  a  church  at  Zschopau.  By  discreet- 
ness he  escaped  Franck's  fate.  He  was  a  follower  of 
Franck  and  the  German  Mystics.  Works  of  Weigel  are, 

—  "Studium  Universale,   TVW&L  o-eavroV  (Know  thyself), 
"  Kurzer  Bericht   vom   Wege  und  Weise,  alle    Dingen  zu 
erkennen  "  (Brief  Description  of  the  Way  and  Method  of 
Learning  all  Things) ,   "  Christliches  Gesprach  vom  wahren 
Christenthum."     True  wisdom  has  its  foundation  in  self- 
knowledge,  —  knowledge  of  our  origin  and  destiny.     Man  is 
the  microcosm :  in  him  are  united  soul,  spirit,  and  body, 
originating  respectively  in  the  divine,  the  celestial    (sethe- 
real),  and  the  earthly  worlds.     By  his  soul   (only)  he  is 
an  image  of  God,  and  is  immortal.     He  apprehends  God 
directly :    he  cognizes  the  world,  the  macrocosm,  through 
the  elements  of  it  united  in  himself.     The  object  of  knowl- 
edge is  the  occasion  but  not  the  cause  of  our  knowledge  : 
we  know  and  understand  only  what  we  ourselves  are.     God 
is  one  and  self-sufficient :  man  is  dependent,  and  contains 
in  himself  alterity,  has  self-  existence  not  of  necessity,  but  by 
grace  or  favor.     True   Christianity,  true   resurrection   and 
consciousness  of  God,  are  contained  in  "  death  to  self."  a 

§  22. 

Jacob  Boehme*  (1575-1624),  the  "  Gorlitz  Shoemaker," 
a  native  of  Upper  Lusatia,  attended  a  village  school,  and 
was  then  apprenticed  to  a  shoemaker.  For  many  years  he 
was  an  industrious  maker  of  shoes,  and  gloves  in  the  town 

1  See  Erdmann,  §  233.  2  Erdmanr.  §  234,  4-6. 

8  Zeller,  Hegel,  etc. 
VOL.  i.  —  3 


34  A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  Gorlitz.  He  was  a  constant  reader  of  the  Bible,  the 
works  of  the  Mystics,  and  astrological  works.  He  experi- 
enced in  youth  supernatural  visions  and  ecstatic  conditions 
of  mind,  and  in  later  years  passed  through  inner  mystical 
struggles.  His  peculiar  views  brought  upon  him  charges  of 
heresy,  and  made  him  an  object  of  inveterate  hatred  to  the 
clergy  in  his  neighborhood. 

Works.  —  Of  Boehme's  works  (1612—1624), — about 
twenty  in  all,  —  the  following-named  are  among  the  most 
important:  "Aurora,"  "Vom  dreifachen  Leben  des  Men- 
schen"  (Threefold  Life  of  Man),  "Signatura  Rerum," 
"Von  der  Gnadenwahl  "  (Election  by  Grace),  "  Myste- 
rium  Magnum."  Boehme's  works,  both  by  their  content 
(which  is  strongly  mystical)  and  their  form  (which  is  very 
highly  figurative),  have  been  universally  found  difficult  to 
comprehend,  and  even  more  difficult  to  expound. 

Philosophy.  —  Boehme  is  a  naturalistic  theosophist.  In 
its  physics,  his  doctrine  is  Paracelsian  (see  below,  p.  37)  ; 
in  its  metaphysics,  Neo-Platonic.  He  divides  speculation 
into  three  branches :  philosophy,  treating  of  God  and  the 
origin  of  the  heavens  and  the  elements ;  astrology,  treating 
of  the  origin  of  all  mundane  things,  from  the  stars  and  the 
elements ;  and  theology,  which  treats  of  the  "  Kingdom 
of  Christ."  Boehme  attempts  to  refer  all  things  to  their 
source  in  such  a  manner  that  the  greatest  contrarieties  even 
shall  be  comprehended  in  a  single  principle.  All  things 
have  their  source  in  God,  and,  conversely,  all  things  are, 
without  giving  up  their  being,  contained  in  God ;  the  dis- 
tinction between  God  and  Nature  (including  man)  is  one 
that  is  in  some  manner  eternally  in  God  himself,  for  only  so 
is  God  all  in  all.  The  distinction  exists  that  God  may  mani- 
fest himself,  and  so  be  a  true,  perfect  God.  Apart  from 
this  distinction,  God  is  pure  groundless  unity,  eternal  still- 
ness, eternal  nothing.  If  God  were  only  this  unity,  this 
stillness,  this  nothingness,  any  distinction  would  be  a  sep- 
aration from  God  without  a  return  to  him,  and  he  would 
not  be  the  All.  There  is  both  a  "Yes"  and  a  "  No"  in 


NATURAL  PHILOSOPHERS.  35 

all  things,  by  which  they  subsist.  The  primary  physical 
elements  are  "  light  "  and  "  wrath,"  which  are  antagonistic 
forms  of  the  same  thing,  —  "  heat."  Light  is  lovely,  and 
the  universal  cause  of  life ;  wrath  burns,  consumes,  de- 
stroys. The  constant  war  of  light  and  wrath  is  at  once  the 
source  and  offspring  of  "quality,"  —  spirit.  In  God  are 
seven  primal  qualities  or  spirits.  Of  these,  six  were 
begotten  by  and  are  embraced  in  the  seventh,  which  is 
the  divine  nature, — "  mysterium  magnum."  In  itself,  the 
mysterium  magnum  is  a  world  of  pure  light,  harmony,  and 
joy ;  unfolded,  it  becomes  the  world  of  both  good  and  evil. 
Hence,  evil  as  well  as  good  is  from  God,  and  is  of  his 
essence,  appertains  to  the  property  of  generation  neces- 
sarily contained  in  God.  The  evil  in  every  creature  is  that 
inherent  individual  self-will  which  opposes  itself  to  the 
universal  will.  The  fall  of  man  was  a  division,  which  took 
place  in  the  slumber  of  selfishness,  of  his  originally  sexless 
nature  into  the  two  sexes.  The  redemption  of  man  is 
through  the  divine  light  manifest  in  Christ.  —  Boehme  is 
commonly  known  as  the  philosophus  Teutonicus  (the  Ger- 
man philosopher  par  excellence}.  He  has  had  a  very 
marked  influence  in  later  German  thought,  particularly  in 
the  systems  of  Schelling,  Baader,  and  Hegel. 

§  23. 

III.  THE  (RELATIVELY)  INDEPENDENT  CULTIVATION  OF 
PHILOSOPHY  AS  SUCH.  —  Here  occur  (i)  Natural  Philoso- 
phers; (2)  Ethical  (chiefly  Political)  Philosophers. 

§  24. 

( i )  Natural  Philosophers.  —  As  the  most  important  of 
the  natural  philosophers  may  be  named  :  Nicolaus  Cusanus, 
Theophrastus  Bombastus  Paracelsus,  Hieronymus  Cardanus, 
Bernardinus  Telesius,  Franciscus  Patritius,  Thomas  Cam- 
panella,  Ucilio  Vanini,  Giordano  Bruno. 


36          A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

§  25. 

Nicolaus  Cusanus  (1401-1464).  —  Nicolas  of  Cusa 
took  a  doctor's  degree  in  law  in  the  University  of  Padua, 
but  instead  of  practising  law,  entered  the  Church.  In 
1448  he  was  appointed  to  a  cardinalship,  and  two  years 
hter  was  made  bishop  (of  Brixen),  having  performed 
important  services  as  church-official.  In  the  midst  of 
ecclesiastical  duties  he  carried  on  mathematical  and  astro- 
nomical studies,  in  which  he  was  at  least  a  century  beyond 
his  age,  having  even  anticipated  Copernicus  in  important 
regards. 

Works.  —  The  chief  work  of  Nicolas  is  entitled  "De 
docta  Ignorantia"  (1440).  Other  works  are  "De  Con- 
jecturis  "  (supplementary  to  the  foregoing),  "De  Visione 
Dei,"  "De  Ludo  Globi,"  "De  Beryllo." 

Philosophy.  —  All  human  knowledge  is,  as  such,  mere 
"  conjecture  ;  "  human  learning  is  "  learned  ignorance  ;  "  and 
our  highest  knowledge  is  the  knowing  that  we  do  not  know. 
Tnie  knowledge  —  knowledge  of  God  —  we  have  only  by 
an  intellectual  intuition,  a  vision  of  God.  God  is  the 
content  or  substance  of  all  things,  the  unity  of  all  opposi- 
tions :  in  him  absolute  motion  and  absolute  rest,  the 
infinitely  great  and  the  infinitely  little,  reality  and  possi- 
bility, matter  and  form,  subject  and  object,  are  one  and  the 
same.  The  universe  is  (not  God  himself,  but)  the  explication, 
unfolding,  external ization  of  God's  nature.  All  things  fol- 
low mathematically  from  the  divine  unity,  and  form  together 
a  cosmos  governed  by  mathematical  relations.  The  physi- 
cal universe  is  infinite  in  time  and  space ;  the  earth  rotates 
on  its  axis.  The  destiny  of  man  is  to  be  united  with  God, 
by  faith  in  the  God-man,  Christ.  —  The  ideas  of  Nicolas, 
through  their  direct  influence  upon  Bruno,  and  their  in- 
direct influence  on  Spinoza,  Leibnitz,  and  others,  have 
been  a  very  considerable  factor  in  modern  philosophy. 
Particularly  original  and  modern  in  Nicolas  is  the  idea  of 
the  infinitude  of  the  universe,  on  account  of  which  chiefly 


PARACELSUS.  37 

is  he  to  be  classed  with  modern  rather  than  with  (early) 
mediaeval  philosophers. 

§  26. 

Theophrastus  Bombastus  Paracelsus  !  ( 1493-1541 ) .  — 
Paracelsus,  who  was  educated  by  his  father  and  at  several 
universities,  spent  a  considerable  portion  of  his  life  roving 
about  the  countries  of  Europe,  seeking  a  knowledge  of  the 
world  in  general  and  medicine  in  particular.  He  had 
already  studied  medicine  under  his  father  and  other  in- 
structors. In  1526  he  was  appointed  professor  of  medicine 
in  the  University  of  Basel.  He  is  reported  to  have  opened 
his  first  course  of  lectures  by  burning  the  works  of  Galen 
and  Avicenna,  to  symbolize  his  conception  of  the  duty  of 
investigators  as  regards  independence  of  the  past  and  the 
direct  study  of  nature  and  life.  He  attempted  to  intro- 
duce a  reform  in  the  art  of  medicine  upon  the  basis  of  a 
philosophical  knowledge  of  human  nature  as  a  whole. 

Works.  —  Works  of  Paracelsus  are  "  Paramirum  seu  de 
Medica  Industria,"  "  Paragranum  "  (or  the  "  Four  Pillars 
of  Medicine"),  "  Labyrinthus  Medicorum  et  de  Tartaro," 
"  Pestilitate  ex  Influxu  Siderum,"  etc. 

Philosophy.  —  Philosophy  has  for  its  only  subject  nature, 
and  is  itself  merely  "  invisible  nature."  Its  instrument  is 
the  natural  light  of  the  mind,  reason.  Nature  is  to  be 
comprehended  only  through  the  knowledge  of  its  end, 
man,  who  is  (therefore)  the  "  book  from  which  we  may 
read  the  secrets  of  nature,"  the  microcosm.  Man  is  com- 
posed of  an  earthly  body,  which  is  tangible,  a  heavenly  or 
astral  body,  which  is  aether-like  in  nature,  and  a  "  spirit,"  and 
a  soul,  which  is  purely  of  divine  origin  and  destiny.  The 
first  of  the  three  parts  of  man  is  nourished  from  the  mate- 
rial elements  (fire,  air,  earth,  water),  the  second  from  the 
influences  of  the  stars,  the  third  from  Christ  through  faith. 
The  material  elements  are  formed  from  salt,  sulphur,  and 
quicksilver,  which  in  turn  come  from  a  primal  matter 
1  Zeller,  Geschichte  der  deutschen  Philosophic. 


38  A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

(termed  by  Paracelsus  mysterium  magnum},  which  is  not 
so  much  corporeal  as  incorporeal  in  nature.  The  essence 
of  material  things  is  force  rather  than  matter.  There  is  a 
universal  life,  each  thing's  peculiar  share  of  which  is  its 
quintessence  (/.  <?.,  the  fifth  essence,  fire,  air,  water,  and 
earth  being  the  other  four),  its  virtue,  or  nature.  Medicine 
is  the  art  by  which  that  virtue,  in  man,  is,  when  obstructed 
in  its  operation,  made  effective.  The  virtue  or  quintessence 
of  man  is  to  be  understood,  of  course,  only  through  a  knowl- 
edge of  his  various  parts  individually  in  their  relations,  — 
the  earthly,  the  astral,  and  the  divine  parts  of  man :  hence 
the  "  four  pillars  "  of  medicine,  — philosophy  (having  to  do 
with  the  earthly  portion),  astronomy  (having  to  do  with  the 
astral  portion),  and  theology  (which  is  concerned  with 
the  soul),  together  with  alchemy,  or  the  applied  theory  of 
nature.  Possessing  a  right  knowledge  of  these,  the  phy- 
sician can  easily  determine,  in  case  of  disease,  whether  the 
disease  be  earthly,  sidereal,  or  divine,  and  accordingly  stimu- 
late to  appropriate  activity  the  inner  human  virtue.  It  is 
the  business  of  medical  chemistry  (alchemy)  to  produce 
the  quintessences  or  virtues  of  things  at  will.  As  a  form  of 
knowledge,  medicine  combines  speculation  and  experience, 
either  of  which  is  false  without  the  other.  Paracelsus,  it 
may  be  said  in  passing,  seems  to  have  a  title  to  be  regarded 
as  a  great  reformer  in  the  science  of  medicine.  If  so,  he 
affords  a  striking  illustration  of  a  fact  too  often  overlooked, 
—  that  advances  in  science  frequently  have  their  initiative 
in  philosophical  theory. 

§  27. 

Hieronymus  Cardanus,  or  Girolamo  Cardano1  (1501- 
1576),  eminent  as  a  physician  and  mathematician  as  well 
as  a  philosopher,  studied  philosophy  and  medicine  at  the 
universities  of  Pavia  and  Padua.  He  was  at  one  time 
professor  of  medicine  in  Bologna.  In  his  youth  he  was 

1  Noack,  Erdmann. 


CARDANUS.  39 

a  victim  of  strange  visions  and  hallucinations,  and  his  mind 
even  in  later  life  was  filled  with  distempered  imaginations. 
His  character  and  life  were  eccentric  :  he  was  full  of  the 
restlessness  of  his  age,  and  was  a  sensualist  in  his  habits 
even  in  his  old  age.  He  is  to  be  credited,  however,  with 
the  possession  of  a  genuinely  scientific  spirit.  He  was  one 
of  the  early  discoverers  in  the  science  of  algebra. 

Works.  —  The  principal  works  of  Cardanus  are  entitled  : 
"De  Subtilitate"  (1552),  "  De  Varietate  Rerum"  (1556), 
"  Arcana  ^Eternitatis  "  (posthumous),  the  most  important 
of  all. 

Philosophy.  —  In  the  system  of  Cardanus  we  have  the 
conception  of  a  coherent  universe  having  its  principle  of 
unity  and  being  in  a  world-soul,  the  phenomenal  or  material 
form  of  which  is  heat.  All  changes  occur  according  to  natural 
law  and  through  natural  causes,  since  to  conceive  them  as 
occurring  merely  because  God  wills  them  is  to  assume  God 
to  be  without  reason  and  to  be  capable  of  occupying  him- 
self with  trivial  things.  That  all  things  are  subject  to  law  is 
sufficiently  shown  outwardly  by  the  fact  that  the  motions  of 
the  stars  are  governed  by  number.  The  will  of  man,  who  is 
a  triple  nature  composed  of  body,  soul,  and  an  immortal 
mind,  is,  however,  free  from  the  law-governed  influences  of 
the  heavenly  bodies.  Man  is  not  merely  an  individual  of  a 
species,  like  the  animal,  but  a  whole  in  himself:  he  is, 
nevertheless,  so  far  as  he  is  an  individual,  not  entirely  self- 
sufficient, —  hence  society.  Human  laws  have  binding  force 
only  if  accordant  with  philosophy  or  religion;  tyrannical 
laws  may  rightfully  be  broken,  and  tyrants  murdered.  An- 
cient theories  of  the  state  were  constructed  too  little  with 
reference  to  the  actual,  varying  conditions  of  social  life. 
Philosophy  has  to  do  solely  with  theory :  perfect  religious 
freedom  should  be  accorded  to  thinkers.  By  divine  grace 
the  mind  rises  in  mystical  ecstasy  to  the  intuition  of  the 
divine,  and  becomes  one  with  God.  —  Cardanus  had  a  close 
follower  in  Telesius. 


40  A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

§   28. 

Bernardinus  Te/esius,  or  Telesio  (1508-1588). — Tele- 
sius,  first  instructed  by  an  uncle,  afterwards  studied  philos- 
ophy and  mathematics  at  Padua,  and  the  natural  sciences 
at  Rome.  He  conceived  a  scientific  antipathy  to  Aristotle, 
and  formed  a  plan  of  reforming  philosophy.  Under  the 
auspices  of  the  prince  of  Naples  he  founded  an  academy 
for  the  cultivation  of  natural  philosophy  and  the  antagonizing 
of  the  revived  Aristotelianism. 

Works.  —  An  early  work,  the  first  indeed  of  Telesius,  is 
entitled  "De  Rerum  Natura  juxta  Propria  Principium" 
(1565-1586).  Various  treatises,  on  comets,  atmospheric 
phenomena,  the  rainbow,  etc.,  appear  together  in  a  work 
entitled  "Varii  de  Naturalibus  Rebus  Libelli "  (1590). 

Philosophy.  —  Telesius  —  like  Cardanus  —  professes  to 
philosophize  in  accordance  with  the  conception  of  universal 
natural  law  and  natural  causes  in  the  universe.  Two  com- 
manding phenomena  are  ( i )  the  heavens  sending  forth  heat 
and  the  earth  emitting  cold,  (2)  the  sun's  heat  producing 
life  upon  the  earth.  Heat  and  cold,  then,  are  two  "  prin- 
ciples." Body  without  properties  is  a  third.  This  third 
property  is  passive,  the  others  are  active,  "  soul-like." 
Heat  is  the  cause,  but  not  a  consequence,  of  motion.  Light 
is  a  manifestation  of  heat.  Heat  causes  the  earth  to  per- 
spire, so  to  say,  and  thus  produces  water.  Air  is  condensed 
or  cooled  fire.  Body,  or  composite  existence,  presupposes 
a  soul  by  which  its  parts  are  made  to  cohere.  The  human 
soul  is  a  very  subtle  substance,  the  principle  of  which  is  heat. 
The  seat  of  the  soul  in  man  and  animals  is  the  blood,  the 
nerves,  and,  especially,  the  brain.  The  soul  has  its  origin  at 
the  birth  of  the  body.  All  knowledge  —  even  geometry  — 
is  grounded  in  sense-perception,  or  experience.  Animals 
think.  Volition  in  man  is  a  consequence  of  thought :  we 
will  only  what  we  determine  to  be  good.  The  highest  good 
is  self-preservation  ;  and  the  virtues  are  merely  the  opera- 
tions of  the  impulse  to  self-preservation.  To  the  immaterial 


PATRITIUS.  41 

soul  of  man  it  belongs  to  know  God  and  to  be  like  him.  — 
Telesius  is  perhaps  the  most  distinctly  scientific  and  the 
most  original  of  these  early  modern  natural  philosophers. 
He  was  a  favorite  with  Francis  Bacon,  of  whom,  indeed,  he 
was  a  forerunner. 

§  29. 

Franciscus  Patritius,  or  Francesco  Patrizzi  (1529- 
1597),  received  a  good  early  training  in  classical  literature 
and  philosophy,  and,  after  some  time  spent  in  travelling, 
completed  his  studies  at  Venice  and  Padua.  He  became  a 
teacher  of  philosophy  at  Ferrara.  He  was  a  violent  op- 
ponent of  the  Aristotelianism  of  his  day,  and  an  equally 
energetic  advocate  of  Platonic,  or,  rather,  Neo-Platonic 
doctrines. 

Works,  —  Works  of  Patritius  are  "  Nova  de  Universis 
Philosophia  Libris  quinquaginta  Comprehensa "  (1591- 
1593),  "Zoroastris  Oracula,"  etc.,  "  Hermetis  Trismegisti 
Libelli  et  Fragmenta,"  etc. 

Philosophy.— The  doctrine  of  Patritius  is  Neo-Platonism, 
with  a  modern  naturalistic  cast.  The  universe  is  an  emana- 
tion from  a  primal  immaterial  light,  the  special  manifestations 
of  which  in  the  heavens  and  on  the  earth  are  heavenly  and 
earthly  light.  The  highest  principle  is  an  indivisible  One. 
From  it  emanates  a  discrete  unity.  The  two  are  united  by 
love.  There  exists  a  world-soul,  possessing  reason  in  a 
limited  degree.  Space  is  the  condition  of  material  existence, 
and  the  first  element  of  all  things.  Other  elements  are  the 
heat  and  light  filling  and  belonging  to  space.  A  fourth 
element  is  fluidity.  The  earth  moves.  It  is  subject  to  the 
influences  of  the  stars,  from  which  come  germs  —  having, 
however,  their  primary  source  in  the  light  above  the  stars 
—  to  the  earth.  Patritius  praised  Telesius. 

§  30- 

Thomas,  or   Tommaso,    Campanella*   (1568-1639). — 
Campanella    (born  in  southern   Calabria)   early  read   the 
1  Noack  and  Erclmann. 


42  A  HISTOXY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

works  of  Albertus  Magnus  and  Thomas  Aquinas,  studied 
theology  with  the  Dominicans,  acquired  a  knowledge  of 
the  systems  of  Democritus,  Plato,  Aristotle,  the  Stoics,  and 
Telesius.  Going,  afterwards,  to  Naples,  he  joined  the 
Telesian  Academy,  and  became  an  avowed  follower  of 
Telesius.  Owing  to  the  radical  character  of  his  opinions, 
frankly  uttered,  he  came  into  disharmony  with  his  fellows, 
and,  in  consequence,  lived  for  some  years  a  roving  life. 
For  some  reason  he  became  an  object  of  political  suspicion, 
and  was,  on  the  pretext  of  his  being  a  conspirator  against 
the  Spanish  government  in  Naples,  thrown  into  prison.  In 
various  prisons  —  more  than  fifty,  it  is  reported  —  he  spent 
twenty-seven  years  of  his  life. 

Works.  —  Works  of  Campanella  are  :  "  Prodromus  Philo- 
sophiae," etc.  (1611),  "  De  Sensu  Rerum,"  etc.  (1620), 
"  Realis  Philosophise  Epilogisticae  Partes  IV.,"  etc.  (1623), 
"  Atheismus  Triumphatus  "  (1631),  "  Philosophiae  rationalis 
Partes  V.,"  etc.  (1638),  "  Universalis  Philosophiae  seu  Meta- 
physicarum  Rerum  Partes  III.,"  etc.  (1638).  Of  these,  the 
last  named  is  regarded  as  the  most  important.  Campanella 
is  popularly  known  by  a  politico-philosophical  romance 
called  "City  of  the  Sun"  (Civitas  Solis),  which  forms  a 
part  of  the  "  Realis  Philosophiae,"  etc. 

Philosophy.  —  Campanella  treats  philosophy  as  a  "  maid- 
servant "  of  theology.  He  divides  philosophy  proper  into 
two  "  real  sciences,"  philosophia  naturalis  and  philosophia 
moralis.  Merely  formal  and  instrumental  are  the  sciences 
of  logic  and  mathematics.  Intermediate  between  the  real 
and  the  formal  sciences  is  metaphysics,  treating  of  being 
and  essence.  The  starting-point  of  philosophy  is  the  cer- 
tainty of  the  existence  of  self,  which  is  self-evident  and 
beyond  the  reach  of  all  scepticism.  The  self  is  limited.  In 
common  with  all  other  limited  beings,  the  self  presupposes 
an  infinite  being.  The  essence  of  the  self  is  seen  on  re- 
flection to  consist  in  power,  knowledge,  and  will ;  and  since 
the  cause  must  contain  at  least  as  much  as  its  effect,  power, 
knowledge,  and  will  belong  to  being  as  such,  and  not 


CAMPANELLA.  43 

merely  partially  as  to  us,  but  eminenter.  The  attributes  of 
not-being  are  mere  negations.  Besides  its  positive  attributes 
everything  has  negative  attributes  which  are  the  negations 
of  all  the  attributes  which  it  has  not  in  a  positive  manner  : 
/.  e.,  being  and  not-being  are  united  in  all  beings.  God 
created  the  finite  world  from  love.  In  it  he  is  only  partially 
contained.  Nearest  God  is  a  world  of  archetypes :  then 
follow  in  order,  the  spiritual  world  or  world  of  eternal  ideas, 
the  world  of  mathematical  entities,  the  abstract  temporal, 
or  corporeal,  world,  and  the  world  of  definite  time  and  space. 
The  lower  worlds  are  varied  images  of  the  highest  of  all. 
All  existence  is  an  act  of  knowledge  and  will,  and  nothing 
is  without  soul :  even  of  space  is  this  true,  for  it  abhors  a 
vacuum  and  strives  to  fill  it :  it  is  true  also  of  passive  matter, 
which  by  its  fixedness  (inertia)  and  its  accelerating  its  speed 
in  falling,  gives  evidence  of  its  not  being  merely  dead. 
Hate  and  love  mingle  in  all  things.  The  physical  principles 
of  existence  are  heat  and  light  (in  the  circumference  of  the 
universe)  and  cold  and  dark  (at  the  centre).  Animal  in- 
stinct is  knowledge  blended  with  its  opposite.  The  instinct 
of  self-preservation  in  animals  is  love  of  their  own  being. 
Every  creature  loves  only  its  own  being.  Self-love  ceases 
to  be  merely  selfish  when  it  becomes  love  of  God.  The 
highest  end  of  action  is  self-preservation :  virtue  is  but  the 
method  of  attainment  of  this  end.  The  highest  political 
problem  is  the  welfare  of  the  State :  the  act  of  legislation 
and  governing  demand  the  highest  wisdom.  This  "  highest 
wisdom "  includes,  among  other  similar  acts,  those  of 
currying  favor  with  lower  classes  of  society,  and  so  dispersing 
the  higher  that  their  influence  may  not,  by  becoming 
centralized,  be  an  obstacle  to  the  realization  of  the  idea  of 
a  high  and  arbitrary  universal  ecclesiastical  monarchy.1 

Result.  —  There  occurs  in  the  doctrine  of  Campanella 
one  very  remarkable  anticipation  of  a  distinctive  feature  of 
modern  philosophy  in,  so  to  say,  its  majority,  viz.,  the 
resting  of  all  certainty  and  knowledge  upon  the  certainty 

1  See  Erdmann,  §  246. 


44  A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

and  knowledge  of  self,  as  is  done  by  Descartes,  with  his 
famous  Cogito,  ergo  sum,  and  by  many  coming  after  him. 
We  may  regard  Campanella  as  a  forerunner  of  Descartes, 
as  Telesius  is  of  Bacon. 

§31- 

Pompeio  Ucilio  Vanini  (1585-1619).  —  Vanini  studied 
theology  and  philosophy  in  Rome,  jurisprudence  at  Padua, 
and  the  natural  sciences  in  various  European  universities. 
A  wanderer,  like  Bruno,  Paracelsus,  and  other  philosophers 
we  have  noticed,  he  travelled,  teaching  as  he  went,  through 
Switzerland,  France,  Belgium,  and  England,  persecuted 
much  for  his  heterodox  convictions.  He  is  said  to  have 
been  a  pupil  and  worshipper  of  Pomponatius :  he  styled 
Aristotle  the  "God  of  philosophers  and  pontiff  of  wis- 
dom." He  was  put  to  death  in  a  most  horrible  manner 
by  the  Inquisition.  A  work  of  his  (the  second  mentioned 
below)  was  condemned  to  the  flames. 

Works.  —  Two  of  his  works  are  entitled,  respectively, 
"  Amphitheatrum  ^Eternse  Providentiae  "  (1615)  and  "De 
Admirandis  Naturae  Reginae  Deseque  Mortalium  Arcanis 
Libri  IV."  (1616),  often  cited  as  "  Dialogues  on  Nature." 
The  real  views  of  Vanini  are  contained  in  the  latter  of  these 
two  works. 

Philosophy. 1  —  Nature  is  the  energy  of  God  and  God 
himself.  It  is  an  eternal  begetting,  and  has  its  own  inhe- 
rent laws  of  bringing- forth  and  preservation.  Matter  is 
indestructible,  unchangeable  in  quantity :  it  exists  not  with- 
out form,  but  always  is  changing  form.  The  matter  of  all 
things  —  of  heaven  and  earth  —  is  the  same.  The  heavens 
are  not  moved  by  intelligences,  but  by  the  omnipresent  en- 
ergy of  God.  The  sea  ebbs  and  flows  of  its  own  essence  ; 
the  air  by  its  motion  heats  itself,  and  so  becomes  flame ; 
plants  hate  and  love  one  another.  The  soul  rules  in  all 
parts  of  the  body  as  a  material  spirit,  or  nerve- mind  :  it  is 
the  form  of  the  living  element  in  matter,  and  the  creative 

i  Noack. 


BRUNO.  45 

form  in  germs.  As  the  centre  of  all  life  man  combines  in 
himself  the  earthly  and  the  heavenly :  in  the  human  com- 
pound as  in  a  microcosm  the  whole  of  nature  is  contained, 
wherefore  man  has  the  powers  of  plants,  animals,  and  min- 
erals. Our  vital  spirits  depend  upon  the  food  we  eat ;  our 
vices  on  the  bodily  humors  and  germs.  —  In  Vanini  (as  in 
Bruno)  nature-philosophy,  and  indeed  philosophy  in  gen- 
eral, dissociates  itself  from  theology,  or  at  least  "  Christian 
theology,"  and  exists  in  and  for  itself.  As  compared  with 
the  philosophy  of  Bruno,  the  principle  of  which  is,  as  we 
are  about  to  see,  the  unity  of  opposites,  the  philosophy  of 
Vanini  is  rather  abstract  and  undeveloped,  a  product  of  the 
negative  understanding  rather  than  of  synthetic  imagin- 
ation. On  this  account  we  have  reserved  the  notice  of 
Bruno  till  the  last. 

§  32- 

Giordano  Bruno l  (1548-1 600) .  —  Bruno  —  born  at 
Nola,  a  city  near  Naples,  —  early  received  a  training  in 
logic,  dialectic,  and  the  ancient  classics,  and  later  was  an 
enthusiastic  student  of  the  ancient  philosophers  —  especially 
Plato,  Aristotle,  the  Stoics  and  Epicureans  —  and  of  the  sci- 
entific investigators  and  speculators  of  his  own  age,  Nicolaus 
Cusanus,  Telesius,  Cardanus,  Copernicus.  Decidedly,  how- 
ever, of  an  original  and  creative  turn,  he  could  be  no  mere 
borrower  nor  a  mere  eclectic.  Independence  of  thought 
caused  him  to  desert  the  cloister  near  Naples  which  he  had 
entered,  and  to  become  a  wanderer  on  the  face  of  the  earth. 
He  went  to  Rome,  Genoa,  Padua,  Geneva,  Lyons,  Toulouse, 
Paris,  teaching  and  propagating  on  the  way  the  ideas  with 
which  his  enthusiastic  brain  seethed.  He  became  instructor 
in  philosophy  and  lectured  with  eclat  at  the  universities  of 
Toulouse  and  of  Paris  (1579-1583).  He  spent  two  years 
in  England,  living  in  intimate  association  with  Sir  Philip 
Sidney  and  other  choice  spirits  there,  debating  the  Coper- 

1  See  Giordano  Bruno's  Weltanschauung  und  Verhangniss,  aus 
den  Quellen  dargestellt  von  Dr.  Hermann  Brunhofer,  Leipzig, 
1882  ;  Franck ;  Noack ;  etc. 


46  A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

nican  doctrine  with  Oxford  professors,  and  producing  some 
of  his  most  important  works.  He  also  spent  two  years 
(1586-1588)  in  Germany,  lecturing  privately,  composing 
treatises,  debating  with  scholars  burning  topics  of  the  age, 
such  as  the  Scholastico-Aristotelianism  (which  he  vehe- 
mently opposed),  the  Copernican  astronomy,  and  religious 
and  intellectual  intolerance.  He  sought  particularly  the 
universities  as  centres  of  intellectual  life,  and,  though  an  in- 
tellectual radical,  received  a  professorship  at  the  University 
of  Helmstadt.  His  radicalism  caused  his  exclusion,  how- 
ever, and  he  again  became,  after  a  time,  a  wanderer.  In 
1591  he  was  invited  by  a  certain  Venetian  nobleman  to  go 
to  Venice  to  instruct  him  in  the  Lullian  art  of  invention  and 
discovery,  which  had  been  a  favorite  subject  of  cogitation 
with  Bruno  since  almost  his  earliest  instruction  in  logic. 
The  nobleman  becoming  suspicious  after  a  time  that  Bruno 
was  not  revealing  to  him  the  true  Lullian  doctrine,  betrayed 
him  to  the  representatives  of  the  Inquisition,  who  impris- 
oned him  in  May,  1592.  Bruno  had  been  misunderstood 
and  misrepresented.  He  was  at  last,  after  seven  years  or 
more  of  imprisonment  in  Rome,  burned  at  the  stake. 
"  The  judgment  which  ye  have  pronounced  upon  me,"  he 
said  at  the  stake  to  his  judges,  "  inspires  fear  in  you 
rather  than  in  me." 

Works.  —  Bruno  was  by  natural  aptitude,  and  also  by 
conscious  intent,  a  poet-philosopher.  Always  a  fervid 
spirit,  he  early  wrote  poetry  and  early  believed  philosophy 
to  be  a  "foster- parent  of  the  Muses,"  and  himself  to  be 
truly  inspired  by  the  Platonic  love  of  philosophic  beauty 
and  truth.  His  philosophy  is  to  be  found  therefore  not 
merely  in  didactic  expositions,  but  in  poems  also.  Among 
the  most  important  of  his  works:  "Delia  Causa"  (1584), 
"Principled  Uno "  (1584),  —  metaphysical  in  content; 
"Del1  Infinite "  (1584),  "Universo,  e  Mondi"  (1584),- 
physical ;  "  Spaccio  della  Bestia  Trionfonte  "  (Expulsion  of 
the  Triumphing  Beast  [w.]  in  human  nature),  —  moral; 
"  Degli  Eroici  Furor,"  a  poem,  —  moral ;  "  De  Triplici 


BRUNO.  47 

Minimo  et  Mensura "  (1591),  "  De  Monade  Numero  et 
Figura"  (1591),  "  De  Immenso  et  Innumerabilibus,  hoc 
est,  de  Absolute  Magno  Innumerabili  et  de  Mundis " 
(1591),  "  De  Umbris  Idearum  et  Arte  Memoriae"  (1582), 
(one  of  numerous  treatises  on  method). 

Philosophy :  Method}-  —  Paradoxical  as  it  may  appear,  it 
was  a  matter  of  prime  necessity  to  this  poet-philosopher  to 
lay  down  a  method  of  philosophizing.  That  creative  in- 
stinct of  power,  determination,  unity,  which  was  the  foun- 
tain-head of  poetry  in  him,  was  also  of  necessity  the  source 
of  an  effort  to  get  possession  of  an  absolute,  self-determin- 
ing method,  a  method  uniting  thought  and  reality.  In  one 
aspect  this  effort  was,  it  may  be,  merely  psychological ;  so 
powerful  was  Bruno's  intuition  of  unity  and  determination 
that  the  external  world  presented  by  contrast  a  spectacle  of 
confusion.  In  another  aspect  this  effort  is  a  direct  conse-  / 
quence  of  the  immediate  perception  of  the  unity  of  thought 
and  being,  and  possesses  thus  absolute  reality,  and  we  may 
properly  begin  with  the  exposition  of  it.  The  foundation 
of  real  knowledge  is,  according  to  Bruno,  evidence:  that 
which  is  not  supported  by  evidence  is  unworthy  a  philos- 
opher's acceptance ;  that  which  is,  cannot  be  rejected  by 
him.  Evidence  presupposes  criticism  and  doubt.  In 
itself,  knowledge  is  an  order  in  ideas  according  to  which 
there  is  a  rank  of  higher  and  lower,  the  latter  flowing  from 
the  former  by  a  necessity  corresponding  to  a  necessity  in 
being,  with  which  thought  is  one.  There  is  in  knowledge 
as  in  the  universe  a  determining  nature  and  a  determined. 
Man's  ideas  are  the  shadows  or  copies  of  the  archetypal 
Ideas  or  patterns  "  existing  metaphysically  in  the  ultimate 
unity  or  intelligence,  physically  in  the  world  of  things,  and 
logically  in  signs,  symbols  or  notions."  It  is  the  office  of 
true  method  to  connect  our  ideas  in  the  relations  of  neces- 
sary determination  corresponding  to  those  in  the  archetypal 
ideas.  The  philosophy  of  the  monad,  or  primary  being, 
must,  that  is  to  say,  precede  natural  science.  Method  must 
1  See  Brunhofer. 


48  A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

be  deductive,  mathematical.  And  yet,  on  the  other  hand, 
since  thought  and  being  are  one,  there  is  everywhere 
a  harmony  of  opposites,  thought  is  nothing  if  it  can- 
not be  "  put  into  the  mould  of  phantasy  or  sensuous 
imagination,  imagination  is  nothing  if  not  a  vehicle  of 
thought,"  and  all  theoretical  investigation  of  nature  must 
have  as  its  corrective  and  complement,  experience.  In 
the  study  of  nature  we  have  to  regard,  as  far  as  possible, 
the  higher  forms  of  existence  as  consequences  of  the  lower, 
and  gaps  in  our  knowledge  of  the  higher  must  be  filled 
from  our  knowledge  of  the  lower.  True  method  is  an  art 
of  discovery  as  well  as  of  memory.  Such  an  art  supersedes 
the  Scholastico-Aristotelian  logic. 

The  primal  Unity :  God.  — ^All  things  haye^their^  source 
and  their  truth  and^xplanation  in  a  single  simple  substance. 
Without  opposition  or  difference  in  itself,  it  is  the  ground 
of  all  differentiated  being.  In  it  are  contained  simulta- 
neously and  in  one  act  the,  to  finite  intelligence,  infinite 
variety  and  succession  of  beings.  Matter  ajid  form,  power 
and  end,  in  it  fall  together  into  perfect  unity :  matter  is, 
from  the  beginning,  form,  power,  and  end.  j^orrn,  power, 
and  end  are  in  themselves  matter ;  and  all  are  but  mani- 


festations of  the  one  single  substance,  nature  of  nature, — 
God.  The  manifestations  of  this  substance  are  not  persona- 
lities nor  even  attributes  of  it,  since  it  is  not  in  the  least 
affected  with  plurality,  but  are  merely  aspects  which  this 
substance  presents  to  finite  intelligence.  In  itself  it  is 
absolutely  simple;  and  it  is  consequently  incognoscible, 
all  its  manifestations  are  but  shadows  and  reflections,  — 
negative  manifestations.  It  is  directlypercejxedbj 
eye  of  pure  reason  alone,  to  which  all  contrarifity^appeaj 
as  resolved  into  pure  identity. 

Nature.  —  Nature  is  not  God,  but  his  manifestation.  In 
nature  there  are  two  highest  principles,  —  mjtter  and Jprm. 
In  the  last  analysis  these  two  are  one ;  form  proceeds  from, 
and  returns  into,  matter,  which,  consequently,  cannot  be 
conceived  as  mere  barren  possibility,  as  Aristotle  attempted 


BRUNO.  49 

to  conceive  it.  Form,  indeed,  is  merely  a  (self-)  determi- 
nation of  it.  Matter  is  thus  force,  soul,  spirit.  Nature, 
therefore,  must  be  conceived  as  working  in  the  manner  of 
an  artist,  and  though  distinct  from  God,  is  not,  in  reality, 
separate  from  him.  Nature  as  God's  image  contains  in 
itself  at  every  moment  all  that  it  is  and  can  be.  The  whole 
of  nature  is  present  in  every  part,  as  the  life  of  the  body  is 
in  the  juices  and  the  blood  of  the  whole  body.  But  it  is 
present  in  a  different  manner  in  different  parts :  hence 
multiplicity  and  change,  which  obviously  cannot  belong  to 
being  as  such,  but  only  to  the  mode  of  being.  Nature,  as 
in  itself  one  and  as  subject  of  multiform  and  changing 
modes,  is  a  harmony  of  opposites ;  its  working  is  at  one  and 
the  same  time  both  union  and  opposition ;  the  resolution  or 
dissolution  of  one  individuality  is  also  the  formation  of  a 
new  individuality.  The  elementary  constituents  of  nature 
are  point-like  material  spheres  (termed  monads),  having,  in 
different  degrees,  a  psychical  nature.  Of  these  there  are 
as  many  classes  as  there  are  classes  of  things  perceivable  by 
the  senses.  The  monads,  as  the  elements  of  all  that  is,  are, 
on  the  one  hand,  the  "minima"  (smallest),  and,  on  the 
other  (since  all  else  has  its  source  in  them),  the  "  maxima  " 
(greatest)  of  things.  God  is  the  monad  of  monads.  Space 
is  merely  a  necessary  thought- form,  correlative  to  body,  and 
is  an  infinite  continuum.  Time  is  not  (as  Aristotle  held)  the 
measure  of  motion,  but  motion,  rather,  of  time,  which  would 
exist  even  were  there  no  motion  (motion  is  necessary,  how- 
ever, to  the  perception  of  time).  Objective  time  would  be 
that  measured  off  by  the  motions  of  the  heavenly  bodies  if 
uch  motions  were  perfectly  regular  in  every  regard. 

The  Concrete    Universe.  —  The   visible  universe   is  not 
bounded  by  the  region  of  the  fixed  stars   ^as  Aristotle  and 
/     even  Copernicus  held),  but  is  infinite   [as  Nicolas  of  Cusa 
had  said] .     There  is  an  infinity  of  worlds  infinitely  various 
in  degree  of  perfection,  so  reflecting  the  infinite  perfection 
of  the  Creator.     They  are  living  organisms,  and  contain  an 
infinite  variety  of  organic  life,  in  the  maintenance  of  which 
VOL.  i.  —  4 


50  A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  creative  world-soul  finds  its  infinite  satisfaction.  Reason 
never  tires  of  drawing  forth  from  matter  all  sorts  of  forms. 
The  immanent  end  of  the  existence  of  every  living  thing  is 
the  perfection  of  the  whole.  The  world  is  the  most  beautiful 
possible,  the  perfect  harmony  of  all  oppositions.  It  is  the 
work  of  an  in-dwelling  reason, —  gives  evidence,  by  the  won- 
derful structure  and  manifoldness  of  its  parts,  the  tendency 
of  objects  to  "  preserve  their  being,"  flee  their  opposites, 
and  struggle  towards  that  which  is  useful  to  them,  of  the 
presence  in  it  of  a  universal  intelligence.  There  are  three 
degrees  of  this  intelligence.  On  the  plane  of  the  lowest 
degree  neither  the  nature  nor  any  property  of  objects  is 
clearly  distinguished,  there  is  at  most  but  an  indefinite 
feeling  of  bodily  properties.  Such  intelligence  belongs  to 
plants.  A  higher  stage  is  that  which  distinctly  perceives  the 
constitution  and  character  of  objects  :  this  is  animal  intelli- 
gence. The  third  and  highest  stage  is  that  of  rational 
knowledge.  There  are  degrees  of  life  in  ascending  scale, 
and  corresponding  changes  from  one  to  another  resulting  in 
a  gradual  development  of  higher  forms  of  life  out  of  lower. 
Change  is  universal  and  constant,  but  gradual  and  occurring 
in  infinitely  long  periods.  In  a  period  of  twenty  thousand 
years  one  genus  may  develop  into  another.  Real  infinitude 
is  predicable  of  the  genus  only  :  the  genus  alone  has  infinite 
capacity  for  development.  Man's  place  in  the  scale  of 
living  things  is  midway  between  the  divine  and  the  earthly, 
—  he  is  the  harmony  of  these  two  opposites,  the  bond  between 
them ;  his  nature  contains  implicitly  all  others.  The  soul 
lives  in  the  whole  body,  returning  towards  the  heart  (from 
which  it  extended  itself,  as  a  web)  at  death.  The  present 
life  of  the  soul  is  but  death,  death  the  awakening  of  a  new 
life.  Sense,  imagination,  understanding,  and  spiritual  in- 
telligence are  the  forms  of  human  knowledge.  In  spiritual 
intelligence  everything  is  embraced  in  a  single  perception  — 
"  life,  light,  sense,  and  thought,  are  one  essence,  one  power, 
one  act,  —  the  All-One."  This  is  the  only  real  intelligence. 
Viewing  the  world  with  the  eye  of  this  intelligence,  man  sees 


ETHICAL  PHILOSOPHERS.  51 

it  as  the  image  and  law  of  God,  nay,  God  himself.  In  such 
intelligence  and  the  longing  and  hope  corresponding  to  it, 
man  passes  into  God  and  "  becomes  all  as  he  is  all."  In  so 
doing  he  becomes  the  Good,  which  is  precisely  the  One, 
King,  the  Divine.  Evil  is  relatively  non-existent,  —  is  mere 
defect  and  opposition,  finitude,  not-being  in  being.  To  be- 
come evil  is  merely  to  fall  away  from  God.  Only  as  good 
does  the  soul  find  true  joy  in  itself  and  its  environment. 
Goodness  is,  first  of  all,  truth,  since  truth  is  just  that  One 
which  is  in  and  above  all  things.  In  truth  and  goodness, 
thought  and  action  are  united  and  become  love,  which  is 
their  consummation.  He  who  is  filled  with  love  is  filled 
with  God,  who  is  precisely  Love,  which  pours  itself  forth  on 
all  things,  and  towards  which  all  things  struggle. 

Result.  —  In  the  doctrine  of  Bruno,  the  nature-philosophy 
of  the  First  Period  reaches  its  highest  form ;  in  it  there 
is  manifested  a  fuller  conception  of  the  presuppositions, 
method,  and  results  of  a  philosophy  of  nature,  whether 
speculative  or  empirical,  than  in  any  of  these  systems  we 
have  contemplated  before  it.  By  his  conception  of  nature 
as  the  sum  and  unity  of  all  possible  determinations,  Bruno 
holds  the  position  of  forerunner  of  Spinoza ;  by  his  concep- 
tion of  the  monad  that  of  forerunner  of  Leibnitz.  The 
philosophy  of  Bruno  stands  almost  entirely  alone  among  the 
systems  of  this  First  Period  as  being  wholly  "  non-Christian  " 
in  principle  and  result :  it  is  simply  Platonism,  or  Neo- 
Platonism,  purified  of  mediaeval  accretions,  and  blended 
with  the  widest  truths  of  nature  as  known  to  the  science  of 
the  age  of  Bruno,  or  as  divined  by  a  mind  gifted  with  high 
poetico-philosophical  insight.  The  kernel  of  it  is,  doubtless, 
the  conception  of  the  unity  of  opposites,  —  a  conception 
which  has  played  (and  is  playing)  a  vast  role  in  modern  spec- 
ulative thought,  as  we  shall  have  abundant  occasion  to  see. 

33- 

(2)     Ethical   Philosophers    (chiefly    Political}. — The 
names  which  occur  here  are  those  of  Nicol6  Macchiavelli, 


52  A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Thomas  More,  Johannes  Oldendorp,  Nicolaus  Hemming, 
Jean  Bodin,  Albericus  Gentilis,  Benedict  Winckler,  Hugo 
Grotius,  Richard  Hooker. 

§  34- 

Nicolb  Macchiavelli  (1469-1527),  the  Italian  statesman, 
in  his  two  works,  "  II  Principe  "  (The  Prince),  (1513,  pub. 
1532),  and  "  Discorsi  sul  Primo  Libro  delle  Deche  di  Tito 
Livio "  (Discourses  on  the  First  Book  of  the  Decades 
of  Titus  Livius),  (1520?),  gives  not  so  much  a  theory  of 
the  State  as  such,  as  a  theory  of  a  State  under  conditions 
like  those  existing  in  Italy  in  his  own  day.  He  separates 
political  methods  entirely  from  moral  and  religious,  and 
upholds  the  maxim  that  the  "  end  justifies  the  means." 

§35- 

Thomas  More  (1478-1535).  —  More,  the  well-known 
Lord  Chancellor  of  King  Henry  VIII.  of  England,  in  a 
philosophical  romance,  "Utopia"  (Latin,  1516;  English 
translation  by  Ralph  Robinson,  1551),  portrays  an  "ideal 
commonwealth,"  agricultural  in  basis,  in  which  com- 
munity of  property  is  the  universal  rule,  the  form  of 
government  is  republican,  transgression  of  the  laws  (which 
are  but  few)  is  punished  by  degradation  to  a  condition  of 
slavery,  the  sciences  are  assiduously  cultivated,  education 
is  compulsory,  religious  toleration  prevails  except  towards 
those  denying  the  doctrine  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul 
and  of  a  divine  providence,  and  the  priesthood  (numeri- 
cally small)  enjoys  special  respect  and  is  irresponsible. 

§  36- 

Johannes  Oldendorp  (d.  1561).  —  Oldendorp,  professor 
at  Marburg,  whose  "Juris  Naturalis  Gentium  et  Civilis 
fio-aywyri"  (1539)  has  been  called  the  "first  attempt  to 
establish  a  system  of  natural  law," 1  based  natural  right  on 
universal  reason,  but  held  that  Revelation  (/.  e.,  the  Deca- 

1  See  Erdmann,  §  252,  4. 


HEMMING.  —BOD  IN.  5  3 

logue)  was  the  only  "reliable  authority  for  the  same." 
Civil  right,  or  law,  is  a  species  of  natural  right,  but  is  based 
on  probabilities,  and  depends  upon  the  constitution  of 
the  State. 

§  37- 

Nicolaus  Hemming  (1518-1600).  —  Hemming,  at  one 
time  professor  at  Copenhagen,  having  previously  been  five 
years  a  personal  pupil  of  Melancthon,  aims  to  derive  natural 
law  purely  from  the  reason  implanted  in  man  by  God.  In  his 
"Lege  Naturae  apodictica  Methodus  Concinnata  "  (1577), 
he  maintains  —  assuming  that  the  end  of  the  practical  life 
is  threefold  ;  viz.,  economical,  political,  and  spiritual  —  that 
the  political  end  is  ultimately  identical  with  the  spiritual, 
which  is  the  knowledge,  fear,  and  love  of  God.  Immedi- 
ately, the  political  end  is  repose  and  peace  ;  it  is  mediated 
by  the  four  (Platonic)  virtues,  —  prudence,  moderation, 
courage,  and  justice.  Governments  differ  according  to 
circumstances,  but  only  those  sorts  of  law  are  justifiable 
which  can  be  proved  to  flow  from  the  axioms  of  nature.1 

§  38- 

Jean  Bodin*  (1530-1597).  —  Bodin,  who  took  a  degree 
in  law  at  Toulouse,  and  afterwards  lectured  there  on  juris- 
prudence, and  who  was  one  of  the  earliest  of  modern  politi- 
cal economists  as  well  as  modern  writers  on  jurisprudence, 
undertakes,  in  a  work  entitled  "  Six  Libres  de  Re'publique  " 
(1597),  to  erect  a  theory  of  society  on  a  historico-empirical 
basis  as  regards  method.  The  State,  according  to  Bodin, 
is  a  community  of  families  regulated  by  authority  and  rea- 
son ;  it  arises  by  "  force  and  violence  from  a  patriarchal 
state  of  society."  Citizenship  in  a  true  State  is  the  "  ac- 
knowledgment of  the  sovereign  by  his  free  subject,  and  the 
protection  of  the  sovereign  towards  the  subject."  The 
State  reposes  on  a  real  or  imaginary  contract.  The  sov- 

1  See  Noack. 

2  See  Hallam,  Lit.  of  Europe,  Part  II.,  pp.  150-164. 


54  A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

ereign  power  of  the  State  is  the  legislature :  it  is  a  power 
that  is  perpetual,  absolute,  and  subject  to  no  law.  The 
forms  of  government  are  three,  and  three  only :  democ- 
racy (in  which  the  sovereignty  rests  with  the  majority  of 
the  citizens) ,  monarchy  (which  is  the  "  rule  of  one  man 
according  to  the  law  of  nature,  who  maintains  the  liberties 
and  properties  of  others  as  much  as  his  own"),  aristocracy 
(a  government  in  which  a  "  smaller  body  of  the  citizens 
governs  the  greater").  Resistance  to  the  commands  of  the 
sovereign  is  a  thing  to  be  avoided  except  in  cases  where 
those  commands  indubitably  conflict  with  the  "  law  of 
God."  Slavery  is  undesirable.  Revolution  best  takes  place 
by  a  voluntary  cession  of  power.  The  supreme  law  of  the 
State  is  public  safety.  Climate,  the  surface  of  the  land, 
soil,  and  physical  conditions  generally  (a  subject  that  has 
hitherto  been  neglected)  must  be  considered :  the  laws 
of  "  Nature  will  not  bend  to  the  fancy  of  man."  Religious 
tolerance  should  be  the  rule,  since  men  give  assent  "  volun- 
tarily, not  by  force."  The  best  form  of  government  is  an 
agnate  monarchy.  —  Bodin  may,  profitably,  be  compared 
with  Aristotle,  on  the  one  hand,  and  Montesquieu,  on  the 
other. 

§  39- 

Albericus  Gentilis,  or  Alberico  Gentili  (1552-1608),  an 
Italian  who  was  driven  from  his  native  country  by  religious 
persecution,  and  who,  settling  in  England,  became  Regius 
Professor  of  Civil  Law  at  Oxford,  rejects  both  the  historico- 
empirical  and  the  theological  views  of  the  basis  of  natural 
law,  which  he  finds  solely  in  the  science  of  human  nature. 
Man  is  by  nature  a  social  being.  Right  exists  only  in 
society,  and  only  between  individuals,  so  that  the  ordinary 
distinction  of  right  into  jus  natures  and  jus  gentium  is  un- 
tenable. War  is  justifiable  only  for  the  sake  of  peace. 
Atheists  have  no  rights.  To  all  persons,  except  atheists, 
toleration  should  be  shown.  Gentilis'  chief  work  is  entitled 
"De  Jure  Belli  LibriTres"  (1598).  To  this  work  of  Gen- 


WINCKLER.  —  GRO  TIUS.  5  5 

tilis  the  corresponding  famous  work  of  Grotius  is  said  to 
be  largely  indebted. 

§  40. 

Benedict  Winckler1  (d.  1648),  professor  of  jurisprudence 
at  Leipsic,  whose  "  Principiorum  Libri  Quinque"  (1615) 
has  been  called  the  "  most  important  treatise  on  natural 
right  prior  to  Grotius,"  derives  all  right  ultimately  from  a 
divine  source,  which  is  most  purely  revealed  in  the  Scrip- 
tures, —  particularly  the  Decalogue.  He  distinguishes  a 
jus  natures  prius  by  which  man  was  governed  prior  to  the 
"  fall,"  and  a  jus  naturae  posterius,  sive  jus  gentium,  the 
natural  law  of  man  since  the  "  fall."  The  jus  natures  prius 
is  indispensable  and  binding.  Civil  law  is  merely  a  means 
of  upholding  obedience  to  jus  naturale  and  jus  gentium. 
It  changes  with  circumstances.  Society  is,  ultimately, 
founded  on  the  social  nature  of  man. 

§  41- 

Hugo  Grotius,  or  Huig  van  Groot  (1583-1645). — 
Grotius,  the  commonly  reputed  founder  of  the  science  of 
international  law,  was  a  prodigy  in  learning  even  when 
a  youth ;  very  early  took  a  degree  in  law  at  the  University 
of  Leyden ;  at  the  age  of  twenty  received  the  appointment 
(unsolicited  by  him)  of  historiographer  of  the  United 
Provinces  of  Holland ;  was  afterwards  advocate-general 
of  the  fisc  for  the  provinces  of  Holland  and  Zealand ; 
fiscal-general  at  Rotterdam ;  ambassador  to  London,  etc. 
Imprisoned  for  life  (as  was  intended)  because  of  a  part 
in  theologico-political  disturbances  (Grotius  was  a  "  Re- 
monstrant"), he  managed,  by  the  shrewdness  of  his  wife, 
who  was  allowed  to  share  in  his  imprisonment,  to  escape 
to  Paris.  At  Paris  he  acted  as  ambassador  for  the  Swedish 
Crown.  He  accepted  an  invitation  from  the  Crown  of 
Sweden  to  go  to  Stockholm  to  reside.  He  is  almost  uni- 

1  Zeller,  Erdmann. 


56  A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

versally  known  as  the  author  of  a  treatise  "  De  Jure  Belli 
et  Pads  "  (1625). 

Philosophy.1  —  Grotius,  like  others  before  him,  professes 
to  aim  at  the  establishment  of  a  science  of  law.  Law, 
he  says,  is  founded  in  human  reason,  or  the  social  nature 
of  man,  and  would  be  binding  even  if  God  did  not  exist. 
Upon  natural  law,  thus  founded,  is  based  positive  law, 
which  has  its  source  in  the  pleasure,  or  will,  as  distin- 
guished from  the  nature,  of  man  or  of  nations.  Law  is 
of  four  sorts :  it  is  jus  natura,  jus  civile^  jus  gentium 
naturale,  jus  gentium  voluntarium.  The  condition  of  the 
mere  individual  is  a  condition  of  mere  nature.  In  the 
state  of  nature  every  one  has  an  equal  right  to  everything, 
in  so  far  as  everything  belongs  to  all  but  to  none  in  par- 
ticular. Society  originates  as  a  means  of  obviating  the 
insecurities  of  such  a  condition,  as  well  as  means  of  sup- 
plying social  need  as  such.  It  is  created  by  a  voluntary 
combination,  and  rests  upon  a  compact.  The  rights  of  the 
subject  depend  in  general  upon  the  nature  of  this  com- 
pact; but  it  cannot  as  a  rule  be  right  for  the  subject 
to  make  war  against  the  State.  Humanly  speaking,  the 
only  object  of  punishment  is  the  prevention  of  crime  or  the 
improvement  of  the  criminal :  "  Retribution  belongs  to  the 
Almighty  alone."  Just  cause  of  war  is  found  only  in  injury 
to  rights,  and  in  the  denial  of  the  being  and  providence 
of  God  :  even  a  right  of  taking  up  arms  to  recover  stolen 
liberty  is  inadmissible.  War  is  to  be  avoided  by  all  pos- 
sible means. 

§  42. 

Richard  Hooker  (1554-1600).  —  Hooker  falls  last  in 
our  list,  because  he  seems  to  us  to  have  given  the  best 
philosophical  deduction  of  the  conception  of  law.  Born 
near  Exeter,  England,  he  was  educated  at  the  Exeter 
grammar-school,  and  at  Corpus  Christi  College,  Oxford. 
For  some  years  he  was  Hebrew  lecturer  at  Oxford ;  and 

1  Hallam,  Literature  of  Europe,  part  iii.  pp.  176-220. 


HOOKER.  57 

was  afterwards  minister,  in  the  Established  Church,  of 
various  parishes  in  England.  While  preacher  at  the  Tem- 
ple in  London,  he  became,  unwillingly,  involved  in  a  con- 
troversy with  a  Calvinist  divine  of  the  Temple  on  the 
subject  of  Church  observances  and  laws,  —  whence  arose 
his  philosophical  treatise. 

Work.  —  The  treatise  in  question  is  "  Of  the  Laws  of 
Ecclesiastical  Polity,"  —  particularly  the  First  Book  (1594). 
Hooker's  ideas  seem  to  have  been,  largely,  borrowed  from 
Aristotle,  the  early  Church  Fathers,  and  Thomas  Aquinas. 

Philosophy}-  —  "All  things  that  are,"  says  Hooker,  "have 
some  operation  not  violent  or  casual.  Neither  doth  any- 
thing ever  begin  to  exercise  the  same  without  some  fore- 
conceived  end  for  which  it  worketh.  And  the  end  which 
it  worketh  for  is  not  obtained  unless  the  work  be  also  fit 
to  obtain  it  by."  Now  that  which  "  determines  the  kind, 
the  degree,  and  the  measure  of  the  operation  or  activity 
of  each  thing  "  is  law.  There  is  one  —  and  only  one  — 
being  which  is  a  law  unto  itself;  all  others  act  according 
to  a  law  of  which,  not  themselves,  but  that  being,  God,  is 
author.  The  law  of  God's  activity  is  reason  or,  rather, 
rational  will,  and  not  mere  blind  reason  nor  mere  arbitrary 
will.  It  is  immutable,  eternal :  but  does  not  thereby  abate 
or  hinder  his  freedom,  since  the  imposition  of  this  law 
upon  himself  is  his  own  free  act.  The  law  imposed  by 
God  upon  himself  is  the  "  first  eternal  law  "  of  his  working ; 
that  which  he  imposes  upon  his  creatures  is  the  "  second 
eternal  law."  Hooker  distinguishes  law  in  general  into 
law  of  nature,  law  of  reason,  law  of  spirit,  and  into  human 
and  divine  (revealed)  law;  and  human  law  into  law 
of  the  individual  and  law  of  society.  The  law  of  spirit  — 
of  angels  and  intellectual  beings  as  such  generally  —  is 
that  of  love,  adoration,  and  imitation  of  divine  perfection. 
In  their  associate  capacity,  spirits  form  an  "  army,  one  in 
order  and  degree  above  another :  "  in  relation  to  human 
beings,  they  are  fellow-servants.  All  of  their  functions  are 
1  Hooker's  Ecclesiastical  Polity. 


58  A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

performed  "with  joy."  A  fundamental  law  of  all  things  — 
and  especially  of  human  nature  —  is  consciously  or  uncon- 
sciously to  "  seek  the  highest,  to  covet  the  participation 
of  God  himself."  This  seeking  has  various  degrees,  but 
the  end  is  always  the  same,  viz.,  God  or  goodness.  The 
first  degree  of  seeking  is  the  desiring  the  continuance  of 
existence.  A  second  degree  is  the  striving  to  resemble 
God  in  constancy  and  excellency  of  operation.  This  seek- 
ing is  in  man  conscious,  and  as  such  constitutes  his 
essence.  Man  attains  to  full  consciousness  in  his  seeking, 
by  degrees.  Until  he  distinguishes  "  differences  of  time, 
affirmation,  negation,  and  contradiction  in  speech,"  he  is  on 
a  level  with  the  lower  animals.  When  he  does  so  he  has 
some  "  use  of  natural  reason."  By  reason  he  compre- 
hends the  laws  of  his  true  being,  the  laws  by  which  his 
actions  are  by  him  to  be  guided.  Human  action  has  for 
its  end  either  mere  action  for  its  own  sake,  or  action  for 
the  sake  of  procuring  an  ulterior  object.  Like  that  of  God, 
it  is,  ideally  speaking,  witting  and  free  :  desire  only  solicits, 
will  controls,  it.  Actions  determined  by  appetite  are  volun- 
tary in  the  sense  that  they  are  subject  to  the  control  of  the 
will,  though  the  will  may  not  be  exercised,  but  yields  assent, 
as  it  were  by  silence.  The  good,  or  whatever  is  an  object 
of  real  desire  (since  desire  is  everywhere  the  Good  (God) 
seeking  itself),  does  not  move  to  action  merely  by  being, 
but  by  being  apparent  or  the  object  of  a  consciousness. 
Evil  as  such  is  never  really  desired  or  willed  :  men  choose 
evil,  when  they  choose  it,  from  habits  overpowering  reason 
in  them.  The  good  and  the  evil  are  known  by  one  and 
the  same  criterion.  We  judge  of  the  good  and  evil  of 
things  by  means  of  their  causes  and  effects  and  signs.  The 
main  principles  of  judgment  are  self-evident,  "  for  to  make 
nothing  self-evident  of  itself  unto  man's  understanding 
were  to  take  away  all  possibility  of  knowing  anything." 
Examples  of  self-evident  principles  are :  the  greater  good 
is  to  be  chosen  before  the  less ;  it  profits  a  man  nothing 
to  gain  the  whole  world  and  lose  his  own  soul;  obey 


HOOKER.  59 

the  mind  rather  than  the  body  (the  highest  law  of  action), 
etc.  The  marks  of  the  laws  of  reason  are,  —  likeness 
to  the  laws  of  nature,  accessibility  to  human  understand- 
ing (without  revelation),  universality  of  recognition.  So- 
ciety has  its  origin  in  the  inability  of  the  individual  to 
"  furnish  himself  with  the  store  of  things  needful  for  such 
a  life  as  our  nature  doth  desire,  a  life  fit  for  the  dignity 
of  man."  It  has  a  double  bond,  —  the  natural  inclination 
of  men  to  social  communion,  and  an  "agreement,  ex- 
pressed or  tacit,  as  to  the  manner  of  union  or  living 
together."  The  latter  —  the  agreement  —  is  the  law  of  the 
commonweal,  which  has  for  its  object  the  public  good. 
The  chief  ends  of  living  are  wisdom,  virtue,  and  religion. 
Laws  of  the  commonweal  are  natural  laws,  positive  laws, 
and  laws  of  nations.  Divine  laws  are  such  as  are  "  super- 
natural both  in  respect  of  the  manner  of  deducing  them, 
and  also  in  regard  of  the  things  delivered  "  (viz.,  the  objects 
of  faith,  hope,  and  charity).  Hooker's  discussion  on  the 
subject  of  law  closes  with  the  following  assertions,  which 
may  be  taken  as  a  brief  summing  up  of  his  general  mean- 
ing :  "  Of  law  there  can  be  no  less  acknowledged,  than 
that  her  seat  is  the  bosom  of  God,  her  voice  the  harmony 
of  the  world :  all  things  in  heaven  and  earth  do  her  hom- 
age, the  very  least  as  feeling  her  care,  and  the  greatest 
as  not  exempted  from  her  power :  both  angels  and  men, 
and  creatures  of  what  condition  soever,  though  each  in  a 
different  sort  and  manner,  yet  all  with  uniform  consent 
admiring  her  as  the  mother  of  their  peace  and  joy." 

Result.  —  There  are  in  Hooker's  conception  of  law  two 
features  of  primary  importance,  to  which  special  attention 
may  be  directed,1  viz.,  the  notion  that  law,  instead  of  being 
merely  a  mode  of  mechanical  operation,  is  ultimately  an 
expression  of  rational  will  or  living  reason,  and  the  notion 
of  the  universality  of  law.  By  the  first,  the  philosophy 
of  Hooker  is  absolutely  distinguished  from  all  mechanistic 

1  See  British  Thought  and  Thinkers  (by  the  late  Prof.  G.  S.  Mor- 
ris), pp.  71-79. 


6O  A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

philosophies,  and  especially  mechanistic  philosophies  of 
the  State,  —  like  that  of  Hobbes,  for  example ;  and  even 
more,  were  that  possible,  is  it  by  the  second  taken  in  con- 
nection with  the  first,  —  universal  living  reason  is  wholly 
another  thing  than  blind  necessity.  —  The  influence  of 
Hooker  appears  in  later  political  philosophies,  particularly 
(strange  as  it  may  seem  as  regards  the  first  and  the  last) 
those  of  Hobbes,  Cumberland,  and  Locke.  He  has  re- 
ceived too  little  attention  from  historians  of  philosophy,  — 
has,  in  fact,  generally  been  entirely  ignored  or  overlooked. 


BACON.  6 1 


DIVISION    II.      SECOND   PERIOD   OF    MODERN 
PHILOSOPHY. 

§  43- 

The  Characteristics  of  the  Second  Period  of  Modern 
Philosophy.  —  The  Second  Period  of  Modern  Philosophy 
—  extending  from  the  beginning  of  the  seventeenth  century 
to  the  third  quarter  of  the  eighteenth  —  is  characteristically 
a  period  of  analysisjtnd  formal  .reflection.  A  leading  prob- 
lem —  the  leading  problem  —  of  the  second  period  is  the 
problem  of  the  method  of  philosophical  inquiry  and  reflec- 
tion and  of  the  sources  of  knowledge,.  As  regards  method 
and  its  view  of  the  sources  of  knowledge,  thought  in  this 
period  is,  predominantly,  either  empiricistic,  intuitionalistic, 
or  rationalistic.  As  analytic,  the  standpoint  of  this  period 
is  that  of  (phenomenal)  consciousness  rather  than  of  self- 
consciousness.  The  most  common  results  of  thinking  of 
the  period,  accordingly  (that  is,  in  consequence  of  the  fact 
that  on  the  standpoint  of  mere  consciousness  subject  and 
object  are  separated),  are,  in  the  theory  of  knowledge  and 
being  as  such,  subjective  idealism  or  else  scepticism,  on  the 
one  hand,  and,  on  the  other,  dogmatism,  or  the  arbitrary 
affirmation  of  a  supersensible  existence ;  in  the  theory  of 
nature,  mechanism  ;  in  that  of  will,  determinism.  The  truth 
of  the  foregoing  assertions  can,  of  course,  be  established 
only  in  connection  with  the  presentation  and  characteriza- 
tion of  the  systems  of  the  period.  The  actual  historical 
connection  of  systems  in  this  period  is  such  that  it  is  im- 
practicable to  attempt  to  group  them  under  the  separate 
heads  of  "  empiricistic,"  "  intuitionalistic,"  and  "  rationalis- 
tic "  systems.  The  systems  will  be  characterized  as  they 
are  individually  dealt  with. 

§  44- 

Francis  Bacon  (1561-1626).  —  Francis  Bacon  was  the 
son  of  Nicholas  Bacon,  for  many  years  lord-keeper  of  the 
great  seal  under  Elizabeth,  and  Anne  Cooke,  daughter  of 


62  A    ffJS TORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Sir  Anthony  Cooke  and  said  to  have  been  a  woman  of  ex- 
traordinary learning,  culture,  and  piety.  At  the  age  of 
twelve,  the  "young  lord-keeper,"  as  Elizabeth  styled  the 
rather  precocious  youth,  entered  the  University  of  Cam- 
bridge. Here  he  acquired,  if  not  a  very  profound  knowl- 
edge of  Aristotle  himself,  a  decided  antipathy  to  the 
Aristotelian  philosophy  as  then  taught,  regarding  it  as  dis- 
putatious and  barren.  He  left  the  university,  at  the  age 
of  fifteen,  to  study  law  in  Gray's  Inn,  London.  Soon  after- 
wards he  was  sent  with  the  English  embassy  to  Paris  to 
acquire  a  knowledge  of  the  human  "world"  in  general, 
and  of  diplomacy  in  particular.  The  death  of  his  father, 
in  1579,  recalled  him  from  Paris  to  England,  and  threw 
him  entirely  on  his  own  resources.  He  decided  to  practise 
law ;  but  he  had  a  larger  than  merely  professional  ambition, 
namely,  that  of  being  grandly  useful  to  "  his  country,  the 
Church,  and  humanity  at  large."  He  had,  as  he  himself 
avowed,  "  early  taken  all  knowledge  for  his  province,"  and 
had  conceived  a  design  of  beginning  a  revolution  in  human 
knowledge  and  action  by  the  discovery  of  a  method  that 
would  supplant  the  empty  Scholastico-Aristotelian  logic,  on 
the  one  hand,  and  a  blind,  slavish,  and  delusive  empiricism 
on  the  other.  Passing  through  Gray's  Inn,  he  took  a  place 
at  the  bar  (1582)  ;  sat  several  times  in  Parliament  during 
the  reign  of  Elizabeth,  at  one  time  seriously  offending  the 
Queen  and  damaging  his  prospects  of  advancement  by  hon- 
est opposition  to  a  certain  plan  cherished  by  her  Majesty ; 
acquired  standing  as  queen's  counsel,  after  having  failed  in 
an  attempt  to  secure  an  appointment  as  attorney-general, 
then  as  solicitor-general,  and,  again,  as  master  of  the  rolls ; 
held,  in  the  reign  of  James  I.,  successively  the  positions  of 
king's  counsel,  solicitor-general,  attorney-general,  privy 
councillor,  lord-keeper,  and  lord-chancellor  (1618)  ;  was 
knighted,  and  invested  with  the  titles  of  Baron  Verulam 
and  Viscount  St.  Albans  (1621).  That  he  really  served 
his  country  is  doubtful,  since  he  was  always  an  upholder  of 
royal  prerogative  as  against  the  privileges  of  the  Commons, 
and  was  guilty  of  political  corruption  (.though  not  of  receiv- 


BACON.  63 

ing  of  bribes),  and  fell  in  disgrace  from  his  high  position 
as  chief  minister  of  justice.  He  did  really  serve  the  Church 
in  the  reign  of  Elizabeth  by  earnest  endeavors  in  aiding  to 
promote  ecclesiastical  unity  and  tolerance.  What  service 
he  has  rendered  to  humanity,  by  his  philosophical  achieve- 
ments, may  be  judged  of  after  a  consideration  of  those 
achievements. 

Works.  —  Most  of  Bacon's  philosophical  works  came  into 
being,  and  accordingly  arrange  themselves,  with  direct  ref- 
erence to  a  design  early  conceived,  and  followed  up  through- 
out life,  which  was  nothing  less  than  a  design  of  inaugurating 
a  reformation  of  existing  sciences,  the  reconstruction  of  all 
knowledge.  "  The  end  of  knowledge,"  says  Bacon,  is  the 
"  glory  of  the  Creator  and  the  relief  of  man's  estate."  The 
reformation  of  science  has  for  its  goal  the  rendering  of  it 
"  active,"  or  practical.  To  become  truly  "  active  "  it  must 
cease  to  be  merely  empirical,  on  the  one  hand,  and  merely 
abstract  and  formal  on  the  other,  it  must  have  a  method 
by  which  it  may  be  both  universal  and  concrete.  The  ap- 
plication of  the  method  presupposes  the  existence  of  a  col- 
lection of  facts  or  phenomena  as  data.  The  systematic  and 
complete  application  of  the  method  to  the  interpretation  of 
facts  results  in  the  knowledge  sought.  The  application  may 
be  not  only  systematic  and  complete,  it  may  also  be  merely 
tentative  and  incomplete.  By  way  of  illustration  of  the 
application  of  the  method  a  series  of  graduated  instances 
must  be  exhibited,  and,  further,  a  department  of  knowledge 
must  be  created  to  preserve  truth  accidentally  discovered 
apart  from  the  systematic  application  of  the  method.  Pre- 
liminarily to  the  positive  construction  of  science  in  the  new 
sense,  is  needed  a  survey  of  the  existing  state  of  knowledges. 
The  reformation  of  the  sciences,  the  "  Magna  Instauratio," 
must,  according  to  the  foregoing  analysis,  have  certain 
leading  parts.  These  are  represented  by  certain  works  of 
Bacon,  as  follows  : 1  Part  I.  "  Partitiones  Scientiarum,"  or 

1  See  the  Prefaces  and  Introductions  to  the  works  of  Bacon  in  the 
edition  of  Spedding,  Ellis,  and  Heath ;  also  Professor  Adamson's 
article  on  Bacon  in  the  "  Encyclopaedia  Britannica  "  (gth  ed.). 


64  A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

survey  of  the  sciences,  with  which  are  concerned  the  "  Va- 
lerius Terminus"  (1603),  which  falls  partly  into  the  next  class 
also,  "Advancement  of  Learning  "(1605),  "Descriptio  Globi 
Intellectualis  "  (1609),  "  De  Dignitate  et  Augmentis  Scien- 
tiarum  "  (1623),  the  last-named  incorporating  the  substance 
of  the  rest  -,  Part  II.  "  Interpretatio  Naturae,"  the  method 
of  interpreting  nature,  with  which  deal  "  Partis  Secundae 
Instaurationis  Delineatio  et  Argumentum"  (1606,  1607), 
"Cogitata  et  Visa"  (1612),  "  De  Interpretatione  Senten- 
tiae  duodecim  "  ( — ?),  "  Redargutio  Philosophiarum  " 
(1609),  "  Novum  Organum  "  (1620),  the  last  embodying 
the  results  of  the  others  of  this  group ;  Part  III.  "  Historia 
Naturalis  et  Experimentalis,"  the  data  or  raw  materials  of 
science,  represented  by  "  Historia  Ventorum,"  "  Historia 
Vitae  et  Mortis,"  "  Historia  Densi  et  Rari,"  "  Sylva  Sylva- 
rum,"  etc.,  the  last-named  being  the  most  important ; 
Part  IV.  "Scala  Intellectus,"  graduated  examples  of  in- 
vestigation conducted  by  the  new  method,  represented  by 
the  work  "  Filum  Labyrinthi  "  (1607?);  Part  V.  «  Pro- 
dromi,"  or  anticipations  of  the  new  philosophy ;  Part.  VI. 
"Active  Philosophy,"  to  be  the  work  of  future  generations. 
There  may  be  mentioned  as  indirectly  connected  with  the 
"  Instauratio  Magna  "  :  "  The  New  Atlantis  "  (a  fragment), 
which  is  a  picture  of  an  imaginary  state  in  which  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  new  philosophy  are  embodied ;  "  De  Principiis 
et  Originibus  Secundum  Fabulas  Cupidinis  et  Cceli "  (circa 
1623),  perhaps  the  most  important  of  the  very  few  of 
Bacon's  works  that  concern  themselves  with  really  meta- 
physical conceptions  ;  "  Cogitationes  de  Natura  Rerum,"  to 
be  classed  with  the  "  De  Principiis,"  etc.  The  celebrated  "  Es- 
says "  and  "  Wisdom  of  the  Ancients  "  may  be  mentioned 
here;  nor  should  the  "Temporis  Partus  Masculus"  (circa 
1583),  Bacon's  first  expression  of  the  standpoint  which 
distinguishes  him  among  philosophers,  be  overlooked.  The 
most  important  of  Bacon's  works  are,  of  course,  the  "  De 
Dignitate  et  Augmentis  Scientiarum "  and  the  "  Novum 
Organum."  The  latter,  it  should  be  noted,  is  a  fragment. 


BACON.  65 

Philosophy.  —  i .  The  Survey  of  the  Sciences  *  {Bacon's 
"Encyclopedia"  of  Existing  Sciences).  Introduction. — 
Human  knowledge  has  two,  quite  distinct,  sources,  —  un- 
derstanding and  revelation :  it  is,  accordingly,  "  philoso- 
phy "  or  "theology,"  "human  learning"  or  "divine 
learning."  "  Human  learning "  may,  upon  the  basis  of 
the  division  of  the  understanding  into  the  three  branches, 
memory,  imagination,  and  reason,  be  divided  into  history, 
poesy,  and  philosophy  (in  the  narrower  sense).  "Divine 
learning  "  may  be  likewise  divided. 

History.  —  History  is  natural  and  civil,  the  latter  com- 
prising ecclesiastical  and  literary  history.  Natural  History 
treats  of  nature  as  free,  as  constrained,  or  subject  to  rules  of 
art,  and  as  "  erring,"  or  varying :  it  is  a  history  of  "  crea- 
tures," of  arts,  and  of  "  marvels."  Civil  History  is  either 
memorials,  perfect  histories,  or  antiquities.  Ecclesiastical 
History  is  the  history  of  the  Church,  of  providence,  and  of 
prophecy. 

"Poesy."  —  "Poesy,"  which  is  distinguished  from  history 
and  from  philosophy,  in  that  it  "  bows  things  to  the  desires 
of  the  mind,"  whereas  those  two  do  just  the  opposite,  is 
either  epic,  dramatic,  or  allegorical  (the  other  kinds  of 
poetry  being  regarded  by  Bacon  as  belonging  to  Rhetoric). 

"  Philosophy."  —  "  Philosophy  "  is  either  "  divine,"  "  natu- 
ral," or  "  human,"  the  last-named  being  styled  also  "  hu- 
manity." But  underlying  these  three  branches  of  philosophy 
is  a  "primitive  or  summary  philosophy  "  a  philosophia  prima, 
which,  rather  difficult  of  exact  definition,  may  be  described 
as  a  "  receptacle  for  all  such  profitable  observations  and 
axioms  as  fall  not  within  the  compass  of  any  special  parts 
of  philosophy  or  science,  but  are  more  common  and  of  a 
higher  stage."  Bacon  would  here  place,  for  example,  the 
"axioms":  "If  equals  be  added  to  unequals,  the  wholes 
will  be  unequal,"  "All  things  change,  but  nothing  per-, 
ishes,"  etc. ;  and  the  conceptions,  "  quantity,"  "  similitude," 

1  We  follow  the  "  Advancement  of  Learning,"  supplementing  it  at 
points  from  the  "  De  Augmentis." 

S 


66  A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

"  diversity,"  etc.  This  part  of  philosophy  (Bacon  thinks) 
is  deficient  as  yet,  being  "mixed"  and  "confused,"  a 
"  degradation  of  other  sciences  rather  than  anything  solid 
or  substantive  of  itself."  —  "Divine  Philosophy"  or  "  natural 
theology"  is  the  knowledge  of  God  obtained  by  the  con- 
templation of  his  works.  The  ancient  opinion  that  God's 
works  are  an  image  of  himself  is  erroneous;  in  contem- 
plating them  we  do  not  cognize  God  as  he  is  in  himself. 
God  is  really  known  only  through  revelation,  or  through 
faith.  The  ancient  opinion  "  mixes  religion  and  philoso- 
phy," to  the  great  detriment  of  both,  since  this  mixing  has 
as  result  "  an  heretical  religion  and  fabulous  philosophy." 
Philosophy  is  interdicted  from  the  direct  consideration  of 
God's  nature.  It  is  not  so  interdicted,  however,  as  regards 
the  nature  of  "  angels  "  and  "  spirits."  — Natural  Philosophy 
has  two  parts,  concerned,  respectively,  with  the  "  acquisition 
of  causes,"  and  the  "  production  of  effects :  "  it  is  either 
speculative  or  operative,  science  or  prudence.  The  two 
parts  have  a  natural  relation  to  one  another,  since  there  is 
an  "  intercourse  between  causes  and  effects."  Speculative 
Philosophy  is  either  metaphysics  or  physics,  according  as  it 
treats  of  the  "abstracted,"  "fixed,"  "rational,"  /.  e.,  of  formal 
and  final  causes,  or  of  the  "  material,  transitory,  changing  and 
merely  existent  and  necessary,"  /.  e.,  of  material  and  efficient 
causes.  Metaphysics,  as  just  defined,  must  not  be  confounded 
with  prima  philosophia,  the  "  parent  or  common  ancestor  of 
all  knowledge,"  nor  vice  versa.  Any  doubt  as  to  the  pos- 
sibility of  metaphysics,  or  the  possibility  of  discovering  the 
ultimate  forms,  or  causes,  or  natures,  of  things,  may  be 
annulled  by  the  consideration  that,  as  we  know  the  alphabet 
without  knowing  all  possible  words,  so  may  we  reasonably 
think  to  determine  the  simplest  forms,  or  principles,  of 
sense,  of  voluntary  motion,  of  vegetation,  heat,  cold,  etc. 
Metaphysics,  as  treating  of  formal  and  final  causes,  has 
two  parts,  corresponding  to  these  two  classes  of  causes. 
Physics,  as  treating  of  the  "  contexture  and  configuration 
of  things,"  of  the  "  principles  or  originals  of  things,"  and 


BACON.  67 

of  the  "  variety  and  peculiarity  of  things,"  has  three  parts. 
We  must  carefully  distinguish  between  the  metaphysical  and 
the  physical  consideration  of  forms.  Physically  regarded, 
the  whiteness  of  snow  or  of  froth,  for  example,  has  as  its 
form  or  cause  the  "  subtle  intermixture  of  air  and  water ;  " 
but  this  account  of  whiteness  is  not  an  account  of  its  essen- 
tial nature  or  formal  cause.  Final  causes  —  with  which  the 
second  part  of  metaphysics  is  occupied  —  have  no  place 
whatever  in  physics.  It  is  an  error,  however,  to  suppose 
that  there  is  any  "  enmity  or  repugnance  "  whatever  between 
final  and  physical  causes.  There  is,  for  example,  no  incom- 
patibility between  the  propositions,  that  "  the  eyelids  are 
for  the  safeguard  of  the  sight,"  and  that  "  pilosity  is  inci- 
dent to  orifices  of  moisture."  Further,  it  is  no  "  derogation 
from  divine  providence  "  to  affirm  the  compatibility  of  the 
two  sorts  of  causes :  the  "  wisdom  of  God  is  the  more 
admirable  when  nature  intendeth  one  thing  and  providence 
draweth  forth  another  than  if  he  had  communicated  to  par- 
ticular creatures  and  motions  the  characters  and  impressions 
of  his  providence."  As  regards  the  relation  of  metaphysics 
to  the  other  branches  of  philosophy,  Bacon  explains  his 
view  by  likening  all  knowledge  to  a  pyramid,  the  base  of 
which  may  be  taken  to  represent  history  (i.e.,  mere  em- 
pirical science),  the  apex  metaphysics,  the  intermediate 
portion  physics.  The  superiority  of  metaphysics  lies  in  the 
possession  of  certain  two  characters :  viz.,  a  higher  unity 
and  a  greater  "  capability  of  enfranchising  the  power  of 
man  unto  the  liberty  and  possibility  of  works  and  effects." 
Physics  carries  men  in  "  narrow  and  restrained  ways,  sub- 
ject to  many  accidents  of  impediments  imitating  the  ordi- 
nary flexuous  courses  of  nature ;  but  whoever  knows  any 
form  knows  the  utmost  possibility  of  superinducing  that 
nature  upon  any  variety  of  matter,  and  so  is  less  restrained 
in  operation  either  to  the  basis  of  the  matter  or  the  condi- 
tion of  the  efficient."  Subsidiary  to  physics  and  meta- 
physics, but  belonging  to  the  latter  rather  than  to  the 
former,  is  the  science  of  mathematics,  the  subject  of  which 


68  A    HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

is  definite  quantity  (indefinite  quantity  being  a  subject  of 
philosophia  prima).  Mathematics  is  pure  or  mixed:  of 
pure  mathematics  there  are  two  branches,  treating  respect- 
ively of  "  dissevered  quantity  "  and  "  continued  quantity." 
The  use,  or  value,  of  mathematics  is  quite  as  much  sub- 
jective (/.  e.,  value  as  a  means  of  intellectual  discipline)  as 
objective.  —  Operative  Philosophy  has  two  recognized  main 
parts,  corresponding  to  the  two  principal  divisions  of  Spec- 
ulative Philosophy,  —  Natural  Magic  (corresponding  to 
metaphysics),  and  Mechanics  (corresponding  to  physics). 
Natural  Magic  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  degenerate  magi- 
cal arts  of  alchemy,  astrology,  etc.  It  is  the  deduction 
of  operations  from  metaphysics,  —  applied  metaphysics. 
Bacon  here  proposes,  as  a  new  part  of  natural  philosophy, 
the  making  of  an  inventory  of  all  extant  discoveries,  and 
the  conducting  experiments,  and  not  only  such  as  shall  be 
esteemed  of  immediate,  but  also  such  as  are  of  most  uni- 
versal, consequence  for  the  discovery  of  other  experiments 
and  of  causes.  He  proposes  also,  as  a  last  part  of  natural 
philosophy,  the  making  of  "  calendars  of  doubts,"  "  calen- 
dars of  popular  errors,"  and  "  calendars  of  sects  of  philos- 
ophy."—  Human  Philosophy,  "though  the  end  and  term 
of  natural  philosophy  "  in  the  intention  of  man,  is  but  a 
"portion  of  philosophy  in  the  continent  of  nature": 
separated  from  natural  philosophy,  it  would  be  little  better 
than  "  empirical  practice."  ("  And  generally  let  this  be  a 
rule,"  says  Bacon,  "  that  a  partition  of  knowledges  be 
accepted  rather  for  lines  and  veins  than  for  sections  and 
separations;  and  that  the  continuance  and  entireness  of 
knowledge  be  preserved.")  Human  Philosophy  has  two 
parts,  one  of  which  deals  with  "  man  segregate,"  or  taken 
distributively,  and  the  other  with  "  man  congregate  "  :  it  is 
"simple  and  particular"  or  "congregate  and  civil."  Sim- 
ple Human  Philosophy  treats  of  the  "  league  of  body  and 
mind,"  and  of  the  body  and  the  mind  viewed  separately. 
The  science  of  the  "  league  of  body  and  mind  "  has  two 
parts,  one  of  which  is  called  physiognomy,  a«d  the  other  is 


BACON.  69 

without  a  name.  The  most  important  part  of  this  science 
is  that  relating  to  the  "  seats  and  domiciles  which  the  sev- 
eral faculties  of  the  mind  do  take  and  occupate."  (On  this 
point  Bacon  is  not  dogmatic,  but  inclines  to  the  doctrine  of 
Plato.)  Knowledge  of  the  body  is  of  four  sorts,  — relating 
to  health,  to  beauty,  to  strength,  and  to  pleasure ;  hence 
the  four  branches  of  physiology, —  medicine,  cosmetics, 
athletics,  and  the  "voluptuary  art  "(music  and  painting). 
Medicine  is  deficient,  in  being  too  empirical  and  not  taking 
comparative  views.  The  knowledge  of  the  Soul,  as  such,  or 
Psychology,  has  two  main  branches,  occupied,  respectively, 
with  the  origin  and  nature  of  the  soul,  and  with  the  subject 
or  substratum  of  the  faculties.  "  Considerations  of  the 
origin  of  the  soul,  whether  it  be  native  or  adventive,  and 
how  far  it  is  exempted  from  the  laws  of  matter,  and  of  the 
immortality  thereof,  should  be  bounded  by  religion." 
Bacon  distinguishes  a  rational  nature  (of  supernatural 
origin)  and  an  irrational,  or  material,  nature,  in  the  soul. 
Two  appendices  of  the  branch  of  psychology  are  Divina- 
tion, which  is  foreknowledge  growing  out  of  the  nature  of 
the  soul  in  itself,  and  Fascination,  the  "  power  and  act  of 
the  imagination  intensive  upon  other  bodies  than  the  body 
of  the  imaginant."  The  consideration  of  the  faculties  of 
the  rational  soul  has  two  branches,  treating,  respectively/ 
of  understanding  and  reason,  and  of  will,  appetite,  and 
affection ;  hence  the  sciences  Logic  and  Ethics.  Between 
the  two  leading  faculties,  or,  rather,  groups  of  faculties, 
stands  the  imagination,  which  has  the  office  of  mediating 
between  those  faculties  or  groups,  and  also  an  independent 
office,  as  in  Eloquence  and  Rhetoric.  Logic,  or  the  purely 
"  rational  "  or  intellectual  branch  of  Psychology,  has  four 
divisions  —  "  intellectual  arts  "  —  viz. :  Inquiry,  or  Inven- 
tion; Examination,  or  Judgment;  Custody,  or  Memory; 
Elocution,  or  Tradition.  Within  the  art  of  judgment  falls 
the  consideration  of  those  false  appearances,  those  idola,  of 
human  knowledge  (which  Bacon  claims  the  credit  of  being 
the  first  to  point  out  and  explain)  which  hinder  the  right 


7O  A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

operation  of  the  understanding  in  judgment.  (These  idola 
are  discussed  at  length  in  the  First  Book  of  the  "  Novum 
Organum."  See  infra.}  A  branch  of  the  art  of  Tradition 
is  Rhetoric,  which  has  for  its  office  the  "  application  of 
reason  to  imagination  for  the  better  moving  of  the  will." 
Rhetoric  is  an  "  excellent "  art,  and  "  can  no  more  be 
charged  with  coloring  of  the  worse  part  than  Logic  with 
sophistry,  or  morality  with  vice."  Appendices  of  rhetoric 
are  literary  criticism  and  pedagogy.  Ethics  treats  of  the 
doctrine  of  the  good  (the  utile),  which  is  either  private 
(or  particular)  or  "communicative"  (or  general).  The 
"  communicative  "  sort  of  good  is  paramount ;  active  life 
should  take  precedence  over  the  contemplative.  The 
"  husbandry  "  which  shall  procure  this  fruit  of  life  —  the 
good  —  is  culture  of  the  mind,  the  real  problem  of  Ethics. 
This  depends  upon  a  doctrine  of  human  knowledge  and  a 
doctrine  of  moral  culture.  Ethics  has  hitherto  (Bacon 
says)  been  deficient  in  a  knowledge  of  the  feelings  and 
temperaments  of  men.  —  Civil  Philosophy  is  "  conversant 
about  a  subject  which  of  all  others  is  most  immersed  in 
matter"  and  "  hardliest  reduced  to  axiom."  It  has  the 
three  branches,  "  Conversation,"  "  Negotiation,"  and  "  Gov- 
ernment "  :  civil  society,  that  is  to  say,  has  three  main  ends 
to  secure,  —  "comfort  in  loneliness,"  "advantage  in  busi- 
ness," and  "protection  from  injury."  "The  sum  of  be- 
havior "  (in  conversation)  is  "  to  retain  a  man's  own  dignity 
without  intruding  on  the  liberty  of  others."  In  negotiation, 
or  business,  a  knowledge  of  human  nature  is  of  the  highest 
importance :  other  things  of  value  are  slowness  of  belief, 
the  giving  of  trust  to  deeds  rather  than  words,  "  framing 
the  mind  to  be  pliant  and  obedient  to  occasion,"  etc. 
Speaking  of  Government,  Bacon  says,  "All  who  have 
written  of  laws  have  written  either  as  philosophers  or  as 
lawyers,  and  none  as  statesmen.  As  for  the  philosophers, 
they  make  imaginary  laws  for  imaginary  commonwealths ; 
and  their  discourses  are  as  the  stars,  which  give  little  light, 
because  they  are  so  high.  For  the  lawyers,  they  write,  accor- 


BACON.  71 

ding  to  the  states  where  they  live,  what  is  received  law,  not 
what  ought  to  be  law.  There  are  in  nature  certain  foun- 
tains of  justice  whence  all  civil  laws  are  derived  but  as 
streams."  —  Divine  Learning  "rests  upon  the  word  and 
oracle  of  God :  "  but  great  latitude  is  practised  as  regards 
the  use  of  reason  in  religion.  It  is  a  defect  in  Divine 
Learning  that  it  has  not  sufficiently  inquired  into  the  true 
limits  and  use  of  reason  in  religious  matters.  Reason  has 
two  uses  in  religion:  (i)  the  "  conceiving  and  appre- 
hending of  the  mysteries  of  God  revealed  to  us,"  and  (2) 
the  "  inferring  and  deriving  of  doctrine  and  direction  there- 
from." There  are  two  principal  parts  of  Divinity:  the 
matter  or  information  revealed,  and  the  nature  of  the  re- 
velation. Perfection  or  completeness  in  Divinity  is  not  to 
be  sought.  The  Scriptures  require  to  be  treated  according 
to  a  method  not  applicable  to  any  other  written  work. 

2.  The  New  Method  of  the  Interpretation  of  Nature. 
Introduction.  —  The  New  Method,  or  Organon,  is  by  Bacon 
distinguished  from  the  Old,  —  the  traditional  logic  having 
its  source  remotely  in  the  Organon  of  Aristotle  —  as  re- 
gards "  end,"  "  order  of  demonstration,"  and  "  starting-point 
of  inquiry."  As  to  end,  the  New  Method  aims  ultimately 
at  the  invention  of  arts,  not,  like  the  Old,  at  the  invention 
of  mere  arguments.  As  to  "  order  of  demonstration," 
the  New  Method  entirely  rejects  the  syllogism,  because 
of  the  uncertainty  of  mere  words,  and  of  the  fact  that  the 
primary  notions  which  must  form  the  content  of  the  terms 
of  the  propositions  constituting  syllogisms  are  as  yet  vague 
and  false  from  overhastiness  of  induction ;  and  it  proceeds 
regularly  and  gradually  from  one  axiom  to  another,  so  that 
the  most  general  are  now  reached  only  last.  As  to  start- 
ing-point, the  New  Method  begins  with  careful  o&servation 
and  induction,  treating  the  received  first  notions  and  the 
immediate  reports  of  the  senses  as  inadequate  and  false. 
The  Old  Method  was  a  method  of  "  anticipation  "  or  of 
applying  preconceived  notions  to  the  judgment  of  nature : 
the  New  Method  is  a  method  of  interpreting  nature.  Nor 


72  A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

is  the  New  Method  sceptical,  any  more  than  dogmatic ; 
it  does  not  assert  or  imply  that  nothing  can  be  known,  but 
rather  the  contrary.  In  the  treatise  on  the  New  Method, 
viz.,  the  "  Novum  Organum,"  Bacon  devotes  one  book, 
the  first,  (chiefly)  to  pointing  out  and  explaining  the  idola 
of  human  knowledge,  and  a  second  to  explaining  the 
method  itself. 

The  Idola  of  Human  Knowledge.  —  Man  is  the  "  ser- 
vant and  interpreter  of  nature  :  "  he  can  do  and  under- 
stand only  so  much  as  he  has  observed  in  fact  or  in  thought 
of  the  course  of  nature.  The  unaided  intellect,  like  the 
unaided  hand,  cannot  effect  much.  To  penetrate  into  the 
recesses  of  nature,  we  require  a  fixed  and  sure  method. 
The  mind  must  be  led  to  particulars  and  their  series  and 
order,  and  must  lay  aside  its  preconceived,  false  notions 
and  become  familiar  with  facts.  There  are  four  sorts  of 
false  notions  besetting  men's  minds,  which  must  be  known, 
either  to  the  end  that  they  be  eradicated,  or,  if  that  be  not 
possible,  be  not  allowed  to  warp  the  mind  in  its  search  for 
truth.  First,  the  human  understanding  has  false  notions 
because  it  is  prone  to  suppose  the  existence  of  more  order 
and  regularity  in  the  world  than  there  really  is :  having 
once  formed  an  opinion,  it  seeks  to  support  it  by  all  pos- 
sible means;  it  is  deeply  impressed  by  that  which  sud- 
denly strikes  the  imagination ;  it  is  restless ;  it  is  not 
a  "  dry  light,"  but  is  clouded  by  the  influence  of  the 
will  and  feelings ;  it  is  deceived  by  the  dulness  and  inept- 
ness  of  the  senses ;  it  is  prone  to  abstraction,  and  to  give 
substance  and  reality  to  things  transitory.  These  false 
notions  are,  by  name,  Idola  Tribiis  ("  idola  of  the  tribe 
or  race  ").  Another  class  of  false  notions  are  those  beset- 
ting individual  minds  as  such,  —  Idola  Specus  ("  idola  of 
the  cave").  They  are  such  as  result  from  the  circum- 
stances that  particular  men  become  attached  to  certain 
particular  sciences  or  speculations,  to  the  neglect  of  others, 
that  some  minds  are  more  apt  to  mark  differences,  others  the 
likenesses  of  things,  some  are  given  to  the  admiration 


BACON. 


73 


of  antiquity,  others  to  an  extreme  "  love  and  appetite  for 
novelty,"  etc.  A  third  class  —  the  most  important  —  of 
idola,  Idola  Fori  ("  idola  of  the  market-place  "),  are  such 
as  are  due  to  the  "alliance  of  words  and  names."  A 
fourth  class,  Idola  Theatri  ("idola  of  the  theatre"),  in- 
cludes the  false  notions  caused  by  the  (uncritical)  recep- 
tion of  (ancient)  systems  of  philosophy.  —  The  destruction 
and  avoidance  of  idola,  though  of  very  great  importance, 
is  but  a  negative  and  preliminary  work  in  the  advance- 
ment of  human  knowledge.  The  chief  hope  for  that 
advancement  lies  in  induction  by  means  of  contradictory 
instances  (and  this  is  as  true  in  Ethics  and  Politics  as 
in  Physics).  Hypothesis  also  may  be  of  use,  if  cautiously 
employed. 

The  Positive  Side  of  the  Interpretation  of  Nature.  — The 
(positive)  interpretation  of  nature  has  two  parts:  i,  the 
eduction  of  axioms  or  forms  from  experience  ;  and,  2,  the 
derivation  of  new  experiments  from  forms.  There  is,  first 
of  all,  required  for  the  discovery  of  forms  :  (i)  a  "  muster 
or  presentation  before  the  understanding  of  all  known 
instances  which  agree  in  the  same  nature  (selected  for 
investigation),  though  in  substances  the  most  unlike;" 
/.  e.,  what  may  be  termed  (is  so  termed  by  Bacon)  a 
Table  of  Essence  and  Presence;  (2)  a  "presentation 
to  the  understanding  of  instances  in  which  the  given  nature 
is  wanting  (for  the  form  ought  no  less  to  be  absent  when 
the  given  nature  is  absent,  than  present  when  it  is  present), 
and  since  to  note  all  these  would  be  endless,  also  the  sub- 
joining to  the  affirmatives  of  the  negatives,  and  the  inquir- 
ing as  to  the  absence  of  the  given  nature  only  in  those 
subjects  which  are  most  akin  to  the  others  in  which  it  is 
present  and  forthcoming,"  —  Table  of  Deviation  or  Ab- 
sence in  Proximity;  (3)  a  "presentation  to  the  under- 
standing of  instances  in  which  the  nature  under  inquiry 
is  found  in  different  degrees,  more  or  less,  which  must 
be  done  by  making  a  comparison  either  of  its  increase 
or  decrease  in  the  same  subject,  or  its  amount  in  different 


74  A    HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

subjects,  as  compared  with  one  another,"  —  Table  of  De- 
grees, or  Table  of  Comparison.  It  is  next  necessary,  in 
order  to  discover  the  "  form  "  of  a  given  nature,  or  the 
nature  which  always  occurs  with  it  as  its  cause,  to  exclude 
from  investigation  all  natures  not  always  found  in  con- 
junction with  the  given  nature,  or  not  found  to  increase 
or  decrease  when  the  nature  increases  or  decreases.  This 
process  of  exclusion  is  the  foundation,  but  not  the  real 
beginning,  of  it  in  an  affirmative  sense  ;  which  is  made 
only  by  a  survey  of  all  instances  remaining  after  the  pro- 
cess of  exclusion.  The  result  of  this  survey  may  be  called 
the  First  Vintage.  It  is  always  of  a  somewhat  tentative 
character,  and  requires  to  be  supplemented  by  certain  "  helps 
of  the  understanding  in  the  interpretation  of  nature  and 
true  and  perfect  induction."  These  helps  of  the  under- 
standing (only  the  first  of  which  was  ever  fully  explained, 
owing  to  the  fragmentary  character  of  the  treatise  on  the 
Interpretation  of  Nature)  are  as  follows :  ( i )  prerogative 
instances  (/.  e.,  instances  of  first  importance)  ;  (2)  supports 
of  induction;  (3)  rectification  of  induction;  (4)  varying 
of  the  investigation  according  to  the  nature  of  the  subject ; 
(5)  prerogative  natures  with  respect  to  investigation  (or 
what  should  be  inquired  of  first  and  what  last)  ;  (6)  limits 
of  investigation,  or  a  synopsis  of  all  natures  in  the  universe  ; 
(7)  application  to  practice,  or  things  in  their  relation 
toman;  (8)  preparations  for  investigation:  (9)  ascend- 
ing and  descending  scale  of  axioms.  The  prerogative 
instances  —  twenty-seven  in  all  —  are  distinguished  among 
themselves  by  their  different  values  in  relation  to  the 
"  speculative  "  or  the  "  operative "  phases  of  induction, 
to  the  activities  of  sense  and  of  understanding,  etc.  Cer- 
tain instances,  five  in  number,  the  "  Instances  of  the 
Lamp  "  (the  use  of  a  fanciful  terminology  is  characteristic 
of  Bacon),  have  their  significance  in  the  fact  that  they 
assist  the  senses.  Others,  "  by  facilitating  the  processes 
of  exclusion,  by  narrowing  and  indicating  more  nearly  the 
affirmative  of  the  form,  or  by  exalting  the  understanding 


BACON.  75 

and  leading  it  to  genera  and  common  natures,  etc.,  assist 
the  understanding.  Of  Bacon's  twenty-seven  prerogative 
instances,  it  must  suffice  to  notice  in  particular  only  one, 
—  the  Crucial  Instance,  or  "  Instance  of  the  Finger-post," 
which,  according  to  Professor  Fowler,1  is  "  by  far  the  most 
celebrated  of  all "  :  "  When  in  the  investigation  of  any 
nature  the  understanding  is  so  balanced  as  to  be  uncertain 
to  which  of  two  or  more  natures  the  cause  of  the  nature 
in  question  should  be  assigned,  on  account  of  the  frequent 
and  ordinary  concurrence  of  many  natures,  Instances  of 
the  Finger-post  are  such  as  show  the  union  of  one  of  the 
natures  with  the  nature  in  question  to  be  sure  and  indis- 
soluble, of  the  other  to  be  varied  and  separable.  For 
example,  if  it  be  found  in  any  history  worthy  of  credit 
that  there  has  been  any  comet,  whether  high  or  low,  which 
has  not  revolved  in  manifest  agreement  (however  irregular) 
with  the  diurnal  motion,  but  has  revolved  in  the  opposite 
direction,  then  certainly  we  may  set  down  thus  much  as 
established  that  there  may  be  in  nature  some  such  motion. 
But  if  nothing  of  the  kind  can  be  found,  it  must  be  re- 
garded as  questionable,  and  recourse  had  to  other  Instances 
of  the  Finger-post  about  it."  Following  are  the  mere 
names  of  a  number  of  the  instances :  Solitary  Instances, 
Migratory  Instances,  Striking  Instances,  Clandestine  In- 
stances, Instances  of  Range  or  Limitation.  (It  should  here 
be  said  that  it  is  not  always  easy  to  separate  the  instances 
clearly  one  from  another,  and  in  fact  there  appears  to  be 
considerable  overlapping  among  them.) 

Natural  and  Experimental  History?  —  Bacon's  chief 
performance  in  the  gathering  of  data  for  the  new  science 
is  a  collection  consisting  of  one  thousand  "  experiments," 
grouped,  in  no  very  systematic  fashion,  into  ten  equal 
divisions  (termed  "centuries").  One  group  relates  to 
"  percolation,"  another  to  the  subject  of  musical  phenomena 

1  See  note  on  this  topic  in  his  edition  of  the  "  Novum  Organum ; " 
also  "  Bacon  "  in  "  English  Philosophers  "  series. 

2  See  Nichol's  Bacon  ("  Blackwood's  Philosophical  Classics"). 


76  A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

in  general,  another  to  that  of  sound,  another  to  the  ways 
and  means  of  retarding  or  accelerating  the  ordinary  pro- 
cesses of  nature,  three  others  to  plant- management,  two 
to  miscellaneous  topics,  —  heat,  weight,  growth  and  frui- 
tion, want  of  rain  in  Egypt,  sources  of  fevers,  —  one  to 
what  would  be  at  the  present  moment  called  phenomena  of 
"  telepathy."  "  Experiments  "  are  distinguished  by  Bacon 
as  "  experiments  solitary  "  and  "  experiments  in  consort." 
(Much  the  greater  part  of  the  "facts"  of  the  "Sylva  Syl- 
varum  "  were,  according  to  one  of  Bacon's  editors,  drawn 
from  a  few  then  well-known  authors,  —  George  Sandys, 
Cardanus,  Aristotle,  Pliny,  and,  especially,  the  Italian  Bap- 
tista  Porta :  some  were  gathered  from  hearsay,  and  some, 
finally,  were  the  fruit  of  Bacon's  own  observation.  The 
collection  possesses  little  or  no  scientific  value  in  itself.) 

"Principles  and  Origins."  * —  We  may  pass  over  entirely 
the  remaining  parts  of  Bacon's  vast  scheme,  —  unless,  in- 
deed, what  we  are  about  to  discuss  belongs  to  the  Fifth 
Part,  —  and  take  up  Bacon's  metaphysical  principles  proper. 
Reality,  according  to  Bacon,  is  not  unknowable ;  scepticism 
is  an  "  idle  doctrine."  Reality  is  not,  indeed,  an  object  of 
sense,  but  it  is  known  through  combined  sense  and  under- 
standing. The  real  —  that  to  which  the  "new  method" 
must  guide  us  —  is  a  primary  matter,  not  formless,  but  hav- 
ing certain  definite  qualities.  Beyond,  or  behind,  this,  we 
cannot  by  mere  philosophy  get.  It  is  the  First  Cause  within 
nature,  and  the  cause  of  causes  next  to  God  Himself,  and 
must  be  taken  just  as  found.  It  were  as  foolish  to  try  to 
get  back  of  this  as  not  to  look  for  a  cause  of  the  immediate 
phenomena  of  sense.  It  is  the  primary  qualities  of  this 
matter  which  are  the  ultimate  objects  of  philosophy's  quest, 
—  the  "  forms."  Philosophy  is  natural  science.  Ultimate 
reality,  or  God,  is  known  only  through  Revelation. 

Bacon's  Position  and  Rank  as  a  Philosopher.  —  Bacon 
deserves,  in  a  certain  sense,  but  not  without  qualification, 
the  title  often  accorded  to  him  of  the  "  Father  of  Modern 

1  See  Nichol's  Bacon. 


BA  CON.  —  HOBBES.  57 

Inductive  Philosophy."  The  method  of  induction  had,  as 
we  have  had  occasion  to  see,  been  advocated  in  modern 
philosophy  prior  to  Bacon  :  but  Bacon  was  the  first  to  make 
the  method  the  object  of  comprehensive  reflection,  and  to 
institute  a  formal  investigation  into  its  character;  and, 
though  his  "  analysis  "  of  the  method  was  imperfect,  those 
who  helped  practically  to  perfect  the  method  —  Descartes 
and  Newton,  in  particular  —  were  not  uninfluenced  by  what 
Bacon  had  done  before  them.  Practically,  it  is  true,  Bacon 
was  no  inductive  philosopher,  butjie  clearly  saw  and  stated 
the  object  of  inductive  philosophy,  viz.,  to  discover  "  causes 
or  facts  of  causation,"  and  the  importance  of  an  "  acquain- 
tance with  facts,"  and  of  complete  analysis  and  cautious 
generalization.  What  he  did  not  appreciate,  was  the  value 
of  certain  things  which  more  mature  reflection  upon  in- 
duction has  learned  to  emphasize,  viz.,  hypothesis,  deduc- 
tive inference,  and  verification.  Bacon  does  not  touch  the 
metaphysical  problems  lying  back  of  induction,  /.  <?.,  does 
not  consider  how  it  is  possible,  and  what  it  means.  But 
Bacon  was  something  more  than  a  philosopher  of  induction ; 
he  was  an  initiator  of  a  critical  attitude  of  thought,  a  real 
forerunner  even,  notwithstanding  their  wide  differences,  of 
the  greatest  of  all  critical  philosophers,  Kant ;  his  doctrine 
of  the  idola  of  human  thought  is  an  anticipation  (in  the 
empirical  sphere  of  reflection,  it  is  true)  of  the  "  Kritik  of 
Pure  Reason  "  of  Kant.  That  Bacon  was  not  a  speculative 
philosopher  in  the  highest  sense  of  the  term  scarcely  needs 
be  said.  Though  he  condemned  mere  empiricism  in  method, 
the  real  was  practically  for  him,  as  a  philosopher,  in  the 
domain  of  mere  consciousness  as  distinguished  from  self- 
consciousness,  or  from  the  union  of  the  two.  He  is  to 
be  regarded  as  the  initiator  of  the  empirical  direction  in 
modern  philosophy. 

§  45- 
Thomas  Hobbes*  (1588-1679). —  Hobbes,  who  sprang 

1  Prof.     Robertson's     "  Hobbes "    ("  Blackwood's    Philosophical 
Classics  ")  ;  Hobbes's  "  Elements  of  Philosophy,"  "  Leviathan,"  etc. 


78  A    HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

from  a  "  plain  English  stock,"  was  educated  at  the  Univer- 
sity of  Oxford.  He  left  the  university  with  a  very  unfavor- 
able opinion  of  the  instruction  and  discipline  in  vogue  there. 
Among  the  causes  of  his  dissatisfaction  had  been  the  Scho- 
lastic, superficially  formal  treatment  of  logical,  metaphysical, 
and  physical  sciences  at  Oxford.  After  graduation  Hobbes 
travelled  on  the  Continent,  in  the  capacity  of  tutor  to  a 
member  of  the  Cavendish  family.  (He  resided  with  the 
family  for  more  than  thirty  years.)  He  carried  on  classical 
studies;  and  made  a  translation  (published  1628)  of  the 
History  of  Thucydides  for  the  "purpose  of  showing  the 
evils  of  popular  government."  Between  the  years  1621 
and  1626  he  was,  it  appears,  private  secretary  of  Bacon, 
and  assisted  in  the  translation  of  some  of  Bacon's  works 
from  English  into  Latin.  In  the  years  1629-1631  a  second 
journey  was  made  by  him  on  the  Continent,  and  within  not 
many  years  afterwards  two  others,  all  of  which  proved  of 
the  utmost  importance  for  Hobbes's  scientific  development, 
since  they  brought  him  into  direct  communication  with 
some  of  the  most  eminent  men  of  science  on  the  Continent, 
and  acquainted  him  with  the  actual  state  of  scientific  dis- 
covery at  the  time.  During  the  period  of  the  Civil  Wars 
and  for  some  time  before  and  afterwards  (i.  e.,  from  1640  to 
1651),  Hobbes  was  again  on  the  Continent;  after  that  he 
lived  in  England  continually  till  his  death.  His  scientific 
and  philosophical  activity  were  for  the  most  part  completed 
before  his  final  return  to  England  from  the  Continent. 
Literary  composition  and  acrid  learned  controversies  occu- 
pied his  later  years. 

Works.  —  Hobbes's  chief  philosophical  works  are,  "  Ele- 
menta  Philosophica  de  Give"  (1642),  "  De  Corpore  Po- 
litico, or  the  Elements  of  Law,  Moral,  and  Politic  "  (1650), 
"  Human  Nature,  or  the  Fundamental  Elements  of  Polity  " 
(1650),  "Leviathan,  or  the  Matter,  Form,  and  Power  of  a 
Commonwealth,  Ecclesiastical  and  Civil"  (1651),  "Of 
Liberty  and  Necessity,"  etc.  (1654),  "  Elementa  Philo- 
sophise" ("De  Corpore,"  "  De  Homine,"  "De  Give," 


HOBBES. 


79 


1668).  —  (We  may  mention,  of  Hobbes's  nonphilosophical 
works,  his  "  Behemoth,"  a  history  of  the  Civil  War,  and  a 
metrical  translation  of  the  "  Iliad  "  and  the  "Odyssey.") 

Philosophy.  Problem,  Parts,  and  End  of  Philosophy.  — 
Philosophy  is,  according  to  Hobbes,  the  knowledge  of 
causes;  or,  more  accurately  speaking,  the  knowledge  of 
causes  from  given  effects,  and  the  knowledge  of  effects  from 
already  known  causes :  it  is  the  knowledge  of  the  genera- 
tive and  the  generable ;  the  knowledge  of  "  nature."  Phi- 
losophy is  a  science  in  the  strict  sense :  it  is,  indeed, 
science  itself  (CTTIOTT//-^)  .  It  has  nothing  to  do  with  the 
supernatural  (or  nongenerable)  or  the  eternal  (the  object 
of  "  faith  ")  ;  it  is  not  in  any  sense  metaphysics  or  theology. 
It  is  distinct  from  experience  as  such,  or  the  merely  em- 
pirical knowledge  of  things  (Aristotle's  €/u7r«pta)  ;  it  is 
distinguished  from  experience  in  that  it  is  reasoned  sys- 
tematic knowledge,  whereas  experience  is  haphazard  and 
reaches  no  universal  conclusions.  It  has  nothing  to  do 
with  history,  natural  or  civil,  so  far  as  these  rest  on  expe- 
rience (including  authority  or  testimony).  Philosophy,  or 
science,  as  general  knowledge,  is  a  knowledge  of  names 
expressing  the  common  attributes  of  things ;  its  foundation 
is  definitions  (or  the  explications  of  the  meanings  of 
names),  or  when  (as  in  the  case  of  the  simplest  notions, 
space,  body,  motion,  etc.)  definitions  are  impossible,  the 
nearest  possible  approach  to  them  by  mere  indication  or 
suggestion.  The  body  of  all  primary  or  fundamental  defi- 
nitions, together  with  their  direct  consequences,  constitutes 
First  Philosophy  (philosophia  prima).  All  definitions  or 
indications  or  suggestions  of  primary  notions  are  expres- 
sions of  abstract  notions  of  things  perceived  by  sense ;  all 
knowledge  takes  its  "rise  intense.  "Rnt  SPT^P  ppjrcgSwT 
only  l5ocITes~and  their  attributes.  This  it  can  do  only  as 
motions  proceeding  from  bodies  affect  the  organs  of  sense. 
Bodies  are  in  motion ;  their  attributes,  so  far  as  they  can 
be  known  at  least,  are  generated  by  motion.  By  motion  in 
bodies  is  generated  the  attribute  of  extension,  the  science 


80  A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  which  is  Geometry.  The  theory  of  effects  of  motion 
between  bodies  is  the  Doctrine  of  Motion.  The  theory  of 
motion  as  it  affects  the  senses,  producing  the  qualities  of 
light,  heat,  sound,  etc.,  is  Physics.  The  doctrine  of  motions 
of  the  individual  mind  is  Moral Philosophy ;  that  of  motions 
of  minds  associated  is  Civil  Philosophy.  If  we  add  to  the 
foregoing  divisions  Logic,  or  the  science  of  reasoning,  or 
computation  (in  the  arithmetical  sense),  we  have  the  main 
branches  of  Philosophy  as  the  doctrine  of  bodies.  These 
branches  group  themselves  as  follows :  ( i )  Preliminary 
Sciences,  —  Logic  and  First  Philosophy;  (2)  Natural  Phi- 
losophy, —  Geometry,  the  Doctrine  of  Motion,  Physics ; 
(3)  Civil  Philosophy,  —  Moral  Philosophy  and  Civil  Phi- 
losophy (in  the  narrower  sense).  "The  end  or  scope  of 
philosophy  is,"  says  Hobbes,  "that  we  may  make  use  to 
our  benefit  of  effects  formerly  seen ;  or  that  by  the  applica- 
tion of  bodies  to  one  another  we  may  produce  the  like 
effects  of  those  we  conceive  in  our  mind,  as  far  forth  as 
matter,  strength,  and  industry  will  permit,  for  the  commodity 
of  human  life." 

N  First  Philosophy.  —  It  is  possible  to  conceive  all  things 
annihilated,  except  space  and  time.  From  the  notions  of 
space  and  time  are  derived  all  such  notions  as  part  and 
whole,  division  and  composition,  one  and  number,  con- 
tinuous and  contiguous,  beginning  and  end,  finite  and 
infinite.  Space  and  time  are  the  subjective  correlatives 
of  two  primary  attributes  of  body,  viz.,  extension  and  mo- 
tion. The  "  attributes  "  extension  and  motion  —  and  indeed 
attributes  in  general  —  do  not  form  a  part  of,  or  even 
inhere  in,  body  as  such,  but  are  merely  our  modes  of 
conceiving  body,  or  the  "  power  body  has  of  making 
itself  to  be  conceived."  The  only  necessary  attribute  of 
body  is  extension.  The  generation  and  the  destruction 
of  body  are  merely  the  generation  and  the  destruction 
of  the  attributes  of  body  (extension  excepted).  For  us 
body  is  its  attributes ;  and  the  essence  of  body  is  merely 
"  that  accident  for  which  a  thing  gets  its  name."  Body  as 


HOBBES.  8 1 

the  materia  prima  of  the  Scholastics  is  an  abstraction.  The 
causes  of  attributes  are  motions.  The  causes  of  motions 
are  other  motions,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum.  The  relations  of 
bodies  are  purely  mechanical.  "  An  effect  wrought  in  any 
patient  is  the  generation  or  destruction  of  some  accident, 
and  the  cause  of  this  effect  is  nothing  less  than  the  aggre- 
gate of  all  accidents  in  agent  and  patient  together,  which 
being  supposed  present,  it  cannot  be  understood  that  the 
effect  is  not  at  the  same  time  produced,  and  any  of  which 
being  absent  it  cannot  be  understood  that  the  effect  is  pro- 
duced. Such  is  cause  simple  and  entire,  inclusive  of  causa 
sine  qua  non,  which  may  be  any  one  of  the  accidents  that 
in  a  particular  case  is  wanting  to  the  production  of  the 
effect."  All  causes  are  either  efficient  or  material,  —  formal 
and  final  causes  are  mere  metaphysical  figments,  or,  rather, 
special  cases  of  efficient  cause.  For  distinction's  sake,  effi- 
cient cause  is  in  those  beings  which  have  sense  or  will,  called 
final  cause;  the  term  "power"  has  meaning  only  as  indi- 
cating a  cause  the  effect  of  which  is  yet  to  be  produced. 
There  is  a  cause  for  every  accident.  The  accident  is  "  con- 
tingent "  only  as  depending  on  its  cause.  That  for  which 
there  is  no  cause  is  impossible,  and  vice  versa.  Everything 
possible  will  necessarily  be  produced.  Bodies  falling  under 
the  same  sense  belong  to  the  same  species.  Relations,  — 
identity  and  difference,  likeness  and  unlikeness,  equality  and 
inequality,  etc.,  are  not  accidents. 

Geometry.  —  Hobbes's  treatment  of  Geometry  concerns 
it  chiefly  as  regards  its  form  or  method.  Geometry  is,  in 
this  regard,  the  pattern  of  all  (demonstrative)  sciences.  It 
is  so  because  in  Geometry  we  generate  the  very  objects  to 
be  known,  —  lines,  surfaces,  figures,  etc.,  —  and  thus  know 
them  in  their  very  causes. 

Doctrine  of  Motion.  —  Motion  is  universal.  Non-visible 
motion,  or  motion  occurring  in  less  time  and  space  than 
can  be  conceived,  is  nevertheless  real  and  effective  motion. 
It  may  be  termed  "  endeavor :  "  it  is  indestructible,  and 
propagates  itself  ad  indefinitum.  All  motion  has  for  its 
voi.  i.  —  6 


82  A   Hf STORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

cause  other  motion,  and  that  another,  etc.  Motion  is  either 
"simple  circular"  motion  or  "compound  circular"  motion 
(or  motion  about  an  axis). 

Physics.  —  Physics,  or  the  doctrine  of  concrete  material 
existence  in  general,  is  dependent  upon  experience  ;  has 
therefore  an  a  posteriori  character,  herein  differing  from 
Geometry  and  the  Doctrine  of  Motion.  Since  time  and 
space,  and,  consequently,  all  things  as  conceived  under  the 
forms  of  them,  are  purely  subjective,  there  is  no  proving 
from  them  the  infinity  of  the  real  world  in  time  and  space ; 
there  is  no  necessary  connection  between  body  as  it  is  in 
itself  and  the  notions  of  time  and  space.  From  the  sub- 
jectivity of  the  notion  of  space  follows  the  meaninglessness 
of  the  idea  of  the  vacuum  as  applied  to  the  real  world. 
The  real  world,  in  fact,  is  a  plenum  of  bodies,  visible  and 
invisible,  —  solid,  fluid,  and  both  solid  and  fluid.  Physical 
continuity  depends  on  the  omnipresence  of  the  perfect 
fluid,  aether,  which  fills  all  space  not  otherwise  occupied. 
/Ether  is  common  air  minus  the  solid  particles  commonly 
mixed  with  air.  Its  existence  is  predicated  only  as  an  in- 
ference from  the  fact  of  action  at  a  distance,  as,  for  example, 
in  the  case  of  objects  affecting  our  senses.  Upon  the  move- 
ment of  the  aether  in  and  out  of  the  interstices  of  bodies 
depend  the  phenomena  of  rarefaction  and  condensation, 
^ther  transmits  motion  equally  in  all  directions  and  with- 
out any  loss.  It  is  through  the  medium  of  the  aether  that 
the  sun  by  its  motions  rules  the  solar  system,  as  regards 
movement,  light,  heat,  etc.  Visible  bodies  are  aggregates 
of  quasi-atomic  bodies  everywhere  floating  in  the  aether. 

Moral  Philosophy.  —  The  soul  of  man  cannot  be  imma- 
terial, since  all  that  really  exists  is  material  or  extended. 
The  chief  seat  of  the  soul  is  the  heart,  from  which  are 
distributed  through  nerves  to  the  brain  and  the  rest  of 
the  body  the  impulses  of  both  bodily  and  mental  life.  The 
powers  of  the  soul  are  two,  —  cognitive  and  motive,  the 
latter  depending  upon  the  former.  Our  ideas  of  external 
objects  are  merely  subjective  reactions  from  the  heart  in 


HOBBES,  83 

response  to  impressions  made  by  external  motions  on  the 
organs  of  sensation.  Not  every  reaction  is  sensation,  but 
only  "  that  which  at  several  times  is  by  vehemence  made 
stronger  than  the  rest,  and  which  deprives  us  of  the  sense 
of  other  phantasms,  as  the  sun  deprives  the  rest  of  the  stars 
of  light."  The  "  subject "  of  sensation  is  the  entire  organ- 
ism ;  the  object  is  real  body  (not  the  subjectively  conceived 
qualities).  We  objectify  body,  because  the  "endeavor" 
of  the  heart  in  response  to  external  stimulation  is  felt  as 
outgoing,  and  "seemeth  to  be  some  matter  without."  A 
necessary  condition  of  sensation  is  a  perpetual  change  of 
object  of  sensation  :  "to  be  sensible  of  the  same  thing  "  is 
"  not  to  be  sensible  at  all."  The  continuance  of  motion  iu 
an  organ  of  sense,  after  the  removal  of  the  cause  exciting  it, 
produces  imagination  and  memory,  which  may,  therefore, 
be  termed  "  weakened  sense,"  and  are,  in  fact,  sense  over- 
powered by  newer  sense.  Transition  from  one  imagination 
to  another  occurs  only  in  case  the  latter  has  once  been 
before  sense :  the  principle  of  association,  in  other  words, 
between  acts  of  imagination  or  of  memory,  is  that  of  conti- 
guity. Connected  acts  of  imagination  or  memory  constitute 
"  mental  discourse."  The  power  of  conjoining  ideas  other- 
wise than  they  are  conjoined  in  mere  experience,  and  of 
giving  them  a  definite  and  fixed  succession,  is  reason.  In 
the  fixing  of  the  succession  of  ideas  language  is  a  necessary 
medium,  since  only  by  it  are  we  able  to  comprehend  many 
things  together  in  their  unity,  and  relieve  ourselves  of  the 
burden  of  our  ideas  merely  collectively  taken.  Reason  is  not 
inborn,  nor  a  product  of  "  experience,"  but  an  acquisition 
made  by  "  industry," — by  "apt  imposing  of  names  and  pro- 
ceeding in  orderly  method  from  the  elements,  which  are 
names,  to  assertions  made  by  conversion  of  one  with  an- 
other." When  an  "endeavor,"  or  non-visible  motion,  from 
the  heart  towards  the  organ  of  sense  is  accompanied  with  a 
feeling  of  pleasure  or  pain,  there  is  also  an  accompanying 
endeavor  towards  or  away  from  the  organs  of  motion,  which 
may  be  called  appetite  (desire)  or  aversion.  The  pleasure 


84  A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

and  the  appetite,  the  pain  and  the  aversion,  are  one  and  the 
same  thing  viewed  from  different  sides.  Pleasures  and  pains 
are  either  bodily  or  mental.  Mental  pleasures  and  pains  in- 
volving the  sense  of  power  (/.  e.,  of  one's  faculties,  knowl- 
edge, place,  riches,  etc.)  are  passions.  The  simple  passions 
are  appetite  (desire)  and  aversion,  love  and  hate,  joy  and 
grief.  Appetite  with  expectation  of  obtaining  that  of  which 
there  is  appetite  is  hope ;  with  expectation  of  the  opposite, 
despair.  Aversion  with  expectation  of  hurt  is  fear ;  the 
same  with  expectation  of  avoiding  hurt  is  courage.  Sudden 
courage  is  anger.  Desire  to  know  "  how  "  and  "  why  "  is 
curiosity,  which  is  peculiar  to  man  among  animals.  Laugh- 
ter proceeds  from  sudden  glory  (elation).  Pity  for  an- 
other arises  from  conceiving  that  his  calamity  may  befall 
one's  self,  etc.  The  alternation  of  the  passions  of  desire 
and  aversion  is  the  cause  of  deliberation.  Will  is  the  last 
appetite  which  presents  itself  in  the  act  of  deliberation, 
when  there  happens  to  be  deliberation.  In  any  case,  it  is 
merely  appetite  or  desire :  there  is  no  freedom  or  purely 
rational  self-determination.  Whatever  is  the  object  of  will 
or  appetite  is  good ;  the  opposite  evil.  The  kinds  of  good 
are,  "good  in  the  promise  "  (the pulchrum,  i.  e.,  beautiful), 
"good  in  the  effect  as  the  end  desired  "  (the  jucundum,  or 
delightful),  "good  as  the  means  "  (the  uti/e,  or  profitable). 
The  corresponding  sorts  of  evil  are,  —  the  furpe,  or  base  ; 
the  moles  turn,  or  troublesome  ;  the  inutile,  or  unprofitable, 
hurtful.  Man  is,  primarily,  moved  by  selfish  impulses. 
Happiness  is  not  a  mere  feeling  of  pleasure  or  content- 
ment :  the  "  felicity  of  this  life  consisteth  not  in  the  repose 
of  a  mind  satisfied^  but  in  a  continual  progress  of  desire 
from  one  object  to  another,  the  attaining  of  the  former 
being  still  the  way  to  the  latter."  The  passions  of  men 
determine  not  merely  their  actions,  but  also  their  concep- 
tions of  the  natures  and  causes  of  things  in  general,  causing 
them  to  attribute  to  invisible  powers  and  agencies  the  phe- 
nomena about  them.  Hence  arises  religion.  The  idea  of 
a  first  eternal  cause  is  a  consequence  of  man's  curiosity, 


HOBBES.  85 

or  the  impulse  to  know  the  "how"  and  "why"  of  things 
rather  than  of  the  mere  passions,  such,  for  example,  as 
anxiety  and  fear  regarding  his  fortunes. 

Civil  Philosophy.  —  Men  are  actuated  by  the  three  pas- 
sions of  the  desire  of  safety,  desire  of  gain,  and  desire  of 
glory,  —  all  sources  of  dissension.  The  natural  state  of 
men,  consequently,  is  a  state  of  war.  Jn^such  a  state  the 
"  life  of  man  is  poor,  nasty,  brutish,  and  short,  and  in  it 
there  is  no  property,  no  dominion,  no  mine  and  thine  dis- 
tinct, but  that  is  every  man's  that  he  can  get,  and  for  so 
long  as  he  can  keep  it."  The  undesirableness  of  such  a 
state,  the  desire  of  things  promotive  of  commodious  living, 
and  the  hope  of  being  able  to  attain  them,  together  with 
the  fear  of  death  and  the  instinct  of  self-preservation,  cause 
men  to  seek  the  conditions  of  peace,  which,  indeed,  is  the 
"  first  law  of  nature,"  the  second  being  to  defend  one's  self. 
These  conditions  men  come  to  find  in  a  mutual  transfer- 
enTC"  of  right  by  means  of  covenant ;  the  performance  of 
the  covenant  made ;  the  practice  of  gratitude,  sociability, 
mercifulness ;  eschewing  cruelty,  pride,  and  arrogance ; 
observance  of  equity  in  judging  between  man  and  man,  etc. 
(Hobbes  enumerates  twenty- two  such  conditions,  which  he 
calls  "  laws  of  nature  ")  ;  inaword,  in  not  doing  to  another 
what  one  would  not  have  done  to  one's  self.  Injustice, 
ingratitude,  arrogance,  inhumanity,  and  the  like  can  never 
(Hobbes  has  to  admit,  in  spite  of  his  theorem,  that  man  is 
essentially  selfish)  be  made  lawful  in  the  "  court  of  con- 
science ":  ^in_  other  words,  the  state  owes  its  existence 
partly,  at  least,  to  the  idea  of  justice.  Civil  society  comes 
into  existence  through  the  instrumentality  (as  has  been  inti- 
mated) of  a  contract,  tacit  or  expressed,  by  which  there  is 
transferred  to  a  single  authority,  consisting  of  one  man  or 
an  assembly  of  men,  of  the  individual's  natural  right  of  self- 
defence,  and  all  is  "  made  subject  to  the  sovereign  or  su- 
preme power  thus  constituted."  This  transference  may 
take  place  "  by  institution  or  by  acquisition,  by  free  choice 
or  by  conquest.'"  Civil  society  once  formed  is  the  "  body 


\ 


86  A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY.. 

politic  "  (as  contradistinguished  from  "  natural  or  physical 
bodies").  The  contract  is  an  agreement  not  between  the 
sovereign  and  the  people,  but  between  the  people  among 
themselves :  it  does  not  bind  the  sovereign,  the  authority 
of  whom  is,  consequently,  absolute  and  irrevocable.  The 
sovereign  has  the  "  power  of  coercion,  absolute  command  of 
military  forces,  power  of  judicature  and  of  legislation,  ap- 
pointing all  magistrates  and  determining  all  conditions  of 
honor  and  order,  judging  all  doctrines  that  may  be  taught." 
It  is  the  duty  of  the  sovereign  to  seek  the  safety  and  good 
government  of  the  people,  and,  to  this  end,  to  educate  them 
in  right  opinions  regarding  their  duties  in  relation  to  the 
integrity  and  safety  of  the  State.  Practically,  the  sove- 
reign must  regulate,  not  only  the  secular,  but  also  the  reli- 
gious, conduct  of  the  people,  since  there  must  not  be  a 
conflict  between  the  consciences  of  the  individual  and  of 
the  sovereign ;  hence  the  sovereign  is  the  ecclesiastical  as 
well  as  the  political  head  (the  "  soul ")  of  the  "  body 
politic."  The  individual  retains  in  society  certain  inde- 
feasible rignTs",  such  as  the  right  not  to  "  kill,  maim,  or  wound 
himselt,  or  kill  others  or  perform  any  dangerous  or  dis- 
honorable office  in  a  case  where  refusal  does  not  frustrate 
the  end  for  which  sovereignty  is  ordained."  The  individ- 
ual is  free  to  do  those  things  as  regards  which  the  law 
has  not  limited  his  natural  liberty.  There  are  three  forms 
of  sovereignty :  democracy,  aristocracy,  and  monarchy. 
Monarchy  is  superior  to  either  of  the  others.  In  favor  of 
monarchy  are  the  following  considerations  :  the  public  and 
private  interest  of  the  sovereign  cannot  but  be  identical; 
deliberation  on  the  part  of  the  sovereign  may  be  mature, 
since  the  monarch  when  in  doubt  may  take  such  counsel  as 
is  requisite ;  the  "  resolutions  of  the  monarch  are  not  neces- 
sarily abnormally  inconstant ;  "  factions  are  impossible  un- 
der a  monarchy;  the  evils  of  favoritism  are  at  least  no 
greater  in  a  monarchy  than  in  an  aristocracy ;  the  incon- 
veniences attending  the  succession  of  an  infant  are  not 
greater  than  those  attending  the  rule  of  an  assembly ;  etc. 


HERBERT.  87 

Results.  —  We  have  now  to  note  a  few  points  by  way  of 
indicating  the  general  character  of  Hobbes's  philosophy  and 
its  place  in  the  history  of  Modern  Philosophy.  There  is  in 
Hobbes  the  same  antagonism  to  the  Scholastic  mode  of 
thought  as  in  Bacon,  though  there  is  a  nominalism  in  his 
logic  which  in  spite  of  himself  allies  hirrTln  part  with  the 
Scholastics.  There  is  also  the  same  general  empirico-sensa- 
tionalistic  view  of  knowledge  and  the  same  materialistic  con- 
ception of  reality  in  the  doctrine  of  Hobbes  as  in  that  of 
Bacon,  with  the  noteworthy  difference  that  whereas  Bacon 
underrated  the  value  of  mathematics  and  the  deductive  side 
of  knowledge  generally,  Hobbes  strongly  emphasized  them. 
Hobbes  was  the  earliest  systematic  modern  exponent  of  the 
mechanico-sensational  theory  of  knowledge  so  prevalent  at 
the  present  day :  he  was  the  inaugurator  of  lines  of  devel- 
opment in  moral  and  political  philosophy  which  have  ex- 
tended down  to  the  moment ;  his  egoistic  theory  of  morals 
and  his  absolutist  doctrine  of  the  State  have  never  failed  in 
any  considerable  period  of  philosophical  speculation  to  pro- 
voke thought,  —  generally  in  directions  opposed  to  them- 
selves. He  attempted  to  construct  —  as  no  one  in  modern 
times  before  him  —  a  comprehensive  system.  Inconsis- 
tencies may  be  found  in  it,  —  as,  for  example,  that  "  mo- 
tion "  is  employed  in  different  meanings  when  applied  to 
the  two  classes  (physical  and  moral)  of  phenomena;  that 
while  extension  is  said  to  be  real,  space  is  treated  as  sub- 
jective ;  that  though  there  are  no  rights  in  the  state  of 
nature,  peace  is  the  ideal  of  men  in  that  state  :  but  that  the 
system  breaks  down,  does  not  hide  the  scientific  breadth  of 
Hobbes's  attempt.1 

§  46. 

We  pass  now  to  a  philosopher  who  is  the  earliest  of  the 
philosophers  of  the  "  intuitional "  type,  Edward  Herbert, 

1  The  reader  may  be  referred  to  Professor  Robertson's  work  on 
these  and  other  points. 


88  A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Lord  Cherbury*  (1582-1648).  —  Herbert  was  educated  at 
Oxford,  travelled  several  years  on  the  Continent,  distin- 
guished himself  as  a  soldier  in  the  Netherlands,  and  was 
English  ambassador  at  Paris.  He  came  of  a  race  of  sol- 
diers, and  was  noted  as  a  knightly  character  and  for 
courtly  accomplishments. 

Works, — The  philosophical  works  of  Lord  Cherbury 
are  :  "  De  Veritate  prout  distinguitur  a  Revelatione,  a  Veri- 
simili  et  a  Falso  "  (1624),  with  an  Appendix,  "  De  Causa 
Errorum  una  cum  Tractatu  de  Religione  Laici  et  Appen- 
dice  ad  Sacerdotos  ;  "  and  "  De  Religione  Gentilium  Erro- 
rumque  apud  eos  Causis  "  (1645—1663). 

Philosophy.  —  It  is,  according  to  Lord  Cherbury,  equally 
impossible  that  we  should  know  all  things  and  that  we  know 
nothing ;  some  things  we  may  be  certain  of.  We  know  that 
man  has  certain  faculties,  and  can  apply  them  to  the  inves- 
tigation of  truth.  We  have,  first  of  all,  to  become  ac- 
quainted with  our  faculties,  their  classes,  laws,  relations  to 
objects,  etc. ;  then,  we  may  attempt  to  determine  the  reali- 
ties underlying  the  appearances  of  things.  There  is  such  a 
thing  as  truth  —  permanent,  omnipresent,  self-evident,  man- 
ifold. Truth  is  of  four  kinds :  truth  of  the  object,  —  the 
agreement  of  a  thing  with  itself  (object  must  be  of  a  certain 
size,  have  a  principle  of  individuation,  be  adapted  to  some 
sense  or  faculty)  ;  truth  of  appearance,  —  agreement  of  a 
phenomenon  with  the  essence  of  the  object  (object  must 
be  perceived  for  a  sufficient  time,  be  at  a  proper  distance, 
be  perceived  through  a  medium,  etc.)  ;  truth  of  perception, 
—  agreement  of  our  faculty  with  the  object  (faculty  must 
be  sound,  attention  must  be  directed  towards  object,  etc.)  ; 
truth  of  the  mind  in  itself  or  the  intellect  (depends  on  a 
certain  common  nature  in  the  mind).  "The  most  impor- 
tant truths  are  truths  of  the  intellect,  which  are  truths  en- 
tirely inaccessible  to  sense.  They  manifest  themselves  in 
every  sane  and  well-organized  mind ;  they  seem  to  come 

1  Franck;  Histoire  de  la  Philosophic  en  Anglcterre  depuis 
Bacon  jusqu'a  Locke,  par  Charles  de  Remusat. 


HERBERT.  89 

from  a  supernatural  source  and  to  be  destined  for  deter- 
mining the  nature  of  objects  which  present  themselves  in 
the  theatre  of  the  world."  They  are  the  notions  —  pre- 
senting themselves  either  immediately  or  after  reflection  — 
which  all  men  have  in  common.  They  are  original  and 
derived.  The  former  are  known  by  the  marks  of  priority, 
independence,  universality,  certainty,  necessity,  immediacy. 
The  latter  ("  derived "  notions)  are  discovered  by  ascer- 
taining about  what  things  there  has  been  universal  agree- 
ment among  men.  These  communes  notifies  (common 
notions)  are  the  object  of  the  faculty  of  "  natural  instinct  " 
(/.  e.,  according  to  Hamilton,1  the  vov?  of  Aristotle,  intclli- 
gentia  of  the  Schoolmen,  "common  sense"  of  philoso- 
phers in  general) .  Besides  this  faculty  are  those  of  internal 
sense,  external  sense,  and  discursive  reason,  with  all  of  which 
natural  instinct  cooperates  in  a  greater  or  less  degree.  In- 
ternal sense  discerns  the  inner  intrinsic  nature  of  things, 
the  hidden  types  of  being.  The  discursive  faculty  employs 
ten  categories,  expressed  in  the  terms  whether,  what,  of 
what  sort,  how  much,  in  what  relation,  how,  when,  where, 
whence,  wherefore  (the  categories  of  Aristotle).  Of  all  our 
faculties  the  discursive  reason  is  the  most  exposed  to  error ; 
it  "  confounds  the  limits  of  our  faculties,  prevents  or  de- 
stroys the  common  notions,  confuses  internal  sense,  thereby 
making  us  deny  our  liberty  :  it  is  the  faculty  of  the  schools." 
The  distinguishing  attribute  of  man  is  religion.  No  man  is 
really  an  atheist;  though  because  of  their  detestation  of 
certain  false  and  horrible  notions  of  the  Deity,  many  sup- 
pose themselves,  or  are  supposed,  to  be  such.  The  end  of 
religion  is  the  practical  obligating  of  men  to  what  they 
should  do  of  themselves,  and  the  maintaining  of  the  com- 
mon unity  of  all.  The  essence  of  religion  is  contained  in 
the  following  truths  :  (i)  the  existence  of  a  supreme  being ; 
(2)  the  duty  of  worshipping  this  being;  (3)  virtue  and 
piety  as  the  prime  elements  of  the  worship  of  God  ;  (4)  re- 
pentance for  transgression;  (5)  present  and  future  rewards 

1  Hamilton's  edition  of  Reid's  works,  p.  781. 


90  A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY, 

and  punishments,  depending  on  the  justice  and  goodness  of 
the  Supreme  Being.  God  is  revealed  to  man  in  his  inner 
consciousness  —  in  the  yearning  towards  our  eternal  life 
and  happiness  —  and  in  outward  nature.  The  object  of 
his  revelation  is  his  greater  glory.  Historically  the  stages 
of  religion  are :  ( i )  pure  instinctive  worship  of  God  in 
thought  and  purity  of  life  ;  (2)  worship  with  rites  and  cer- 
emonies upheld  by  a  sect;  (3)  idolatry,  encouraged  by  false 
teachers.  The  first  of  these  is,  alone,  natural  and  true 
religion.  A  true  revelation  fulfils  the  following  conditions  : 
it  presupposes  prayer  and  faith ;  it  is  immediately  evident  to 
each  one  (otherwise  it  is  a  mere  tradition,  history)  ;  it  offers 
something  of  uncommon  truth  and  value  ;  it  produces  upon 
our  faculties  the  effect  of  an  inspiration.  All  error  is  in- 
complete, obscured  truth. 

§  47- 

The  Cartesians.  —  We  pass  next  to  the  initiators  of  the 
third  main  direction  of  thought  in  the  Second  Period  of 
Modern  Philosophy ;  viz.,  the  rationalistico-idealistic  direc- 
tion. Here  have  to  be  considered  Ren£  Descartes,  Arnold 
Geulincx,  Nicolas  Malebranche,  Baruch  de  Spinoza.  Minor 
names  we  are  obliged  to  omit. 

§  48- 

Rene  Descartes  l  (1596-1650).  —  Descartes  was  born,  of 
noble  family,  at  La  Haye,  Touraine,  in  March,  1596.  He 
received  an  excellent  education  at  the  Jesuit  College  at 
La  Fleche  (1604-1612),  developing  there  special  fondness 
and  taste  for  poetry,  eloquence,  and  mathematics.  Even 
before  his  entering  college,  the  mental  trait  of  inquisitive- 
ness  showed  itself  very  markedly  (one  story  of  him  relates 
that  his  father  had  dubbed  him  "his  philosopher  "),  and  at 
school  he  was  distinguished  by  a  habit  of  "  matutinal  reflec- 

1  See  "  Descartes,"  by  J.  P.  Mahaffy  ("  Blackwood's  Philosophical 
Classics  ") ;  article  in  "  Encyclopaedia  Britannica ;  "  Descartes'  works; 
etc. 


DESCARTES.  9 1 

tion  "  in  bed.  A  deep  distrust  of  tradition  and  his  teach- 
ers, growing  out  of  his  extreme  intellectual  individuality, 
determined  him  to  throw  aside  books  for  a  time,  and  to 
study  himself  and  the  great  world.  He  went  to  Paris.  He 
took  lessons  in  horsemanship  and  fencing ;  he  spent  a  short 
time,  at  least,  in  something  like  dissipation,  in  which  he 
displayed  a  special  fondness  for  gaming.  But  his  purely 
intellectual  interests  did  not  permanently  forsake  him ;  he 
theorized  about  fencing,  and  almost  before  his  friends  were 
aware  of  it,  had  secluded  himself  in  an  obscure  quarter  of 
Paris  (1614-1616)  to  evolve  a  mathematical  theory  of 
music,  and  study  physics.  He  was  drawn  from  his  seclu- 
sion, and  in  his  pursuit  of  a  knowledge  of  the  world  entered 
the  army,  first  in  Holland,  and  afterwards  in  Bavaria  and 
other  countries  during  the  Thirty  Years'  War,  quitting  the 
army  in  1621.  In  Holland  he  formed  the  acquaintance  of 
a  Dutch  mathematician,  Isaac  Beeckman,  from  whom  he 
received  mathematical  suggestions;  and  while  in  Bavaria 
he  had  strange  and  sudden  mental  revelations,  which  deter- 
mined forcibly  the  bent  of  his  thinking,  regarding  a  universal 
scientific  method,  combining  features  of  ancient  geometry, 
modern  algebra  (which  had  been  partially  founded  by  cer- 
tain Italian  and  German  mathematicians),  and  logic.  After 
some  rather  extensive  travels  in  northern  Germany  and  in 
Italy,  and  a  considerable  period  spent  in  Paris  studying  the 
refraction  of  light,  grinding  glasses  for  optical  instruments, 
and  reflecting  on  human  nature  and  God,  he  went,  in  1629, 
to  Holland,  to  breathe  a  freer  intellectual  atmosphere. 
There  he  resided  in  a  dozen  or  more  different  places,  ac- 
cording as  the  necessity  of  seclusion  required,  until  1649  > 
returning  to  France  occasionally  on  business  or  to  receive 
honors  bestowed  upon  him  for  scientific  achievement.  His 
studies  were  chiefly  in  physical  "  philosophy ; "  he  read 
little,  despised  history,  politics,  learning,  and  art,  studied 
anatomy  and  chemistry  in  the  laboratory  in  search  of  a 
medical  doctrine  based  on  absolute  demonstration,  and  pur- 
sued astronomical  and  meteorological  inquiries,  —  all  with 


92  A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY, 

the  purpose  of  carrying  the  physical  explanation  of  phe- 
nomena as  far  as  possible,  and,  to  a  considerable  extent,  as 
it  would  seem,  in  the  spirit  of  Baconian  empiricism,  for 
which  he  seems  to  have  had  a  certain  admiration  notwith- 
standing his  very  decided  mathematical  predilections.  But 
in  spite  of  his  scientific  independence,  he  preserved  a  certain 
respect  for  Church  doctrines  and  awe  of  Church  authority, 
since  he  feared  to  run  the  risk,  by  publishing  his  scientifico- 
philosophical  works,  of  being  accused  of  heresy,  and  took 
care  to  soften  certain  features  of  his  physical  doctrines  that 
contravened  established  theological  tenets.  He  did  not, 
however,  escape  all  odium  theologicum ;  he  was  charged 
with  atheism  and  infidelity  by  the  universities  of  Leyden 
and  Utrecht.  In  the  year  1649  ^e  accepted  (reluctantly) 
the  urgent  and  often-repeated  invitation  of  Queen  Christina 
of  Sweden  to  come  to  her  capital  and  reside,  instruct  her 
in  philosophy,  and  found  an  academy  of  sciences.  Change 
of  climate  and  of  mode  of  living,  occasioning  serious 
abridgment  of  the  individual  freedom  he  had  always  sought 
and  cherished,  resulted  in  his  death,  in  1650.  —  From  the 
foregoing  biographical  sketch  it  clearly  appears  that  Des- 
cartes was  personally  a  true  child  of  the  Renaissance,  — 
disdainful  of  the  past,  restless,  intense,  sanguine,  egoistic. 
His  philosophy  corresponds  closely  with  his  character. 

Works.  —  The  principal  philosophical  works  of  Descartes 
are:  "Discours  de  la  M£thode  "  (1637),  " Meditationes 
de  Prima  Philosophise"  (1641),  "  Principia  Philosophise " 
(1644),  containing  his  physics,  "Traite'  des  Passions  de 
I'Ame"  (1649). 

Philosophy  of  Descartes:  Standpoint  and  Method. — 
The  philosophy  of  Descartes  has  as  its  starting-point  a 
definite  conception  of  truth  as  union  of  knower  and  known 
object  in  intellect,  as  distinguished  from  sense,  imagination, 
and  memory.  Truth,  Descartes  holds,  presents  itself  only 
in  those  clear  and  distinct  (as  opposed  to  obscure  and  con- 
fused) ideas  which  intellect  alone  is  capable  of.  In  full 
keeping  with  his  mental  history  as  we  have  sketched  it, 


DESCARTES.  93 

Descartes  affirms  that  the  precondition  to,  the  attainment  of 
truth  is  thorough-going  doubt.  Not  doubt  merely  for  its 
own  sake,  however ;  scepticism  is  only  a  means  to  an  end, 
a  moment  or  element  of  method,  not  the  goal  of  thought. 
And  it  must  be  remembered,  of  course,  that  the  principle 
of  universal  doubt  has  application  in  theoretical  matters 
only ;  in  matters  pertaining  to  conduct,  says  Descartes,  we 
must  follow  as  principle  that  which  is  merely  probable. 
Now  it  is,  in  the  first  instance,  easy  to  doubt  all  forms  of 
so-called  knowledge,  except  mathematics.  Mathematics,  • 
therefore,  suggests,  if  it  does  not  immediately  contain,  the 
ideal  of  scientific  method ;  it  is  not  merely  formal,  like  the 
old  logic,  —  not  merely  the  rule  of  the  operation  of  a  cer- 
tain subjective  faculty,  —  but  is^j^jgethod^of  arriving  at 
objective  truth  of  fact;  and  it  possesses  the  highest  degree 
of  certainty.  But  the  melnod  sought  must  be  absolutely 
universal,  which  majjiei»atics  is  not.  It  has  four  elementary 
principles,  which  in  their  relation  to  one  another  are  but' 
steps  in  a  single  process,  whose  unity  corresponds  to  the 
nature  of  truth  itself.  These  principles  or  steps  are  as  fol- 
lows :  (i)  Never  receive  as  true  anything  not  certainly 
known  to  be  such ;  avoid  prejudice  and  precipitancy  in 
judgment,  and  embrace  nothing  except  that  which  presents 
itself  so  clearly  and  distinctly  to  the  mind  that  there  is  no 
room  for  doubt  about  it;  (2)  Analyze  every  problem  into 
as  many  parts  as  possible  and  as  may  best  facilitate  its  solu- 
tion ;  (3)  Think  in  an  orderly  manner,  commencing  with 
objects  that  are  the  simplest  and  easiest  to  understand,  and 
ascending  by  degrees  to  the  knowledge  of  the  most  com- 
plex, assuming  the  same  order  among  those  which  do  not 
naturally  have  the  precedence  one  over  the  other ;  (4)  Make 
everywhere  enumerations  so  complete  and  reviews  so  com- 
prehensive as  to  be  assured  of  having  omitted  nothing. 
Descartes,  it  is  true,  gives  this  as  merely  the  method  which 
he  had  resolved  upon  to  assure  himself  personally  of  rising 
out  of  the  region  of  confused,  obscure,  and,  hence,  doubtful 
things  into  that  of  clear  and  distinct  truth ;  but  he  asserts, 


94  A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

nevertheless,  that  diversity  of  opinion  results  not  so  much 
from  differences  in  minds  as  in  methods  of  using  them ; 
that  truth  is  the  same  for  all  minds  following  the  true 
method ;  and,  furthermore,  the  method  of  analysis  and 
synthesis  embodied  in  his  four  principles  is,  as  we  shall 
see,  quite  in  harmony  with  the  physico-mechanical  char- 
acter of  his  doctrines.1 

Metaphysics :  The  First  Principle,  "  Cogito,  ergo  sum." 
—  If  the  truth  is  that  only  which  is  absolutely  certain,  which 
is  perfectly  clear  and  distinct  to  the  mind,  it  would  appear, 
at  first,  at  least,  that  nothing  whatever  can  be  received  as 
true.  The  presentations  of  the  senses,  of  memory,  of  imagi- 
nation, may  all  easily  be  questioned,  may  be  treated  as 
dreams,  mere  hallucinations,  the  machinations,  say,  of  some 
omnipotent  deceiver :  they  are,  if  believed  in,  mere  pre- 
judices and  presuppositions,  which  have  to  be  got  rid 
of.2  But  there  is  one  prejudice  that  I  cannot  rid  myself  of: 
I  think,  and  (therefore)  I  am.  However  questionable  all 
my  ideas  considered  as  representations  of  fact,  it  is  not  at 
all  questionable  that  /  have  them  :  I  could  not  be  deceived 
if  I  did  not  have  them,  did  not  think  (in  the  broad  sense 
of  the  term),  and  hence  did  not  exist.  If  it  be  said  that  I 
am  deceived  in  thinking  that  I  exist,  I  reply  that  I  cannot 
here  make  a  distinction  between  my  existing  and  my  think- 
ing that  I  exist.  I  can  not  with  such  certainty  say,  "  I  walk, 
therefore  I  exist,"  because  it  is  not  absolutely  certain  to  the 
understanding  —  however  it  may  be  to  sense  —  that  I  do 
walk.  My  existence  and  my  thinking  are  to  understanding 
inseparable ;  walking  and  my  existence  are  not  thus  insep- 
arable.8 The  reasoning  of  Cogito,  ergo  sum,  is  not  purely 
syllogistic.  There  is  not  wanting  a  premise  to  complete  my 
thought,  —  as  the  premise,  Whatever  thinks  exists.  I  imme- 
diately perceive  intellectually  my  existence  as  a  thinking 
being.  Further,  I  perceive  that  I  exist  as  thinking.  I  do 
not  as  yet  perceive  anything  beyond  that ;  *  my  doubt  and 

1  Discours  de  la  M^thode.  2  First  Meditation. 

8  Second  Meditation.  *  Ibid. 


DESCARTES.  95 

those  creations  of  my  imagination,  the  truth  of  which  I  can 
easily  doubt,  prove  only  that  I  exist  as  thinking.  This 
principle,  Cogito,  ergo  sum,  is,  then,  the  first  material  prin- 
ciple of  philosophy;  it  is  the  foundation  and  criterion  of 
all  truth,  and  may  fitly  be  compared  to  the  single  fixed 
point  Archimedes  required  (but  could  not  get)  to  move  the 
whole  world  with  his  lever.  In  the  intellectual  perception 
of  myself  I  have  that  feeling  of  certainty  and  that  clearness 
and  distinctness  of  idea  which  gives  to  mathematical  truth 
its  almost  supreme  value  as  regards  method.  All  other 
ideas  are  true  in  so  far  as  they  possess  the  clearness  and 
distinctness  of  this.  In  fine,  whatever  assertion  I  make 
concerning  the  existence  of  other  beings  than  myself  in- 
volves, as  its  support,  the  assertion  of  my  own  existence, 
and  is  to  be  judged  by  comparison  with  my  assertion  as  to 
my  own  existence.1 

The  Knowledge  of  other  Existences  than  Self:  (i)  God. 
—  Now  with  regard  to  the  existence  of  other  beings  than 
myself  there  is  a  possibility  of  my  being  deceived.  To 
resolve  the  doubt  here  I  am  obliged  to  determine  whether 
or  not  there  be  a  God,  and,  if  there  is,  whether  or  not  he 
can  be  a  deceiver.  Where  do  I  get  the  idea  of  a  God,  and 
what  truth  is  there  in  it  ?  Of  all  my  ideas,  I  find  some  that 
have  come  from  without,  as  those  of  sensible  existences, 
others  that  are  created  purely  by  myself,  such  as  those  of 
a  winged  horse  or  a  siren,  and  others  still  that  neither  come 
from  without  nor  are  created  by  myself,  and  must  therefore 
be,  as  it  were,  innate ;  for  example,  the  idea  of  truth,  thing, 
thought,  an  infinite  being.  Thatjhe_idea  of  an  infinite 
being  does— noL^come  to  me  from  without,  is  seil-.evident : 
that^it  ha&-not  been  produced  by  me  may  be  argue.cLfrom 
the  fact  that  an  effect  can  in  no  case  be  greater  than  its 
cause;  e.g.,  the  perfectj:ajinot  in  any-wayilte-an -effect  of 
the  Jrnrjerfect.  I  can  easily  produce,  by  abstraction,  the 
idea  of  the  indefinite ;  but  not  the  positive  idea  of  infinite 
perfection,  for  I  am  imperfect.  The  source  of  such  an  idea 
1  See  Second  Meditation. 


96          A   JUS  TORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

can,  originally,  bejanly  a  being  that  is  infinite  in  nature, 
/.  e.,  God ;  therefore  the^ j'Hpa  m\\^  havp  bp^n  impbntpd.  in 
me  by  him,  —  he  must  exist.  I  know  that  God  exists  also 
from  the  fact  of  my  own  existence  ;  if  I  had  been  the  author 
of  my  own  being,  I  should  have  given  myself  all  possible 
perfection,  and  I  must  attribute  my  continued  existence  as 
well  as  my  creation  to  a  God.1  Further,  the  existence  of 
God  may  and  must  be  inferred  from  the  very  idea  of  the 
infinite.  It  is  as  impossible  for  me  to  conceive  the  idea  of 
infinite  perfection  without  that  of  existence  as  it  is  to  con- 
ceive a  triangle  the  sum  of  whose  angles  is  not  two  right 
angles,  or  to  conceive  a  mountain  without  a  corresponding 
valley.  I  have,  in  other  words,  a  distinct  and  clear  percep- 
tion of  existence  as  a  necessary  attribute  of  an  infinitely 
perfect  nature.  I  can,  it  is  true,  separate  in  thought  the 
idea  of  a  finite  thing  and  the  existence  of  that  finite  thing ; 
but  the  idea  of  the  infinite  would  be  self-contradictory  and 
impossible  to  me  if  it  did  not  include  that  of  God's  exist- 
ence.2 This  proof  of  the  existence  of  God,  which  resem- 
bles that  of  Ansejm,  is  distinguished  from  the  Anselmic 
proof  as  follows  :  Anselm  infers  the  existence  of  God  purely 
from  the  necessary  implication  of  the  idea  of  the  perfect 
being;  I  rather  from  the  clearness  and  distinction  with 
which  the  necessary  connection  between  infinitude  and 
existence  is  perceived  by  the  understanding.8 

Existence  of  the  External  World.  —  Now,  it  is  utterly 
impossible  that  God,  a  being  of  infinite  perfection,  can 
wish  to  deceive  me.  I  know,  therefore,  that  whatever 
I  can  clearly  and  distinctly  conceive  as  existing  does  really 
exist,  just  as  I  know  that  God  exists  from  the  clear  and 
distinct  conception  of  him.  I  clearly  and  distinctly  con-  ,oJ 
ceive  the  external  world  as  existing,  (ergo)  it  really  exists.  v 

Substances.  —  Among  my  ideas  are  ideas  of  things  that 
are  clearly  and  distinctly  conceivable  in  and  by  themselves, 
and  ideas  of  others  that  are  not  so  conceivable.  I  can, 

i  Third  Meditation.  2  Fifth  Meditation. 

8  Fifth  Meditation. 


DESCARTES.  gy , 

for  example,  clearly  and  distinctly  conceive  myself  as  a 
purely  intellective  being,  as  complete  without  the  faculties 
of  feeling  and  imagination ;  but  I  cannot  conceive  imagina- 
tion and  feeling  as  existent  without  me  or  some  intelligent 
nature  to  which  they  belong ;  nor  can  I  conceive  the  power 
of  changing  place  and  taking  various  situations  without 
a  certain  nature  to  which  it  belongs.  Things  which  are 
thus  conceivable  in  themselves  are  siibstances  ;  things  not 
thus  conceivable  are  attributes  or  are  modes.  There  are 
three  substances :  God,  ourselves,  and  external  nature. 
Ourselves  we  know  as  thinking  substance,  God  we  know 
also  as  thinking  substance  and  as  author  of  ourselves  and 
external  nature,  and  nature  we  know,  from  the  veracity 
of  God,  as  extended  substance.  Primarily,  God  alone  is 
substance,  since  we  and  nature  depend  on  him ;  we  and 
nature  are  secondary  substances,  having  the  attributes  re- 
spectively of  thought  and  extension. 

Nature.  —  According  to  his  view  of  substance,  Descartes 
could  not  conceive  nature  as  really  distinct  from  God ;  nor 
did  he,  except  for  purposes  of  mere  explanation.  And  for 
purposes  of  explanation  he  finds  it  necessary,  in  accord- 
ance with  his  mathematical  method  of  knowledge,  to  treat 
of  nature  as  mere  extension  and  motion.  The  conception 
of  force  or  power  he  expressly  terms  non-physical,  — 
power  belongs  to  God  alone ;  and  he  excludes  all  inter- 
pretation of  nature  by  the  doctrine  of  final  causes.  Abso- 
lutely^considered,  nature  is  to  Descartes  eternal ;  and 
yet  he  finds  it  necessary  for  explanation's  sake,  and  con- 
venient for  theology's  sake,  to  treat  nature  as  having  a  cer- 
tain origin  from  material  elements  and  motion.  Extension 
is  without  limitation  of  any  nature ;  hence  there  are  no 
fixecl  atoms  and  no  vacuum.  Original  matter  (extension) 
is  divided  into  innumerable  undifferentiated  parts  set  and 
kept  in  motion  by  the  power  of  God.  From  the  collision 
of  the  parts  of  moving  matter  there  results  a  differentia- 
tion of  matter  into  three  sorts:  (i)  "first  matter,"  com- 
prising innumerable  fine  particles,  materia  subtilissima, 
VOL.  i.  —  7 


0)8  A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

composing  the  sun  and  fixed  stars,  and  producing  heat  by 
their  motions ;  (2)  "second  matter,"  less  subtile  but  very 
fine,  composing  the  heavens  and  producing  light  by  its 
motion;  (3)  a  sort  comprising  larger  particles  and  com- 
posing the  planets,  etc.  [The  motion  of  matter  is  in  no 
case  produced  by  action  at  a  distance,  but  by  pushing  of 
portions  of  matter  by  others,  —  in  particular,  by  the  finest 
of  the  differentiated  material  elements,  or  "  first  matter." 
By  a  rotatory  motion  caused  by  collision  of  particles  vor- 
tices are  produced  in  ^matter,  and  bodies  and  systems 
of  bodies  are  evolved  throughout  space.  The  sum  of  mo- 
tion in  the  universe  is  constant.  The  earth  does  not  move 
of  itself  about  the  sun,  but  is  carried  about  in  a  vortex 
(says  Descartes,  steering  carefully  between  the  Scylla  of 
Catholicism  and  the  Charybdis  of  Science) .  Organic  bodies, 
like  inorganic,  are  explicable  on  purely  mechanical  prin- 
ciples. "  If  we  possessed  a  thorough  knowledge  of  all  the 
parts  of  the  seed  of  any  species  of  animal  (e.g.,  man),  we 
could  from  that  alone,  by  reasoning  entirely  mathematical 
and  certain,  deduce  the  whole  figure  and  conformation 
of  each  of  its  members,  and,  conversely,  if  we  knew  the 
several  peculiarities  of  this  conformation,  we  could  deduce 
from  these  the  nature  of  the  seed." 1  Animals  are  in  fact 
mere__autQniatic  machines.  Life  in  plants  is  due  merely 
to  motion  anoT  brHer^  of~parTs :  Hfe~~tTr  animals  is  due 
tojnotion  or  circulation  of  blood,  whTch  in^turrTls-  due 
merely__tp__changes  ot  temperature.  By  a  separation  of 
particles  in  the  brain  are  generated  animal  spirits,  which 
are  conducted  by  the  nerves  to  and  from  sense-organs, 
muscles,  and  brain,  giving  rise  to  sensuous  impressions  and 
movements  of  muscles,  etc.  The  pineal  gland,  in  the 
centre  of  the  brain  and  single  in  nature,  is  the  seat  of  the 
soul. 

The  Soul.  —  As  animals  are  mere  automata,  having  no 
souls,  so  man  has  but  the  one  rational  soul,  without  the  ani- 
mal and  vegetable  souls,  of  the  ancient  theorists.  Of  this 

1  Encyclopaedia  Britannica,  vol.  vii.,  art.  Descartes. 


DESCARTES. 


99 


soul  we  have,  as  already  seen,  a  clear  and  distinct  idea  in 
perfect  abstraction.      We  perceive  the  soul  to  be  simple, 
unextended,  or  immaterial,  and  hence  imperishable,  except 
it  be  destroyed  by  direct  act  of  its  creator.     The  acts  of 
the  soul  as  such  are  either  ideas  or  volitions,  —  the  former 
being  as  acts  relatively  passive,  the  latter  positively  active. 
As  to  origin,  our  ideas  are,  as  we  have  seen,  innate,  or 
impressed  upon  us  from  without,  or  made   by  ourselves. 
With  regard  to  their  truth,  they  may  be  classed  as  adequate 
and  inadequate.    (  Error   in   our   ideas  is  a  consequence 
of  the  incommensurateness  of  intellect,  which  is  necessary 
in  its  action  because  determined  by  the  nature  of  necessary 
being,  and  will,  which  is  free :  by  act  of  will  we  may  in 
judging  receive  and  approve  that  which  understanding  does 
not  clearly  and  distinctly  apprehend.      Innate  ideas  are, 
by  virtue  .of  their  necessary  origin  in  God,  not  thus  subject 
to  error./   While  the  ideas  of  the  intellect  are  clear  and 
distinct,  because   innate,  those  of  sense  and  imagination 
are  obscure  and  confused,  because  they  have  a  material 
origin :  they  are  occasioned,  though,  since  body  and  soul 
are  distinct  and   disparate    substances,  not   directly   pro- 
duced, by  the  changes  in  the  animal  spirits  occurring  in  the 
brain.    (And  as  the  body  does  not  directly  act  upon  the 
soul,  so  the  soul  does  not  in  acts  of  volition  work  directly 
upon  the  body :  it  merely  gives  direction  to  the  vital  spirits 
in  the  conarium,  or  pineal  gland,  as  the  rider  directs  the 
movements  of  the  horse,  j   More  directly  dependent  upon 
the  association  of  body  a'nd  soul  than  ideas  and  volitions 
are  the  passions  which  are  involved  in  certain  tendencies 
of  the  vital  spirits,  some  more  practical,  and  others  more 
theoretical.      Of  the  passions,  six  are  primary :    wonder, 
love,  hate,  desire,  sorrow,  and  joy.     The  passions  are  con- 
trolled  through  the    influence  of  ideas   upon  the  animal 
spirits.      In  the  control  of  the  passions  lies  the  essence 
of  moral  activity.     By  firm  and  definite  judgments  regard- 
ing good  and  evil  we  rise  superior  to  passion  and  experi- 
ence ;  the  highest  of  all  pleasures  is  the  pleasure  of  rational 
activity. 


IOO        A    HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

God.  —  The  union  of  body  and  soul,  upon  which  the 
lower  mental  operations  so  closely  depend,  requires  the 
immediate  concourse  of  God  with,  or  his  presence  to,  both 
body  and  soul.  God  is  perfect,  necessary  intelligence.  His 
intelligence,  however,  and  all  else  that  exists,  depend  upon 
his  free  and  arbitrary  will. 

Result.  —  The  system  of  Descartes  ends  in  dualism  (of 
thought  and  extension,  mind  and  matter),  or  at  least  a 
monism  which  is  merely  formal  or  mechanical :  God  is, 
after  all,  but  a  Deus  ex  machina  in  this  system.  Descartes 
states  the  problem  of  philosophy  (from  the  point  of  view 
of  self-consciousness  as  such),  and  makes  clear  the  terms 
of  it ;  but  leaves  these  imperfectly  synthesized,  and  the 
problem  not  completely  solved.  It  becomes  the  endeavor 
of  certain  men  nearly  contemporary  with  Descartes  to 
complete  the  solution.  The  question  is,  How  shall  the 
secondary  substances  be  conceived  in  relation  to  one 
another  and  the  primary  substance ;  how  shall  mind  and 
matter  be  conceived  as  related  to  one  another  and  God? 
—  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  say  that  as  Bacon  is  the 
initiator  of  the  empirico-realistic  tendency  of  the  second 
period  of  modern  thought,  Descartes  is  the  inaugurator  of 
the  rationalistico-idealistic  tendency. 

§  49- 

Arnold  Geulincx*  (1625-1669).  —  Geulincx,  born  at  An- 
twerp, took  a  degree  in  medicine  and,  perhaps,  philosophy 
in  the  University  of  Louvain,  and  was  afterwards  for  twelve 
years  lecturer  there.  Exciting  hostility  by  attacks  on  Scho- 
lasticism, he  was  compelled  to  leave  Louvain.  He  went  to 
Leyden  and  became  a  private  lecturer  in  the  university  at 
that  place.  At  one  time  he  underwent  extreme  poverty, 
and  would  have  died  but  for  the  assistance  of  a  (Cartesian) 
friend,  Heidanus  by  name. 

Works.  —  "  Saturnalia,  seu  Qusestiones  quodlibeticse  in 

1  See  Fischer,  vol.  i.  (trans.). 


GEULINCX.  101 

utramque  Partem  disputatse "  (1660);  "Logica  Funda- 
mentis  suis,  a  quibus  hactenus  collapsa  fuerat  restituta  " 
(1662);  "  TvSidi  a-eavTov  sive  Ethica "  (1665), —  his 
most  important  work;  "Physica  Vera"  (1680);  "Meta- 
physica  Vera  et  Mentem  Peripateticam "  (1691);  "An- 
notata  praecurrentia  "  (1690)  ;  "Annotata  majora  in  Prin- 
cipia  Renati  Descartes"  (1691). 

Philosophy.  —  Philosophy  is  divided  into  Metaphysics, 
Anthropology,  and  Ethics.  Metaphysics  is  the  doctrine  of 
self,  of  body,  and  of  God  :  Autology,  Somatology,  and  Theol- 
ogy. Self-certainty  is  the  basis  of  all  knowledge.  Cogito, 
ergo  sum  :  "  My  activity  coincides  with  my  consciousness ;  " 
thought  or  will  of  which  I  am  not  conscious  is  not  my 
thought  or  will.  The  self  is  simple.  It  is  united  to  a  body, 
which  is  composite  in  nature.  The  two  are  disparate,  and 
cannot  act  upon  one  another.  Their  union  is  a  miraculous 
one,  and  depends  upon  a  power  above  body  and  soul,  namely, 
God.  He  is  the  cause  of  motions  in  body  and  of  sensa- 
tions in  me  through  these  motions.  As  such  he  must  be 
conceived  as  omnipotent  will  and  thought.  In  relation  to 
all  other  things  "  he  is  active,  they  are  passive ;  he  inde- 
pendent, they  dependent ;  he  is  the  absolute  being ;  cause 
of  himself,  unlimited,  perfect,  necessary,  eternal,"  etc. 
"Geulincx,"  says  Fischer,  "wavered  between  the  theo- 
logical and  the  naturalistic  conception  of  the  relation  of 
finite  minds  to  God.  He  regarded  finite  minds  as  creatures 
(mentes,  create,  particulars,  limitata),  and  at  the  same 
time  as  modes  of  God  (aliquid  mentis)  "  Conduct  is  the 
harmony  of  will  and  thought.  The  (four)  cardinal  virtues 
are  diligence,  obedience,  justice,  humility.  "  We  must  first 
perceive  the  voice  of  reason  by  making  a  careful  study  of 
ourselves,  then  obey  it  by  doing  what  it  commands,  and, 
finally,  make  this  obedience  the  guiding  principle  of  our 
conduct,  the  constant  rule  of  our  lives.  Thence  the  fourth 
and  highest  duty  naturally  follows  :  we  must  pretend  to  be 
nothing  except  what  we  in  truth  are,  —  instruments  in 
the  hands  of  God."  Humility  includes,  on  the  one  hand, 


102        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 


Despectio  sui,  and,  on  the  other,  Amor  Dei  ac 
The  doctrine  —  of  which  Geulincx  is  the  real  founder  —  that 
the  acts  of  body  and  of  soul  in  their  interrelation  are  merely 
occasions  upon  which  supervene  the  causative  operation  of 
God,  is  known  as  Occasionalism. 

§  5°- 

Nicolas  Malebranche*  (1638-1715).  —  Nicolas  Male- 
branche,  son  of  the  secretary  to  Louis  XIII.  of  France, 
received  a  classical  training  at  home  (because  of  a  feeble 
constitution),  studied  philosophy  at  the  College  de  la  Marche, 
and  theology  in  the  Sorbonne.  He  joined  the  Congregation 
of  the  Oratory,  and  took  up  the  study  of  Church  history  and 
Biblical  Criticism.  He  did  not  become  satisfied  and  settled 
in  thought  until  after  the  accidental  reading,  in  1664,  of 
Descartes'  "Traite  de  1'Homme,"  which  determined  him  to 
philosophy  forever.  After  ten  years  of  reflection  he  pub- 
lished his  (first  and  chief)  work,  "  De  la  Recherche  de  la 
Verit^,  ou  Ton  traite  de  la  Nature  de  1'Esprit  de  1'Homme 
et  de  1'Usage  qu'il  en  doit  faire  pour  eViter  1'Erreur  dans 
les  Sciences."  This  occasioned  controversy,  in  which,  with 
others,  Locke  and  Leibnitz  took  part,  and  was  followed  at 
intervals  by  other  works,  mostly  theological  in  matter  and 
aim.  Besides  theology  and  metaphysics,  mathematics  and 
physics  also  engaged  his  thought.  His  death  is  said  to 
have  been  the  consequence  of  an  illness  caused  by  a  con- 
troversy with  Bishop  Berkeley  in  a  personal  interview. 

Works.  —  Other  works  of  Malebranche,  besides  the 
chief  work  above  mentioned,  are  :  "  Conversations  Chre- 
tiennes  "  (1676,  etc.);  "Trait£  de  la  Nature  et  de  la 
Grace  "  (1680)  ;  "Meditations  Chretiennes  et  Me'taphysi- 
que"  (1683)  ;  "Traite  de  la  Morale"  (1684)  ;  "Entre- 
tiens  sur  la  Melaphysique  et  la  Religion"  (1688). 

1  See  Kuno  Fischer's  History  of  Modern  Philosophy,  vol.  i.  (trans. 
by  J.  P.  Gordy.) 

2  See  ibid.' 


MALEBRANCHE. 


103 


Philosophy.  —  Adopting  the  distinctions  laid  down  by 
Descartes  as  to  the  faculties  and  the  method  of  cognition, 
the  relations  of  extension  and  thought,  or  mind  and  body, 
and  God,  as  comprehending  in  himself  pure  thought  and 
pure  extension,  Malebranche,  under  the  general  influence 
of  his  theological  prepossessions,  came  to  the,  with  him, 
cardinal  position  that  we  see  all  things  in  God,  i.e.,  we 
have  knowledge  of  the  true  nature  of  existences  by  partici- 
pation in  God's  knowledge  of  them.  God's  knowledge  is  a 
knowledge  through  pure  ideas,  or  archetypes,  of  which  he 
is  the  "  place,"  as  space  is  the  place  of  sensible  objects. 
The  knowledge  we  have  by  this  participation  is  rational  or 
scientific,  /.  e.,  geometrical  knowledge.  Our  knowledge  of 
the  merely  sensible  aspect  of  things  is  confused  and  uncer- 
tain, and  it  is  knowledge  by  things  in  their  relations  to  us 
rather  than  of  things  in  themselves.  Our  knowledge  of  our 
individual  selves  is,  likewise,  confused  and  uncertain :  it  is 
merely  a  matter  of  feeling  or  inner  experience.  Our  knowl- 
edge of  others  is  purely  conjectural.  What  we  and  others 
are  in  ourselves  and  themselves  is  known  to  God  (and  per- 
haps also  to  spirits).  (Descartes  had  declared  the  knowl- 
edge of  ourselves  to  be  the  most  certain  of  all  knowledge.) 
Our  knowledge  of  God  as  spirit  depends  on  immediate  illu- 
mination by  him.  Body  as  apprehended  through  ideas  is 
mere  (intelligible  or  non-sensible)  extension.  Real  indi- 
vidual bodies  are  "modifications"  or  "participations,"  i.e., 
specifications  or  limitations,  of  this  extension  produced  by 
God  through  motion.  Force  does  not  appertain  to  body 
as  such,  but  to  God ;  and  bodies  moving  or  communicating 
motion  do  so  only  by  God's  presence  and  influence.  Motion 
as  originating  with  God  is  simple  and  unchangeable  in  its 
laws.  As  the  ultimate  essence  of  body  is  extension,  so  that 
of  mind  is  thought,  and  differences  of  mind  are  a  conse- 
quence of  inclination  or  will,  which  is  therefore  related  to 
mind  in  its  essence  as  motion  is  related  to  extension.  Will 
as  such  depends  on  God,  and  is  his  love :  and,  since  he 
is  source  and  end  of  all  things,  it  is  his  love  toward  himself. 


IO4        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Particular  will  depends  on  relation  of  body  and  soul.  This 
relation  is  founded  on  God  :  external  objects  are  merely  the 
occasion  of  ideas  in  us ;  our  will  is  merely  the  occasion 
of  our  bodily  movements :  God  alone  produces  ideas  and 
movements.  Instrumental  in  the  reciprocal  relation  of 
body  and  soul  are  the  passions,  whose  ultimate  source  is 
love,  and  whose  end  is  the  liberation  of  the  soul  from  the 
constant  care  of  the  body.  They  are  good  or  evil  accord- 
ing to  the  nature  of  that  which  is  their  exciting  cause,  or 
their  object.  Enlightenment  is  the  precondition  to  freedom 
from  error  through  the  passions.  Our  destiny  is  to  live, 
through  knowledge  and  love,  in  union  with  God,  who  is 
himself  eternal  wisdom  and  love. 

Result.  —  In  the  system  of  Malebranche  Cartesianism 
approaches  more  nearly  than  hitherto  a  monistic  (substan- 
tialistic)  standpoint.  The  secondary  substances,  thought 
and  extension,  are  in  real  subordination  to  the  primary, 
God.  There  is  an  assimilation  to  one  another  of  opposed 
terms  through  the  conception  of  God  as  Replace  of  "ideas," 
as  space  is  the  place  of  sensible  objects.  This  assimilation 
is  an  assimilation  of  thought  to  extension  (rather  than  the 
opposite),  and  the  system  of  Malebranche,  though  by  its 
theory  of  knowledge  of  a  theological  cast,  is  by  virtue  of  this 
peculiar  character  of  the  assimilation  it  contains,  naturalistic 
also :  it  in  fact  (as  Fischer  suggests)  borders  upon  the 
.naturalistic  pantheism  of  Spinoza,  —  whom  we  have  next  to 
consider. 

§51- 

Baruch  de  Spinoza  1  (1632-1677).  —  Spinoza,  descend- 
ed from  a  family  of  Spanish  Jews  that  had  fled  to  Hol- 
land to  escape  persecution,  was  born  in  Amsterdam. 
His  education  was  conducted  by  a  Talmudist,  Saul  Levi 

1  Spinoza's  Works;  Kuno  Fischer's  Geschichte  der  neuern  Phi- 
losophic; Spinoza,  a  Study,  by  James  Martineau  ;  Ueber  die  beiden 
ersten  Phasen  des  Spinozistischen  Pantheismus,  von  Richard  Ave- 
narius;  Noack  ;  etc. 


SPINOZA.  105 

Morteira,  through  whom  he  became  acquainted  with  the 
teachings  of  Maimonides  (d.  1204)  and  Gerson  (d. 
1344),  by  an  atheist  physician,  Franz  Van  den  Ende, 
who  taught  him  the  classics,  and  possibly  also  impreg- 
nated his  mind  with  naturalistic  conceptions,  and  by  a 
Cartesian,  Ludwig  Meyer,  who  instructed  him  in  phy- 
sical science ;  Spinoza  meantime  studying  the  works  of 
Bruno  and  Descartes.  His  studies  carried  him  beyond 
the  faith  of  the  Synagogue,  and  he,  though  once  the  hope 
of  the  Jewish  doctors,  had  to  undergo  excommunication 
from  the  Synagogue.  Hunted  by  persecutors,  from  whom, 
on  one  occasion,  he  made  his  escape  barely  with  his  life, 
he  lived  in  rather  close  retirement  in  a  number  of  differ- 
ent places,  —  Rhynsburg,  Voorburg,  The  Hague.  At  one 
period,  at  least,  he  won  a  (frugal)  living  by  polishing 
lenses.  Nothing  —  not  even  a  call  to  the  chair  of  phi- 
losophy in  the  University  of  Heidelberg  —  could  tempt 
him  to  give  up  his  quiet  and  independent  mode  of  life, 
which  alone  could  shield  him  from  the  possibility  of  being 
disturbed  in  the  pursuit  of  philosophical  contemplation. 
He  had  a  number  of  discreet  friends,  to  whom  he  com- 
municated his  system  as  it  grew.  He  was  in  close  as- 
sociation with  the  (heterodox)  Arminians  at  Rhynsburg. 
Directly  or  indirectly  he  was  in  communication  with  some 
of  the  most  eminent  men  in  the  world  of  science  and 
philosophy  in  Europe,  —  Huyghens,  Leibnitz,  Boyle, 
Tschirnhausen. 

Works.  —  Spinoza's  chief  philosophical  works  are : 
"Tractatus  Theologico-Politicus ;  "  "Tractatus  de  Deo  et 
Homine  ejusque  Felicitate ; "  "  Tractatus  de  Intellectus 
Emendatione  et  de  Via  qua  optime  in  veram  Cogni- 
tionem ; "  "  Ethica  Ordine  geometrico  demonstrata  et 
in  quinque  Partes  distincta  in  quibus  agitur,  —  I.  De 
Deo,  II.  De  Natura  et  Origine  Mentis,  III.  De  Origine 
et  Natura  Affectuum,  IV.  De  Servitute  humana  seu  de 
Affectuum  Viribus,  V.  De  Potentia  Intellectus  seu  de 
Libertate  humana;"  "Tractatus  Politicus  in  quo  demon- 


106        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

strantur  quomodo  Societas  ubi  imperium  Monarch  ium 
Locum  habet,  sicut  et  Ea  ubi  Optimi  imperant  debet 
institui,  ne  in  Tyrannidem  labatur  et  ut  Pax  Libertas- 
que  Civium  inviolata  maneat ; "  "  Epistolae."  Only  the 
first-named  of  the  foregoing  works  was  published  in 
Spinoza's  life-time.  The  "  Tractatus  de  Deo  et  Homine  " 
etc.  was  not  generally  known  to  exist,  until  the  middle 
of  the  present  century.  Spinoza's  masterpiece  is  the 
"  Ethica ;  "  next  in  importance  for  the  knowledge,  of  his 
philosophy  are  the  "  Epistolae.''lxM.vWV  ^  {fj^^*^ 

Philosophy:  Motive  and  Genesis  of  Spinoza's  Philos- 
ophy.—  The  motive  of  Spinoza's  philosophizing  is  prima- 
rily ethical."  His  ethical — doctrines  are  prefaced  by 
riTeTapHysical  and  psycKoIogical doctrines,  and  supple- 
mentedb~y~a political  ~fHeory  \vEIch  constitutes,  as  it 
were,  a  scholium  to  his  doctrine  of  the  passions.  It 
must  be  observed,  however,  that  Spinoza's  ethical  theory 
culminates,  as  it  begins,  in  metaphysics,  so  that  meta- 
physics does  not  exactly  occupy  a  subordinate  position 
in  his  system.  —  Genetically  viewed,  the  doctrine  of  Spinoza 
is,  on  the  whole,  a  resultant  of  a  combination  of  th~e  Neo- 
Flatonlco-  CabUIstic  doctrine  ot  BruncTand  the  Cartesian 
doctrine.  Three  general  stages  may  be  detected  in 
Spinoza's  thinking ;  the  first  of  which  may  be  character- 
ized as  naturalistic,  the  second  as  theistic,  the  third_jis 
substantialistic.  It  appears,  from  a  certain  portion  of  the 
"  Tractatus  de  Deo  et  Homine,"  that  Spinoza's  first  thought 
was  that  of  Nature  as  the  infinite  and  as  altogether  perfect 
in  its  totality.  Next  —  as  appears  from  another  portion  of 
the  same  work  —  he  held  the  notion  of  God  as  the- infinite, 
and  God,  too,  viewed  as  a  predetermining  providence,jper- 
mitting  human  freedom  and  the  operation  of  final  causes. 
/-If  with  the  conception  of  the  perfect  all-inclusive  and  self- 
\  contained,  /.  <?.,  the  conception  of  substance,  there  be 
j  joined  the  mathematical  method  of  thought-development 
(  recommended  by  Descartes,  we  have  the  essence  of  the 
\third  phase  of  Spinoza's  thought.  The  mathematical 

^v  X"*».»^_  _—— i*— "" 


SPINOZA. 


107 


method  is  the  only  -method,  as  Spinoza  assumes,  suited 
to  the  conception,  since  it  alone  possesses  always  clearness 
and  distinctness  and  demonstrative  cogency,  or,  in  other 
words,  the  self-evidence  and  complete—  xieteKaination  cor- 
responding to  self-contained  and  all-inclusive  being  as 
content.  It  should  be  noted  that  all  three  phases  contain, 
implicitly  or  explicitly,  the  notion  of  substance,  and  all  are 
monistic. 

TJoctrine  of  God.  —  The  first  and  fundamental  con- 
ception in  the  final  doctrine  of  Spinoza  is  the_conceptJ9n 
of  that  which  by  its  very  nature  is,  is  only  in  and  through 
itself,  and  is  knogp-JP  and  through  itself  and  only  so. 
This,  Spinoza  terms  causa  sui,  —  defined  (see  Definition 
i.)  as  "that  the  nature  of  which  involves  existence,  or 
cannot  be  conceived  as  not  existing  ;  "  and  substance,  — 
defined  (Definition  iii.)  as  "that  which  is  in  itself  and 
is  conceived  through  itself,  or  that  the  notion  of  which 
needs  for  its  formation  the  notion  of  no  other  thing." 
Causa  sui,  or  substance,  is  eternal,  since  existence  is  its 
very  essence  (Definition  viii.),  free,  since  it  "  exists  from 
the  sole  necessity  of  its  nature,  and  acts  from  itself  alone  " 
(Definition  vii.),  is,  hence,  unconditioned,  and  is  infinite, 
indivisible,  one.  It  is  known  through  attributes,  —  attri- 
bute being  defined  as  "  that  which  the  intellect  perceives 
of  substance  as  constituting  its  essence"  (Definition  iii.). 
In  and  with  its  attributes  it  is  God,  —  who  may  be  defined 
as  "  absolute  being  or  substance  consisting  of  infinite  attri- 
butes, each  of  which  expresses  the  eternal  and  infinite 
essence."  Of  the  (numerically)  infinite  attributes  of 
God  —  each  of  which  is  conceived  only  per  se  and  is 
not  limited  by  any  other,  two  only  are  known  to  us,  viz., 
thought  and  extension.  God's  thought  is  like  that  of  man 
only  in  name  ;  it  excludes  choice  or  purpose,  since  God 
acts  solely  from  the  laws  of  his  own  nature  (Prop,  xvii.), 
though  "  freely,"  because  not  governed  from  without.  So 
far  as  he  is  extended,  God  is  identical  with  Nature,  in 
and  with  which  he  acts  as  immanent  cause  of  all  things 


IOS        A    HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

(Prop,  xviii.).  From  the  divine  nature,  consisting  of  in- 
finite attributes,  there  follow  "  infinite  things  in  infinite 
modes,"  the  mode  being  an  "affection  of  substance  or 
that  which  is  in  another,  and  through  which  that  other 
is  conceived"  (Definition  v.).  The  modes  in  God  differ 
from  him  as  effect  from  cause,  viz.,  in  that  it  has  a  cause ; 
otherwise,  each  is  known  as  the  other,  /.  e.,  they  are  alike. 
Modes  are  of  two  sorts,  —  finite  modes,  such  as  are,  in- 
dividually, all  finite  things,  and  infinite  modes,  which  are, 
in  one  aspect,  the  permanent  characters  or  qualities  of 
finite  existence  in  general,  and,  in  another,  necessary 
varieties  or  modifications  of  the  infinite  attributes  of  God. 
The  intellect  (see  below,  page  no)  is  an  example  of  an 
infinite  mode  of  thought ;  motion  and  rest  are  examples 
of  infinite  modes  of  extension.  Infinite  modes  are  a  mid- 
dle term  between  finite  modes,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
attributes,  on  the  other.  The  modes  are  in  God,  and  are 
modifications  of  his  attributes,  just  as  triangles,  or  figures  in 
genera],  are  "in"  extension,  and  are  modifications  of  it. 
And  they  follow  from  the  nature  of  God's  attributes ;  the 
infinite  directly,  the  finite  through  others,  ad  infinite m. 
They  follow  necessarily,  or  as  from  the  nature  of  the  tri- 
angle it  follows  that  the  sum  of  the  angles  is  equal  to 
two  right  angles.  All  things  are  therefore  necessary,  noth- 
ing is  contingent  in  any  other  sense  than  that  of  being 
dependent :  contingency  is  merely  a  name  for  our  ignorance. 
The  same  is  true  also  of  the  term  final  cause*  —  there  is  no 
purposing  of  things.  All  things  exist  necessarily  and  at 
once  with  their  causes.  In  reality  they  "  follow  "  one  an- 
other only  as  one  mathematical  truth  "  follows  "  another,  not 
temporally.  A  corollary  to  the  foregoing  is,  that  our  men- 
tal attitude  towards  nature  or  the  works  of  God  should 
be,  not  that  of  one  who  praises  or  finds  fault  with  what 
does  or  does  not  answer  to  a  certain  "  ideal,"  but  that  of 
one  simply  trying  to  understand.2 

1  See  the  famous  Appendix  to  Book  I.  of  the  "  Ethica." 
2  Tractatus  Politicus,  cap.  i.,  §  4. 


SPINOZA. 


109 


•i  h<>  Ajfrifwtff  s>j  'l»m$t't  a>^_P'rffrtnctr)  —  Mind  and 
yav.  —  - 


Body.  — A  "  mode  of  God  expressing  his  esseTlce  in  so  far 
as  he  is  res  extensa,  is  extended,  is  a  body  "  (Part  II.  Def.  i.). 
Modes  of  thought  express  the  essence  of  God  in  so  far  as  he 
is  a  res  cogitans.  As  the  attributes  of  God  are  conceived 
each  per  se,  and  are  not  limited  by  one  another,  bodies,  on 
the  one  hand,  and  modes  of  thought,  on  the  other,  are  inde- 
pendent of  one  another ;  and  by  ideas  are  to  be  understood, 
not  anything  passively  received  from  body,  but  products  of 
the  mind's  own  action.  An  "  adequate  idea "  is  an  idea 
which,  as  far  as  considered  in  itself  and  without  relation  to 
an  object,  has  all  the  properties  and  characteristics  of  a  true 
idea"  (Def.  ii.),  i.e.,  clearness  and  distinctness.  The 
following  propositions  are  axioms :  The  essence  of  man 
does  not  involve  necessary  existence,  —  i.e.,  from  the  order 
of  nature  it  may  happen  that  this  or  that  man  may  or  may 
not  exist  (Ax.  i.)  ;  Man  thinks  (Ax.  ii.)  ;  Modes  of  thought 
such  as  love,  desire,  or  whatever  other  affects  of  mind,  are 
not  given  in  the  same  individual  without  the  idea  of  the 
thing  loved,  desired,  etc.,  though  the  idea  may  be  given 
without  any  other  mode  of  thought  being  given  (Ax.  iii.)  ; 
We  know  a  certain  body  affected  in  many  ways  (Ax.  iv.)  ; 
We  neither  know  nor  perceive  particular  things  besides 
bodies  and  modes  of  thought  (Ax.  v.).  Though  extension 
and  thought,  body  and  mind,  are  independent  of  one  an- 
other, or  do  not  interact,  the  order  and  connection  of  ideas 
is  the  same  as  the  order  and  connection  of  things  (Prop, 
vii.  Part  ii.)  ;  Mind  and  body  are  but  two  corresponding 
sides  of  the  same  thing ;  any  bodily  mode  and  the  idea  of 
that  mode  are  one  and  the  same  thing ;  and  in  general,  the 
essence  of  the  human  mind  is  to  be  the  idea  of  some  par- 
ticular actually  existing  thing,  /.  e.,  of  some  body.  The  idea 
of  the  body  constituting  the  object  of  the  mind  is  necessa- 
rily given  in  the  mind.  Bodies  external  to  our  own  are 
known  through  their  effects  upon  our  bodies,  —  i.e.,  the 
ideas  of  them  are  involved  with  the  ideas  of  our  own  body. 
The  number  of  our  perceptions  depends  on  the  aptitude  of 


I  10        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  body  for  being  disposed  in  various  ways.  Acts  of  im- 
agination are  dependent  on  the  fact  that,  if  the  human  body 
is  affected  with  a  mode  which  involves  the  nature  of  an  ex- 
ternal body,  the  mind  will  continue  to  contemplate  the 
external  body  as  present  until  the  human  body  is  affected 
with  such  a  state  as  excludes  the  notion  of  the  presence  of 
the  body.  Memory  is  a  "  concatenation  of  ideas  involving 
the  nature  of  the  external  bodies,  according  to  the  order 
of  the  human  body."  From  this  concatenation  is  to  be  dis- 
criminated that  which  takes  place  according  to  the  order  of 
the  intellect,  whereby  the  mind  perceives  things  by  means 
of  their  causes ;  and  which  is  the  same  in  all  men.  Self- 
consciousness,  or  the  idea  of  the  human  mind,  "  follows  in 
God,  and  is  referred  to  God,  in  the  same  way  as  the  idea 
of  the  human  body :  "  it  is  an  idea  which  is  a  member  of 
an  infinite  series  corresponding  to,  or  parallel  with,  the  idea 
of  the  body,  and  is  united  with  the  mind  as  the  mind  is 
with  the  body ;  the  idea  constituting  the  mind  and  the  idea 
of  that  idea  are  two  sides  of  one  and  the  same  thing.  The 
ideas  of  the  body  are,  so  far  as  referred  to  the  human  mind 
alone,  confused  and  inadequate ;  so,  too,  are  the  ideas  of 
those  ideas.  They  are  true  when  referred  to  God  or  seen 
in  their  origin.  Every  adequate  idea  (see  Def.  iv.  above) 
and  complete  idea  is  true.  There  is  adequate  knowledge 
of  that,  and  that  only,  which  is  common  to  all  things  in  part 
as  in  whole,  for  this  constitutes  the  essence  of  no  particu- 
lar thing  (Props,  xxxvii.  and  xxxviii.).  Such  knowledge  is 
expressed  in  axioms.  Ideas  in  the  human  mind  following 
adequate  ideas  are  adequate.  Abstract  terms — being,  thing, 
something,  etc.  —  arise  from  the  fact  that  the  human  body  is 
capable  of  only  a  limited  number  of  distinct  states,  and  the 
states  (and  their  corresponding  ideas)  become  confused 
and  generalized  when  their  number  exceeds  a  certain  limit. 
There  are  three  sorts  of  cognition  :  ( i )  opinion,  or  imagi- 
nation (opinio  or  imaginatio) ,  which  may  or  may  not  be 
true;  (2)  reason  (ratio),  or  "adequate"  ideas,  which  is 
true  but  not  demonstrated  cognition ;  (3)  intuitive  science 


SPINOZA.  1 1 1 

(intuitiva  scientia),  which  is  "the  adequate  cognition  of 
the  essence  of  things  through  the  adequate  idea  of  the  for- 
mal essence  of  certain  attributes  of  God."  In  knowledge 
of  the  last  named  sort  things  are  perceived  in  their  neces- 
sary, eternal  nature,  or  under  the  form  of  eternity,  —  sub 
specie  aternitatis  (Bk.  II.,  Prop.  xliv.).  "Imagination" 
perceives  under  the  form  of  time.  "  Reason  "  is  the  faculty 
of  adequate  ideas  which  follow  from  God  in  so  far  as  he 
constitutes  the  essence  of  the  human  mind.  The  mind  has 
adequate  knowledge  of  the  infinite  and  eternal  essence  of 
God,  since  it  has  ideas  by  means  of  which  it  perceives  itself, 
its  body,  and  external  objects  as  actually  existing,  and  since, 
further,  any  idea  of  any  body  or  particular  thing  actually  ex- 
isting necessarily  involves  the  infinite  and  eternal  essence  of 
God  (Prop. xlvii.).  "There  is  in  the  mind  no  absolute,  or 
free,  will,  but  the  mind  is  constrained  to  willing  this  or  that 
thing  by  a  cause  which  also  is  constrained  by  another,  and 
this  by  another,  and  so  on  in  infinitum"  (Prop,  xlviii.). 
There  is  no  independent  power  of  willing,  as  of  knowing, 
desiring,  or  loving.  Men  (ignorantly)  suppose  themselves 
free,  merely  because  they  have  confused  ideas  of  the  causes 
of  their  deeds.  "  Free  will "  is  identical  with  intellect :  will 
otherwise  is  not  distinguishable  from  the  strongest  desire^ 
So-called  suspension  of  judgment  is  merely  inadequate  per- 
ception. This  doctrine  of  will  has  special  advantages  in  a 
moral  point  of  view :  it  teaches  that  we  are  truly  free  and 
happy  only  as  we  know  God  ;  it  helps  us  to  bear  with 
equanimity  inevitable  misfortune ;  it  teaches  us  not  to  de- 
spise, hate,  ridicule,  envy,  or  be  angry  with  any  one  :  it 
shows  men  how  they  should  act  as  citizens,  —  viz.,  not  as 
slaves,  but  as  those  who  unconstrainedly  do  those  things 
which  seem  best. 

Origin  and  Nature  of  the  Emotions.  —  Human  actions 
and  emotions  are  to  be  explained  by  the  same  method  that 
the  geometer  employs ;  the  scientific  treatment  is  merely, 
as  it  were,  a  "  matter  of  lines,  planes,  and  solids."  "  By 
emotions  I  understand  affections  of  the  body,  by  which  the 


112        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

body's  power  of  acting  is  augmented  or  diminished,  in- 
creased or  decreased ;  also  the  ideas  of  those  affections  " 
(Part  III.,  Def.  i.).  .  Subjectively  viewed,  an  emotion  is  a 
confused  idea  by  which  the  mind  affirms  that  the  power  of 
the  body  or  some  part  of  the  body  to  exist  is  increased  or 
diminished,  and  by  which  the  mind  is  constrained  to  think 
this  or  that  thing  rather  than  some  other.  When  we  are 
the  adequate  or  real  causes  of  our  emotions  (considered  as 
affections  of  the  body)  we  may  be  said  to  act.  We  are 
adequate  causes  in  so  far,  and  only  in  so  far,  as  we  have 
adequate  ideas.  The  passions  or  passive  emotions  are  to 
be  referred  to  the  mind  only  in  so  far  as  it  involves  nega- 
tion, or  can  be  considered  a  part  of  nature  which  cannot 
per  se  and  without  other  things  be  distinctly  and  clearly 
perceived.  But  the  mind  is  also  independent  of  nature  as 
such,  is  essentially  conatus,  or'  endeavor  to  persist  in  a  cer- 
tain manner  of  its  own,  —  with  a  consciousness  of  this 
conatus.  This  conatus  referred  to  the  mind  alone  is  will, 
referred  to  both  mind  and  body  is  instinct,  or  appetite. 
Appetite,  together  with  the  consciousness  of  it,  is  desire, 
examples  of  which  are  benevolence,  anger,  cruelty,  fear, 
modesty,  ambition.  Desires  and  passions  are  the  two  great 
classes  of  affects  or  emotions.  As  depending  upon  the  body 
the  mind  suffers  great  mutation  of  condition,  now  passing  to 
a  greater  degree  of  perfection,  now  to  a  less.  ^lence  arise 
two  distinct  classes  of  passions,  or  two  passions,  joy  and 
grief,  the  former  being  the  passion  by  which  the  mind 
'passes  to  a  state  of  greater  perfection,  the  latter  the  passion 
opposite  to  this.  The  passions  are,  further,  divisible,  with 
reference  to  the  externality  or  internality  of  their  cause. 
Examples  of  passions^Having  an  external  cause  are  love, 
hate,  devotion,  indignation,  envy;  examples  of  passions 
having  an  internal  cause  are  humility,  penitence,  pride, 
shame.  Joy  and  grief  are  the  most  general  emotions. 
Desire  is  to  be  classed  with  joy  as  an  emotion  by  which  the 
mind  is  active  and  passes  from  a  lower  to  a  higher  degree 
of  perfection.  All  actions  which  follow  from  emotions 


SPINOZA.  113 

which  are  referred  to  the  mind,  so  far  as  it  knows,  are 
forms  of  "fortitude"  which  is  either  a  desire  by  which  each 
one  endeavors  from  the  dictate  of  reason  alone  to  preserve 
his  own  being,  —  "animosity"  or  a  desire  by  which  one 
endeavors  from  the  dictate  of  reason  alone  to  assist  others 
and  unite  them  in  friendship,  —  "generosity"  (Spinoza  dis- 
cusses forty-eight  emotions  which  he  regards  as  the  chief — 
not  the  only —  ones.)  We  may  cite  one  or  two  propositions 
further  on  the  origin  and  nature  of  the  emotions.  "  If  the 
mind  has  been  once  affected  by.  two  emotions  at  the  same 
time,  it  will  when  it  is  affected  by  either  of  them  afterwards 
be  affected  by  the  other  also."  The  mastery  of  the  passions 
depends  in  considerable  measure  on  the  opposing  of  those 
by  which  the  mind  passes  to  a  less  degree  of  perfection  by 
those  by  which  it  passes  to  a  greater  degree  of  perfection. 

Human  Servitude  or  Power  of  the  Emotions.  —  Whatever 
strengthens  that  conatus,  or  endeavor  to  persist,  which  con- 
stitutes the  essence  of  each  thing,  is  good ;  the  opposite  is 
evil.  Things  are  not  good  in  themselves,  but  because  and 
in  so  far  as  desired  and  striven  for.  The  stronger  the  cona- 
tus the  more  virtuous  we  are.  There  can  be  no  virtue, 
without  the  desire  to  exist ;  and  there  can  be  no  virtue 
greater  than  the  desire  to  exist,  —  none  to  which  it  is  re- 
lated as  means  to  end.  It  follows  from  the  foregoing  prin- 
ciples that  all  forms  of  grief  are  evil.  Some  forms  of  joy 
may  be  evil  if  they  exist  in  a  very  high  degree,  e.g.,  love, 
titillation  ;  others  are,  without  qualification,  so,  —  e.g.,  con- 
ceit, great  pride  ;  hope  is  not  good  per  se.  In  view  of  the  fact 
that  evil  emotions  may  be  disciplined  by  means  of  stronger 
and  contrary  emotions,  it  is  important  to  determine  what 
emotions  are  stronger  than  and  contrary  to  others.  An 
emotion  whose  cause  we  imagine  to  be  present  in  us  is 
stronger  than  one  whose  cause  we  do  not  imagine  to  be 
present  in  us ;  an  emotion  towards  a  thing  present  is 
stronger  than  an  emotion  towards  a  thing  in  the  future  to 
us ;  feeling  towards  a  thing  which  we  imagine  to  be  neces- 
sary is  more  intense,  other  things  being  equal,  than  towards 
VOL.  i.  —  8 


114        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

a  thing  which  we  imagine  to  be  contingent,  possible,  or  not 
necessary ;  desire  arising  from  joy  is  stronger,  other  things 
being  equal,  than  desire  springing  from  grief;  love  and 
generosity  are  stronger  than  hate,  anger,  contempt,  etc. 
(All  these  propositions,  it  must  be  remembered,  are  demon- 
strated geometrico  more,  —  like  all  others  in  the  "Ethica.") 
The  Power  of  the  Intellect  or  Human  Freedom.  —  By 
the  fact  that  the  mind  possesses  the  power  of  concatenating 
ideas  according  to  a  different  order  from  that  of  the  body, 
there  are  other  ways  of  moderating  and  coercing  the  emo- 
tions and  attaining  to  spiritual  freedom  than  by  opposing 
to  them  those  contrary  and  stronger,  —  ways  leading  more 
directly,  if  not  always  more  certainly,  to  reason.  It  is  pos- 
sible to  moderate  feeling  (i)  by  separating  it  from  the 
idea  of  its  exciting  cause  and  joining  it  to  other  ideas 
(Part  V.,  Prop,  ii.),  (2)  by  referring  it  to  many  instead 
of  few  causes,  and  to  an  object  of  reason  rather  than 
of  sense  or  imagination  (Props,  ix.  and  vii.),  (3)  by  view- 
ing things  in  their  necessary  character  (Prop,  vi.),  or  under 
the  form  of  eternity.  The  last-mentioned  method  is  not 
merely  a  means  to  freedom,  but  is  in  itself  freedom. 
In  viewing  things  sub  specie  <zternitatis  the  mind  is  no 
longer  passive  or  subject  to  nature,  but  active  and  self- 
determining  and  free  from  nature.  This  condition  of 
mind  has  an  emotional  aspect,  in  virtue  of  which  it  may 
be  called  intellectual  love  towards  the  eternal  or  God, — 
for  what  the  mind  knows  sub  specie  aternitatis  it  delights 
in,  recognizing  at  the  same  time  God  as  the  cause  of 
its  delight.  The  intellectual  love  of  God,  amor  intel- 
lectualis  Dei,  is  the  most  constant  of  all  emotions,  since 
there  is  no  stronger  opposite  emotion  by  which  it  can  be 
destroyed  (for  no  one  can  hate  God),  and  cannot  be  pol- 
luted by  envy  or  jealousy.  It  is  a  part  of  the  infinite  love 
of  God  towards  himself  (Prop,  xxxvi.).  It  is  necessary 
and  eternal,  and  can  be  destroyed  by  nothing  in  nature. 
The  cup  of  him  who  loves  God  with  this  love  is  full  of 
joy.  He  cannot  even  desire  that  God  should  love  him 


SPINOZA.  1 1 5 

(Prop,  xxxvi.,  Schol.).  /This  blessedness  of  his  is  not  the 
reward  of  virtue  but  virtue  itself  (Prop.  xlii.).  But  even 
though  we  should  not  know  this  love  and  that  our  minds 
are  eternal,  we  ought  to  esteem  above  all  things  the 
rational  endeavor  for  self-preservation  and  the  rational 
endeavor  to  assist  others  and  unite  them  in  friendship. 

The  State.  —  The  conatus  of  man  is,  ideally  speaking, 
an  endeavor,  in  accordance  with  reason.  Nothing  is  so 
useful  to  man  as  that  which  promotes  that  endeavor.  That 
endeavor,  whether  in  its  bodily  or  its  mental  aspect,  de- 
pends on  nothing  so  much  as  upon  man :  nothing,  there- 
fore, is  so  useful  to  man  as  man.  The  highest  good  of 
men  is  a  good  that  is  virtually  common  to  all  men,  a 
good  that  all  can  rejoice  in :  and  he  who  lives  in  society 
is  freer  and  better  than  he  who  lives  in  solitude.  While 
however  all  this  is  true  ideally,  society  actually  has  its 
foundation  in  the  emotions  rather  than  in  reason.  The 
corner-stones  of  society  as  it  actually  exists  are  the  two 
principles  that  the  emotions  must  be  coerced  by  those 
that  are  stronger,  and  that  whoever  hates  any  one  will 
strive  to  injure  him  unless  he  fears  that  a  greater  evil  will 
befall  him  ("Ethica,"  Part  III.,  Prop,  xxxix.).  The  State, 
therefore,  has  its  end,  office,  and  virtue  in  the  providing 
for  the  security  of  the  individual  as  against  the  emotions 
of  others,  —  which  it  does  by  coercing  those  emotions 
by  stronger  and  contrary  ones.  The  right  of  the  State  — 
expressed  in  the  most  general  terms  —  is  that  of  coercion, 
a  right  which  it  possesses  merely  because  of  its  might.  The 
State,  as  long  as  it  has  the  power  to  exist,  can  do  no  wrong. 
It  alone  has  the  power  to  break  the  contract  on  which 
it  rests.  Every  citizen  is  bound  to  obey  all  laws,  however 
absurd  they  may  seem  to  him.  The  utmost  liberty  of 
opinion  and  discussion,  short  of  sedition,  should  be  per- 
mitted in  the  State.  The  right  of  coercion  may  be  vested 
in  a  single  person,  a  popular  assembly,  or  in  a  select  body 
of  men :  government,  that  is  to  say,  may  be  a  monarchy, 
a  democracy,  or  an  aristocracy.  In  a  monarchy  the  sove- 


II  6        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

reign  should  be  a  king  with  an  advisory  or  consultative 
council  ;  in  an  aristocracy  a  senate  of  four  hundred,  chosen 
from  a  patrician  order  of  five  thousand  men,  constituting 
a  great  common  council,  the  fountain  of  all  authority  ;  in 
a  democracy  the  body  of  "  native  "  or  naturalized  citizens. 
Religion.  —  Religion  has  a  function  quite  different  from 
that  of  philosophy.  While  the  end  of  philosophy  is  truth, 
that  of  religion  is  obedience.  To^  this  end  Jhgre  suffices 
merely  the  belief  that  there  js  a  single  _omnipj-esent  highest 
being  vvho  loves  justice  and  goodnessJL_that^everence  of 
Gpd^and^  obedience  to  him  consist  in  righteousness  and 
love  of  one's  neighbor,  that  those  ajone_who_p^ractise  this 
obedience^re  happy,  and  that  God  parHnm  thp 


Obedience  to  divine  laws  may  be  practised  by  all  men, 
without  distinction  as  regards  their  mental  endowment; 
but  philosophy  is  only  for  the  select  few.  Religion  may 
have  a  sufficient  basis  in  the  lowest  form  of  knowledge,  — 
opinio  or  imaginatio  ;  philosophy  is  scientia  intuitiva,  the 
highest  form  of  knowledge. 

Result.  —  As  compared  with  the  pantheism  of  Male- 
branche,  Spinoza's  pantheism  is  the  more  naturalistic  ;  and 
because  more  consistently  substantialistic,  since  where  sub- 
stance (including  mechanical  cause  and  effect)  is  the 
supreme  category,  there  is  the  realm  of  nature  as  such. 
The  substantialistic  pantheism  of  Spinoza  closes  the  natu- 
ral course-  of  development  of  Cartesianism  :  Descartes' 
notion  of  God  as  substance  par  excellence,  or  as  the 
substance  of  substances,  attains  in  Spinoza's  conception 
of  God  as  the  only  substance,  all  other  so-called  substances 
being  merely  attributes,  its  fully  developed  form,  since  sub- 
stance is  in  its  very  nature  but  one. 

§  S*- 

The  Cambridge  Plafonist1  and  Richard  Cumberland: 
Anti-Hobbean  and  Anti-  Cartesian. 

1  See  Tulloch's  "  Rational  Theology  and  Christianity  in  England  " 
(in  the  seventeenth  century),  vol.  ii. 


CAMBRIDGE  PL  A  TONISTS.—  WHICHCO  TE.       117 

We  may  next  consider  a  group  of  thinkers  of  the  seven- 
teenth century,  whose  position,  if  not  their  very  existence,  in 
the  history  of  philosophy  is  due  largely  to  the  fact  that  they 
opposed  the  mechanico-naturalistic  standpoint  as  advocated 
by  the  Cartesians  and  (especially)  by  Hobbes.  They  are 
the  so-called  Cambridge  Platonists,  Benjamin  Whichcote, 
John  Smith,  Nathaniel  Culverwel,  Ralph  Cudworth,  and 
Henry  More ;  and  Richard  Cumberland.  The  Cambridge 
Platonists  may  be  classed  as  intuitionalists :  Cumberland 
as  an  empirico-rationalist. 

§  53- 

Benjamin  Whichcote  (1609-1683).  —  Whichcote  gradu- 
ated at  Cambridge  University,  and  was  afterwards  fellow 
there,  and  provost  of  King's  College  (1644).  His  sermons, 
for  he  became  a  preacher,  are  said  to  have  kindled  the 
religio-philosophical  movement  carried  on  by  the  Cambridge 
Platonists.  His  philosophical  utterances  are  contained  in  cer- 
tain "  Aphorisms  "  on  (i )  the  "  Use  of  Reason  in  Religion," 

(2)  the  "Differences  of  Opinion  among  Christians,"  and 

(3)  the    "True   Character  of  Religion."     (i)   "He  that 
gives  a  reason  for  what  he  saith,"  says  Whichcote,  "has 
done  what  is  fit  to  be  done,  and  the  most  that  can  be  done. 
He  that  gives  no  reason  speaks  nothing,  though  he  saith 
never  so  much."     "There  is  nothing  proper  and  peculiar 
to   man  but  the  use  of  reason   and   exercise   of  virtue." 

(2)  "  Every  man  hath  a  right  of  judging,  if  he  be  capable ; 
yea,  can  a  man,  ought  a  man,  to  believe  otherwise  than  as 
he  sees  cause?     Is  it  in  a  man's  power  to  believe  as  he 
would,  or  only  as  the  reason  of  the  thing  appears  to  him  ?  " 
"  He  that  is  light  of  faith  by  the  same  reason  will  be  light 
of  belief;  he  will  as  easily  disbelieve  truth  as  believe  error." 

(3)  "Religion  is  intelligible,  rational,  and  accountable:  it 
is  not  our  burthen,  but  our  privilege.     The  moral  part  of 
religion  never  alters.     Moral  laws  are  of  themselves,  without 
sanction  by  will ;  and  the  necessity  of  them  arises  from  the 
things  themselves.     All  other  things  are  in  order  to  these. 


I  1 8        A   HISTORY  OF  MODE  RAT  PHILOSOPHY. 

.  .  .  Morals  are  owned  as  soon  as  they  are  spoken,  and  they 
are  nineteen  parts  in  twenty  of  all  religion.  .  .  .  Religion 
doth  possess  and  affect  the  whole  man ;  in  the  understand- 
ing it  is  knowledge;  in  the  life  it  is  obedience;  in  the 
affections  it  is  delight  in  God ;  in  our  carriage  and  be- 
havior it  is  modesty,  calmness,  gentleness,  quietness,  candor, 
ingenuity  [ingenuousness?]  ;  in  our  dealing  it  is  uprightness, 
integrity,  correspondence  with  the  rule  of  righteousness ; 
makes  men  virtuous  in  all  instances."  The  foregoing  apho- 
risms may  be  said  to  contain  the  seed-thoughts  of  most  of 
the  philosophic  wisdom  of  the  Cambridge  Platonists. 

§  54. 

John  Smith  (1618-1652).  —  John  Smith  was  a  graduate 
of  Emmanuel,  and  fellow  of  Queen's  College,  Cambridge. 
Besides  being  very  successful  as  a  teacher,  he  won  esteem 
for  many  excellences  of  character.  His  philosophical  views 
are  contained  in  a  volume  of  "  Select  Discourses." 

Philosophy :  Knowledge.  —  Smith  finds  the  test  of  knowl- 
edge in  its  relation  to  character  rather  than  in  the 
accordance  with  the  formal  requirements  of  syllogistic 
demonstration.  He  distinguishes  between  evidence  and 
certainty,  affirming  that  the  "  common  notions  of  God  and 
virtue  impressed  on  the  souls  of  men  are  more  clear  and 
conspicuous  than  any ;  and  if  they  have  not  more  certainty, 
yet  they  have  more  evidence,  and  display  themselves  with 
less  difficulty  to  our  reflective  faculty  than  any  geometrical 
demonstrations."  In  the  last  analysis  all  knowledge  is  self- 
knowledge. 

Stages  of  Spiritual  Attainment.  —  After  the  manner  of 
Plotinus  (whom  he  cites)  and  of  Plato  (in  the  "  Phsedrus," 
"  Symposuim,"  and  "Republic"),  Smith  distinguishes  cer- 
tain stages  of  spiritual  attainment.  He  characterizes  the 
types  of  intellect  respectively  belonging  thereto  as  follows  : 
"  First  is  the  complex  and  multifarious  man,  in  whom  sense 
and  reason  are  so  mixed  and  twisted  up  that  his  knowledge 
cannot  be  laid  out  into  first  principles,"  —  the  victim  of 


JOHN  SMITH.  119 

custom  and  vulgar  opinion  ;  next  in  order  is  the  "  ration- 
alist," "  who  thinks  not  fit  to  view  his  own  face  in  any  other 
glass  but  that  of  reason  and  understanding,  and  in  whom 
the  communes  notitice,  or  common  principles  of  virtue  and 
goodness,  are  more  clear  and  steady,  but  who,  being  unfed 
and  unfilled  with  the  practice  of  true  virtue,  may  be  poor, 
empty,  and  hungry ;  "  third,  there  is  the  mystic,  who  has 
an  "  inward  sense  of  virtue  and  moral  goodness  far  tran- 
scendent to  all  mere  speculative  opinions,  but  whose  soul 
is  apt  too  much  to  heave  and  swell  with  the  sense  of  his 
own  virtue  and  knowledge  ;  "  last  we  have  the  true  "  meta- 
physical and  contemplative  man,"  who,  leaving  behind  his 
mere  "  logical  or  self-rational  life,  pierceth  into  the  highest 
life." 

Immortality.  —  Smith's  conception  of  the  dignity  of 
human  nature  leads  him  directly  to  the  conception  of  im- 
mortality (and  thence  to  that  of  God).  The  highest  proof  of 
immortality  is  with  him,  man's  capacity  for  virtue,  and  the 
indestructibility  of  virtue,  —  virtue  making  us  partakers  of 
the  divine  eternity.  Immortality  is  proved  also  by  the 
soul's  incorporeality,  its  self-action,  its  apprehension  of 
necessary  truth.  Incorporeality  follows  from  the  fact  of 
self-consciousness ;  mere  material  atoms  could  not  by  any 
possibility  beget  thought,  nor  even  mere  sensation,  which  is 
far  from  being  real,  discriminative  thought.  It  follows  also 
from  the  unity  and  self-identification  of  the  soul,  —  which 
are  demonstrated  by  the  facts  of  memory  and  the  power  to 
connect  ideas  into  a  single  whole  of  conception,  and  are 
attributes  entirely  opposite  to  those  possessed  by  matter. 
Again,  the  apodictical  principles  of  geometry,  and  the 
directly-apprehended  and  unchangeable  archetypal  concep- 
tions of  morals,  physics,  and  metaphysics,  — justice,  wisdom, 
goodness,  truth,  eternity,  omnipotency,  —  require,  in  virtue  of 
their  purity,  a  higher  source  than  mere  matter. 

God.  —  "Though  God  hath  copied  forth  his  own  per- 
fection in  this  conspicable  and  sensible  world,  according  as 
it  is  capable  of  entertaining  them,  yet  the  most  clear  and 


120        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

distinct  copy  of  himself  could  be  imparted  to  none  else  but 
intelligible  and  inconspicable  natures ;  and  though  the  whole 
fabric  of  the  visible  universe  be  whispering  out  the  notions 
of  a  Deity,  and  always  inculcates  the  lesson  of  its  divine 
origin  to  the  contemplation  of  it,  yet  we  cannot  understand 
it  without  some  interpreter  within."  Self-knowledge,  that 
is  to  say,  is  the  key  to  the  knowledge  of  the  world  as  re- 
lates to  God,  and  hence  of  God.  This  is  true  as  regards 
not  only  the  existence  but  also  the  attributes  of  God,  —  ex- 
cept that  we  know  only  in  part  and  by  degrees  what  is  in 
God  eternally.  God's  intelligence  is  reason ;  his  acts  are 
determined  by  his  intelligence.  He  is  constantly  present 
with  us  as  an  unsatisfied  ideal.  He  is  revealed  to  us 
through  the  senses  as  well  as  the  understanding.  Revela- 
tion is  an  influx  of  the  divine  mind  into  ours. 

Religion.  —  The  main  purpose  of  religion  is  to  "  purge 
and  reform  our  hearts,  and  all  the  illicit  actions  and  notions 
thereof."  Religion,  instead  of  being  a  "  boiling  up  of  our 
imaginative  powers."  or  the  "  flowing  heat  of  passion,"  is  a 
new  nature,  informing  the  souls  of  men. 

§  55- 

Nathaniel  Culverwel  (1615-1652).  —  Culvenvel  was  a 
graduate  and  fellow  of  Cambridge  University,  and  author  of 
a  philosophico-theological  treatise,  "  Discourse  of  the  Light 
of  Nature  "  (1652).  Culverwel  criticises  "those  theolo- 
gians who  are  unwilling  to  give  to  reason  the  things  that  are 
reason's,  as  well  as  to  faith  the  things  that  are  faith's,"  and 
inquires  whether  they  "  would  be  banished  from  these  es- 
sences." He  "  cannot  look  upon  reason  only  as  a  bird  of 
prey  that  comes  to  peck  out  the  eyes  of  men."  Will  the 
misguided  theologians  "  pluck  out  their  eyes  because  they 
cannot  look  upon  the  sun  in  his  brightness  and  glory?" 
Culverwel,  however,  opposes  the  doctrine  of  innate  ideas 
and  the  doctrine  of  the  pre-existence  of  the  soul,  which  had 
by  Plato  been  assumed  to  account  for  "  innate  ideas."  In- 
trospective psychological  analysis,  "  consulting  one's  own 


CUL  VER  WEL.  —  CUD  WOR TH.  12  I 

breast,"  fails,  he  thinks,  to  disclose  any  such  ideas;  all 
knowledge  originates  primarily  through  the  senses.  Reason, 
in  the  complete  sense  of  the  term,  is  both  a  light  which 
discerns  eternal  law,  and  a  subject  which  obeys  that  law. 
The  eternal  law  discerned  by  reason  is  God  himself,  who 
embraces  in  a  single  great  order  both  matter  and  spirit. 
Law  originates  in  reason  and  is  for  reason,  —  is  essentially 
moral  in  character  (as  Hooker  had  already  taught).  What 
the  law  of  reason  is,  we  may  learn  not  only  by  introspection, 
but  from  the  consensus  gentium,  or  the  universal  consent  of 
men.  "  When  you  see  so  many  rays  from  the  same  light 
shooting  themselves  into  the  several  corners  of  the  world, 
you  presently  look  up  to  the  sun  as  the  glorious  original  of 
them  all.  .  .  .  Certainly  it  is  some  transcendent  beauty  that 
so  many  nations  are  enamoured  withal.  It  is  some  powerful 
music  that  sets  the  whole  world  advancing." 

§  56- 

Ralph  Cudworth  (1617-1688).  —  Cudworth  graduated 
at  Cambridge,  was  fellow  and  tutor  in  Emmanuel  College 
there,  and  was  also  regius  professor  of  Hebrew,  and  master, 
or  principal,  of  Clare  Hall  and  of  Christ's  College.  During 
an  interval  between  different  periods  at  which  he  was  con- 
nected with  the  university  he  preached  in  one  of  the  English 
parishes,  winning  a  name  for  pulpit-eloquence.  "  Even  at 
the  early  age  of  twenty-three  "  Cudworth  had  "  mastered  all 
the  main  sources  of  philosophy,  mediaeval  as  well  as  clas- 
sical," and  was  particularly  familiar  with  the  Neo-Platonic 
and  Jewish  schools  of  thought.  He  is  noted  for  his  great 
learning. 

Works. — Cudworth's  principal  works  are:  "The  Intel- 
lectual System  of  the  Universe"  (1678),  —  a  reply  to 
Hobbes's  "  Leviathan,  a  Treatise  concerning  Eternal  and 
Immutable  Morality"  (published  1731),  "Liberty  and  Ne- 
cessity" (published  1838). 

Philosophy :  Problems.  —  "  These  three  things,"  says  Cud- 
worth,  "  are  the  fundamentals  or  essentials  of  true  religion : 


122         A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

that  all  things  do  not  float  without  a  head  and  governor,  but 
there  is  an  omnipresent  understanding  being  presiding  over 
all ;  that  God  hath  ah  essential  goodness  and  justice,  the 
differences  of  good  and  evil,  moral,  honest  and  dishonest, 
are  not  by  mere  will  and  law,  and  consequently  the  Deity 
cannot  act,  influence,  and  necessitate  men  to  such  things  as 
are  in  their  own  nature  evil ;  and  lastly,  that  necessity  is  not 
intrinsical  to  the  nature  of  everything,  but  men  have  such  a 
liberty  or  power  over  their  own  actions  as  may  render  them 
accountable  for  the  same  and  blameworthy  when  they  do 
amiss,  and  consequently  there  is  justice  distributive  of  re- 
wards and  punishments  running  throughout  the  world."  To 
establish  by  rational  proof  the  three  foregoing  theses  — 
viz.,  the  existence  of  God,  of  the  truth  of  moral  conceptions 
as  such,  and  the  fact  of  liberty  of  will  —  is  the  proposed 
general  object  of  Cudvvorth's  philosophizing. 

The  Existence  of  God.  —  Cudworth's  proof  of  the  thesis 
of  the  existence  of  God  is  largely  merely  a  disproof  of  the 
contradictory.  He  defines  atheism  as  "  corporealism,"  — 
the  "  putting  of  matter  in  place  of  mind ;  "  theism,  on  the 
contrary,  "  making  the  first  original  of  all  things  universally 
to  be  a  consciously  understanding  nature,  or  perfect  mind." 
He  classes  as  "  imperfect  theists "  those  who  hold  to  the 
eternity  of  matter  as  well  as  mind.  Atheistic  were,  actually, 
though  not  necessarily,  the  ancient  doctrines  of  atomism  and 
hylozoism.  Purely  atheistic  is  the  "  corporealism "  of 
Hobbes.  The  logical  origin  of  Hobbes's  atheism  lies  in  his 
doctrine  of  knowledge.  If  the  Hobbean  doctrine  of  knowl- 
edge, which  is,  fundamentally,  that  all  knowledge  is  limited 
by  mere  sense,  be  true,  we  do  not  know  that  we  know,  "  since 
one  sense  cannot  judge  of  another  or  correct  the  error  of  it, 
all  sense  as  such  (that  is,  as  fancy  and  apparition)  being 
alike  true."  Sense  itself  is  unknown,  since  "  neither  fancy 
nor  sense  falls  under  sense,  but  only  the  objects  of  them ; 
we  neither  seeing  vision  nor  feeling  taction,  nor  hearing 
audition,  much  the  less  hearing  sight  or  seeing  taste  or 
the  like."  To  deny  the  existence  of  whatever  may  not 


CUD  WORTH.  123 

be  an  object  of  corporeal  sense  is  to  deny  the  existence 
of  mind  and  soul  in  ourselves  and  others,  since  we  can 
neither  feel  nor  see  any  such  things.  Nevertheless,  we  are 
certain  from  inward  consciousness,  from  "reason,"  —  since 
"  nothing  "  cannot  act,  —  and  from  our  observation  of  the 
actions  of  others,  that  soul  and  mind  really  exist  in  ourselves 
and  others.  And  the  atheist  has  as  little  reason  to  deny 
the  existence  of  a  perfect  mind  presiding  over  the  universe 
as  that  of  mind  and  soul  in  ourselves  and  others.  To  derive 
mind  from  a  "  supposed  senseless,  stupid,  and  inconscious 
life  of  nature  in  matter"  is  equivalent  to  deriving  some- 
thing from  nothing.  "  If  matter  as  such  had  life,  per- 
ception, and  understanding  to  it,  then  of  necessity  must 
every  action  or  smallest  particle  thereof  be  a  distinct  per- 
cipient by  itself:  from  which  it  will  follow  that  there  could 
not  possibly  be  any  such  men  and  animals  as  now  are  com- 
pounded out  of  them ;  but  every  man  and  animal  would  be 
a  heap  of  innumerable  perceptions  and  intellections ;  whereas 
it  is  plain  that  there  is  but  one  life  and  understanding,  one 
soul  or  mind,  one  thinker  in  every  one."  Similarly,  there 
must  be  assumed  in  the  universe  as  one  universe  a  single 
mind  ruling  it.  Further,  were  all  movement  in  the  universe 
merely  mechanical,  communicated,  or  passive,  movement, 
motion  would  primarily  proceed  from  nothing ;  hence  there 
must  be  a  self-moving,  unmoved  first  mover.  Again,  matter 
could  never  have  created  mind ;  but  a  perfect  mind  could 
have  created  matter.  Another  proof  of  the  existence  of 
God  (or  perfect  being)  is  as  follows :  Something  must 
eternally  have  existed,  and  must  consequently  have  ex- 
isted naturally  and  necessarily,  including  necessarily  eternal 
existence  in  its  own  nature ;  hence  have  been  absolutely 
perfect.  Still  another  proof  may  be  given  thus  :  "  Knowl- 
edge is  possible  only  through  ideas,  which  must  have  their 
source  in  an  eternal  reason.  Sense  is  not  only  not  the  whole 
of  knowledge,  but  is  in  itself  not  at  all  knowledge  :  it  is  in 
itself  wholly  relative  and  individual,  and  not  universal  until 
the  mind  adds  to  it  what  is  absolute  and  universal.  Knowl- 


124        A    HISTORY  OF  MODEKN  PHILOSOPHY. 

edge  does  not  begin  with  what  is  universal :  the  individual 
is  known  by  being  brought  under  a  universal :  the  universal 
is  not  gathered  from  a  multitude  of  individuals.  And  the 
universals,  vorj^ara,  or  ideas,  which  underlie  all  knowledge 
of  men,  which  originate  it,  and  do  not  originate  in  it,  have 
existed  eternally  in  the  only  mode  in  which  truth  can  be 
said  to  be  eternally  existent,  /.  e.,  in  an  eternal  mind." 
Another  proof  offered  by  Cudworth  of  the  existence  of  God 
is  that  of  Anselm,  slightly  modified.1 

God  in  Relation  to  Matter :  The  "  Plastic  Nature."  — 
To  suppose  that  "  God  himself  doth  all  immediately,  and,  as 
it  were,  with  his  own  hands,  forms  the  body  of  every  gnat 
and  fly,  insect  and  mite,  is  to  render  divine  providence 
operose,  solicitous,  and  distractious."  And,  apart  from  this, 
the  slowness  and  imperfection  of  actual  nature  confute  such 
an  idea.  There  must  exist  between  God  and  matter  a  third 
nature,  which  may  be  termed  the  "  plastic  nature."  "  It  is 
a  certain  lower  life  than  the  animal,  which  acts  regularly 
and  artificially  according  to  the  directions  of  mind  and  un- 
derstanding, reason  and  wisdom,  for  ends,  in  order  to  good, 
though  itself  do  not  know  the  reason  for  what  it  does,  nor 
is  master  of  that  wisdom  according  to  which  it  acts,  but  only 
a  servant  to  it,  and  drudging  executioner  of  the  same,  it 
operating  fatally  and  sympathetically  according  to  law  and 
commands  prescribed  to  it  by  a  perfect  intellect,  and  im- 
pressed upon  it ;  and  which  is  either  a  lower  faculty  of 
some  conscious  soul,  or  else  an  inferior  kind  of  life  or  soul 
by  itself,  but  essentially  depending  upon  an  higher  intellect."2 
To  suppose  that  "  every  plant,  herb,  and  pile  of  grass  has  a 
plastic  or  vegetative  soul  of  its  own  were  unreasonable, 
but  there  may  possibly  be  one  plastic  unconscious  nature 
in  the  whole  terraqueous  globe,  by  which  vegetables  may  be 
generally  organized  and  framed,  and  all  things  performed 
which  transcend  the  power  of  fortuitous  mechanism." 

1  See  Professor  Flint's  article  on  Cudworth  in  the  "  Encyclopaedia 
Brftannica,"  on  these  proofs. 

8  See  "  Intellectual  System  of  the  Universe,"  book  i.,  ch.  iii. 


HENRY  MOKE.  12$ 

Eternal  and  Immutable  Morality.  —  Cudworth's  theory 
of  the  foundation  of  morality,  intended  as  answer  to  Hobbes's 
mechanico-sensational  theory,  is  summed  up  in  the  following 
propositions:  (i)  Things  are  what  they  are  by  nature,  not 
by  mere  will;  (2)  Things  are  immutably  and  necessarily 
what  they  are,  —  there  is  no  such  thing  as  an  "  arbitrarious 
essence,  mode,  or  relation  that  may  be  made  indifferently 
anything  at  pleasure  ;  "  even  when  a  divine  or  human  com- 
mand makes  a  thing  before  indifferent  obligatory  or  unlaw- 
ful, the  real  element  of  morality  depends  upon  the  right  or 
authority  of  the  one  who  gives  the  command,  which  right 
or  authority  is  founded  on  natural  justice  and  equity  or  on 
antecedent  obligation  to  obedience  in  the  subjects;  the 
moral  quality  of  acts  does  not  depend  on  the  mere  will  or 
pleasure  that  enjoins  them.  Cudworth's  doctrine  of  morality 
rests  immediately  on  the  epistemological  doctrine  that 
knowledge,  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  term,  is  not  born  of 
sense,  which  is  merely  receptive  and  mutable,  like  the  things 
of  which  alone  it  takes  cognizance,  but  of  intellect,  and  is 
as  such  true  and  eternal.  The  mind,  characteristically,  acts 
by  an  inherent  power  of  its  own,  and  has  not  only  fleeting 
"  sensations  "  and  "  phantasms,"  but  also  noemata,  or  pure 
conceptions,  to  the  essence  of  which,  as  the  objects  of  pure 
actuality  or  self-determination,  it  pertains  to  endure.  Among 
such  conceptions  are  those  of  right,  justice,  and  the  like.1 

Liberty  and  Necessity.  —  Cudworth  admits  free  will  in 
man  in  so  far  as  man,  because  of  an  imperfect  nature,  may 
at  times  be  unable  to  make  an  intellectual  choice  or  dis- 
tinction between  objects.  Otherwise  man  is  not  "  free,"  — 
as  God  is  not,  in  any  sense. 

§  57- 

Henry  More  (1614-1687).  —  More  went  from  Eton 
College  (Grammar  School  at  Eton)  to  Christ's  College, 

1  The  student  may  profitably  consult  the  monograph  by  C.  E. 
Lowrey,  Ph.  D.,  entitled,  "The  Philosophy  of  Ralph  Cudworth,"  etc. 
(N.  Y.,  1884). 


126        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Cambridge,  where  as  student  or  as  fellow  he  lived  recluse- 
like  most  of  his  adult  life.  As  a  youth  he  exhibited  great 
sensitiveness  of  feeling.  His  parents  were  stanch  Calvin- 
ists  ;  the  Calvinistic  faith  was  utterly  repulsive  to  him.  After 
passing  through  a  religious  ferment,  he  found  mental  satis- 
faction in  the  study  of  the  doctrines  of  the  Neo-Platonists, 
the  Cabala,  the  mediaeval  Mystics,  and  Boehme.  He  be- 
lieved himself  to  have  a  direct  sense  of  the  presence  of  a 
higher  life  in  him,  and  he  strove  intellectually  and  emotion- 
ally for  a  union  with  the  divine  principle  of  things.  Though 
a  sort  of  recluse,  he  had  a  warm  love  for  visible  nature.  His 
life  and  character  are  said  to  have  been  of  special  beauty. 
Like  Cudworth,  he  was  deeply  learned  in  the  history  of 
philosophy. 

Works.  —  Of  More's  works  may  be  mentioned  :  "  Anti- 
dote against  Atheism,"  "  Immortality  of  the  Soul,"  "  Grand 
Mystery  of  Godliness,"  "  Mystery  of  Iniquity,"  "  Divine 
Dialogues"  (1668),  "Enchiridion  Ethicum"  (1668),  "En- 
chiridium  Metaphysicum,  or  Manual  of  Metaphysics " 
(1671),  "Letters  to  Descartes."  He  wrote  treatises  on 
Boehme  and  Spinoza. 

Philosophy :  Problems.  —  The  character  of  More's  philoso- 
phizing was  determined  by  his  opposition  to  the  doctrines 
of  the  unphilosophical  theologians  of  his  time,  and  of  Des- 
cartes and  Hobbes.  He  strives  to  establish  against  the 
theologians  the  rights  of  reason  in  religion,  and  the  ration- 
ality of  (Christian)  religion.  "  For  mine  own  part,  reason 
seems  to  me  to  be  so  far  from  being  any  contemptible  prin- 
ciple in  man  that  it  must  be  acknowledged  in  some  sort  to 
be  God  himself."  To  make  clear  this  point  he  distinguishes 
the  divine  reason  as  the  ratio  stabilis,  a  "kind  of  steady 
and  immovable  reason  discovering  the  connections  of  all 
things  at  once,"  and  the  human  reason  as  the  ratio  mobilis, 
or  "  reason  in  evolution,"  and  a  real  "  participation  of  that 
divine  reason."  The  "logos,  or  steady  comprehensive 
wisdom  of  God,  in  which  all  ideas  and  their  respects  are 
contained,  is  but  universal  reason."  The  root  of  religion, 


HENRY  MORE.  I2J 

and  indeed  of  philosophy,  is  moral  purity,  the  very  consti- 
tution of  human  nature  itself.  More's  attitude  towards 
Descartes  and  Hobbes  will  appear  in  what  follows. 

Matter  and  Spirit.  —  Matter  is,  not  extension,  as  Des- 
cartes maintains,  but  "  impenetrable  and  discerptible  sub- 
stance :  "  it  is  "  resistance  or  capacity  of  keeping  out 
stoutly  or  irresistibly  another  substance  from  entering  into 
the  same  space  or  place  with  itself,"  and  it  is  the  capa- 
city of  endless  subdivision  into  parts.  Equally  rational 
(Hobbes  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding)  with  the  notion 
of  an  impenetrable  and  discerptible  substance  is  that  of 
a  "  penetrable  and  indiscerptible  substance,"  /'.  e.,  spirit. 
"  Penetrability  "  implies  "  self-motion,  self-contraction,  and 
dilation  ;  "  indiscerptibility  "  implies  that  spirit  of  its  own 
nature  invisibly  holds  itself  together,  so  that  it  cannot 
be  disunited  or  dissevered."  The  idea  of  extension  and 
space  cannot  be  thought  away :  it  is  necessary,  and  implies 
a  necessary  reality,  —  one,  indivisible,  infinite.  Matter 
is  not  such  a  reality;  matter,  as  being  essentially  con- 
tingent, implies  a  necessary  principle,  spirit ;  the  very  idea 
of  God  as  being  absolutely  perfect,  implies  a  spiritual  exist- 
ence ;  the  fact  of  motion  points  to  an  immaterial  cause 
of  motion,  since  matter  is  "  homogeneal,"  and  hence  with- 
out a  principle  of  difference  and  change  such  as  motion 
implies,  —  matter,  even  if  capable  of  producing  motion, 
could  not  be  conceived  as  doing  anything  more  than 
"  grinding  itself  into  the  more  rude  and  general  delineation 
of  nature  ;  "  unquestionable  testimony  to  the  existence  of 
ghosts  and  apparitions  necessitates  belief  in  the  existence 
of  spirit ;  above  all,  the  fact  of  an  ideal  element  in  knowl- 
edge and  of  the  freedom  of  the  will  prove  the  existence 
of  spirit.  Spirit  is  extended  substance.  If  it  were  not, 
God  would  not  be  omnipresent.  Whatever  is,  is  in  virtue 
of  its  simple  being,  somewhere,  and  is  therefore  in  some 
sort  of  space.  The  space  occupied  by  matter  is  an  ^ten- 
sive space,  that  occupied  by  spirit,  mtensive.  Space,  as 
both  extensive  and  intensive,  is  the  bridge  (in  More's 


128        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

doctrine)  between  the  corporeal  and  incorporeal,  and  the 
means  by  which  the  spiritual  world  brings  the  material 
under  its  dominion. 

The  Soul  of  Man  and  the  World-Soul.  —  Spirit  (soul) 
in  man  originated  neither  ex  traduce  nor  by  special  creation 
when  the  body  was  formed,  but  from  a  previous  state 
of  existence,  and  is  therefore  immortal.  It  passes  through 
three  definite  stages  of  development,  —  a  terrestrial,  an 
aerial,  and  an  ethereal.  While  in  the  material  body  the 
soul  has  its  seat  in  the  fourth  ventricle  of  the  brain, 
where  it  may  have  the  best  possible  communication  with  all 
parts  of  the  brain.  The  soul  of  the  world  is  a  spirit 
"  without  sense  and  animadversion ;"  it  pervades  the  "  whole 
matter  of  the  universe,"  producing  such  "  phenomena 
as  cannot  be  resolved  into  mere  mechanical  power."  Evi- 
dence of  the  fact  of  the  wo  rid- soul  appears  in  gravity, 
which  must  be  conceived  as  the  effect  of  some  "  immaterial 
cause  directing  the  motions  of  ethereal  particles  to  act 
upon  those  grosser  bodies  to  drive  them  towards  the 
earth." 

Morality.  —  Morality  is  the  art  of  living  well  or  happily. 
The  essential  condition  of  morality  is  freedom  of  the  will. 
The  freedom  of  the  will  we  know  directly :  —  we  know 
it,  sometimes,  only  too  well,  since  we  frequently  do  not 
do  the  good  which  we  know  we  ought  to  do.  There  can- 
not possibly  be  a  contradiction  between  divine  prescience 
and  freedom  of  the  will,  since  contradiction  cannot  at 
all  come  within  the  sphere  of  divine  omniscience.  We 
know  the  good  by  a  faculty  which  perceives  instinctively 
and  with  absolute  certainty  its  object,  and  delights  in  it 
alone,  viz.,  the  "  boniform  faculty."  This  faculty  in  us 
is  a  "  sense  "  corresponding  to  TO  a-yaOov  in  the  Deity.  It 
is  the  most  truly  divine  faculty  in  our  souls,  the  image 
of  the  "  divine  sagacity,"  which  in  God  is  superior  even 
to  reason.  The  perception  of  this  faculty  consists  in  a 
living  sense  of  its  object,  and  not  a  merely  formal  appre- 
hension of  it.  The  characteristic  fruit  of  the  faculty  is 


CUMBERLAND,  1 29 

love  of  God  and  one's  neighbor.  The  passions  of  men 
are  not  necessarily  evil,  but  may  be  servants  of  the  notion 
of  virtue.  They  may  be  compared  to  the  winds,  which 
purify  the  material  atmosphere.  The  seat  of  the  passions 
is  the  plastic  nature  (which  occupies  the  heart) .  The  funda- 
mental passions  are  those  of  admiration,  love,  and  hate. 
Love  towards  future  good  is  desire ;  love  exulting  in  the 
presence  of  the  good  is  joy ;  etc.  The  primary  virtues 
are  prudence,  sincerity,  and  patience.  Derivative  are 
justice,  courage,  and  temperance.  Subordinate  are  the 
virtues  of  liberality,  gratitude,  veracity,  candor,  urbanity, 
fidelity.  "  All  virtue  is  summed  up  in  '  intellectual  love," 
or  love  of  the  highest  good.  Just  as  numbers  spring  from 
unity  and  may  be  measured  by  it,  so  intellectual  love, 
as  a  single  and  simple  principle,  is  the  source  and  rule 
of  the  diverse  forms  of  good." 

§  58. 

Richard  Ctimberland  ( 1 632-1 718).  —  Cumberland  was 
a  graduate  and  fellow  of  Cambridge,  and  was  rector  at 
Brampton  and  Stamford,  chaplain  to  the  Lord  Keeper  of 
the  Seals,  and  Bishop  of  Peterborough.  His  only  philo- 
sophical work  appears  to  have  been  "  De  Legibus  Dis- 
quisitio  Philosophica  in  qua  earum  Forma,  summa  Capita, 
Ordo,  Promulgatio,  et  Obligatio  e  Rerum  Natura  investi- 
gantur ;  quin  etiam  Elementa  Philosophic  Hobbianae,  cum 
Moralis  turn  Civilis,  considerantur  et  regulantur"  (1692). 

Philosophy.  —  Cumberland  undertakes,  in  common  with 
More  and  Cudworth,  to  vindicate  the  notion  of  a  natural 
and  immutable  foundation  of  morality  against  the  me- 
chanico-sensational  and  individualistic  theory  of  Hobbes. 
He  rejects  the  Platonistic  doctrine  of  knowledge  upon 
which  the  Cambridge  philosophers  had  based  their  ethical 
doctrine,  and  maintains  a  theory  not  unlike  (indeed)  that 
of  Hobbes  himself:  he  will  as  far  as  possible  deduce  the 
laws  of  morality  by  a  geometrical  method  from  a  single 
fundamental  principle.  This  principle  is,  the  law  of  bene- 
VOL.  i.  —  9 


130        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

volence  towards  all  rational  beings,  —  including  even  God. 
This  law  has  its  foundation  in  the  fact  that  since  every- 
thing has  a  definite  place  in  the  entire  world  of  things, 
and  is  so  framed  as  to  continue  in  that  place  and  preserve 
its  nature,  human  nature,  or  rational  nature  in  general, 
is  a  certain  end  in  itself  to  itself.  An  a  posteriori  proof 
of  this  law  of  nature  is  found  in  the  fact  of  man's  natural 
aptitude  for  social  virtues  or  a  common  life  with  others. 
This  aptitude  appears  in  the  possession  of  reason,  of  power 
of  comparison  and  of  perception  of  analogies,  of  speech, 
of  efficiency  of  hand,  of  organs  for  the  propagation  of  the 
human  species,  etc.  This  law  has  as  sanction  happiness 
and  unhappiness,  which  common  experience  and  the  con- 
sensus gentium  show  to  be  consequent  upon  observance 
and  violation  of  it.  This  sanction  is  one  affixed  by  the 
divine  will  to  the  law,  though  the  happiness  consequent 
upon  observance  and  the  unhappiness  consequent  upon 
violation  follow  from  human  nature  as  well  as  from  the 
divine  will.  Benevolence  is  good,  however,  apart  from 
its  connection  with  happiness.  It  promotes  the  common 
good :  that  it  does  so  is  (says  Cumberland)  as  certain  as 
that  a  moving  point  generates  a  line.  The  limited  nature 
of  our  physical  powers  makes  it  necessary  that,  in  the 
observance  of  the  primary  law  of  morality,  we  (i)  dis- 
tinguish between  things  within  our  reach  and  things  not 
so,  and  (2)  limit  our  benevolence  as  regards  persons, 
times,  places,  etc.  Since  the  whole  depends  upon  its 
parts,  a  corollary  of  the  law  of  benevolence  is  an  individual 
right  of  property.  After  benevolence,  the  chief  moral 
virtue  is  justice,  which  embraces  liberality,  courtesy,  and 
domestic  affection.  All  government  and  political  author- 
ity have  their  foundation  in  the  idea  of  benevolence.1 

§59- 
John  Locke*  (1632-1704).  —  Locke,  who  was  the  son  of 

1  See  Hallam's  Literature  of  Europe,  Part  IV. 

2  Locke's   works  ;    "  Life    of    Locke,"   by    H.   R.    Fox-Bourne : 


LOCKE.  131 

a  Puritan  attorney  and  small  landowner  of  Somersetshire, 
attended,  between  the  ages  of  fourteen  and  twenty, 
the  Westminster  Grammar  School,  at  the  head  of  which 
was  a  Dr.  Busby,  famous  as  a  flogger  of  schoolboys. 
The  impressions  received  by  him  there  were  of  lasting 
consequence  :  he  always  afterwards  had  a  hatred  of  mere 
scholasticality  in  thinking,  which  constituted  a  prime  motive- 
force  in  his  philosophizing.  He  entered  Oxford  University 
in  1652,  and  remained  connected  with  that  institution,  as 
student,  tutor,  fellow,  or  honorary  student,  for  many  years. 
He  was  not,  as  an  undergraduate,  specially  studious :  he 
was  repelled  at  Oxford,  as  at  Westminster,  by  outworn  Scho- 
lasticism. He  was,  however,  a  busy  reader.  The  reading 
of  Descartes,  who  greatly  delighted  if  he  did  not  com- 
pletely satisfy  him,  gave  him  his  first  stimulus  to  philo- 
sophical reflection.  Some  thought  of  making  divinity  his 
profession  was  dispelled  by  the  certainty  that  if  he  did  so  he 
would  be  obliged  to  surrender  all  real  conviction ;  and  he 
chose  the  study  and  practice  of  medicine.  He  fell  into 
the  society  of  men  interested  in  physical  research,  and 
was  elected  member  of  the  Royal  Society  of  London.  In 
1665  he  accompanied  Sir  Walter  Vane  as  secretary  on  an 
embassy  to  Germany.  In  1667  he  became  private  secretary 
to  the  statesman,  or  politician,  Lord  Ashley.  During  Ash- 
ley's term  as  minister  he  received  appointments  as  Secretary 
of  Presentations,  and  of  the  Board  of  Trade.  In  1675 
(after  Ashley's  dismissal  from  office),  Locke  went  to  France 
on  account  of  ill-health.  He  there  had  the  society  of  men 
of  intellectual  eminence.  He  returned  to  England  in  1679 
to  become  again  secretary  and  counsellor  of  Ashley,  with 
whom  he  remained  till  the  latter's  flight  to  Holland  four 
years  later.  Locke  fled  to  Holland,  and  was  for  six  years 
a  (political)  exile.  In  Holland  his  time  was  largely  occu- 
pied with  the  preparation  of  his  great  "  Essay,"  begun 

"  Locke,"  by  Thomas  Fowler  ("English  Men  of  Letters");  Green's 
"Introduction  to  Hume;"  "Conduct  of  the  Understanding,"  ed.  by 
Fowler;  "Locke,"  by  Fraser  (Blackwood  Series). 


132         A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

fifteen  years  previously.  He  had  the  pleasure  and  advan- 
tage of  social  and  intellectual  intercourse  with  the  Dutch 
theological  liberals.  Locke  returned  to  England  when  the 
new  political  order  began,  and  took  an  active  part  during 
the  remainder  of  his  life  in  the  work  of  establishing  firmly 
the  quasi-republican  form  of  government  under  the  reign 
of  William  of  Orange.  Ill-health  necessitated  his  declining 
the  offer  of  certain  positions  of  great  honor  and  responsi- 
bility ;  but  he  did  accept  the  office  of  Secretary  of  Trades 
and  Plantations,  and  acted  as  a  personal  adviser  of  the  chief 
republican  statesmen  about  him.  His  published  works, 
dealing  with  burning  questions  of  his  day,  brought  upon 
him  many  controversial  tasks,  which  he  always  performed 
vigorously  and  effectively.  In  the  scientific,  religious,  and 
political  life  of  his  age  he  was  one  of  the  most  active  and 
useful  of  men.  Few  philosophers,  if  any,  in  any  age,  have, 
indeed,  been  practically  so  efficient  as  Locke.  His  private 
life  and  character  seem  to  have  been  most  estimable. 

Works.  —  Locke's  chief  philosophical  works  are  :  "  Essay 
Concerning  Human  Understanding,"  first  published  in  1690, 
and  enlarged  twice  or  thrice  within  the  following  decade, 
the  sixth  edition  being  the  fullest ;  "  Thoughts  Concerning 
Education"  (1693)  ;  "  The  Conduct  of  the  Understanding  " 
(posthumuously  published)  ;  "  Second  Treatise  of  Civil 
Government"  (1689);  Three  "Letters"  (1697-1699)  to 
the  Bishop  of  Worcester  (Edward  Stillingfleet) . 

Philosophy.  I.  Human  Understanding.  Introduction : 
Scope,  Value,  and  Method  of  the  Proposed  Investigation. — 
Locke  proposes  in  his  chief  philosophical  undertaking,  con- 
cerning human  understanding,  to  inquire  into  the  "original 
[origin]  of  those  ideas,  notions,  or  whatever  else  one  may 
please  to  call  them,  which  a  man  observes  and  is  con- 
scious to  himself  he  has  in  his  mind;  the  ways  whereby 
the  understanding  comes  to  be  furnished  with  them ;  what 
knowledge  the  understanding  hath  by  those  ideas,  and  the 
certainty,  evidence,  and  extent  of  it ;  the  nature  and  grounds 
of  faith  or  opinion  [or  the  assent  which  we  give  to  any 


LOCKE.  133 

proposition  as  true  of  whose  truth  we  have  no  certain  knowl- 
edge], and  there  as  on  and  degrees  of  assent."  He  proposes 
to  exclude  from  his  investigation  all  "  physical  considera- 
tion of  mind"  and  all  examination  into  its  essence  and  the 
"  motions  of  our  spirits  or  alteration  of  our  bodies  by  which 
we  come  to  have  any  sensation  by  our  organs  or  any  ideas 
in  our  understandings,  and  with  the  question  whether  those 
ideas  do  in  their  formation,  any,  or  all  of  them,  depend 
on  matter  or  no."  He  hopes  that  undertaking,  successfully 
carried  through,  "  may  be  of  use  to  prevail  with  the  busy 
mind  of  man  to  be  more  cautious  in  meddling  with  things 
exceeding  its  comprehension,  to  stop  where  it  is,  at  the 
utmost  extent  of  its  tether,  and  to  sit  down  in  quiet  igno- 
rance of  those  things  which  upon  examinatipn  are  found  to 
be  beyond  the  reach  of  our  capacities ;  our  business  in  this 
world  being  not  to  know  all  things,  but  only  those  which 
concern  our  conduct,"  etc.  And  he  is  confident  that  it 
"  will  be  no  excuse  to  an  idle  and  untoward  servant,  who 
would  not  attend  his  business  by  candle-light,  to  plead  tha-t 
he  had  not  broad  sunshine,  since  the  candle  that  is  set 
in  us  shines  bright  enough  for  all  our  purposes."  Locke's 
proposed  method  is  what  he  terms  the  "  plain  historical  one," 
the  looking  into  his  own  mind  to  find  what  he  can  there, 
without  even  assuming  that  all  "  minds  "  are  similar  to  his. 
And,  in  fact,  anything  like  the  methods  of  recent  experi- 
mental psychology,  comparative  psychology,  and  of  the 
theory  of  knowledge  in  the  sense  of  an  inquiry  into  the 
condition  of  experience,  is  quite  foreign  to  Locke's  con- 
scious (or  unconscious)  plan.  He  proposes  simply  to  take 
the  "ideas  he  finds  in  his  mind,"  and  by  exhausting  the 
consideration  of  the  agreements  and  disagreements  among 
them,  to  gather  what  he  can  concerning  their  origin  and 
meaning.  —  Thejnvestigation  of  human  understanding  has 
four  parts  :  I.  "  Of  Innate  Notions ;  "  II.  "  Of  Ideas ;  " 
III.  "Of Words;"  IV.  "Of  Knowledge  and  Opinion." 
Innate  Ideas  :  ( i )  Speculative  Principles)-  —  Defining 

1  Essay  Concerning  Human  Understanding,  Book  II.  ch.  ii. 


134        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

/  an  idea  as  "  whatsoever  is  the  object  of  the  under- 
standing when  a  man  thinks,"  "  whatever  the  mind  can 
be  employed  about  in  thinking,"  "something  which  a  man 
observes  and  is  conscious  to  himself  he  has  in  his  mind," 
Locke  combats  the  doctrine  of  innate  ideas.  Universal 
consent  or  agreement  as  to  the  (supposed)  fact  of  innate 
ideas,  or  "constant  impressions  which  the  souls  of  men 
receive  in  their  first  being,  and  which  they  bring  into  the 
world  with  them  as  necessarily  and  really  as  they  do  any 
of  their  inherent  faculties,  proves  nothing,"  says  Locke, 
"  if  there  be  any  other  way  shown  how  men  come  to  that 
universal  agreement  in  the  things  they  do  consent  in." 
But  there  are  no  ideas  to  which  mankind  give  universal 
assent  :  even  such  axiomatic  truths  as  "  What  is,  is,"  and 
"  It  is  impossible  for  the  same  thing  to  be  and  not  to  be," 
are,  to  a  large  portion  of  mankind,  unknown  even.  Again, 
"no  proposition  can  be  said  to  be  in  the  mind  which  it 
never  yet  knew,  which  it  was  never  yet  conscious  of,"  for 
otherwise  all  propositions  that  the  mind  is  capable  of  as- 
senting to  might  be  regarded  as  "  innate  ;  " 


ideas  —  if  that  is  all  that  is  meant  —  is,  of  course/'  innate.  '  ' 
If  it  be  said  that  certain  principles  are  innate  in  the  sense 
that  all  men  know  and  assent  to  them  when  they  come  to 
the  use  of  reason,  and  that  this  is  enough  to  prove  them 
innate,  the  answer  is  that  savages,  children,  idiots,  and  the 
illiterate  employ  reason  long  before  they  are  aware  of 
such  truths  as  "  What  is,  is,"  and  "  It  is  impossible  for 
the  same  thing  to  be  and  not  to  be  ;  "  that  if  such  truths 
were  innate  on  this  ground,  so  likewise  are  many  others  not 
regarded  as  innate  ;  that  it  would  be  no  more  true  to  say 
that  these  truths  are  innate,  on  the  ground  that  the  time 
of  assenting  to  them  and  the  time  of  coming  to  reason 
coincide,  than  to  say  that  speech  could  be  innate  if  the 
time  of  coming  to  the  use  of  it,  and  the  time  of  first  assent- 
ing to  these  truths,  were  the  same;  that,  —  overlooking 
time,  —  if  all  truths  discovered  by  reason  be  innate,  then 
equally  are  the  axioms  of  mathematics  (which  are  innate 


LOCKE.  135 

if  any  principles  are)  and  the  theorems  grounded  on  them 
innate,  and  it  would  follow  that,  since  all  reasoning  is 
"search  and  casting  about,  and  requires  pains  and  appli- 
cation," what  was  imprinted  by  nature  as  the  foundation 
and  guide  of  our  reason  (as  innate  principles  are  supposed 
to  have  been)  would  require  the  use  of  reason  to  discover 
it !  Further,  on  the  alleged  ground  that  ideas  are  innate 
which  are  assented  to  when  the  terms  in  which  they  are 
proposed  are  understood,  innumerable  propositions  in 
mathematics,  natural  philosophy,  and  all  other  sciences 
would  have  to  be  (falsely)  declared  innate.  And,  indeed, 
why  should  innate  ideas  or  principles  need  to  be  proposed 
in  order  to  gain  assent?  It  is  not  true  to  say  here  that 
men  do  not  learn  anything  absolutely  de  novo :  the  truth 
is,  rather,  that  ideas  are  no  more  innate  than  names  are. 
To  conclude,  then,  as  regards  "  speculative "  principles, 
such  as,  "  Whatever  is,  is,"  and  "It_js  impossible  for  the 
same  thing  to"~be~~an3T^h6t  to  be,"  —  they  have  not  uni- 
versal'assent,  they  Tire  not  first  known  Imless  wlPmake 
the~  absurd  supposition  that  they  can  be  imprinted  in 
the  mind  and  yet  not  be  perceived,  and  finally,  they 
appear  least  where  what  is  innate  shows  itself  most 
clearly,  in  the  original  impressions,  if  there  be  such, 
upon  the  minds  of  children,  idiots,  savages,  and  the 
illiterate  being  least  of  all  corrupted  by  custom,  bor- 
rowed opinion,  learning,  and  education,  though  the  minds 
of  such  persons  are  without  innate  principles.  There  are, 
therefore,  no  innate  speculative  principles. 

(2)  Practical* Principles?-  —  And  it  is  even  more  true 
that  there  are  no  innate  practical  principles,  or  principles 
of  action.  The  proverbial  "  honor  among  thieves,"  for 
example,  points  not  to  any  such  innateness  of  practical 
principles,  but  merely  to  men's  natural  instinct  of  self- 
preservation.  Again,  "  practical  principles "  that  are 
denied  in  action,  but  approved  in  theory,  are  not 
really  practical  principles  or  "  inclinations  of  appetite " 

1  Essay,  Book  I.  ch.  iii. 


136        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

to  good  or  evil.  Further,  moral  rules  require  proof:  one 
who  had  never  heard  the  Golden  Rule  might,  on  first  hear- 
ing it,  ask,  without  absurdity,  Why?  Virtue  is  approved 
among  men,  not  because  it  is  innate,  but  because  it  is 
profitable.  Nor  is  conscience  innate :  it  depends  on 
education,  surroundings,  custom;  and  sanctions  different 
and  even  contrary  things  in  different  persons  and  peoples. 
And  if  conscience  were  innate,  how  could  individuals  and 
nations  fail  To^  rjegard  ifr  and  ever  openly  reject  and  re- 
nounce its  rules  ?  Again,  to  say  "  that  innate  principles 
of  morality  may,  by  education  and  custom  and  the  gen- 
eral opinion  of  those  among  whom  we  converse,  be  dark- 
ened, and  at  last  quite  worn  out  of  the  minds  of  men,"  is, 
in  effect,  to  deny  the  universality  of  assent,  or  to  take  it 
in  a  sense  contrary  to  fact.  But  as  a  matter  of  fact  we 
do  not  find  innate  principles  "  clearest  and  most  perspicu- 
ous nearest  the  fountain,  in  children  and  illiterate  people 
who  have  received  least  impression  from  foreign  opinions." 
There  are  no  innate  practical_prin£iples ;  nor,  indeed,  do 
those  wficT  mamTam  their  existence  say  what  they  are. 
Tradition,  reverence  for  what  seems  established,  want 
of  skill,  of  leisure,  of  inclination  to  investigate,  laziness, 
ignorance,  education,  precipitancy,  have  all  combined  to 
preclude  the  discovery  of  the  real  origin  of  the  supposed 
innate  practical  principles. 

Mere  Ideas}- — Finally,  there  are  no  innate  ideas,  not 
to  say  principles.  Who  will  affirm  that  the  ideas  of  im- 
possibility and  identity  involved  in  the  principle,  "  It  is 
impossible  for  the  same  thing  to  be  and  not  to  be,"  are 
innate?  Can  a  child  of  seven  (or  even  a  man  of  seventy) 
state  positively  "  whether  a  man,  being  a  creature  con- 
sisting of  soul  and  body,  be  the  same  man  when  his  bodies 
are  changed"?  The  idea  of  whole  and  part  presupposes 
those  of  extension  and  number,  which  no  one,  surely,  will 
affirm  to  be  innate.  Whole  nations  have  been  without  the 
idea  of  God,  and  different  nations  and  individuals  have 

1  Essay,  Book  I.  chap.  iv. 


LOCKE.  137 

held  widely  different  conceptions  of  the  Deity,  and  since, 
if  there  were  no  other  way  by  which  we  could  have  the 
idea,  and  it  would,  therefore,  seem  most  natural  that  it,  of 
all  ideas,  should  have  been  imprinted  upon  the  mind,  and 
so  be  universally  acknowledged,  whereas  such  is  not  the 
case,  we  cannot  suppose  any  other  idea  to  be  innate.  The 
idea  of  substance,  which  might  seem  to  be  an  exception, 
is  not  a  positive  idea,  —  we  mean  by  the  word  substance 
merely  something  "  which  we  take  to  be  the  substratum, 
or  support,  of  those  ideas  we  know."  Lastly,  to  say  that 
there  are  ideas  in  the  mind  which  it  does  not  actually 
"  think  on,"  is  unintelligible. 

Conclusion.  —  Innate  ideas  and  principles  so-called  are,  in 
fine,  merely  certain  classes  of  ideas  and  principles  that  "  for- 
wardly  offer  themselves  to  all  men's  understandings,"  and 
are  no  more  innate  than  arts  and  sciences.  The  mind  is 
originally  an  empty  "  cabinet,"  which  has  to  be  "  furnished" 
with  contents  ;  it  is  a  tabula  rasa,  a  blank  sheet  of  paper, 
to  be  written  upon. 

Origin  and  Sorts  of  Ideas?-  —  The  source  of  all  our  knowl- 
edge  is  experience. 


"  which  is  such  an  impressJon^orL_motion,  made  in  some 
par^of  the  body,  as  produces  some  perception  in  the  under- 
standing." "  The  impulse  made  on  the  organ  [say  of  sight] 
must  be  produced  by  some  insensible  particles  coming  from 
the  object  to  the  eyes  ;  and  by  a  continuation  of  that  mo- 
tion to  the  brain,  ideas  are  produced  in  us."  A  "  new  set  of 
ideas,"  which  may  be  called  "  ideas  of  reflection,"  is  pro- 
duced by  the  mind's  reflection  upon  its  "  operations  about 
the  ideas  got  by  sensation."  "  In  all  that  good  extent 
wherein  the  mind  wanders,  in  those  remote  speculations  it 
may  seem  to  be  elevated  with,  it  stirs  not  one  jot  beyond 
those  ideas  which  sense  or  reflection  have  offered  for  its 
contemplation  "  (Bk.  II.  ch.  i.,  §  23,  24).  The  impressions 
made  on  our  senses  by  outward  objects  are  wholly  "  extrin- 
sical "  to  the  mind,  its  own  operations  are  "intrinsical  "  to 

1  Essay,  Bk.  II.  ch.  i. 


d 
v/  q 


yc 
\y  i 


138        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

it.  The  power  to  produce  an  idea  in  the  mind  by  impres- 
sion upon  the  senses  is  the  quality  of  the  "  subject  wherein 
that  power  is."  Whiteness,  coldness,  roundness,  regarded 
as  "  sensations  or  perceptions  in  the  understanding  "  are 
called  ideas  ;  regarded  as  "  powers  "  in  a  snowball  to  pro- 

uce these  ideas,  are  the  qualities  of  the  object.  The 
qualities  perceived  in  bodies  are,  —  (i)  such  as  are  in  the 
bodies  themselves,  are  inseparable  from  them,  whatever 
their  state,  produce  ideas  in  us  that  are  "  resemblances  "  of 
the  qualities  themselves,  and  may  be  termed  "  original,"  or 
<f^Hmary~>JTpialities,  or  (2)  such  as  are  not  in  bodies  ex- 

ept  in  some  mysterious  and  accidental  manner,  produce 
in  us  ideas  that  have  no  resemblance  to  the  qualities  them- 
selves, and  may  therefore  be 


X 


qualities.  Secondary  qualities  are  of  two  sorts  :  (  i  )  such 
as  produce  ideas  in  us  through  the  senses,  and  (2)  such  as 
produce  changes  in  other  bodies  whereby  they  are  caused 
to  operate  on  our  senses  differently  from  what  they  did 
before.  The  primary  qualities  of  bodies  are  solidity,  ex- 
tension, figure,  number,  motion,  rest.  Secondary  qualities 
of  the  first-named  sort  are  colors,  smells,  sounds,  and  tastes. 
The  power  the  "  sun  has  to  make  wax  white,"  or  "  fire  has 
to  make  lead  fluid,"  are  examples  of  the  second-named 
class  of  secondary  qualities.  That  "  God  should  annex 
such  ideas  "  (as  those  corresponding  to  secondary  qualities) 
to  motions  with  which  they  have  no  similitude,  is  "no 
more  impossible  to  conceive  .  .  .  than  that  he  should  annex 
the  idea  of  pain  to  the  motion  of  a  piece  of  steel  dividing  our 
flesh,  with  which  that  idea  has  no  resemblance."  Secondary 
qualities  would  have  no  existence  were  there  not  minds 
to  be  cognizant  of  them.  —  In  themselves  ideas  may  be 
.  classed  as  simple  and  complex.  Of_simple-44eas.  some  are 
;  got  by  sensation  alone,  some  by  sensation  and  reflection 
t/  together,  some  by  reflection  alone.  Some  simple  ideas 
belong  to  one  sense  only,  as  colors  to  sight,  and  heat,  cold, 
and  solidity  to  touch  ;  others  to  more  senses  than  one,  as 
space,  figure,  rest,  and  motion  to  both  sight  and  touch. 


LOCKE.  139 

Our  ideas  of  pleasure  and  pain,  existence,  unity,  power, 
and  succession  we  get  from  sensation  and  reflection  united. 
Our  ideas  of  perception,  thinking,  willing,  knowledge,  faith, 
etc.,  are  given  to  us  in  reflection  only.  The  simple  idea  is 
given  to  the  mind  when,  in  a  merely  "  passive  "  state,  and  in 
clear  and  distinct  perception,  it  "  contains  in  itself  one  uni- 
form appearance  of  mind,  and  is  not  distinguishable  into 
different  ideas."  As  the  mind  is  passive  in  relation  to  sim- 
ple ideas,  it  is  "  not  in  the  power  of  the  most  exalted  wit 
or  enlarged  understanding,  by  any  quickness  or  variety  of 
thought,  to  invent  or  frame  one  new  simple  idea  in  the 
mind,  not  taken  in  by  the  ways  before-mentioned,  nor  can 
any  force  of  understanding  destroy  those  that  are  there  : 
the  dominion  of  man  in  this  little  world  of  his  own  under- 
standing, being  much  what  the  same  as  it  is  in  the  great 
world  of  visible  things,  wherein  his  power,  however  man- 
aged by  art  and  skill,  reaches  no  farther  than  to  compound 
and  divide  the  materials  that  are  made  to  his  hand,  but 
can  do  nothing  towards  making  the  least  particle  of  new 
matter,  or  destroying  one  atom  of  what  is  already  in 
being."  In  an  active  relation  to  its  ideas,  the  mind  may 
by  repeating,  comparing,  uniting  simple  ideas  produce  to 
"almost  infinite  variety,"  "complex  ideas,"  examples  of 
which  are  space,  time,  number,  substance,  cause.  —  Gom- 
plex  ideas  may  be  classed  as  ideas  of  m^^  of-  sub-^ 
stances,  and  of  relations.  The  idea  of  the  mode  "  contains 
"the  Supposition  of  a  thing  subsisting  in  dependence  on  an- 
other :  the  idea  of  the  substance  contains  no  such  supposi- 
tion." Modes  are  either  "simple,"  which  are  "variations 
or  different  combinations  of  the  same  simple  idea"  (e.g., 
dozen  or  a  score),  or  "mixed,  which  are  compounds  ".of 
simple  modes  of  various  kinds  (e.  g.,  beauty,  "  which  is  a 
compound  of  color  and  figure  causing  delight  in  the  be- 
holder ").  The  "  mixed  modes  "  do  not  correspond  to  any 
real  existence,  but  are  "  scattered  and  independent  "  ideas 
"  put  together  "  by  the  mind,  the  unity  of  the  mode  con- 
sisting solely  in  an  "  act  of  the  mind."  Mixed  modes  are 


140        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

constantly  changing  with  custom  and  opinion.  Substances 
are  single  or  collective ;  examples  of  the  latter-named  sort 
are  "army,"  "lead." 

Ideas  of  Modes.  —  Space  as  mere  extension  is  a  "simple 
idea."  It  must  not  be  confounded  with  body  (as  was  done 
by  the  Cartesians),  since  it  is  not  solid,  and  its  parts  are 
immovable  and  inseparable.  Modes  of  space  are  distance 
(including  figure  and  place)  and  capacity.  The  fact  that 
the  power  of  "  enlarging  "  our  idea  of  space  remains  con- 
stant how  many  soever  "  additions  "  we  may  make,  suggests 
to  us  the  idea  of  infinite  space,  which,  however,  is  not  a 
positive  idea.  The  same  is  true  of  the  idea  of  time.  (If 
we  could  "  enlarge  "  other  ideas  as  easily  as  we  can  those 
of  space  and  time,  we  could  more  readily  than  we  now  can 
join  the  idea  of  the  infinite  with  them.)  Number  is  a 
"complex  idea"  (though  a  simple  mode),  which  is  given  to 
us  in  all  our  experiences.  Pleasure  and  pain  are  simple 
ideas  indescribable,  indefinable,  and  known  only  as  experi- 
enced. They  constitute  the  criteria  of  good  and  evil  (moral 
and  physical).  Pleasure  and  pain  are  the  primary  constitu- 
ents of  all  our  passions.  "  Happiness  in  its  full  extent  is 
the  utmost  pleasure  we  are  capable  of ;  misery  the  utmost 
pain  ;  the  lowest  degree  of  what  may  be  called  happiness  is 
so  much  ease  from  all  pain,  and  so  much  present  pleasure 
as  without  which  any  one  cannot  be  content "  (Bk.  II.  ch. 
xxi.).  Modes  of  pleasure  and  pain  are:  love,  or  the  idea 
of  the  delight  which  any  present  or  absent  object  is  apt  to 
produce ;  hatred,  or  the  "  idea  of  the  pain  any  present  or 
absent  object  is  apt  to  produce ;  desire,  or  the  uneasiness  a 
man  finds  in  himself  upon  the  absence  of  anything  whose 
present  enjoyment  carries  the  idea  of  delight  with  it ;  "  joy, 
sorrow,  hope,  fear,  despair,  anger,  envy.  The  idea  of 
"  power  "  is  a  simple  idea  produced  in  us  by  the  fact  that  the 
mind,  being  "every  day  informed  by  the  senses  of  this  alter- 
ation of  these  simple  ideas  it  observes  in  things  without, 
and  taking  notice  how  one  comes  to  an  end,  or  ceases  to 
be,  and  another  begins  to  exist  which  was  not  before,  re- 


LOCKE.  141 

fleeting  also  on  what  passes  within  itself,  and  observing  a 
constant  change  in  its  ideas,  sometimes  by  the  impression 
of  outward  objects  on  the  senses,  and  sometimes  by  the 
determination  of  its  own  choice,  and  concluding  from  what 
it  has  constantly  observed  to  have  been,  that  the  like 
changes  will  for  the  future  be  made  in  the  same  things  by 
like  agents  and  by  like  ways,  considers  in  one  thing  the 
possibility  of  having  its  ideas  changed,  and  in  another  the 
possibility  of  making  that  change."  We  get  our  clearest 
idea  of  power  from  our  own  minds,  —  from  our  ability  to 
"  begin  or  forbear,"  "  continue  or  end,"  etc.  The  actual 
exercise  of  power  in  us  (or  will)  is  volition,  —  one  of  the 
"simple  ideas  of  reflection."  Volition  must  not  be  con- 
founded with  desire.  Desire  is  that  "  uneasiness "  by 
which  alone  the  will  is  "  determined ;  "  volition  the  act  of 
the  determined  will.  But  will  may  "  suspend  the  prosecu- 
tion of  desire  "  ("as  every  one  daily  may  experiment  upon 
himself").  This  power  in  the  will  is  the  real  "  source  of  all 
liberty "  and  of  "  that  which  is  (as  I  think  improperly) 
called  free  will."  Properly  speaking,  the  man  himself,  and 
not  the  will,  must  be  said  to  be  free  or  not  free. 

Ideas  of  Substances.  —  Locke's  account  of  the  origin  of 
the  "  ideas  of  substances  "  (or  independent  beings)  is  as 
follows :  *^he  mind  being,  as  I  have  declared,  furnished 
with  a  great  number  of  simple  ideas,  conveyed  in  by  the 
senses  as  they  are  found  in  exterior  things,  or  by  reflection 
on  its  own  operations,  takes  notice  also  that  a  certain  num- 
ber of  those  simple  ideas  go  constantly  together;  which 
being  presumed  to  belong  to  one  thing,  and  words  suited 
to  common  apprehensions  and  made  use  of  for  quick  de- 
spatch, are  called,  so  united  in  one  subject,  by  one  name ; 
which  by  inadvertency  we  are  apt  afterwards  to  talk  of,  and 
consider  as  one  simple  idea,  which  indeed  is  a  complica- 
tion of  many  ideas  together,  —  because,  as  I  have  said,  not 
imagining  how  these  simple  ideas  can  subsist  by  themselves, 
we  accustom  ourselves  to  suppose  some  substratum  where- 
in they  do  subsist  and  from  which  they  do  result ;  which 


142         A   IflS TORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

therefore  we  call  substances.  So  that  if  any  one  will  ex- 
amine himself  concerning  his  notions  of  pure  substance  in 
general,  he  will  find  he  has  no  other  idea  of  it  at  all  but 
only  a  supposition  of  he  knows  not  what  support  of  such 
qualities  which  are  capable  of  producing  ideas  in  us ;  which 
qualities  are  commonly  called  accidents."  A  principal  in- 
gredient of  our  complex  ideas  of  substances  is  the  idea  of 
power,  since  the  qualities  of  substances  are  dependent  upon 
and  rest  in  the  substances  themselves.  The  ideas  of  the 
primary  qualities  are  necessary  ingredients,  and  if  we  knew 
the  relation  of  secondary  to  primary  qualities, —  /.  e.,  could 
reduce  them  to  terms  of  the  primary,  —  our  ideas  of  sub- 
stances would  be  fundamental  and  complete.  Unfortu- 
nately, they  are  not  now :  in  fact,  it  is  "  very  evident : 
( i )  That  all  our  ideas  of  the  several  sorts  of  substances 
[God,  ourselves,  and  the  things  constituting  the  world]  are 
nothing  but  collections  of  simple  ideas  with  a  supposition 
of  something  to  which  they  belong,  and  in  which  they  sub- 
sist ;  though  of  this  supposed  something  we  have  no  clear 
idea  at  all.  (2)  That  all  the  simple  ideas  that  thus  united 
in  one  common  substratum  make  up  our  complex  ideas  of 
*he  several  sorts  of  substances  are  no  other  but  such  as  we 
have  received  from  sensation  or  reflection.  So  that  even 
in  those  which  we  think  we  are  most  intimately  acquainted 
with,  and  that  come  nearest  the  comprehension  of  our  most 
enlarged  conceptions,  we  cannot  go  beyond  these  simple 
ideas.  And  even  in  those  which  seem  most  remote  from 
all  we  have  to  do  with,  and  do  infinitely  surpass  anything 
we  can  perceive  in  ourselves  by  reflection  or  discover  by 
sensation  in  other  things,  we  can  attain  to  nothing  but  those 
simple  ideas  which  we  originally  received  from  sensation 
or  reflection,  as  is  evident  in  the  complex  idea  of  angels, 
and  particularly  of  God  himself.  (3)  That  most  of  the 
simple  ideas  that  make  up  complex  ideas  of  substances, 
when  truly  considered  are  only  powers,  however  we  are  apt 
to  take  them  for  positive  qualities ;  e.  g.,  the  greatest  part 
of  the  ideas  that  make  our  complex  idea  of  gold,  as  yellow- 


LOCKE.  143 

ness,  weight,  ductility,  fusibility,  and  solubility  in  aqua 
regia,  etc.,  are  all  united  together  in  an  unknown  substra- 
tum :  all  which  ideas  are  nothing  else  but  so  many  relations 
to  other  substances,  and  are  not  really  in  the  gold  consid- 
ered barely  in  itself,  though  they  depend  on  those  real  pri- 
mary qualities  of  its  internal  constitution  whereby  it  has  a 
fitness  differently  to  operate  and  be  operated  on  by  several 
other  substances"  (Bk.  II.  ch.  xxiii.).  As  has  already 
been  indicated,  the  primary  qualities  belonging  to  bodily 
substances  alone  are  extension,  solidity,  mobility;  to  spir- 
itual substances,  perceptivity  and  motivity;  to  both,  exis- 
tence, duration,  and  number.  We  "  frame  "  our  idea  of 
God  by  joining  the  idea  of  infinity  to  that  of  finite  spiritual 
substance.  God  is  infinite  knowledge,  power,  existence, 
duration,  and  number  [!?]. 

Ideas  of  Relations.  —  Ideas  of  relations  are  such  as 
"father,"  which  implies  son  or  daughter;  "cause,"  which 
implies  effect ;  "  identity,"  which  implies  diversity ;  and  all 
moral  conceptions,  etc.  Such  ideas  are  derived  "  from  the 
comparison  of  things  one  with  another ;  "  and  imply  the 
previous  existence  of  simple  ideas.  There  are  as  many 
such  ideas,  of  course,  as  there  are  "  occasions  of  compar- 
ing "  things  with  one  another.  Relations  are  "  extraneous 
to  things  themselves  and  superinduced."  The  ideas  of 
cause  and  effect  are  produced  as  follows  :  "  In  the  notice 
our  senses  take  of  the  constant  vicissitude  of  things  we 
cannot  but  observe  that  several  particular  both  qualities 
and  substances  begin  to  exist ;  and  that  they  receive  their 
existence  from  the  due  application  and  operation  of  some 
other  being.  .  .  .  That  which  produces  any  simple  or 
complex  idea  we  denote  by  the  general  name  cause ; 
that  which  is  produced  effect."  The  ideas  of  cause  and 
effect  presuppose  the  idea  of  power.  — The  ideas  of  "  iden- 
tity and  diversity  "  are  formed  "  when,  considering  any- 
thing as  existing  at  any  determined  time  and  place,  we 
compare  it  with  itself  as  existing  at  another  time.  When 
we  see  anything  to  be  in  any  place  in  any  instant  of  time, 


144        A  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

we  are  sure  (be  it  what  it  will)  that  it  is  that  very  thing  and 
not  another  which  at  that  same  time  exists  in  another 
place,  how  like  and  undistinguishable  soever  it  may  be 
in  all  other  respects.  The  principium  individuationis  is 
existence  itself,  which  determines  a  being  of  any  sort  to 
a  particular  time  and  place  incommunicable  to  two  beings 
of  the  same  kind."  As  regards  personal  identity,  Locke 
says :  "  Since  consciousness  always  accompanies  thinking, 
and  'tis  that  that  makes  every  one  to  be  what  he  calls 
self,  and  thereby  distinguishes  himself  from  all  other  think- 
ing beings,  in  this  alone  consists  personal  identity,  /.  e.,  the 
sameness  of  a  rational  being ;  and  as  far  as  this  conscious- 
ness can  be  extended  backwards  to  any  past  action  or 
thought,  so  far  reaches  the  identity  of  that  person."  We 
must  distinguish  between  personal  identity  and  the  (sup- 
posed but  perhaps  not  necessary)  identity  of  substance 
in  that  which  thinks.  Moral  ideas  are  ideas  of  relations 
cf  actions  to  rules ;  and  "  rules  being  nothing  but  a  col- 
lection of  several  simple  ideas,  the  conformity  thereto 
is  but  so  ordering  an  action  that  the  simple  ideas  belong- 
ing to  it  may  correspond  to  those  which  the  law  requires." 

Adequateness  in  Ideas.  —  Locke  discusses  the  distinc- 
tion of  ideas  made  by  the  "  Cartesians  "  into  clear  and 
obscure,  distinct  and  confused,  adequate  and  inadequate. 
As  regards  the  last-named  distinction,  he  says  that  simple 
ideas  must  all  be  adequate,  since,  "being  the  effects  of 
certain  powers  in  things  fitted  and  ordained  by  God  to 
produce  such  sensations  in  us.  they  cannot  but  correspond 
and  be  adequate  to  those  powers ;  and  we  are  sure  they 
agree  to  the  reality  of  things ;  "  that  our  "  complex  ideas 
of  modes,  being  voluntary  collections  of  simple  ideas  which 
the  mind  puts  together  without  reference  to  any  real  arche- 
types or  standing  pattern  existing  anywhere,  are  and  can- 
not but  be  adequate  ideas."  Our  ideas  of  substances, 
considered  either  as  the  substratum  or  as  the  sum,  of 
the  known  qualities,  are  necessarily  inadequate,  imperfect, 
since  we  have  no  positive  idea  of  the  substratum,  and 


tuunuujK* 

:tion,  may  i      / 
riginal  im-  \/ 
o  receives    \ 


LOCKE.  145 

cannot    comprehend    together     the    numerically    infinite 
qualities. 

Association  of  Ideas.  —  "  Some  of  our  ideas  have  a  natu- 
ral correspondence  and  connection  with  one  another; 
it  is  the  office  and  excellence  of  our  reason  to  trace  these 
and  hold  them  together  in  that  union  and  correspondence 
which  is  founded  on  their  peculiar  beings.  Besides  this 
there  is  another  connection  of  ideas  wholly  owing  to 
chance,  —  ideas  that  in  themselves  are  not  at  all  of  kin,  .  .  . 
always  keep  company.  Their  connection  is  made  volun- 
tarily or  by  chance.  Custom  settles  habits  of  thinking. 
Ideas  having  at  first  a  merely  accidental  connection, 
become  firmly  united,  because  of  strength  of  original 
pression  or  of '  future  indulgence.'  A  man  who  receives 
a  sensible  injury  from  another  is  ever  afterwards  unable  to 
dissociate  the  ideas  of  the  two.  A  man  has  suffered  pain 
or  sickness  in  any  place  in  space,  and  afterwards  associates  f 
the  place  and  the  sickness.  Time__alojie_dissQciat€s--ideas  \j 
thus  united.  The  influence  of  this  artificial  association  on 
the  intellectual  habits  is  sometimes  unfortunate!  Figure 
and  shape,  for  example,  are  by  custom  associated  in  the 
child's  mind  with  the  idea  of  God.  Some  such  wrong  and 
unnatural  combinations  of  ideas  will  be  found  to  establish 
the  irreconcilable  opposition  between  different  sects  of 
philosophy  and  religion.  This  gives  sense  to  jargon, 
demonstration  to  absurdities,  consistency  to  nonsense,  and 
is  the  foundatien_£f_the  greatest,  I  had  almost  said,  of  all 
errors  in  the  world"  (Book  II.,  chap,  xxxiii.). 

Words}-  —  Locke  finds,  when  he  has  arrived  at  the  end 
of  the  discussion  of  the  "  original  sorts  and  extent  of  our 
ideas,"  that  "  there  is  so  close  a  connection  between  ideas 
and  words,  and  our  abstract  ideas  and  general  words  have 
so  constant  a  relation  one  to  another,  that  it  is  impossible 
to  speak  clearly  and  distinctly  of  our  knowledge,  which 
all  consists  in  propositions,  without  considering  first  the 
nature,  use,  and  signification  of  language ;  "  that  is  to  say, 

1  Book  III.     Mill  speaks  of  this  book  as  "  immortal." 
VOL.  I.  —  10 


J 


146        A    HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

he  interpolates  a  third  task  between  the  two  main  portions 
of  his  task  as  it  first  proposed  itself  to  him.  —  Words  are 
signs  of  our  ideas  about  things,  and  of  things  themselves. 
The  ends  of  language  are  the  easy  and  rapid  communica- 
tion of  ideas  in  themselves  and  of  the  knowledge  of  things. 
It  is  impossible,  and  it  would  be  "useless,"  that  every 
particular  thing  should  have  a  distinct  peculiar  name, — 
useless,  since  so  many  names  as  there  would  necessarily 
be  would  overburden  the  memory,  and  necessary  disagree- 
ment among  men  as  to  the  names  of  the  same  things 
would  defeat  the  end  of  discourse.  General  names  are 
therefore,  on  this  account,  a  practical  necessity ;  and  they 
are,  furthermore,  natural  products  of  thought,  generated 
by  the  act  of  abstraction.  The  general  name  represents 
the  nominal  (or  externally  conceived)  essence  of  a  thing, 
not  its  "  real  "  essence  or  substratum  of  qualities ;  /'.  <?.,  the 
essence  of  the  (abstract)  species  or  genus,  not  of  the 
individual.  Names  of  simple  ideas  and  substances  "  inti- 
mate real  existence."  Names  of  simple  ideas  and  modes 
signify  always  both  real  and  nominal  essence.  Names  of 
simple  ideas  are  indefinable.  The  principaL.  abuses  of 
words  consist  in  the  use  ofjh^m^_wjth^ut_any_clear  ideas 
attached  to  them,  the  "  unsteady^application  of  them,  the 
affected  wrong  apph^ajioji^f_them4l_the  taking  of  them 
for  things"  (particularly  in  the  case  of  substances).  Words 
have  their  inherent  limitations,  however.  The  names  of 
mixed  modes  are  doubtful  because  the  ideas  they  stand 
for  are  so  complex  and  there  is  no  standard  in  nature 
to  refer  them  to.  Names  of  substances  are  doubtful  be- 
cause they  refer  to  a  real  essence  that  can  not  be  known, 
and  to  coexisting  qualities,  which  are  known  only  limitedly. 
Less  doubtful  are  the  names  of  simple  modes ;  least  doubt- 
ful those  of  simple  ideas. 

Knowledge :  its  Nature  and  Kinds.  —  The  subject  of  the 
joining  together  of  ideas  in  propositions  by  means  of  words 
introduces  that  of  the  nature,  kinds,  degrees,  and  extent  of 
knowledge.  "  Knowledge  is  the  perception  of  the  connec- 


LOCKE.  147 

tion  and  agreement  or  disagreement  and  repugnancy  of  any 
of  our  ideas."  Where  this  perception  is  wanting,  we  come 
short  of  knowledge,  and  attain  only  to  probability  at  the 
most.  There  are  four  sorts  of  agreement;  viz.,  of  identity,  f^/ 
coexistence,  relation,  and  real  existence.  "All  the  inquiries  I 
that  we  can  make  concerning  any  of  our  ideas,  all  that 
we  can  know  or  can  affirm  concerning  any  of  them,  is  that 
it  is  or  is  not  the  same  with  some  other ;  that  it  does 
or  does  not  always  coexist  with  some  other  idea  in  the 
same  subject ;  that  it  has  this  or  that  relation  to  some 
other  idea;  or  that  it  has  a  real  existence  without  the 
mind."  An  example  of  an  agreement  of  identity  is,  Blue 
is  not  yellow ;  of  relation,  Two  triangles  upon  equal  bases 
between  two  parallels  are  equal;  of  coexistence,  Iron  is 
susceptible  of  magnetical  impressions ;  of  real  existence, 
"  God  is."  With  regard  to  the  mode  of  presence  of  knowl- 
edge in  the  mind,  —  knowledge  is  actual  or  habitual, 
it  being  in  the  latter  case  merely  "  laid  up,"  either  "  en- 
tire," or  else  without  the  proofs  leading  to  it,  in  the 
memory. 

Degrees  of  Knowledge.  —  As  to  the  degrees  of  knowl- 
edge,—  "when'the  mind  perceives  the  agreement  of  two 
ideas  immediately  by  themselves,  without  the  intervention 
of  any  other,"  its  knowledge  is  intuitive  ;  when  its  percep-  I 
tion  is  mediated  by  intervening  ideas  (termed  proofs),  its  v 
knowledge  is  called  demonstrative.  In  default  of  intuition  <. 
we  have  either  belief  (or  opinion),  the  reality  correspond- 
ing to  which  is  the  probable,  or  else  a  perception  inter- 
mediate between  opinion,  on  the  one  hand,  and  intuition 
and  demonstration  on  the  other ;  viz.,  the  perception  of  the 
particular  existence  of  finite  things.  Intuition  precludes 
all  doubt  either  before  or  after  it :  it  is  present  at  every 
step  of  demonstrative  or  mediated  knowledge.  Demon- 
stration may  be  preceded,  but  not  accompanied  nor  fol- 
lowed, by  doubt.  Among  the  demonstrative  sorts  of 
knowledge  may  be  included,  not  only  mathematics  (which, 
from  the  clearness  and  distinctness  of  its  ideas  and  from 


148        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

its  usefulness  has  been  deemed  the  only  sort  of  demon- 
strative knowledge),  but  also  morals. 

Extent  of  Knowledge.  —  From  the  nature  of  knowledge 
as  above  defined  it  follows  that  (i)  "we  can  have  knowl- 
edge no  further  than  we  have  ideas;"  (2)  "we  can  have 
no  knowledge  further  than  we  can  have  perception  of  that 
agreement  or  disagreement;"  (3)  "we  cannot  have  an 
intuitive  knowledge  that  shall  extend  itself  to  all  our  ideas 
and  all  that  we  can  know  about  them,  because  we  cannot 
examine  and  perceive  all  the  relations  they  have  to  one 
another  by  juxtaposition  and  immediate  comparison  one 
with  another;"  (4)  "our  rational  (or  demonstrative) 
knowledge  cannot  reach  to  the  whole  extent  of  our  ideas, 
because  between  two  different  ideas  we  would  examine  we 
cannot  always  find  such  mediums  as  we  can  connect  one  to 
another  with  intuitive  knowledge  in  all  parts  of  the  deduc- 
tion;  (5)  scientific  knowledge,  reaching  no  farther  than 
to  the  existence  of  things  actually  present  to  our  senses,  is 
yet  much  narrower  than  the  former."  As  regards  the  kinds 
and  degrees  of  knowledge,  in  their  relations,  the  following 
observations  may  be  made:  (i)  Our  intuitive  perception 
of  identity  and  diversity  is  coextensive  with  our  range  of 
ideas.  (2)  Our  knowledge  of  coexistence,  "though  in  this 
perception  consists  the  greatest  and  most  material  part  of 
our  knowledge  concerning  substances,"  which  is  a  "  weighty 
and  considerable  part  of  human  science,"  is  very  limited, 
since  the  connection  between  most  simple  ideas,  especially 
secondary  qualities,  is  unknown,  and  the  connection  between 
secondary  and  primary  qualities  is  undiscoverable.  (3)  Our 
knowledge  of  relations  (conclusions)  is  of  uncertain  extent. 
The  ideas  of  quantity  (which  are  ideas  of  relations),  how- 
ever, are,  as  has  been  said,  not  the  only  ideas  capable  of 
demonstration.  "  The  idea  of  a  Supreme  Being,  infinite  in 
power,  goodness,  and  wisdom,  whose  workmanship  we  are, 
and  on  whom  we  depend,  and  the  idea  of  ourselves  as  un- 
derstanding beings,  being  such  as  are  clear  in  us,  would,  I 
suppose,  if  duly  considered  and  pursued,  afford  such  foun- 


LOCKE.  149 

dations  of  our  duty  and  rules  of  action  as  might  place  mo- 
rality amongst  the  sciences  capable  of  demonstration, 
wherein  I  doubt  not  but  from  self-evident  propositions  by 
necessary  consequences  as  incontestable  as  those  in  mathe- 
matics, the  measures  of  right  and  wrong  might  be  made  out 
to  any  one  that  will  apply  himself  with  the  same  indifferency 
and  attention  to  the  one  as  he  does  to  the  other  of  those 
sciences.  Where  there  is  no  property,  there  is  no  injustice,  is 
a  proposition  as  certain  as  any  demonstration  in  Euclid ; 
for,  the  idea  of  property  being  a  *  right  to  anything,'  and 
the  idea  to  which  injustice  is  given  being  the  '  invasion  or 
violation  of  that  right,'  it  is  evident  that,  these  ideas  being 
established,  and  these  names  being  annexed  to  them,  I  can 
as  certainly  know  this  proposition  to  be  true  as  that  a  tri- 
angle has  three  angles  equal  to  two  right  angles."  "  Com- 
plexedness  "  and  want  of  sensible  demonstration  as  regards 
moral  ideas  have  alone  made  demonstration  seem  impossible 
with  reference  to  them.  (4)  We  have  an  intuitive  knowl- 
edge of  our  own  existence,  a  demonstrative  knowledge  of 
the  existence  of  God,  and  a  "sensitive"  knowledge  of  the 
existence  of  things.  If  any  one  be  so  foolish  as  to  doubt 
his  own  existence,  he  is  readily  confuted  by  hunger,  say,  or 
any  other  pain.  The  existence  of  God  follows  certainly, 
for  us,  from  the  certainty  of  our  own  existence.  "  In  the 
first  place,  nothing  cannot  produce  any  real  being.  Again, 
that  which  had  its  beginning  and  being  from  another  must 
also  have  all  that  which  is  in  and  belongs  to  its  being  from 
another  too.  All  the  powers  it  has  must  be  owing  to  and 
received  from  the  same  source.  This  eternal  source  of  all 
being  must  be  the  source  and  original  of  all  power,  so  this 
eternal  being  must  be  also  the  most  powerful.  We  have 
then  got  one  step  farther;  and  we  are  certain  now  that 
there  is  not  only  some  being,  but  some  knowing,  intelligent 
being  in  the  world.  There  was  a  time,  then,  when  there 
was  no  knowing  being,  and  when  knowledge  began  to  be, 
or  else  there  must  have  been  also  a  knowing  being  from 
eternity.  If  it  be  said,  there  was  a  time  when  no  being  had 


150        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

any  knowledge,  when  that  eternal  being  was  void  of  all  un- 
derstanding, I  reply  that  then  it  was  impossible  there  should 
ever  have  been  any  knowledge,  it  being  as  impossible  that 
things  wholly  void  of  knowledge  and  operating  blindly,  and 
without  any  perception,  should  produce  a  knowing  being  as 
it  is  impossible  that  a  triangle  should  make  itself  three 
angles  bigger  than  two  right  ones.  For  it  is  as  repugnant 
to  the  idea  of  senseless  matter  that  it  should  put  into  itself 
sense,  perception,  and  knowledge,  as  it  is  repugnant  to  the 
idea  of  a  triangle  that  it  should  put  into  itself  greater  angles 
than  two  right  ones."  Hence  the  existence  of  an  "  eternal, 
most  powerful,  and  most  knowing  being,  .  .  .  which  whether 
any  one  will  please  to  call  it  God  it  matters  not.  .  .  .  We 
have  more  certain  knowledge  of  God  than  of  anything  our 
senses  have  not  immediately  discovered  to  us.  Nay,  I  pre- 
sume I  may  say  that  we  more  certainly  know  there  is  a  God 
than  there  is  anything  else  without  us.  .  .  .  The  knowledge 
of  the  existence  of  any  other  thing  we  can  have  only  by 
sensation :  for  there  being  no  necessary  connection  of  real 
existence  with  any  idea  a  man  hath  in  his  memory,  nor  of 
any  other  existence  but  that  of  God,  with  the  existence  of 
any  particular  man,  no  particular  man  can  know  the  exist- 
ence of  any  other  being  but  only  when  by  actually  operating 
upon  him  it  makes  itself  perceived  by  him.  ...  It  takes  not 
from  the  certainty  of  our  senses  and  the  ideas  we  receive  by 
them,  that  we  know  not  the  manner  in  which  they  are  pro- 
duced. .  .  .  The  notice  we  have  by  our  senses  of  the  existing 
things  without  us,  though  it  be  not  altogether  so  certain  as 
our  intuitive  knowledge  or  the  deductions  of  our  reason  em- 
ployed about  the  clear  abstract  ideas  of  our  minds,  yet  it  is 
an  assurance  that  deserves  the  name  of  knowledge.  .  .  . 
This  is  certain,  that  the  confidence  that  our  faculties  do 
not  herein  deceive  us,  is  the  greatest  assurance  we  are  capa- 
ble of  concerning  the  existence  of  material  beings.  For  we 
cannot  act  upon  anything  but  by  our  faculties,  nor  talk  of 
knowledge  itself  but  by  the  help  of  those  faculties  which  are 
fitted  to  apprehend  even  what  knowledge  is."  A  "  concur- 


LOCKE.  1 5  I 

rent  reason  "  for  the  belief  in  the  existence  of  external  things 
is  the  following :  "  Those  perceptions  are  produced  by  ex- 
terior causes  affecting  our  senses,"  as  is  evident  from  these 
considerations  :  ( i )  those  that  want  the  organs  of  any  sense 
can  never  have  ideas  belonging  to  that  sense  produced  in 
their  minds;  (2)  sometimes  I  find  I  cannot  help  having 
those  ideas  produced  in  my  mind ;  (3)  many  of  those  ideas 
are  produced  in  us  with  pain  which  we  afterwards  remember 
without  the  least  offence;  (4)  our  senses  bear  witness  to 
the  truth  of  each  other's  reports  concerning  the  existence 
of  sensible  things  without  us. 

"  Improvement  of  Knowledge."  —  Knowledge  grows,  not 
from  supposed  a  priori  "  maxims  "  (of  the  Schoolmen),  or 
axioms,  nor  by  hasty  hypotheses,  but  from  "  clear,  distinct, 
complete  ideas  "  given  by  experience.  And  since  the  "  un- 
derstanding faculties  are  given  to  man  not  barely  for  specu- 
lation, but  also  for  the  conduct  of  his  life,"  our  scientific 
knowledge  is  supplemented  by  the  use  of  the  faculty  of 
judgment.  "  He  that  will  not  eat  till  he  has  demonstrated 
that  it  will  nourish  him,  he  that  will  not  stir  till  he  infallibly 
knows  the  business  he  goes  about  will  succeed,  will  have 
little  else  to  do  but  sit  still  and  perish."  By  judgment  we 
at  least  attain  to  "  the  twilight  of  probability "  (or  the 
"appearance  of  agreement  upon  fallible  proofs")  "suitable 
to  the  state  of  mediocrity  and  probationership  in  which  we 
are  placed."  In  other  words,  —  "  the  faculty  which  God '"""' 
has  given  to  man  whereby  to  supply  the  want  of  clear  cer- 
tain knowledge  in  cases  where  it  cannot  be  had,  is  judgment, 
whereby  the  mind  takes  its  ideas  to  agree  or  disagree,  or, 
which  is  the  same,  any  proposition  to  be  true  or  false  with- 
out perceiving  a  demonstrative  evidence  in  the  proofs." 
The  criteria  of  probability  in  ideas  are  (i)  conformity  to 
our  knowledge,  observation,  and  experience ;  (2)  testimony 
of  others;  (3)  the  number  of  witnesses,  their  integrity  and 
skill,  and,  in  case  of  a  written  work,  the  design  of  the 
author,  consistency  of  its  parts,  "  circumstances  of  the  rela- 
tion," contrary  testimonies.  In  things  which  sense  cannot 
discover,  analogy  is  the  great  rule  of  probability. 


152         A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY.  ' 

Reason.  —  The  name  of  all  probable  truth,  including  even 
"  revelation  "  and  the  faculty  of  natural  knowledge  in  gene- 
ral, is  reason.    Reason  has  two  parts  :  sagacity,  or  the  faculty 
\/ythat  "  finds  out "  ideas,  and  "  illation,  a  faculty  concerned 

^  with  intermediary  ideas."  There  are  four  degrees  in  reason  : 
"  The  first  and  highest  is  the  discovery  and  finding  out  of 

/  proofs;  the  second,  the  regular  and  methodical  disposition 
of  them,  and  laying  them  in  a  clear  and  fit  order  to  make 
their  connection  and  force  to  be  plainly  and  easily  perceived ; 
the  third  is  the  perceiving  their  connection ;  the  fourth, 
making  a  right  conclusion."  Is  the  syllogism  the  "  proper 
instrument"  of  it?  The  syllogism  is  useful  merely  for 
1  showing  the  connection  of  the  proofs  in  any  one  instance, 
and  no  more ;  and  it  is  of  "  no  great  use  here,  since  the 
mind  can  perceive  such  connection  where  it  really  is,  as 
easily,  nay,  perhaps  better,  without  it.  ...  Many  men  reason 
exceedingly  clearly  and  rightly  who  know  not  how  to  make 
a  syllogism ;  "  and  "  scarce  any  one  ever  makes  a  syllogism 
on  reasoning  within  himself.  The  syllogism  is  made  use  of 
on  occasion  to  discover  a  fallacy  hid  in  a  rhetorical  flourish, 
or  cunningly  wrapped  up  in  a  smooth  period."  "  God  has 
not  been  so  sparing  to  men  to  make  them  barely  two-legged 
creatures,  and  left  it  to  Aristotle  to  make  them  rational. 
The  Scholastic  ways  of  reasoning  are  not  less  liable  to  fal- 
lacy than  the  plainer  ways."  The  syllogism  has  no  value 
I  whatever  in  matters  of  probability. 

^^  Reason  and  Faith.  —  Reason  is  contradistinguished  from 
\/faith,  or  knowledge  by  revelation,  as  knowledge  by  our  natural 

^/faculties.  Revelation  cannot  be  admitted  against  the  clear 
evidence  of  reason  :  our  natural  intuitive  and  demonstrative 
knowledge  is  the  most  certain  we  have.  No  man  inspired 
by  God  can  by  any  revelation  communicate  to  any  other 
any  new  simple  ideas,  since  the  communication  of  a  revela- 
tion is  conditioned  by  the  ordinary  use  of  language.  Reve- 
lation may  discover  and  convey  to  us  ideas  which  are 
discoverable  to  us  by  reason  and  the  ideas  we  may  natu- 
rally have.  Things  of  whose  past,  present,  or  future  exist- 


LOCKE.  153 

ence  we  can  by  the  natural  use  of  our  faculties  have  no 
knowledge  at  all,  are,  when  revealed,  the  proper  matter  of 
faith. 

Wrong  Assent.  —  Wrong  assent  results  from  want  of 
proofs,  want  of  ability  to  use  them,  want  of  will  to  use  them, 
from  wrong  measures  of  probability,  from  propositions  that 
are  not  in  themselves  certain  and  clear,  but  doubtful  and 
false,  taken  up  for  principles,  from  received  hypotheses, 
predominant  passions,  authority. 

Division  of  the  Sciences.  —  There  are  three  branches  of 
human  knowledge:  Physics  (Physica),  Ethics  (Ethica), 
Semiotics  (Semiotica) ,  or  the  Doctrine  of  Signs,  —  the  first 
(whose  end  is  merely  "speculative  truth")  having  to  do 
with  the  nature  of  things  as  they  are  in  themselves,  their 
relations,  and  their  manner  of  operation ;  the  second,  with 
that  which  man  ought  to  do  as  a  rational  and  voluntary 
agent  for  the  attainment  of  any  end,  especially  happiness ; 
the  third,  with  the  ways  and  means  by  which  the  knowledge 
of  both  the  one  and  the  other  of  these  is  attained.  From 
a  short  treatise  by  Locke  on  Natural  Philosophy  it  appears 
that  such  investigations  as  we  have  thus  far  gone  over  — 
except  those  on  Words  —  belong  to  Natural  Philosophy 
(the  last  chapter  of  Locke's  brief  treatise  just  referred  to, 
discussing  in  outline  the  Understanding  of  Man).  To  Natu- 
ral Philosophy  there  belong,  besides,  the  theory  of  matter  and 
motion,  and  the  visible  universe  in  all  its  parts.  Ethics 
embraces,  besides  the  general  principles  of  morality,  the 
theory  of  Education,  of  the  State,  and  of  Religion. 

Natural  Philosophy.  —  Locke's  Natural  Philosophy  is  a 
mere  sketch,  in  which  the  substance  of  the  newest  doctrines 
of  his  age  in  physical  science  is  indicated,  without  much 
speculative  interpretation  or  comment.  All  the  phenomena 
of  bodies  are  to  be  explained  "  by  the  figure,  bulk,  texture, 
and  motion  of  small  and  insensible  corpuscles,  /.  e.,  atoms," 
from  the  combinations  of  which  arise  "moleculae"  and 
"  bigger  bodies,"  and  thus  the  whole  material  world  is 
formed.  The  origin  of  the  sensible  phenomena  as  sen- 


154        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY- 

sations  and  perceptions  is  due  to  motion  affecting  organs  of 
sense,  and  propagated  by  animal  spirits  through  the  nerves 
to  the  brain.  The  five  senses  and  memory  belong  to 
animals  as  well  as  men.  Man  has  higher  faculties,  sepa- 
rating him  \to  some  extent  from  the  brute. 

Morality.  —  Locke's  theory  of  morality,  which  is  contained 
in  fragmentary  statements  and  in  suggestions  scattered 
throughout  his  psychological  and  epistemological  investiga- 
tions (contained  in  the  "  Essay  concerning  Human  Under- 
standing "),  may  be  very  briefly  stated  as  follows  :  Morality 
is  the  agreement  of  action  with  certain  rules  acknowledged 
as  the  will  of  God.  Without  belief  in  a  God,  who  is  omnis- 
cient and  "  has  in  his  hands  rewards  and  punishments,  and 
power  enough  to  call  to  account  the  proudest  offender," 
no  morality.  ("  Freedom  of  will,"  or  rather  of  the  man, 
which  Locke  admits  in  the  later  editions  of  the  "  Essay," 
plays  no  part  in  his  moral  theory.)  The  rule  of  action  is 
to  be  found  in  public  happiness,  the  means  to  which  we 
have  to  ascertain  merely  by  use  of  the  natural  reason ;  the 
method  of  knowledge  in  morality  being  essentially  the  same 
as  the  method  in  mathematics. 

Education.  —  The  keynote  of  Locke's  educational  the- 
ories, which  have  become  celebrated  in  the  history  of 
/educational  doctrine,  is  contained  in  the  ancient  aphorism, 
Mens  sana  in  corpore  sano.  He  insists  strongly  on  begin- 
ning education  at  the  earliest  possible  period  in  the  life  of 
-J the  child,  since  it  is  in  this  matter  "  as  in  the  fountains  of 
some  rivers,  where  a  gentle  application  of  the  hand  turns 
the  flexible  waters  into  channels  that  take  quite  contrary 
courses."  All  "cockering  and  tenderness"  in  the  treat- 
ment of  the  child's  physical  nature,  except  perhaps  in  the 
matter  of  sleep  in  the  case  of  the  young  child,  are  forbidden 
by  Locke.  He  would  even  have  children  inured  to  running 
about  with  wet  feet,  and  sleeping  on  hard,  disagreeable  beds. 
The  moral  and  intellectual  education  of  the  child  must 
have  for  its  ends  "  virtue,"  or  rational  control  of  passion  and 
appetite,  wisdom,  or  power  to  "  manage  one's  business  ably 


LOCKE.  155 

and  with  foresight  in  this  world,"  "good  breeding,"  or  agree-!/ 
able  manners,  and  last  (and  least),  learning.  Locke's  theory  V 
of  discipline  to  virtue  is  rather  stern,  though  not  inten- 
tionally unkind :  corporal  punishment  is  to  be  reserved  for 
cases  of  obstinacy,  and  in  its  stead  appeals  to  the  child's 
sense  of  honor  ("  reputation  ")  and  shame  are  to  be  em- 
ployed. Further,  "  he  that  will  have  his  son  have  respect 
for  him  and  his  orders,  must  himself  have  great  reverence 
for  his  son:"  a  child  whose  "spirit"  has  been  broken  is 
even  a  less  worthy  product  of  discipline  than  a  "disorderly 
fellow,"  who  knows  no  such  thing  as  obedience.  Instruc- 
tion by  example  rather  than  precept  and  for  practical  Vy 
rather  than  intellectual  ends  is  Locke's  ideal  of  instruction,  v 
Hence  his  advocacy  of  placing  the  child  in  the  hands  of  a 
private  tutor  (instead  of  in  the  public  schools).  The  tutor 
is  to  "  fashion  the  carriage  and  form  of  the  child's  mind,  to 
settle  good  habits  and  the  principles  of  virtue  and  wisdom, 
to  give  him  by  little  and  little  a  view  of  mankind,  and  work 
him  into  a  love  and  imitation  of  what  is  excellent  and 
praiseworthy,  and  in  the  prosecution  of  it  to  give  him  vigor, 
activity,  and  industry,"  —  merely  opening  the  door  to  the 
purely  intellectual  accomplishments  which  make  a  "  man  a 
critic,  orator,  logician,  metaphysician,  natural  philosopher, 
mathematician,  or  master  in  history  and  chronology  :  "  of 
"  good  breeding,  knowledge  of  the  world,  virtue,  industry, 
and  a  love  of  reputation,  the  child  cannot  have  too  much ; 
and  if  he  have  these,  he  will  not  long  want  what  he  needs 
or  desires  of  the  other."  (Locke's  programme  of  branches 
of  study  to  be  pursued  by  youth  is,  —  Arithmetic,  Geog- 
raphy, Grammar,  Rhetoric,  Chronology,  History,  Geometry, 
Astronomy,  Natural  Philosophy,  French,  Latin,  —  minus 
Latin  Composition,  —  Ethics,  Civil  and  Common  Law,  and 
a  manual  trade,  —  "  nay,  two  or  three.")  In  the  "  Conduct 
of  the  Understanding"  we  have  a  substitute  for  mere  Scho- 
lastic logicism,  an  attempt  to  show  how  intellectual  inde- 
pendence and  grasp  are  to  be  acquired.  The  pattern  of 
intellectual  method  for  all  knowledge  is  the  mathematical 


156        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

v/method.  Intellectual  discipline  has  especially  to  obviate 
the  habits  of  "  taking  ideas  too  much  on  the  authority  of 
others,  and  of  putting  passions  in  the  place  of  thoughts," 
also  a  want  "of  a  large  roundabout  sense."  Locke  dis- 
cusses in  the  "Conduct  of  the  Understanding"  a  great 
variety  of  educational  topics,  among  which  occur  the  fol- 
lowing :  the  necessity  of  having  a  store  of  "  moral  and 
abstract  ideas  as  a  foundation  for  proper  employment  of 
the  reason ; "  critical  examination  of  one's  opinions,  and 
the  avoidance  of  prejudice  ;  impartiality  of  intellectual  dis- 
position ;  observation ;  mental  bias ;  "  hunting  after  argu- 
ments "  for  special  pleading ;  haste,  desultoriness,  smatter- 
ing ;  aiming  at  universality  in  acquisition ;  reading ;  the 
possession  of  intermediate  principles ;  avoiding  partiality 
for  certain  branches  of  study;  classes  of  opinion,  —  as 
mathematics,  ancient  opinions,  heterodox  opinions ;  an- 
ticipation ;  surrendering  of  one's  judgment ;  wandering  of 
the  thoughts ;  perseverance  ;  presumption  ;  despondency  on 
first  encountering  difficulty ;  association  of  ideas ;  fallacies. 
It  is  perhaps  needless  to  remark  that  the  discussion  pre- 
supposes to  a  considerable  extent  the  investigations  of  the 
"  Essay  Concerning  Human  Understanding,"  as,  indeed,  the 
"  Conduct  of  the  Understanding  "  was  at  first  intended  as  a 
chapter  to  be  added  to  the  "  Essay." 

Politics.  —  Locke's  political  doctrines  (framed  with 
particular  reference  to  the  well-known  political  crisis 
that  took  place  in  England  in  the  last  quarter  of  the 
seventeenth  century)  constitute  a  theory  of  a  constitu- 
tional monarchy.  "  Political  power  I  take  to  be  a  right 
of  making  laws  with  penalties  of  death,  consequently  all 
less  penalties,  for  the  regulating  and  preserving  of  prop- 
erty [/.  e.,  "lives,  liberty,  and  estates"],  and  of  employ- 
ing the  force  of  the  community  in  the  execution  of  such 
laws,  and  in  the  defence  of  the  Commonwealth  from 
foreign  injury,  and  all  this  only  for  the  public  good." 
A  full  understanding  of  political  right  depends  on  a  con- 
sideration of  "  what  state  all  men  are  naturally  in,  and  that 


LOCKE.  157 

is  a  state  of  perfect  freedom  to  order  their  actions,  and  dis- 
pose of  their  possessions  and  persons,  as  they  think  fit> 
within  the  bounds  of  the  law  of  nature,  without  asking 
leave  or  depending  on  the  will  of  any  man ;  "  it  is  a  "  state 
of  equality,  wherein  all  power  and  jurisdiction  is  reciprocal, 
none  having  more  power  than  another ;  "  a  state,  however,  in 
which  "  every  man  hath  a  right  to  punish  the  offender  and  be 
the  executioner  of  the  law  of  nature,  a  state  of  peace,  good- 
will, mutual  assistance,  preservation."  This  state  ceases  to 
exist  by  the  fact  that  one  man  tries  to  obtain  absolute 
power  over  another :  a  state  of  enmity,  malice,  violence, 
mutual  destruction  —  in  short,  a  state  of  war  —  ensues,  in 
which  power  rests  on  mere  force.  The  intolerableness  of 
such  a  state  makes  civil  government  a  necessity,  the  chief 
end  of  which  is  the  maintenance  of  the  right  of  property,  or 
the  right  to  life,  liberty,  and  possessions.  Property  is  meas- 
ured by  the  "  extent  of  men's  labor  and  the  convenience 
of  life."  Within  the  state  is  the  family,  the  chief  end  of 
which  is  the  procreation  and  bringing  to  the  age  of  reason 
of  children.  During  nonage  the  child  owes  to  the  parent 
obedience,  afterwards  honor  merely.  The  husband  is  the 
natural  head  of  the  family,  as  "being  the  abler  and 
stronger."  The  power  of  husband  and  father  is  far  from 
absolute.  In  case  of  absolute  disagreement  between  hus- 
band and  wife  there  may  be  an  appeal  to  the  law  of  the  com- 
munity. Political  society  exists  "  there  and  there  only  .  .  . 
where  every  one  of  the  members  hath  quitted  his  natural 
power,  resigned  it  up  into  the  hands  of  the  community  in  all 
cases  that  exclude  him  not  from  appealing  for  protection 
to  the  law  established  by  it.  One  who  resigns  his  natural 
power  thereby  authorizes  the  society,  or  which  is  all  one, 
the  legislative  thereof,  to  make  laws  for  him,  as  the  public 
good  of  the  society  shall  require  ;  to  the  execution  whereof 
his  own  assistance,  as  to  his  own  decrees,  is  due."  An 
absolute  monarchy  is  not  a  true  civil  society,  since  the 
absolute  monarch  does  not  resign  his  natural  power :  abso- 
lute monarchy  is  a  "  state  of  nature."  Now,  in  a  state  of 


J 


158        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

nature  there  is  wanting  established,  settled,  and  known  law, 
a  known  and  indifferent  judge,  "  power  to  back  and  support 
the  sentence  of  the  judge  when  right,  and  to  give  it  due 
execution."  The  possible  forms  of  government,  dependent 
upon  the  placing  of  the  powers,  are  pure  democracy, 
oligarchy,  monarchy,  hereditary  or  elective,  and  common- 
wealth, in  which  last  the  legislative  power  is  the  supreme 
power.  The  legislative  power  in  the  commonwealth,  though 
supreme,  has  not  absolute  authority  over  the  lives  and  for- 
tunes of  the  people ;  it  has,  for  example,  no  right  to  make 
arbitrary  decrees,  it  cannot  take  from  any  man  any  part  of 
his  property  without  his  own  consent,  it  cannot  transfer 
its  function  of  making  laws  into  any  other  hands.  The 
supremacy  held  by  the  legislative  power  passes  in  a  certain 
manner,  however,  over  to  the  executive,  in  as  much  as  the 
executive  must  have  authority  (especially  as  the  legislative 
body  does  not  always  sit)  to  act  according  to  discretion  for 
the  public  good,  without  the  prescription  of  law,  and  some- 
times even  against  it.  In  the  last  resort,  the  really  supreme 
power  of  the  state  is  with  the  people,  who  alone  can  alter 
the  legislative  and  so  determine  the  form  of  government. 
In  relation  to  other  states,  the  commonwealth  is  in  a  state 
of  nature,  and  has  among  its  powers  what  may  be  called  a 
federative  power.  In  case  of  conquest,  he  who  conquers 
acquires  no  power  over  those  "  who  conquered  with  him, 
acquires  power  only  over  those  who  have  actually  assisted, 
concurred,  or  consented  to  that  unjust  force  that  is  used 
against  him,  and  has  over  those  conquered  in  a  just  war,  a 
power  perfectly  despotical."  Tyranny  is  power  exercised 
beyond  right.  Governments  are  overturned  from  without, 
by  conquest,  and  from  within,  by  the  alteration  of  the  legis- 
lative power,  and  by  unfaithfulness  of  legislature  and  prince 
to  their  respective  trusts. 

Religion.  —  Regarding  Locke's  doctrine  of  religion,  it 
may  be  added  to  what  has  already  been  stated  (page  152) 
concerning  reason  and  revelation,  that  Locke  advocated 
what  he  supposed  to  be  a  ";'aA'<?«a/''Chxistianit^_  Such 


CRITICS  AND  DEFENDERS  OF  LOCKE.         \  59 

a  doctrine  was  based  on  a  literal  interpretation  of  the  Ne"\ 
Testament  according  to  the  principles  of  his  doctrine  of 
knowledge  arid  probability ;  it  was  natural  religion,  supple- 
mented by  the  sanctions  of  the  pure  life  of  Christ,  and  the 
revelation  through  him  of  the  altogether  reasonable  hypo- 
theses of  immortality  and  future  rewards  and  punishments. 
Locke  advocated  religious  toleration  for  all  classes  of  per- 
sons except  pronounced  atheists. 

Result.  —  Locke,  it  is  scarcely  necessary  to  say,  is  an 
empiricist ;  consistently  speaking,  he  ought  also  to  be  de- 
scribed as  a  subjective  idealist,  for  if  knowledge  is  merely 
the  perception  oftKe"  agieement  or  disagreement  among 
ideas,  and  ideas  all  originate,  directly  or  indirectly,  in  sen- 
sation, the  mind  contributing  nothing  to  objectify  ideas,  it 
seems  impossible  to  get,  by  knowledge,  beyond  the  indi- 
vidual subject  with  its  ideas.  Locke  did  not  himself  draw 
the  full  consequences  of  his  doctrine,  but  maintained  the 
existence  of  a  (quasi-)  objective  apprehension  of  mind,  th^ 
external  world,  and  God.  On  the  principles  of  his  empiri-) 
cism  it  was  possible  for  any  one  coming  after  him  to  deny, 
regarding  any  one  or  even  all  of  these,  that  we  have  knowl- 
edge of  it  or  them.  Such  denial  occurred.  The  influence 
of  Locke  in  modern  philosophy  has,  as  we  shall  see,  been 
very  great.  —  We  take  up  next  the  critics  and  defenders 
of  Locke's  doctrines  in  his  own  country  and  age. 

§  60. 

Critics  and  Defenders  of 'Locke. .'  — The  doctrines  of  Locke 
provoked  exceptions  from  a  number  of  thinkers  (upwards 
of  a  dozen,  at  least) ,  the  most  important  of  whom  are,  per- 
haps, Edward  Stillingfleet,  Bishop  of  Worcester  (1635- 
1699),  Richard  Burthogge,  M.D.  (d.  1694),  John  Ser- 
geant (1621-1707),  Henry  Lee,  B.D.,  Peter  Browne, 
Bishop  of  Cork  (d.  1735),  Zachary  Mayne  (d.  1750). 

1  See  Dr  Porter's  "Philosophy  in  Great  Britain  and  America" 
(printed  with  Morris's  translation  of  Ueberweg's  "  History  of  Phi- 
losophy ") ;  Noack  ;  etc. 


I6O        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

—  Stillingfleet's  exceptions  relate  to  most  of  the  cardinal 
features  of  the  doctrine  of  Locke :  the  polemic  against 
innate  ideas,  the  merely  twofold  source  of  knowledge,  the 
unknowability  of  substance  and  identity  of  subject  or  object, 
the  meaning  of  the  term  "idea,"  etc. ;  Stillingfleet's  attitude 
being  that  of  a  defender  of  traditional  orthodoxy  in  religion, 
/.  e.,  of  a  revelationist.  —  Burthogge,  in  an  essay  on  Reason 
and  the  Nature  of  Spirits,  substitutes  for  the  Lockean  repre- 
sentationism,  or  doctrine  of  ideas  representing  unknown 
objects,  a  doctrine  of  pure  phenomenism,  asserting  that 
"  things  are  nothing  to  us  but  as  they  are  known  to  us,"  —  a 
doctrine  which  (as  Dr.  Porter  points  out)  "  anticipates  one 
of  the  most  important  positions  of  Kant's  philosophical  sys- 
tem, known  also  as  Hamilton's  doctrine  of  the  relativity  of 
knowledge."  —  Sergeant  criticises  Locke's  use  of  the  term 
"  idea "  to  signify  "  whatever  is  before  the  understanding 
when  one  thinks,"  and  limits  the  term  to  objects  of  sense 
or  of  sensuous  imagination.  He  then  affirms  that  by  the 
understanding  we  cognize  directly  things  as  they  are  in 
themselves.  The  title  of  Sergeant's  work  is  "  Method  to 
Science :  Solid  Philosophy  asserted  against  the  Fancies  of 
the  Ideists"  (1697).  —  Lee,  who  wrote  "the  most  elabo- 
rate and  extended  critical  reply  to  Locke's  'Essay,'"  de- 
fends the  doctrine  of  innate  ideas  ^though  not  in  the  sense 
in  which  Locke  denied  it),  denies,  ol  course,  that  sensation 
and  reflection  are  the  only  sources  of  knowledge,  and  denies 
that  there  are  simple  ideas  which  must  be  "  gained  before 
the  mind  receives  the  knowledge  of  things  by  perceiving 
the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  such  ideas,"  etc.  The 
title  of  Lee's  work  is,  "  Anti-Scepticism ;  or,  Notes  upon 
each  Chapter  of  Mr.  Locke's  '  Essay  Concerning  Human 
Understanding,'  with  an  Explication  of  all  the  Particulars  of 
which  he  treats,  and  in  the  same  order  with  Locke"  (1702). 
—  According  to  Browne,  all  knowledge  depends  upon  "  sim- 
ple perceptions  of  sense,"  and  there  is  no  knowledge  of  the 
supersensible.  Knowledge  is  immediate  or  mediate.  Im- 
mediate knowledge  comprises  the  single  perceptions  of 


ENGLISH  DEISM.  l6l 

sense,  which  are  ideas  of  external  objects,  and  simple  ap- 
prehension of  the  intellect  (or  in  the  present  terminology, 
"self-consciousness").  The  simple  apprehension  of  the 
intellect  is  knowledge  without  ideas ;  it  is  perfectly  direct 
(and  hence  the  term  "  idea  "  has  meaning  only  in  relation 
to  sense-perception).  But  the  apprehension  does  not  occur 
apart  from  the  consciousness  of  external  objects.  Mediate 
knowledge  is  either  demonstrative  certainty,  moral  certainty, 
certainty  based  upon  sight,  or  certainty  based  on  evidence. 
Our  notions  of  the  supersensible  are  derived  from  an  ana- 
logical extension  of  the  application  of  sensible  ideas. 
Browne's  works  of  importance  in  this  connection  are,  "  The 
Procedure,  Extent,  and  Limits  of  Human  Understanding  " 
(1729),  and  "Things  Divine  and  Supernatural  conceived 
by  Analogy  with  Things  Human  "  (1733).  —  Mayne,  vyho 
published  anonymously  a  work  entitled  "  Two  Dissertations 
Concerning  Sense  and  Imagination,  with  an  Essay  on  Con- 
sciousness" (1727),  —  unless,  indeed,  this  work  be  a  work 
of  Browne's,1  —  distinguishes  from  sense  and  imagination, 
which  he  declares  to  be  non-intellectual  in  character,  the 
understanding  as  the  sole  faculty  of  conceptions.  He  "  dis- 
tinctly recognizes  the  functions  of  consciousness  and  self- 
consciousness  as  they  have  been  subsequently  developed  by 
the  schools  of  Reid  and  Hamilton."  2  —  Locke's  views  were 
defended  by  Vincent  Perronet,  Samuel  Bold,  and  Mrs. 
Catherine  Cockburn. 

§   61. 

English  Deism.6  —  Owing  largely  to  the  influence  of 
Locke's  teaching,  but  partly  also  to  that  of  the  teachings 
of  Lord  Cherbury  and  Hobbes,  there  appeared  conspicu- 
ously in  England  about  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth 
century  a  certain  phase  of  philosophical  thought,  hardly 
characterized  by  any  definiteness  or  identity  of  particular 
doctrines  among  different  thinkers,  which  is  known  as  Eng- 

1  See  Noack,  and  Franck,  under  Browne.  2  Porter. 

3  English  Thought  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,  by  Leslie  Stephen. 
VOL.  I.—  II 


1 62        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

lish  Deism.  It  was  in  general  a  denial  of  supernaturalism 
in  religion  and  morals,  together  with  the  (complementary) 
assertion  of  the  inherent  truth  and  sufficiency  of  reason,  or 
common-sense,  in  religion  and  morals.  We  may  take  as 
perhaps  the  most  important  of  the  Deists,  John  Toland 
(1689-1722),  Anthony  Collins  (1676-1729),  Matthew 
Tindal  (1657-1733),  Thomas  Chubb  (1677-1747),  Henry 
St.  John,  Lord  Bolingbroke  (1698-1751).  —  Toland,  in  a 
work  entitled  "Christianity  not  Mysterious"  (ist  ed.,  1696, 
3d  ed.,  1702),  maintains  that  all  things  have  their  real  foun- 
dation in  reason  alone,  and  that,  consequently,  the  only 
legitimate  ground  of  assent  is  reason  or  demonstration,  and 
that  whenever  this  is  wanting,  suspension  of  judgment  is  the 
only  proper  attitude  of  mind.  True  Christianity  cannot  be 
mysterious  in  the  sense  of  being  '•  above  all  reason ;  "  and 
no  alleged  revelation  which  does  not  show  the  "  indisputable 
character  of  divine  wisdom  and  sound  reason "  deserves 
acceptance.  By  "reason,"  Toland,  who  is  a  professed 
Lockean,  means  what  Locke  means  by  "  knowledge  "  when 
he  defines  it  as  "  the  perception  of  the  agreement  or  dis- 
agreement among  ideas."  —  Collins,  a  personal  friend  and 
acknowledged  disciple  of  Locke,  wrote  a  work  entitled  a 
"Discourse  of  Freethinking "  (1713),  in  which  he  main- 
tained the  necessity  of  free  thought  as  an  instrument  of 
truth  and  human  welfare,  and  a  work  entitled  "  Inquiry 
Concerning  Human  Liberty"  (1715),  defending  the  (Hob- 
bean)  doctrine  of  necessitarianism.  Among  Collins's  argu- 
ments upon  freethinking  occur  the  two, —  (i)  that  thought 
cannot  in  reality  be  limited,  since  it  would  be  only  by  a 
reason  or  thought  which  should  show  that  it  is  not  permitted 
to  think  on  a  subject  on  which  one  may  wish  to  think ;  and 
(2)  the  limiting  of  thought  takes  away  the  only  means  of 
arriving  at  the  truth,  —  especially  in  religion.  Collins  ad- 
mits liberty  (with  Locke  and  Hobbes)  in  the  sense  of  a 
power  to  do  as  one  wills  or  pleases,  but  denies  it  of  man  in 
any  other  sense,  and  for  the  following  reasons  (among 
others)  :  When  two  contrary  objects  of  choice  are  presented 


THE  ENGLISH  DEISTS.  163 

to  us,  we  are  not  able  to  choose  either ;  our  choice  is  at 
bottom  only  a  practical  judgment  that  one  thing  is  better 
than  another ;  and  as  all  judgment  is  necessary,  so  must  all 
choice  be  ;  even  in  actions  which  appear  the  most  indiffer- 
ent our  choice  is  determined  by  a  multitude  of  causes,  as 
temperament,  habitude,  prejudice,  etc. ;  our  belief  in  free- 
dom is  in  part  a  consequence  of  our  inability  to  give  an 
account  of  the  motives  determining  the  will.  In  a  "  Letter  to 
Mr.  Dodwell,"  Collins,  following  out  a  suggestion  contained 
in  the  "Essay  Concerning  Human  Understanding"  (to  the 
effect  that  God  might  have  endowed  matter  with  the  ca- 
pacity to  think),  maintains  that  the  soul  might  be  a  result- 
ant of  the  activities  of  thinking  particles  composing  the 
body,  and  would  not  therefore  be  in  itself  capable  of  immor- 
tality. —  Tindal,  perhaps  the  most  important  of  the  Deists, 
wrote  a  work  entitled  "  Christianity  as  Old  as  Creation " 
(i  732),  which  received  the  appellation  of  the  "  Bible  of  the 
Deists."  It  is  very  much  in  the  line  of  the  Lockean  thought 
upon  the  subject  with  which  it  deals.  So-called  "  revealed 
religion  teaches  nothing,"  says  Tindal,  "which  nature,  or 
reason,  has  not  always  taught,  could  teach  nothing  that 
would  not  have  to  be  tested  by  the  standards  of  reason." 
Human  nature  is  a  fixed  quantity,  and  what  it  apprehends 
is  apprehended  by  all  alike.  "The  attempt  to  destroy 
reason  by  reason  is  a  demonstration  that  men  have  nothing 
but  reason  to  trust  to."  —  Chubb  (a  tallow-chandler  and  a 
self-taught  scholar)  held  that  the  accountability  of  man  is  a 
guaranty  of  the  possession  by  him  of  a  capacity  to  discern 
and  fulfil  his  responsibilities,  and  that  religion  has  for  its 
content  nothing  not  revealed  in  nature ;  that  Christianity  is 
not  mere  intellectual  adherence  to  dogma,  but  life  according 
to  the  nature  of  things.  Chubb's  principal  works  are  : 
"A  Discourse  Concerning  Reason"  (1731),  "The  True 
Gospel  of  Jesus  Christ "  (1739),  "The  Author's  Farewell  to 
his  Readers"  (1748). — With  Bolingbroke,  Deism  passes 
into  Scepticism  :  Bolingbroke,  though  a  professed  theist, 
affirms  the  uncertainty  of  all  science.  —  English  Deism,  as 


1 64         A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

will  hereafter  appear,  has  exerted  a  powerful  influence  in 
modern  philosophizing  since  its  day. 


George  Berkeley*  (1685-1753).  —  Berkeley,  though  of 
English  descent,  was  born  in  Ireland,  in  the  county  of  Kil- 
kenny. He  early  displayed  a  peculiar  inquisitiveness  of 
temper  and  a  habitual  enthusiasm  for  pure  ideas,  —  decided 
intellectual  precocity ;  also  a  love  of  nature,  and  the  posses- 
sion of  a  quick  eye  for  its  phenomena.  He  was  educated 
first  at  Kilkenny  school,  and  then  at  Trinity  College,  Dublin, 
where  in  1 702  he  received  the  degree  of  B.  A.,  in  1 704 
that  of  M.  A.,  and  in  1707  an  appointment  as  fellow,  tutor, 
Greek  lecturer,  etc.  During  his  college  course  he  mani- 
fested the  deepest  interest  in  the  physical  and  metaphysical 
speculations  of  his  age,  viz.,  those  of  Descartes,  Malebranche, 
Locke,  Newton ;  and  was  greatly  interested  in  the  making 
of  certain  original  investigations  in  the  field  of  metaphysics. 
Not  long  after  his  graduation  two  of  his  principal  works 
were  published.  In  1713  Berkeley  removed  to  London. 
The  next  ten  years  of  his  life  were  filled  with  social  and 
intellectual  intercourse  with  the  chief  literary  luminaries  of 
England,  —  Steele,  Swift,  Addison,  Pope,  and  others,  — 
travelling  on  the  Continent,  and  philosophical  reflection 
and  writing.  As  early  as  1724  he  had  projected  the  phi- 
lanthropical  enterprise  of  founding  a  university  in  the  Ber- 
mudas for  the  education  of  English-speaking  youths,  and 
savages,  there.  Three  years  were  spent  by  him  in  medita- 
tive retirement  in  Rhode  Island,  awaiting  the  action  of 
Parliament  in  relation  to  a  promised  grant  of  funds  for  the 
founding  of  the  proposed  university.  The  scheme  failed, 
and  Berkeley  returned  to  Ireland.  Made  bishop  of  Cloyne 
in  1734,  he  lived  in  philosophical  seclusion,  studying  an- 
cient thinkers,  and  developing  his  own  early-discovered 
philosophical  principle  on  its  higher  side,  until  1752,  when 

1  See  "Berkeley,"  by  Professor  Eraser  (" Blackwood's  Philosophi- 
cal Classics  ")  ;  "  Selections  from  Berkeley,  "  by  Professor  Fraser ;  etc. 


BERKELEY.  1 65 

he  moved  to  Oxford,  where  a  son  was  studying,  to  spend  the 
remainder  of  his  days.  He  died  suddenly  in  January  of  the 
following  year. 

Works.  —  Berkeley's  principal  works  are  :  "  An  Essay 
towards  a  New  Theory  of  Vision"  (1709),  " The  Principles 
of  Human  Knowledge"  (1710),  "  Hylas  and  Philonoiis, 
or  Dialogues"  (1713),  "Alciphron,  or  the  Minute  Philoso- 
pher "  ( 1 733),  "  Siris  :  a  Chain  of  Philosophical  Reflections 
and  Inquiries  concerning  Tar- Water,"  etc.  (1744).  The 
first  two  of  these  set  forth  his  principle  in  its  earliest  form ; 
the  third  is  taken  up  with  the  refutation  of  objections  to  his 
doctrine ;  the  fourth,  with  a  somewhat  transitional  phase  of 
his  thought ;  and  the  last,  with  the  exposition  of  his  thought 
in  its  maturest  form.  We  may  mention  also  the  "  Common- 
Place  Book." 

Philosophy. — The  starting-point  of  Berkeley's  philoso- 
phizing is  to  be  found  in  a  class  of  queries  suggested,  it. 
would  seem,  by  the  following  passage  of  Locke's  "Essay" 
(book  ii.,  ch.  iv.,  §  8)  :  "The  ideas  we  receive  by  sensation 
are  often  in  grown  people  altered  by  judgment  without  our 
taking  notice  of  it.  When  we  set  before  our  eyes  a  round 
globe  of  any  unifo.rm  color,  e.g.,  gold,  alabaster,  or  jet,  it  is 
certain  that  the  idea  thereby  imprinted  on  our  minds  is  of 
a  flat  circle  variously  shadowed,  with  several  degrees  of 
light  and  brightness  coming  to  our  eyes,  etc.  But  we  have, 
by  use,  been  accustomed  to  perceive  what  kind  of  appear- 
ances convex  bodies  are  wont  to  make  in  us,  what  altera- 
tions are  made  in  the  reflections  of  light  by  the  differences 
in  the  sensible  figures  of  bodies,  and  the  judgment  presently, 
by  an  habitual  custom,  alters  the  appearances  into  their 
causes,  etc."  To  the  query  (also  to  be  found  in  Locke) 
"  whether  a  man  born  hlinH  pnH  ^en  n\^r\p  I-Q  see  would  at 
first  give  the  naine^istance  to  any  idea  (object  of  con- 
sciousness) intromitted  by  sight,"  Berkeley's  answers  that 
he  would  "  take  di^tanrejjiat  Jiejhfid  perr[giyed  bytpuch  to^. 
be  something  existing  without  his  mind,  but  would  certainly 
think  nothing  seen  was^without  his  mind"?'  He  would  come 


1 66         A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

to  perceive  distance  by  sight  only  as  he  learned  to  interpret 
visual  impressions  by  impressions  of  touch  and  bodily  move- 
ment. By  experience  he  would  become  able  to  "  perceive  " 
distance  at  once  by  sight ;  every  visual  impression  would 
instantaneously  receive  an  interpretation  in  the  language  of 
touch  and  movement.  But,  this  being  the  case,  all  vision 
would,  in  a  very  important  sense,  be  prevision  ;  visual  per- 
ceptions are,  unconsciously  to  ourselves,  created  for  us  be- 
forehand by  experience ;  and  every  idea  or  object  of 
(visual)  consciousness  would  presuppose  a  subject  of  con- 
sciousness or  mind.  What  is  true  of  vision  is  true  of  all 
forms  of  sensible  experience.  Why  the  sensations  of  one 
sense  thus  receive  interpretation  in  the  language  of  another, 
and  why  certain  impressions  of  different  senses  are  uniformly 
conjoined  to  constitute  the  idea  of  a  fixed  object,  we  do  not 
know,  any  more  than  we  know  why  words  in  English,  Greek, 
or  any  other  language  have  the  significations  they  have  for 
us.  Certain  it  is  that  we  find  in  experience  ideas  or  objects 
existing  in  regular  coexistence  and  succession,  or  in  an 
order,  —  which  order  we  know,  from  the  manner  in  which 
we  get  these  ideas  and  from  the  fact  that  they  form  an 
order,  to  be  inseparable  from  mind.  Such  being  the  case, 
the  traditional  notions  of  matter,  substance,  and  the  like, 
which  suppose  a  real  existence  apart  from  mind,  are  "  empty 
metaphysical  abstractions,"  a  "  dust  raised  by  metaphysicians 
that  prevents  their  seeing  clearly."  The  notion  of  matter  is 
self-contradictory:  "matter"  is  something  that  is  not,  and 
yet  at  the  same  time  is  for  consciousness,  since  we  cannot 
attach  any  meaning  to  the  term  "  matter "  without  giving 
matter  an  existence  for  the  mind,  or  "  bringing  it  within  the 
mind."  The  very  being  of  all  objects  for  us  consists  in  the 
"  being  perceived  and  known."  What  does  not  exist  in  my 
mind  or  that  of  any  other  mind  or  spirit,  finite  or  infinite, 
cannot  have  existence.  The  self-contradiction  inherent  in 
the  notion  of  water  does  not  appertain  to  that  of  spiritual 
substance.  The  words  /  and  you  have  certain  intelligible 
meanings  which  warrant  our  speaking  of  spiritual  beings, 


BERKELEY.  1 67 

though  they  be  not  exactly  phenomenal.  "  I  know  and  am 
conscious  of  my  own  being,  and  that  I  myself  am  not  my 
ideas,  but  am  somewhat  else,  —  a  thinking,  active  principle 
that  perceives,  knows,  wills,  and  operates  about  ideas.  .  .  . 
I  am  not,  in  like  manner,  conscious  of  the  existence  and 
essence  of  matter.  On  the  contrary,  I  know  that  nothing 
inconsistent  can  exist,  and  that  the  existence  of  matter  im- 
plies an  inconsistency."  We  know,  then,  only  that  which 
is  itself  mind,  or  inseparable  from,  and  object  to,  mind. 
The  "  ideas  or  phenomena  of  which  things  are  composed 
are  not  modifications  of  the  mind  to  which  they  are  pre- 
sented, but  are,  on  the  contrary,  perceptions,  dependent 
presentations  exhibited  under  laws  of  nature  in  individual 
minds.  Still  more  it  must  be  remembered  that  phenomenal 
things  need  not  be  composed  only  of  the  phenomena  pre- 
sented to  the  five  senses.  Phenomena  of  innumerable  sorts 
which  do  not  appear  in  human  sense-experience  may  form 
a  part  of  the  experience  of  other  sentient  spirits.  .  .  .  Fur- 
ther, Berkeley's  immaterialism  assumes  the  possibility  of  our 
having  phenomenal  experience  and  perceptions  of  phenome- 
nal things  in  a  disembodied  as  well  as  in  this  embodied  state 
of  conscious  life  "  (Fraser) .  In  reply  to  the  objection  that,  if 
the  nature  of  things  consists  in  their  being  perceived,  there 
can  be  no  things  as  such,  since  the  ideas  of  no  two  persons 
are  identical,  it  may  (besides  other  things)  be  said  that  we 
must  make  a  distinction  between  the  phenomenal  and  hy- 
perphenomenal.  What  we  know  through  the  senses  merely, 
partakes  of  the  nature  of  sense  :  we  sensibly  perceive  only 
the  sensibly  perceptible ;  but  the  real  nature  of  ideas  and 
objects  is  not  therefore  beyond  the  "  limits  "  of  mind,  be- 
cause we  do  not  sensibly  perceive  it :  it  exists  as  an  arche- 
type in  the  Eternal  Mind,  hence  by  hypothesis  is  not  to  be 
known  in  its  absolute  identity  by  sense-perception.  As  to 
the  relation  between  the  phenomenal  and  the  hyperphe- 
nomenal  worlds,  it  is  a  vulgar  mistake  to  suppose  the  latter 
outside  mind.  We  are  directly  conscious  of  ourselves  indi- 
vidually as  thought  and  will,  and  we  interpret  the  (phe- 


1 68        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

nomenal)  actions  and  words  of  others  as  signs  of  thought 
and  will  in  them.  In  like  manner,  we  may  interpret  phe- 
nomena generally  as  signs  of  eternal  thought  and  will, 
as  manifestations  of  eternal  mind  :  we  in  fact  daily  see, 
hear,  and  know  God,  if  our  spiritual  faculties  are  open, 
together  with  our  senses.  From  the  foregoing  it  seems  to 
follow  that  there  are  among  phenomena  no  real  causes: 
real  causes  are  hyperphenomenal,  —  God,  or  finite  spirits. 
Purely  mechanical  philosophy  knows  not  true  causes,  but 
rather  mere  signs  and  things  signified,  forming,  as  it  were, 
a  "  rational  discourse,"  evincing  by  the  regularity  of  connec- 
tion between  sign  and  thing  signified  an  intelligent  primal 
cause.  It  is  concerned  merely  with  phenomena  and  their 
laws,  which  are  but  the  rules  of  the  operation  of  spirit. 
These  rules  constitute  a  grammar  to  the  understanding  of 
nature  and  the  prevision  of  effects.  It  is  not,  however,  a 
rational  necessity  that  the  rules  should  always  remain  the 
same,  though  it  be  a  rational  necessity  that  there  be  rules. 
The  phenomenal  world  is  a  world  in  which  "  reason  is  im- 
mersed in  matter,"  and  intellect  is  merely  latent  in  sense  : 
it  is  a  world  of  "  blemishes  and  defects  "  (which,  however, 
"  have  a  use,  in  that  they  make  an  agreeable  sort  of  variety, 
and  augment  the  beauty  of  the  rest  of  creation,  as  shades  in 
a  picture  serve  to  set  off  the  brighter  and  more  enlightened 
parts").  Pure  reason  is  pure  causality.  It  is  not  known 
by  means  of  the  grammar  of  the  understanding,  but  only 
in  moral  and  spiritual  intuition  and  trust.  "There  is  no 
sense  nor  sensory,  nor  anything  like  sense  or  sensory,  in  God. 
Sense  implies  an  impression  from  some  other  being,  and 
denotes  a  dependence  in  the  soul  that  hath  it.  Sense  is  a 
passion  [passivity],  and  passions  imply  imperfection.  God 
knoweth  all  things  as  pure  mind  or  intellect;  but  nothing 
by  sense,  nor  in  nor  through  a  sensory."  —  The  two  great 
principles  of  morality  are  the  being  of  God  and  the  freedom 
of  man. 

Result.  —  Locke,  we  saw,  left  the  external  world  (matter), 
the  self,  and  God  in  the  doubtful  position  of  being  only 


ENGLISH  MORALISTS,  —  SHAFTESB UR  Y.         1 69 

(quasi-)  knowable  :  Berkeley,  we  have  just  seen,  drops  mat- 
ter, as  an  irrational  notion.  By  so  doing,  he  begins  the 
development  of  the  Lockean  doctrine  towards  its  legitimate 
result.  —  Berkeley  is  a  pure  idealist,  and  one  of  the  very 
few  empiricists  who  have  been  so.  His  idealism  is,  how- 
ever, at  least  in  its  best-known  form,  as  a  factor  in  the 
history  of  philosophy,  only  an  empirical  idealism. 

§  63. 

English  Moralists.  —  The  several  next  following  thinkers, 
including  Hume  (who,  however,  has  an  independent  posi- 
tion in  the  history  of  philosophy)  are  commonly  known  as 
the  English  Moralists  of  the  Eighteenth  Century.  They 
are  (besides  Hume)  Shaftesbury,  Hutcheson,  Butler,  Clarke, 
Price,  Adam  Smith,  Paley.  They  are  perhaps  more  im- 
portant in  the  history  of  thought  than  in  themselves 
regarded,  though  not  insignificant  in  this  respect. 

§  64. 

Anthony  Cooper,  Earl  of  Shaftesbury^  (1671-1713). — 
Shaftesbury,  who  was  grandson  of  the  celebrated  states- 
man of  the  same  title,  was  educated  by  a  private  tutor, 
acting  under  Locke's  direction,  at  a  private  school,  and 
at  the  Grammar  School  of  Winchester.  His  education  was 
supplemented  by  several  years'  travel  on  the  Continent, 
which  gave  a  cosmopolitan  flavor  to  his  thinking.  He  was 
possessed  by  an  ardent  liking  for  the  ancient  classics,  and 
became  so  fully  imbued  with  the  thought  and  spirit  of  them 
that  he  never  afterwards  could  accommodate  himself  fully 
to  the  modern  "  Christian  "  temper  and  view  of  things. 
He  succeeded  his  father,  the  second  Earl  of  Shaftesbury, 
as  a  (Whig)  member  of  the  House  of  Lords.  On  account 
of  ill-health  he  was  obliged,  after  a  few  years  in  Parlia- 
ment, to  retire  to  private  life.  He  made  visits  to  Holland 
and  Italy  on  account  of  ill-health.  Personally  Shaftesbury 

1  See  "Shaftesbury,"  by  Thomas  Fowler,  M.A.,  LL.D.  ("  English 
Philosophers  Series");  Shaftesbury's  "Characteristics." 


1 70         A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

was  characterized  by  a  spirit  of  benevolence  which,  it  is 
said,  practically  benefited  not  a  few  people.  He  was 
particularly  fond  of  stimulating  and  assisting  ambitious, 
intelligent  young  men.  He  was  of  a  religious  tempera- 
ment, but  no  believer  in  dogmas.  He  is  known,  however, 
to  have  had  little  sympathy  with  the  Deistic  movement. 

Works.  —  Shaftesbury's  works  are  "  Characteristics  of 
Men,  Manners,  Opinion,  Times"  (1711),  a  collection 
of  essays  (some  of  which  are  not  strictly  philosophical) 
on  various  topics ;  "  Letters  written  by  a  Nobleman  to 
a  Young  Man  at  the  University."  His  ethical  views  are 
to  be  found  chiefly  in  an  essay  (among  those  of  the  "  Char- 
acteristics ")  entitled  an  "  Inquiry  concerning  Virtue  and 
Merit."  The  essay  "  The  Moralists,  a  Philosophical  Rhap- 
sody," contains  his  metaphysical  doctrines. 

Philosophy.  —  The  motive  impulse  of  Shaftesbury's  think- 
ing is  to  be  found,  like  that  of  the  Cambridge  Platonists 
(whom  he  seems  to  have  esteemed),  in  hostility  to  the 
views  of  Hobbes  and  the  dogmatic  theologians. 

Metaphysics :  God.  —  Shaftesbury  professedly  detests 
technical  "  metaphysics  "  and  "  system-making."  The 
metaphysicians,  he  says,  by  their  attempt  to  demonstrate 
everything,  "  renounce  daylight  and  extinguish,  in  a  man- 
ner, the  bright,  visible,  outside  world."  "The  most  inge- 
nious way  of  becoming  foolish  is  by  a  system.  True 
philosophy  is  the  study  of  happiness."  One  need  "  know 
only  so  much  metaphysics  as  will  teach  him  that  there  is 
nothing  in  it."  But  Shaftesbury  has,  nevertheless,  his 
metaphysics,  and  talks  not  a  little  about  "  system."  He 
regards  virtue  as  a  sort  of  harmony  with  the  "universal 
system  "  of  things,  and  the  good  as  happiness,  —  all  things 
working  together  for  the  best.  From  what  he  terms  the 
"  mutual  dependency  of  things,"  the  "  order,  union,  and 
coherence  of  the  whole,"  the  universal  system,  "  the  co- 
herent scheme  of  things,"  he  infers  the  existence  of  a 
universal  mind,  a  wise  and  benevolent  God.  He  combats 
the  Lockean  notion  that  matter  could  (by  God)  have 


SHAFTESBURY.  I'Jl 

been  made  to  think  or  produce  thought,  and  finds  in  the 
superiority  of  thought  to  matter  evidence  of  the  eternity 
of  thought.  God  is  related  to  the  world  as  the  soul  to  the 
body  ;  he  directs  and  manages  all  the  operations  of  nature 
as  the  soul  does  those  of  the  body. 

Ethics  :  Moral  Beauty  (  Virtue) .  —  That  harmony  which 
characterizes  the  "  universal  system  "  as  such  appears  also 
in  man,  in  himself,  and  "  his  relations  to  the  world."  In 
himself,  in  the  sum  of  his  thoughts  and  affections,  he  is  like 
a  musical  instrument,  no  one  of  the  strings  of  which  can 
be  overstrained  without  damage  to  the  instrument  as  a 
whole.  As  a  part  of  the  universal  human  whole,  he  is  good 
only  as  he  acts  for  the  public  good,  is  possessed  by  the 
spirit  of  benevolence.  As  a  sort  of  harmony,  virtue  is 
a  species  of  beauty :  it  is  moral  beauty,  or  beauty  of  action  \J 
and  characters,  instead  of  mere  objects.  Moral  beauty 
is  not  an  object  or  product  of  reason,  nor  is  it  a  merely 
conventional  thing.  It  is  an  object  and  product  of  a 
faculty  of  "  taste,"  a  moral  sense.  The  moral  sense  is  as 
natural  to  us  as  the  faculty  of  feeling  itself.  Its  operation 
is  immediate,  and  when  the  sense  is  educated,  decisive :  / 
what  i s .  good,  presents  itself  to  it  at  once  as  the  "  amiable* 
and  the  agreeable,  and  hence  right."  The  criterion  of  right 
and  wrong  is,  in  general,  the  public  good :  to  love  the 
public,  "to  study  universal  good,  and  to  promote  the 
interest  of  the  whole  world  as  far  as  lies  within  our  power, 
is  surely  the  height  of  goodness,  and  makes  that  temper 
which  we  call  divine."  On  the  other  hand,  "since  it 
is  impossible  that  the  public  good,  or  good  of  the  system, 
can  be  preserved  without  the  affection  towards  private 
good,  a  creature  wanting  in  these  is  in  reality  wanting  in 
some  degree  to  goodness  and  natural  rectitude,  and  may 
thus  be  esteemed  vicious  and  defective."  But  the  other- 
regarding  sentiments  cannot,  Shaftesbury  maintains  (in 
opposition  to  Hobbes),  be  deduced  from  the  merely  self- 
regarding.  As  regards  the  relation  of  reason  and  the  will, 
—  as  it  is  the  "affectionate  part"  of  human  nature  (the 


1/2        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

"  heart ")  rather  than  the  reason  that  apprehends  the 
right  or  the  good,  so  it  is  the  appetite  rather  than  rea- 
son that  determines  action :  appetite  gives  the  initiative 
of  action,  reason  merely  guides  it.  The  sanction  of  virtue 
is  twofold :  a  sanction  of  conscience  combined  with  the 
"  love  and  reverence  of  a  beneficent,  just,  and  wise  God." 
As  to  the  fear  of  "  future  punishment"  and  hope  of  "  future 
reward"  (the  only  "sanctions"  recognized  by  Locke), 
—  these  "  cannot  be  of  the  kind  called  good  affections 
such  as  are  acknowledged  the  spring  and  source  of  actions 
truly  good."  These  affections  can  at  most  only  help  to 
prepare  the  way  towards  the  cultivation  of  a  moral  disposi- 
tion. A  will  or  decree  of  God,  or  supreme  goodness,  must 
necessarily  be  unintelligible  to  a  being  who  does  not  know 
what  goodness  is. 

/Esthetics :  Beauty.  —  The  constituent  elements  of 
beauty  are  harmony  and  proportion.  There  are  three 
orders  of  beauty:  (i)  "dead  forms,"  or  external  objects; 
(2)  "forms  that  form"  or  "have  intelligence,  action, 
or  operation ;  "  (3)  the  "  form  which  fashions  all  other 
forms,  both  dead  and  living,  viz.,  the  Divine  Mind." 
"  Whatever  is  beautiful  is  harmonious  and  proportion- 
able ;  whatever  is  harmonious  and  proportionable  is  true ; 
what  is  at  once  both  beautiful  and  true  is,  of  consequence, 
agreeable  and  good." 

Result.  —  In  the  philosophy  of  Shaftesbury  we  have  an 
assertion  of  the  rights  of  "internal  sense,"  or  feeling 
against  the  purely  discursive  faculty  or  activity  of  thought. 
Instead  of  a  mechanical  relation  of  part  to  part  and  to 
whole  (as  in  the  system  of  Hobbes) ,  we  have  here  (/.  e., 
in  the  principles  of  benevolence)  an  immediate  living,  or 
felt,  relation :  instead  of  an  individualistic,  egoistic  ethics, 
we  have  a  universalistic,  altruistic  one.  Since  sense,  and 
not  reason,  is  the  norm  of  truth  in  this  system,  the  system 
is  not  rationalistic ;  but  since  sense  here  is  internal  and 
in  a  measure  reflective,  the  system  is  intuitional  rather  than 
empirical.  The  system  of  Shaftesbury  is  pantheistic.— 


HUTCHESON.  173 

Shaftesbury's  influence  was  in  the  last  century  a  very  wide 
one.  Not  only  in  England,  but  also  in  France,  and  even 
more  in  Germany,  his  views  left  distinct  traces  in  the  sys- 
tems of  numerous  philosophers  who  studied  his  works. 

§  65. 

Francis  Hutcheson 1  ( 1 694-1 746) .  —  Francis  Hutcheson, 
son  of  a  Presbyterian  clergyman,  was  of  Scotch  descent, 
though  born  in  Ireland.  After  receiving  a  preliminary 
training  in  a  classical  school  in  his  native  place  and  at  an 
academy  elsewhere,  he  spent  six  years  (1710—16)  in  the 
University  of  Glasgow.  His  course  of  study  there  included, 
besides  philosophy,  the  classics  and  general  literature,  the- 
ology, which  was  taught  by  a  man,  the  liberality  of  whose 
views  (which  cost  him  his  chair)  left  a  marked  effect  upon 
Hutcheson's  way  of  thinking  in  theology.  At  the  close  of 
his  course,  Hutcheson  accepted  a  call  from  a  country  con- 
gregation near  his  old  home,  but  soon  resigned  his  position 
to  open  an  academy  in  Dublin.  After  some  years  of  very 
successful  work  here,  he  went  (1729)  to  Glasgow  to  occupy 
the  chair  of  Moral  Philosophy,  to  which  he  had  been 
elected.  By  a  certain  frankness  and  benevolence  of  dis- 
position and  manner,  and  by  a  liberality  of  view  and  a 
natural  eloquence,  he  won  a  large  following,  and  exercised 
a  wide  influence,  tending  towards  the  separation  of  ethics 
and  religious  dogma,  and  the  liberalization  of  religious 
teaching  in  Scotland. 

Works.  —  Hutcheson's  principal  works  are  :  "  Inquiry 
Concerning  Beauty,  Order,  Harmony,  and  Design  "  (1725)  ; 
"  Inquiry  Concerning  Moral  Good  and  Evil"  (1725); 
"  Essay  on  the  Nature  and  Conduct  of  the  Passions  and 
Affections  "  (1728)  ;  "  Illustrations  upon  the  Moral  Sense  " 
(1728)  ;  "Letters"  (1725-27)  ;  "  Philosophise  Moralis  In- 
stitutio  Compendiaria  Ethices  et  Jurisprudentiae  Naturalis 
Elementa"  (1742);  "  Metaphysicae  Synopsis  Ontologiam 

1  "  Hutcheson,"  by  Thomas  Fowler  ;  Hutcheson's  "  System  of 
Moral  Philosophy  ;  "  "  The  Scottish  Philosophy,"  by  James  McCosh. 


174        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

et  Pneumatologiam  complectens  "  (1742);  "System  of 
Moral  Philosophy"  (1755).  The  most  generally  known, 
and  most  important,  are  the  first  four  works  in  the  pre- 
ceding list. 

Philosophy.  —  Hutcheson  is  important  chiefly  as  a  moralist. 
It  is  worth  while,  however,  to  glance  at  his  psychologico- 
metaphysical  doctrines. 

Psychology  and  Metaphysics.  —  In  psychology  Hutcheson 
is  largely  a  follower  of  Locke.  He  rejects  the  doctrine  of 
innate  ideas  (as  Locke  understood  it),  derives  knowledge 
from  sense  ("sensation"  and  "consciousness"),  and  "re- 
flection." There  are  certain  (not  unimportant)  points  in 
which  he  differs  from  Locke.  He  asserts  that  the  "  ideas 
of  extension,  figure,  motion,  and  rest  are  more  properly 
ideas  accompanying  the  sensations  of  sight  and  touch  than 
the  sensations  of  either  of  these  senses ;  that  the  idea  of 
self  accompanies  every  thought;  and  that  the  ideas  of 
number,  duration,  and  existence  accompany  every  idea 
whatever."  We  cognize  the  external  world  by  means  of 
images  of  it,  which  we  are  compelled  to  refer  to  an  external 
world  by  "  our  very  nature."  The  correspondence  of  image 
and  object  has  for  its  cause  God,  who  by  "  an  established 
law  of  nature  brings  it  about  that  the  notions  which  are  ex- 
cited by  present  objects  may  be  like  the  objects  themselves, 
or  at  least  represent  their  habitudes  or  qualities,  if  not  their 
true  quantities.  We  have  a  direct  consciousness  of  mind  as 
distinguished  from  body  and  of  our  own  personal  identity." 
Still  other  points  in  which  Hutcheson  "  departed  from  or 
supplemented  the  philosophy  of  Locke"  are  the  "distinc- 
tion between  perception  proper  and  sensation  proper,  which 
occurs  by  implication,  though  it  is  not  explicitly  worked  out ; 
a  hint  as  to  the  imperfection  of  the  ordinary  division  of 
the  external  senses  into  five  classes ;  the  limitation  of  con- 
sciousness to  a  special  mental  faculty,  namely,  that  by  which 
we  perceive  our  own  minds,  and  all  that  goes  on  within 
them ;  and  the  disposition  to  refer  disputed  questions  of 
philosophy  not  so  much  to  formal  arguments  as  to  the  testi- 


HUTCHESON.  175 

mony  of  consciousness  and  our  natural  instincts  "  (Fowler). 
With  regard  to  the  senses  —  external  and  internal  —  he 
proposes  the  following  classification  (understanding  by 
"  sense,"  "  every  determination  of  our  minds  to  receive 
ideas  independently  on  our  wills,  and  to  have  perceptions 
of  pleasure  and  pain"):  (i)  "the  external  senses  uni- 
versally known  "  (though  the  ordinary  division  is  "very  im- 
perfect"); (2)  pleasant  perceptions  arising  from  regular 
harmonious  uniform  objects;  (3)  "our  determination  to 
be  pleased  at  the  happiness  of  others,  and  to  be  uneasy 
at  their  misery,"  —  the  "public  sense;"  (4)  the  general 
sense  by  which  we  perceive  virtue  or  vice  in  ourselves  or 
others;  (5)  the  sense  of  honor;  and  perhaps  an  infinite 
number  of  others.  Metaphysical  axioms  are  self-evident 
and  immutable  (though  not  innate)  ;  space  and  time  are 
realities,  but  not  modes  of  the  divine  being  ;  we  perceive  in 
conscious  energy  or  efficacy  —  the  only  sort  of  cause  —  that 
the  nature  of  substance  is  unknown.1 

Ethics.  —  "Human  nature,"  says  Hutcheson,  "was  not 
left  quite  indifferent  in  the  affair  of  virtue  to  form  to  itself 
observations  concerning  the  advantage  or  disadvantage  of 
actions,  and  accordingly  to  regulate  its  conduct.  The  weak- 
ness of  our  reason,  the  associations  rising  from  the  infirmity 
and  necessities  of  our  nature,  are  so  great  that  very  few  men 
could  ever  have  formed  those  long  deductions  of  reason 
which  show  some  actions  to  be  on  the  whole  advantageous 
to  the  agent,  and  their  contraries  pernicious.  The  Author 
of  nature  has  much  better  furnished  us  for  a  virtuous  con- 
duct than  our  moralists  seem  to  imagine  by  almost  as  quick 
andjDOwerful  instructions  as  we  have  for  the  preservation  of 
our  bodies.  He  has  made  a  lovely  form  [in  Shaftesbury's 
sense]  to  excite  our~pursuit  of  it,  and  has  given  us  strong 
affections  to  be  the  springs  of  each  virtuous  action."  There 
is  (that  is  to  say)  for  the  determination  of  conduct  a 
"  moral  sense,"  "  guiding  and  controlling  certain  natural 
and  non-reasoned  impulses."  The  moral  •'*  sense  "  is  for 

1  See  McCosh's  "  Scottish  Philosophy." 


176         A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Hutcheson  not  wholly  without  intellectual  character,  but 
has  a  certain  governing  norm,  or  criterion,  according  to 
which  it  acts.  The  .  springs  of  action  are  :  ( i )  original 
desires,  corresponding  to  the  five  classes  of  senses  above 
enumerated,  viz.,  desires  of  the  bodily  senses,  of  the  imagi- 
nation or  internal  sense,  of  the  sense  of  public  happiness, 
of  virtue,  of  honor;  (2)  various  secondary  desires  conse- 
quent upon  these.  In  moral  action  these  desires,  and  not 
reason,  give  the  initiative,  but  are  subject  to  conscience, 
which  is  therefore  the  real  controlling  principle.  The 
desires  or  affections  are  classifiable  as  turbulent  and  tran- 
sient, or  calm  and  enduring,  and  as  selfish  and  benevolent. 
From  the  calm,  enduring,  benevolent  desires  conscience 
cannot  withhold  approval.  The  criterion  of  the  moral 
sense,  that  is  to  say,  is  the  idea  of  benevolence  or  the 
general  good  of  mankind,  the  "greatest  happiness  of  the 
greatest  number"  (a  phrase  originating  with  Hutcheson). 
"  If  we  examine  all  the  actions  which  are  accounted  amia- 
able  anywhere,  and  inquire  into  the  grounds  upon  which 
they  are  approved,  we  shall  find  that,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
person  who  approves  them,  they  always  appear  as  benevo- 
lent and  flowing  from  the  love  of  others  and  a  study  of 
their  happiness,  whether  the  approver  be  one  of  the  per- 
sons beloved  or  not ;  so  that  all  those  kind  affections  which 
incline  us  to  make  others  happy,  and  all  actions  supposed 
to  flow  from  such  affections,  appear  morally  good  if,  while 
they  are  benevolent  towards  some  persons,  they  be  not  per- 
nicious to  others.  Nor  shall  we  find  anything  able  anywhere 
in  any  action  whatsoever  where  there  is  no  benevolence 
imagined  ;  nor  on  any  disposition  or  capacity  which  is  not 
applicable  to  and  designed  for  benevolent  purposes."  The 
principle  of  benevolence  does  not  exclude  self-love  :  a  man 
may  be  "  in  part  an  object  of  his  own  benevolence ;  and 
those  actions  which  flow  from  self-love,  and  yet  evidence 
no  want  of  benevolence,  having  no  hurtful  effect  upon 
others,  seem  perfectly  indifferent  in  a  moral  sense,  and  raise 
neither  the  love  or  hatred  of  the  observer.  .  .  .  Self-love  is 


BUTLER.  177 

really  as  necessary  to  the  good  of  the  whole  as  benevolence, 
as  that  attraction  which  causes  the  cohesion  of  the  parts  is 
as  necessary  to  the  regular  state  of  the  whole  as  gravita- 
tion." The  only  real  sanction  of  moral  action  is  the  voice 
of  conscience,  governed  by  the  thought  of  benevolence. 

^Esthetics.  —  There  is  a  sense  of  the  beautiful,  as  of  the 
good ;  /.  <?.,  the  perception  of  beauty  is  immediate,  it  is  a 
matter  of  sensibility  or  feeling,  /.  e.,  of  pleasure  or  pain. 
The  sense  of  the  beautiful  is  an  internal  sense,  ...  a  per- 
ception of  relations  rather  than  things.  The  fundamental 
relation  of  beauty  is  that  of  uniformity  amidst  variety : 
"  mathematically  speaking,  beauty  is  a  compound  ratio  of 
these  two,  so  that  when  the  uniformity  of  bodies  is  equal, 
the  beauty  is  as  the  variety,  and  when  the  variety  is  equal, 
the  beauty  is  as  the  uniformity."  There  is  a  beauty  of 
universal  truths,  laws,  actions,  moral  principles.  Our  ideas 
of  the  beautiful  are  in  a  measure  effects  of  association 
of  ideas. 

Result.  — rThe  general  observations  made  upon  the  sys- 
tem of  Shaftesbury  apply  to  that  of  Hutcheson,  a  close  fol- 
lower, almost  a  copyist,  of  Shaftesbury.  —  Hutcheson  is 
generally  regarded  as  the  founder  of  the  Scottish  School  of 
Philosophy,  —  a  school  the  chief  characteristics  of  which  are 
that  (i)  it  makes  the  self  its  chief  object  of  study;  (2)  it 
employs  as  method  "induction;"  (3)  it  maintains  the 
doctrine  of  the  existence  in  mankind  of  a  "  common 
sense  "  perceptive  of  eternal  and  necessary  truths.1 

§  66. 

Joseph  Butler*  (1692-1752). — Butler  was  educated  by 
a  private  tutor  at  a  "  Dissenters'  Academy  "  (to  which  his 
father  sent  him,  with  a  view  to  making  a  Presbyterian  minis- 
ter of  him)  and  at  the  University  of  Oxford.  His  en- 
trance to  Oxford  was  preceded  by  an  expressed  intention 

1  See  McCosh,  "  Scottish  Philosophy." 

-  Butler's   Works ;  "  Butler "  by   Collins  ("  Blackwood's   English 
Philosophers")  ;  "  Encyclopaedia  Britannica." 
VOL.  I. —  12 


1/8        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

to  conform  to  the  principles  of  the  Established  Church. 
On  finishing  his  university  course  he  decided  to  enter  the 
ministry  of  the  Church,  and  was  ordained  in  1717.  He 
occupied  a  number  of  more  or  less  important  ecclesiastical 
posts,  among  them  the  rectorship  of  Stanhope,  the  dean- 
ship  of  St.  Paul's  in  London,  the  bishoprics  of  Bristol  and 
Durham.  His  benevolence  is  said  to  have  been  some- 
thing extraordinary. 

Works.  —  Butler's  philosophical  "works"  comprise 
(fifteen)  "  Sermons "  on  ethical  and  religious  topics 
(1726),  "The  Analogy  of  Religion,  Natural  and  Revealed, 
to  the  Constitution  and  Course  of  Nature"  (1736),  "Two 
Brief  Dissertations  on  Personal  Identity,  and  the  Nature 
of  Virtue,"  appended  to  the  "  Analogy,"  and  a  few  Letters 
to  Samuel  Clarke.  The  "  Analogy  "  was  a  reply  to  Tindal's 
"  Christianity  as  Old  as  Creation,"  the  so-called  "  Bible  of 
Deism." 

Philosophy.  —  Butler  possesses  some  importance  as  an 
opponent  of  the  Deistic  doctrine  of  religion,  but  owes  his 
place  (not  a  mean  one)  in  the  history  of  philosophy  chiefly 
to  his  ethical  doctrines. 

Theory  of  Religion.  —  In  opposition  to  the  Deists,  Butler 
attempts  to  show  (i)  that  nothing  in  "reason"  or  "expe- 
rience "  precludes  for  us  the  probability  —  and  probability, 
he  says,  is  our  only  guide  in  such  matters  —  that  we  are 
immortal,  and  that  the  future  state  is  a  state  of  rewards  and 
punishments :  in  other  words,  that  the  government  of  the 
world  is  a  moral  government  (as  taught  by  revealed  reli- 
gion) ;  (2)  that,  in  view  of  the  imperfection  of  reason  and 
experience,  Revelation  is  probable,  and  that  it  is  no  more 
(nor  less)  impossible  of  comprehension  than  the  ordinary 
course  of  nature.  In  connection  with  the  question  —  "  the 
most  important  that  can  possibly  be  asked  "  —  of  immor- 
tality, arises  that  of  the  "  meaning  of  that  identity  or  same- 
ness of  person  which  is  implied  in  the  notion  of  our  living 
now  and  hereafter  in  any  two  successive  moments."  On 
this  point,  Butler  answers  that  we  live  and  act  constantly 


BUTLER.  179 

as  if  we  were  the  same  to-day  that  we  were  yesterday  and 
shall  be  to-morrow,  that  only  real  beings  —  not  mere  ab- 
stract ideas  —  are  capable  of  life  and  action,  happiness  and 
misery,  and  that  every  person  is  "conscious  that  he  is 
now  the  same  person  or  self  he  was  as  far  back  as  his  re- 
membrance reaches." 

Ethics.  —  "  That  which  renders  beings  capable  of  moral 
government "  is  the  "  having  a  moral  nature,  —  moral  facul- 
ties of  perception  and  action."  And,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  being  moral  is  the  exercise  of  these  faculties.  The  moral 
faculties  of  man  comprise,  according  to  Butler,  four  classes 
of  principles :  ( i )  certain  "  propensions,  aversions,  pas- 
sions, and  affections  "  having  relations  to  external  objects 
which  constitute  "  human  nature  "  in  relation  to  such  ob- 
jects; (2)  self-love,  which  constitutes  our  moral  nature  as 
respects  ourselves ;  (3) a  natural  "  principle  of  benevolence," 
—  our  nature  as  regards  others,  —  "  which  is  in  some  de- 
gree to  society  what  self-love  is  to  the  individual ; "  (4)3 
"principle  of  reflection,"  conscience,  by  "which  we  ap- 
prove and  disapprove  our  own  actions."  In  the  most 
general  sense  of  the  term,  moral  action  is  action  from  and 
according  to  any  one  of  these  principles,  —  way  part  of  our 
moral  nature ;  in  a  less  wide  sense  it  is  action  from  and 
according  to  whichever  is  the  strongest ;  in  a  more  restricted 
sense  still  it  is  action  from  and  according  to  a  principle 
which  prevails,  not  by  reason  of  mere  strength,  but  by  virtue 
of  its  nature  as  representing  most  fully  human  nature  as  a 
unit  and  the  whole,  and  as  being  therefore  the  most  excel- 
lent. This  last  principle  is  doubtless  the  "principle  of 
reflexion,"  or  conscience,  which,  only,  is  unequivocally  pecu- 
liar to  man  as  distinguished  from  the  brute  ;  no  action  that 
is  not  "  suitable  "  or  "  proportionable  "  to  this  principle  has 
a  truly  moral  character  or  is  truly  good.  "  The  very  con- 
stitution of  our  nature  requires  that  we  bring  our  whole 
conduct  before  this  faculty ;  wait  its  determination ;  en- 
force upon  ourselves  its  authority ;  and  make  it  the  business 
of  our  lives,  as  it  is  absolutely  the  whole  business  of  a  moral 


I  SO         A    HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

agent,  to  conform  ourselves  to  it."  Next  in  rank  to  this  is 
self-love,  which  implies  a  certain  degree  of  "  calculation," 
or  reflection.  "  Reasonable  self-love  and  conscience  are 
the  chief  or  superior  principles  in  the  nature  of  man." 
That  self-love,  though  condemned  by  moralists  who  disap- 
prove of  Hobbes's  making  it  the  sole  principle  of  ethics,  is 
a  real  principle  of  our  nature,  becomes  evident  from  the 
consideration  of  the  fact  that  while  as  "  members  of  one 
another  "  we  are  "  made  for  society,"  we  are  "  intended  to 
take  care  of  our  own  life  and  health  and  private  good." 
Self-love  is  not  necessarily  inconsistent  with  love  for  others, 
but  may  be  involved  in  that,  or,  on  the  other  hand,  involve 
that,  without  detriment  to  it.  Without  self-love  benevo- 
lence would  often  be  without  an  object,  except  the  indefinite 
one  of  merely  avoiding  pain.  "  The  gordness  or  badness 
of  actions  does  not  arise  from  hence,  that  the  epithet  '  inter- 
ested '  or  '  disinterested  '  may  be  applied  to  them,  any  more 
than  that  any  other  indifferent  epithet,  suppose  '  inquisitive  ' 
or  'jealous,'  may  or  may  not  be  applied  to  them;  not 
from  their  being  attended  with  future  pleasure  or  pain, 
but  from  their  being  what  they  are,  namely,  what  becomes 
such  creatures  as  we  are,  what  the  state  of  the  case  requires, 
or  the  contrary.  Or,  in  other  words,  we  may  judge  that  an 
action  is  morally  good  or  evil  before  we  so  much  as  consider 
whether  it  be  interested  or  disinterested.  .  .  .  Self-love  in  its 
one  degree  is  as  just  and  morally  good  as  any  other  affec- 
tion whatever.  Benevolence  towards  particular  persons 
may  be  to  a  degree  of  weakness,  and  so  be  blamable  ;  and 
disinterestedness  is  so  far  from  being  commendable  that  the 
utmost  possible  depravity  which  we  can  in  imagination  con- 
ceive is  that  of  disinterested  cruelty."  Injustice  is  done  to 
self-love  by  confounding  it  with  the  pursuance  of  the  grati- 
fications of  the  passions,  which  in  themselves  are  not  directly 
related  to  the  self,  but  to  the  external  world.  It  is  this 
gratification  rather  than  real  self-love  that  is  "unfriendly 
to  benevolence."  Self-love  is  distinguished  from  the  "  par- 
ticular affections,  passions,  and  appetites  to  particular 


BUTLER.  l8l 

external  objects  in  that  it  belongs  to  man  as  a  "  reasonable 
creature,"  whereas  they,  though  a  part  of  human  nature,  are 
quite  distinct  from  reason  as  such.  Self-love  is  further  dis- 
tinguished from  the  passions  in  that  the  gratification  of 
them  is  a  source  of  happiness,  whereas  "  people  may  love 
themselves  with  the  utmost  unbounded  affection,  and  yet 
be  extremely  miserable ;  "  and  if  "  self-love  wholly  engrosses 
us  and  leaves  no  room  for  any  other  principle,  there  can  be 
no  such  thing  at  all  as  happiness  or  enjoyment  of  any  kind 
whatever."  Butler  gives  special  attention  to  resentment, 
compassion,  love  of  neighbor,  among  the  moral  senti- 
ments. He  distinguishes  two  sorts  of  resentment,  one  of 
which  is  "sudden  "  and  "  instinctive,"  and  has  for  its  object 
to  defend  ourselves  from  impending  bodily  "  harm,"  the 
other  reflective,  and  relates  to  a  "  moral  injury."  The  for- 
mer is  justifiable  only  in  special  instances;  the  latter  is 
justifiable  in  the  form  of  moral  indignation.  Compassion 
has  for  its  final  causes  to  prevent  misery  (by  restraining 
resentment,  envy,  unreasonable  self-love)  and  to  relieve 
misery.  Resentment,  compassion,  love  of  neighbor,  are  all 
subject  to  the  dictates  of  conscience.  The  sanctions  of 
virtue  are,  according  to  Butler,  conscience,  and  the  knowl- 
edge of  God  as  the  rewarder  and  punisher  of  virtue  and  its 
opposite.  The  obligation  to  obey  conscience  rests  upon  the 
fact  that  it  is  the  law  of  our  nature,  or,  in  another  aspect, 
the  will  of  God. 

Result.  —  Butler,  it  is  scarcely  necessary  to  remark,  is  an 
intuitionist.  He  is  in  an  important  sense  a  disciple  of 
Shaftesbury ;  his  "  conscience  "  being  the  "  moral  sense  " 
of  Shaftesbury,  tinged  with  an  element  of  reflection,  and  less 
aesthetic  in  its  action.  His  view  of  self-love  may  be  re- 
garded as  a  reaction  against  Shaftesbury's  somewhat  one- 
sided view  of  "  benevolence,"  itself  a  reaction  against  the 
egoistic  ethics  of  Hobbes.  Butler  seems  to  come  very 
near  regarding  benevolence  and  self-love  as  one  and  the 
same  thing,  but,  after  all,  left  the  identification  of  the  two 
through  the  reason,  which  comprehends  both  self  and  other, 


1 82        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

subject  and  object,  to  later  moralists.  —  He  has  been  rightly 
deemed  one  of  the  greatest  moralists  between  Aristotle 
and  Kant.  He  has  .been  somewhat  neglected  by  historians. 

§  67. 

Samuel  Clarke  (1675-1729). — Clarke,  after  a  course 
in  the  school  of  his  birthplace,  Norwich,  entered  the  Uni- 
versity of  Cambridge  and  pursued  studies  in  mathematics 
and  philosophy.  Becoming  acquainted  with  the  Newtonian 
principles  of  physics,  he  adopted  them,  and  upheld  them 
in  opposition  to  those  of  Descartes.  He  studied  divinity, 
took  orders,  became  chaplain  at  court,  and  "resident 
chaplain"  of  the  Bishop  of  Worcester,  —  a  position  held 
by  him  till  his  death. 

Works.  —  Clarke's  principal  philosophical  works,  treat- 
ing particularly  of  the  being  and  attributes  of  God,  the 
principles  of  morality,  freedom  and  necessity,  and  the 
nature  of  space  and  time,  are :  "  A  Demonstration  of  the 
Being  and  Attributes  of  God,  more  particularly  in  answer 
to  Mr.  Hobbes,  Spinoza,  and  their  followers"  (1705); 
"  Discourse  Concerning  the  Unchangeable  Obligations  of 
Natural  Religion,  and  the  Truth  and  Certainty  of  the 
Christian  Revelation"  (1706);  "A  Collection  of  Papers 
which  passed  between  the  late  learned  Mr.  Leibnitz  and 
Dr.  Clarke,"  etc.,  together  with  a  reply  to  Collins's  "  Philo- 
sophical Enquiry  Concerning  Human  Liberty"  (1711). 

Philosophy:  The  Being  and  Attributes  of  God.  —  It  has 
been  asserted1  of  Clarke's  metaphysico-religious  doctrine 
that  it  "  was  intimately  connected  with  his  Natural  Philos- 
ophy, and  Newton  was  hardly  less  his  guide  in  the  former 
than  in  the  latter."  Whether  it  was  Newton  or  Spinoza  who 
was  his  guide,  Clarke  assumes  that  the  mathematical 
method  was  the  method  of  metaphysics,  and  attempts 
to  prove  the  existence,  omnipresence,  and  the  infinite  wis- 
dom and  beneficence  of  the  Creator,  "  geometrico  ordine" 
(as  Spinoza  says).  The  notion  of  an  infinite  chain  of 

1  See  Martineau,  "  Types  of  Ethical  Theory,"  ii.  428  (ist  ed.). 


SAMUEL   CLARKE.  183 

causes  and  effects  is  a  self- contradictory  notion  :  hence 
there  must  have  something  existed  from  eternity.  This 
being  must  be  immutable  and  independent ;  must  be  self- 
existent  ;  its  substance  is  incomprehensible ;  many  of  its 
attributes  may  be  demonstrated,  —  it  is  eternal,  infinite, 
and  omnipresent  (because  self- existent),  and  one  (since  if 
there  were  "  two  beings,  either  could  be  supposed  to  exist 
without  the  other "),  intelligent  (since  the  cause  is  more 
perfect  than  the  effect),  free  (freedom  is  implied  in  intelli- 
gence), omniscient,  omnipotent,  infinitely  good,  just,  true, 
etc. 

Space  and  Time.  —  Space  and  time  are  both  infinite. 
They  are  not  substances,  but  attributes.  As  such  they 
presuppose  a  real,  necessary,  and  infinite  being,  of  which 
they  are  attributes.  They  are,  that  is  to  say,  attributes  of 
God. 

The  Foundation  of  Morality.  —  All  things,  man  included, 
have,  by  virtue  of  unchangeable  laws,  implanted  in  them 
definite  natures  and  definite  relations  to  one  another  and 
the  system  of  the  world.  The  suitedness  or  fitness  (or  the 
opposite)  of  things  in  relation  to  one  another  is  indepen- 
dent of  all  will  or  arbitrary  arrangement,  even  of  God,  since, 
though  not  obliged  to  create  the  world,  God  was,  on  having 
decided  to  create  it,  necessitated  by  the  possible  nature  of 
things.  The  actions  of  intelligent  beings  are  obligated  to 
be  guided  by  the  knowledge  of  the  immutable  relations  of 
things,  not  by  special  interest  or  conditions.  Actions  are 
virtuous  or  otherwise,  according  as  they  are  or  are  not  fitted 
to  the  correspondences  between  things.  In  virtue  alone 
consists  the  happiness  of  man.  The  correspondences  of 
things  are  perceived  by  an  infallible  instinct  of  reason.  For 
those  who  will  not  attend  to  the  voice  of  reason  a  special 
revelatio.n  is  provided,  and  promises  of  rewards  or  punish- 
ment for  obedience  or  disobedience  to  the  laws  of  nature. 

Freedom.  —  Freedom  is  the  power  of  self-motion. 
Among  Clarke's  proofs  of  freedom  is  the  following :  God 
is  freedom,  and  could  communicate  freedom  to  his  crea- 


1 84        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

tures.      Consciousness   attests   the    fact    of   such   a   com- 
munication. 

Result.  —  Clarke  seems  to  combine  characteristics  of  all 
three  of  the  cardinal  directions  of  thought  of  the  Second 
Period  :  he  is  a  rationalist  as  regards  method,  an  intuitionist 
in  his  conception  of  reason  and  the  first  principles  of  mo- 
rality, and  a  (Lockean)  empiricist  in  his  general  meta- 
physical principles  ("  Dr.  Clarke,  though  not  a  formal 
defender  of  the  philosophy  of  Locke,  never  formally  dis- 
sents from  him." —  Porter.}  His  speculations  are  said  to 
have  exercised  a  considerable  influence  upon  English 
theologians. 

§68. 

Richard  Price  (1723-1791).  —  Price,  whose  education 
did  not  extend  beyond  that  of  a  private  tutor,  a  private 
school,  and  an  academy,  studied  especially  mathematics  and 
theology.  Though  the  son  of  a  strict  Calvinist,  he  became 
a  "  Dissenting  "  minister  of  a  "  liberal "  faith.  The  latter 
portion  of  his  life  was  devoted  to  economico-political 
thought  and  work.  He  became  conspicuous  during  the 
war  of  England  against  her  American  Colonies  as  a  cham- 
pion of  the  cause  of  the  Colonies.  By  his  outspoken 
sympathy  with  the  French  Revolutionists  he  became  a 
special  object  of  Burke's  antipathy.  He  is  said  to  have 
"  studied  at  an  early  age  the  works  of  Clarke  and  Butler, 
and  to  have  conceived  a  special  admiration  for  the  theo- 
logico-ethical  works  of  the  latter." 

Works.  —  Works  of  Price  are  :  "A  Review  of  the  Chief 
Questions  and  Difficulties  in  Morals,  particularly  those 
respecting  the  Origin  of  our  Ideas  of  Virtue,  its  Nature,  its 
Relation  to  the  Deity,  Obligation,  Subject,  Matter,  Sanc- 
tions"  (1757)  ;  "  Letters  on  Materialism  and  Philosophical 
Necessity." 

Philosophy.  —  Price  opposes  the  Lockean  sensational 
theory  of  knowledge,  maintaining  that  the  understanding 
is  an  independent  source  of  knowledge  (and  even  of  feel- 
ing) ,  essentially  distinct  from  sensibility,  and  apprehends,  by 


ADAM  SMITH.  185 

its  own  power,  time,  space,  cause,  etc.  The  main  affirma- 
tions in  the  ethical  doctrines  of  Price  seem  to  be  that 
"  right  "  and  "  wrong  "  are  objective,  or  founded  in  the 
nature  of  things  as  parts  of  an  order ;  that  they  are  directly 
apprehended  by  reason  or  understanding  (as  distinguished 
from  the  moral  "  sense  "  of  Shaftesbury,  Hutcheson,  and 
others,  whom  he  criticises)  ;  that  the  mere  perception  of 
right  and  wrong  "  excites  to  action,  and  is  alone  a  sufficient 
principle  of  action,"  or  that  "  excitement  belongs  to  the 
very  ideas  of  right  and  wrong,  and  is  essentially  inseparable 
from  the  apprehension  of  them,"  or  (in  still  other  terms) 
"  that  the  intellectual  nature  is  its  own  law,  and  has  within 
itself  a  spring  and  guide  of  actions,  which  it  cannot  suppress 
or  reject ;  "  and,  finally,  that  actions  are  "  formally  right  " 
(right  in  intention)  only  as  chosen  by  reason  or  under- 
standing, or  are  obligatory,  independently  of  any  relation  to 
happiness  or  unhappiness. 

Results.  —  It  is  important  to  note  that  Price's  theory 
differs  from  all  English  theories  of  morals  prior  to  it  — 
even  from  Clarke's,  with  which  it  seems  otherwise  nearly 
identical — in  admitting  no  "sanction"  or  source  of  obliga- 
tion whatever,  distinct  from  reason  or  understanding  itself. 
In  this  regard  it  anticipates  the  ethical  teaching  of  Im- 
manuel  Kant,  —  if  it  does  not,  rather,  stand  entirely  alone. 

§  69. 

Adam  Smith  1  (1723-1790).  —  Smith  was  educated  at 
the  school  of  his  birthplace  and  at  the  universities  of  Glas- 
gow (where  he  had  Hutcheson  as  an  instructor  in  phi- 
losophy) and  Oxford.  His  studies  at  Oxford  were  chiefly 
in  the  moral  and  political  sciences  and  in  language  and 
literature.  In  1751  he  received  the  appointment  of  pro- 
fessor of  logic,  and  in  1752  that  of  professor  of  moral 
philosophy,  in  the  University  of  Glasgow.  He  resigned 

1  "  Life  of  Adam  Smith,"  by  R.  B.  Haldane  ;  Noack  ;  "  English 
Thought  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,"  by  Leslie  Stephen;  Smith's 
Works. 


1 86        A    HISTORY  OF  MODERK  PHILOSOPHY. 

his  professorship  (in  1763)  to  travel  as  tutor  of  the  Duke 
of  Buccleugh,  on  the  Continent.  After  his  return,  he 
spent  ten  years  in  studies  which  resulted  in  his  renowned 
work  in  political  economy.  As  a  holder  of  a  lucrative  pub- 
lic office,  he  was  able  to  spend  his  latter  years  in  ease  and 
intercourse  with  intellectual  friends,  among  whom  were 
Hume,  Ferguson  (professor  of  moral  philosophy),  Dugald 
Stewart,  Hutton  the  geologist,  and  Black  the  chemist. 

Works.  —  Smith's  philosophical  works  are  :  "  Theory 
of  the  Moral  Sentiments"  (1759);  "Inquiry  into  the 
Nature  and  Causes  of  the  Wealth  of  Nations"  (1776); 
"Essays  on  Philosophical  Subjects"  (1795). 

Philosophy.  —  Smith  is  an  opponent  of  the  Hobbean 
egoism  in  ethics.  "  How-selfish-soever  man  may  be  sup- 
posed, there  are  evidently  some  principles  in  his  nature 
which  interest  him  in  the  fortune  of  others,  and  render 
their  happiness  necessary  to  him,  though  he  derives  nothing 
from  it  except  the  pleasure  of  seeing  it.  Of  this  kind  is 
pity,  or  compassion,  the  emotion  which  we  feel  for  the 
misery  of  others  when  we  either  see  it,  or  are  made  to 
conceive  it  in  a  very  lively  manner."  The  essential  ele- 
ment in  moral  sentiment  is  sympathy.  The  moral  senti- 
ment in  general  involves,  (i)  sympathy  with  the  motives 
of  the  agent ;  ( 2 )  with  the  feelings  of  the  recipient ; 
(3)  perception  of  the  harmony  of  action  with  the  rules 
according  to  which  the  two  sorts  of  sympathy  generally 
act ;  (4)  the  perception  of  action  as  forming  a  part  of 
a  system  of  behaviour  tending  to  promote  the  happiness 
of  the  individual  or  society,  and  as  being  on  this  account 
beautiful.  An  action  with  the  motives  of  the  doer  of  which 
we  find  ourselves  able  to  sympathize  possesses  "  propriety." 
If  it  be  also  beneficent  in  its  effects,  exciting  in  the  patient 
of  it  feelings  of  gratitude  with  which  we  can  properly  sym- 
pathize, it  possesses  "  merit "  also.  The  judgment  of 
merit,  it  appears,  depends  upon  sympathy  with  both  agent 
and  patient.  If  we  disapprove  of  the  motives  of  the  doer 
of  an  action  benefiting  another,  the  action  is  the  opposite 


PA  LEY.  187 

of  meritorious.  The  foundation  of  our  judgments  con- 
cerning our  own  sentiments  and  conduct,  and  of  the  sense 
of  duty,  lies  in  the  fact  that  "  man  desires  not  only  to 
be  loved,  but  to  be  lovely :  "  praise  must  signify  praise- 
worthiness  in  him  who  is  praised  to  be  truly  agreeable. 
The  perfectly  virtuous  man  is  he  who  acts  according  to 
the  rules  of  perfect  prudence,  of  strict  justice,  and  of  proper 
benevolence.  The  knowledge  of  the  rules  of  conduct 
must  be  accompanied  by  self-command,  to  produce  virtue. 
With  Smith,  ethics  is  one  of  four  parts  of  the  whole  of 
philosophy ;  viz.,  natural  theology,  ethics,  politics,  or  juris- 
prudence, and  economics.  —  Smith  is  to  a  certain  extent 
a  disciple  of  Hume. 

§  70- 

William  Paley*  (1743-1805). — Paley  graduated  at 
Cambridge,  and  became  a  fellow  and  tutor  there,  lectur- 
ing on  divinity,  metaphysics,  and  ethics.  Compelled  to 
retire  from  his  fellowship  because  of  intended  marriage, 
he  accepted  a  rectorship  in  the  Church  of  England,  and 
later  held  several  important  preferments,  though  on  account 
of  comparatively  latitudinarian  views  he  failed  to  attain 
to  the  highest  ecclesiastical  honors.  He  was  a  very 
successful  lecturer  and  author.  Some  of  his  works  are 
theological. 

Works.  —  Paley's  philosophical  writings  are  :  "  The 
Principles  of  Moral  and  Political  Philosophy"  (1785); 
"  Natural  Theology,  or  Evidence  of  the  Existence  and 
Attributes  of  the  Deity,  collected  from  the  Appearances 
of  Nature"  (1802). 

Philosophy.  —  Paley's  entire  "philosophy"  comprises 
three  divisions,  occupied  with  the  "  evidences  of  natural 
religion,  the  evidences  of  revealed  religion,  and  an  account 
of  the  duties  that  result  from  both."  We  are  here  con- 
cerned only  with  the  first  and  the  last  of  the  three.  In 

1  "English  Thought  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,"  by  Leslie 
Stephen  ;  "  Encyclopaedia  Britannica." 


1 88        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  Natural  Theology  Paley  "  proves "  the  existence  of 
God  from  the  appearances  of  design  and  contrivance 
in  nature.  Among  the  instances  he  notes  of  apparent 
design  are  the  following  :  the  "  pivot  upon  which  the  head 
turns,  the  ligament  within  the  socket  of  the  hip-joint,  the 
pulley,  or  trochlean  muscles,  of  the  eye,  the  course  of 
the  chyle  into  the  blood,  ...  the  constitution  of  the 
sexes  as  extended  throughout  the  whole  animal  creation." 
Moral  philosophy  is  directly  connected  with  theology ; 
through  the  assumption,  that  is  to  say,  that  the  promise 
of  future  rewards  and  punishments  is  a  necessary  sanction 
of  duty.  The  end  and  criterion  of  virtue  is  happiness : 
"  Virtue  is  the  doing  good  to  mankind,  in  obedience  to 
the  will  of  God,  and  for  the  sake  of  everlasting  happiness." 
The  will  of  God  is  the  "rule,"  as  happiness  is  the  end, 
of  action.  Paley,  of  course,  denies  the  existence  of  a 
"  moral  sense  "  and  of  eternal,  intuitively  perceived  prin- 
ciples of  right.  "  Obligation,"  he  says,  "  is  a  violent  mo- 
tive resulting  from  the  command  of  another."  —  Paley 
is  to  be  regarded  as  a  forerunner  of  the  Nineteenth  Cen- 
tury Utilitarians. 

§  71- 

David  Hume1  (1711-1776).  David  Hume  was  born 
in  Edinburgh.  By  the  anxious  care  of  his  mother,  —  his 
father  having  died  when  Hume  was  an  infant,  —  he  was 
given  a  good  education,  which  included  a  partial  course 
in  the  University  of  Edinburgh.  He  left  the  university 
with  strong  literary  tastes  and  inclinations;  and  when 
afterwards  he  was  supposed  by  his  friends  to  be  digging 
into  books  of  law,  he  was,  as  he  says,  "  secretly  devouring 
Cicero  and  Virgil !  "  Though  his  mother  thought  "  Davie 
a  fine,  good-natured  creatur,  but  uncommon  wake-minded," 
his  mind  seems  to  have  been  sufficiently  active  in  its 

1  Hume's  "  Treatise  of  Human  Nature  ;  "  Green's  "  Introduc- 
tions "  to  Hume;  "Hume,"  by  Professor  Knight  ("  Blackwood's 
Philosophical  Classics") ;  Huxley's  "  Hume/'  etc. 


HUME.  1 89 

own  way.  An  interval  of  several  years  spent  at  home, 
after  a  practical  failure  at  "  law,"  was  followed  by  another 
practical  failure  at  "business."  In  1734,  for  economy's 
sake,  he  went  to  France  to  live,  resolved  on  pursuing  a 
literary  career  and  winning  a  real  literary  fame.  During 
the  following  ten  years,  only  three  of  which  were  spent 
abroad,  he  finished  a  philosophical  treatise  (his  master- 
piece), which  had  been  begun  before  he  left  Scotland, 
and  wrote  a  volume  of  essays.  In  1 746  he  accepted  the 
position  of  secretary  to  General  St.  Clair,  who  was  sent 
out  on  an  expedition ;  and  in  1 748,  a  similar  position  with 
General  St.  Clair,  when  he  went  as  ambassador  to  Turin 
and  Vienna.  Between  the  years  1751  and  1763  Hume 
was  at  Edinburgh,  courting  (successfully)  fame  as  a  his- 
torian, want  of  acknowledged  success  in  philosophy  having 
put  a  damper  on  his  ambition  as  a  philosophical  writer. 
He  held  at  the  same  time  the  position  of  librarian  to  the 
Faculty  of  Advocates  in  Edinburgh.  For  three  years 
(1763-1766)  he  was  secretary  to  an  embassy  to  France, 
and  for  two  Under-Secretary  of  State.  He  had  in  the 
mean  time  acquired  a  good  property,  bearing  (together 
with  a  pension)  an  income  of  ^1,000  a  year,  and  he 
determined  to  spend  the  remainder  of  his  life  (after 
1769)  in  leisure  and  ease.  He  died  in  1776.  A  certain 
gayety  of  disposition  characteristic  of  him  seems  to  have 
been  even  more  marked  than  ever  before,  when,  for  some 

rt     time  previous  to  his  death,  he  was  perfectly  aware  of  his 

-I     approaching  dissolution. 

k  Works.  —  Hume's  chief  philosophical  works  are  :  "  A 
eatise  of  Human  Nature,  being  an  Attempt  to  Intro- 
ice  the  Experimental  Method  of  Reasoning  into  Moral 
Subjects  (three  Books :  I.  Of  the  Understanding ;  II.  Of 
the  Passions;  III.  Of  Morals)  "  (1739-1740)  ;  "Essays, 
Moral,  Political,  Literary"  (1742)  ;  "  Enquiry  Concerning 
Human  Understanding"  (Book  I.  of  the  "Treatise"  re- 
vised for  literary  purposes,  1748)  ;  "Enquiry  Concerning 
the  Principles  of  Morals"  (a  revision  of  Book  III.  of 


190        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERtf  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  "  Treatise,"  and  regarded  by  Hume  as  his  best  work, 
1751);  "Political  Discourses"  (1752);  "The  Natural 
History  of  Religion"  (1757);  "Dialogues  Concerning 
Natural  Religion"  (1779).  Hume's  philosophical  master- 
piece is  the  "  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,"  —  his  earliest 
work.  Perhaps  next  to  this  in  value  are  the  "  Dialogues 
on  Natural  Religion "  and  the  "  Natural  History  of 
Religion." 

Philosophy :  The  Importance  and  the  Method  of  the 
Science  of  Human  Nature.  —  The  only  hope,  says  Hume, 
by  way  of  introduction  to  his  system,  for  success  in  philo- 
sophical investigation  is  to  take  as  the  beginning  and  basis 
of  all  knowledge  the  knowledge  of  human  nature  :  "  There 
is  no  epiesttou  of  importance  wHbse~decistoir  is  not  com- 
prised in  the  science  of  man,  and  there  is  none  which  can 
be  decided  with  any  certainty  before  we  become  acquainted 
with  that  science."  And  as  this  science  is  the  only  solid 
foundation  for  other  sciences,  so  the  only  solid  foundation 
we  can  give  to  this  science  itself  must  be  laid  in  expe- 
rience and  observation.  The  method  of  experience,  or 
experiment  and  observation,  as  applied  to  human  nature, 
has  indeed  its  limitations,  since  reflection  and  premedita- 
tion must  so  disturb  the  operations  of  nature  in  the  mind 
as  to  render  it  impossible  to  "  form  any  just  conclusion 
from  the  phenomena;"  but  by  a  cautious  observation 
of  human  life  we  may  learn  experiments  enough  and  of  the 
proper  sort  to  establish  a  science  of  human  nature. 

I.  The  Understanding:  Origin  of  our  Ideas.  —  All  per- 
ceptions of  the  human  mind  may  be  resolved  into  two 
kinds,  differing  merely  in  degree  of  "  force  and  liveliness." 
The  more  forcible  and  lively  may  be  termed  "  impres- 
sions ;  "  the  less,  "  ideas."  The  latter  are  simply  "  faint 
images"  of  the  former.  Our  perceptions  may  also  be 
divided  into  simple  and  complex.  All  simple  ideas  are 
derived  from  simple  impressions,  which  they  exactly  repre- 
sent. Impressions  are  of  two  sorts :  impressions  of  sensa- 
tion and  impressions  of  reflection.  The  origin  of  the 


HUME.  IQI 

first-named  sort  is  unknown.  The  second  sort  originate 
largely  from  our  "  ideas  (or  copies  of  first  impressions) 
returning  upon  the  soul."  The  theory  of  impressions  of 
sensation  is  a  part  of  anatomy  and  natural  philosophy, 
rather  than  of  a  philosophy  of  mind,  which  begins,  prop- 
erly, with  the  theory  of  ideas.  Now,  "  ideas,"  or  "  impres- 
sions returning  upon  the  soul,"  are  by  the  degree  of  their 
vivacity  either  perfect  ideas,  or  are  intermediate  in  char- 
acter between  a  pure  impression  and  a  pure  idea.  In  the 
latter  case  they  are  an  idea  of  memory ;  in  the  former,  are 
ideas  of  imagination.  By  the  faculty  of  imagination,  but 
not  by  memory,  ideas  are  given  a  different  order  and 
combination  from  that  which  impressions  have.  The 
principles  of  "  union  and  cohesion  "  among  simple  ideas 
in  the  imagination  are  resemblance,  contiguity  in  time 
and  place,  cause  and  effect.  From  the  union  of  simple 
ideas  result  complex  ideas,  which  may  be  classed  as  rela- 
tions, mooes,  and  substances.  Ideas  of  substances  are  and 
can  be  only  ideas  of  collections  of  particular  qualities. 
If  substance  were  not  merely  a  collection  of  qualities,  the 
idea  of  it  must  be  derived  from  an  impression  of  sensa- 
tion or  an  impression  of  reflection.  In  the  former  case, 
it  must  be  a  color,  sound,  taste,  smell,  etc.,  which  certainly 
it  is  not;  in  the  latter,  it  must  be  a  passion  or  emotion, 
which  also  it  is  not.  What  is  true  of  substance  in  these 
respects  is  true  also  of  modes,  which  are  merely  groups 
of  qualities  "  dispersed  among  different  subjects."  To 
Hume's  account  of  the  idea  of  substance  we  may  append 
his  doctrine  of  abstract  ideas  (which  is  substantially  the 
same  as  that  of  Berkeley).  The  abstract  or  general  idea, 
says  Hume,  is  "  merely  the  particular  annexed  to  a  certain 
term,"  "  which  gives  it  more  extensive  signification."  This 
must  be  so ;  for  it  is  "  utterly  impossible  to  conceive  any 
quality  or  quantity  without  forming  any  precise  notion 
of  its  degrees,"  since  "  abstract  ideas  must  be  copies  of  im- 
pressions, which  are  always  definite,  both  in  quantity  and 
in  quality."  The  general  term  always  suggests  the  ideas 


IQ2        A  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  certain  individuals,  together  with  less  definite  ideas  of 
others.  The  mind  really  adds  nothing  to  what  is  impressed 
upon  it.  Relations  are  philosophical  or  natural :  philo- 
sophical when  the  results  of  voluntary  comparison,  other- 
wise natural.  The  philosophical  relations  are  resemblance, 
proportion  in  quantity  and  number,  degrees  in  quality, 
contrariety,  identity,  relations  of  time  and  place,  causation. 
These  may  be  divided  into  two  different  classes,  according 
as  they  either  depend  merely  on  the  ideas  compared  (as 
do  the  first  four  mentioned),  or  do  not  so  depend  (as  do 
the  last  three).  Only  relations  of  the  former  sort  are  self- 
evident  objects  of  "  certainty  and  knowledge."  The  other 
relations  require  further  attention. 

The  Ideas  of  Space  and  Time,  Number,  Existence,  and 
External  Existence.  —  The  idea  of  space  can  originate 
only  in  an  external  impression,  since  it  cannot  be  identified 
in  any  manner  with  passions,  emotions,  desires,  or  aver- 
sions. The  only  external  impressions  from  which  the  idea 
of  space  or  extension  can  possibly  arise  are  "impressions 
of  colored  points  disposed  in  a  certain  manner ;  "  the 
"  idea  of  extension  is  nothing  but  a  copy  of  those  colored 
points  and  the  manner  of  their  appearance."  The  pure 
idea  of  extension  depends  upon  an  act  of  comparison  and 
abstraction ;  but  this  adds  nothing  to  what  is  given  in 
the  impression  as  such.  The  idea  of  time  comes  to  us 
from  the  succession  of  our  ideas  and  impressions.  And 
"  time  cannot  make .  its  appearance  to  the  mind  either 
alone  or  attended  with  a  steady,  unchangeable  object ;  " 
it  is  not  distinguishable,  and  hence  not  separable  from 
particular  impressions,  arising  altogether  from  the  manner 
in  which  impressions  appear  to  the  mind.  That  the  ideas 
of  space  and  time  originate  in  the  senses  is  absolutely 
proved  by  the  fact  that  space  and  time  become  contradic- 
tions if  not  conceived  as  merely  made  up  of  indivisible  and 
in  themselves  perceivable  parts ;  for  how  should  extension 
or  duration  be  composed  of  merely  mathematical  points 
so  called?  It  follows  from  the  sensible  character  of  our 


HUME.  193 

ideas  of  space  and  time  that  mathematical  conceptions  and 
judgments,  though  sometimes  infallible,  are  not  always  so. 
Vagueness  generally  attaches  to  the  notions  greater,  less, 
equal,  curved,  straight,  plane,  etc.,  in  any  real  relation. 
From  the  "  loose  "  and  "  indeterminate  ideas  "  of  sense 
and  imagination,  it  is  impossible  to  derive  those  which 
shall  be  exact.  Beyond  a  "  certain  degree  of  minuteness," 
all  geometrical  demonstration  is  necessarily  fallacious.  At 
most,  geometrical  reasoning  —  mathematics  in  general  — 
is  only  highly  probable.  From  the  foregoing  notion  of 
space,  it  also  follows  "that  we  can  form  no  idea  of  a 
vacuum,  or  space  where  there  is  nothing  visible  or  tan- 
gible." Whether  there  be  a  vacuum  independent  of  sensa- 
tion, or  what  either  it  or  bodies  would  be  independently 
of  sensation,  it  is  useless  to  inquire ;  we  can  have  no 
ideas  of  such,  since  no  ideas  can  possibly  exist  for  us  not 
having  or  betraying  a  sensible  character.  What  has  been 
affirmed  of  the  ideas  of  space  and  time  as  inseparable 
from  sensible  qualities,  applies  also  to  the  idea  of  exist- 
ence :  the  idea  of  existence  is  the  very  same  with  the 
"  idea  which  we  conceive  to  be  existent."  The  idea  of 
existence  makes,  when  conjoined  with  the  idea  of  any 
object,  no  addition  to  it.  There  is  no  distinct  impression 
from  which  the  idea  of  existence  arises.  The  same  is  true 
of  the  idea  of  external  existence  :  we  have  no  idea  of  any 
sort  of  existence  out  of  relation  to  our  perceptions.  "  Let 
us  chase  our  imagination  to  the  heavens  or  to  the  utmost 
limits  of  the  universe,  we  never  really  advance  a  step 
beyond  ourselves,  nor  can  conceive  any  kind  of  existence 
but  those  perceptions  which  have  appeared  in  that  narrow 
compass.  This  is  the  universe  of  the  imagination,  nor 
have  we  any  idea  but  what  is  there  produced." 

The  Relation  of  Cause  and  Effect.  —  The  relation  of 
cause  and  effect  presents  (as  compared  with  the  other 
natural  relations,  identity  and  situation  in  time  or  place) 
the  peculiarity  that  it  takes  us  beyond  what  is  immediately 
present  in  perception,  and  informs  of  objects  which  we  do 
VOL.  i.  —  13 


194        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

not  see  or  feel.  The  origin  and  validity  of  this  idea  is  a 
matter  of  peculiar  -importance.  The  idea__of__cause  and 
effect  cannot  have  its  origin  in  any  particular  qualities, 
since  therejs_jiQtMnge3d^tent,  either~externally  or  inter- 
nally, which  may  notbe  regarded  as  a  cause  or  an  effect. 
What  is  the  relation  among  objects  from  which  this  idea  is 
derived?  Why  do  we  pronounce  it  necessary  that  every- 
thing whose  existence  has  a  beginning  should  also  have  a 
cause?  Why  must  particular  causes  have  particular  effects? 
What  is  the  nature  of  the  inference  we  draw  from  one  to 
another,  and  of  the  belief  we  repose  in  that  inference?  It  is 
not  absolutely  certain  that  whatever  exists  must  have  a  cause. 
Absolute  certainty  in  knowledge  arises  only  from  compari- 
son of  ideas.  But  no  one  of  the  relations  based  on  com- 
parison —  i.  e.,  resemblance,  proportion  in  quantity,  degree, 
or  contrariety  —  suggests  the  idea  that  whatever  exists  has 
a  cause.  There  is,  further,  no  necessity,  in  the  mere  idea  of 
cause,  of  our  conceiving  that  of  effect,  and  there  is  in  reality 
no  reason  why  an  object,  non-existent  at  this  moment,  may 
not  be  existent  at  the  next,  without  a  cause  or  productive 
principle.  In  answer  to  the  possible  objection  that  "  every- 
thing must  have  a  cause,  for  if  anything  want  a  cause  it 
must  produce  itself,  /.  e.,  exist  before  it  existed,"  it  is  to  be 
said  that  this  objection  begs  the  question,  since  to  say  that 
a  thing  is  "produced,"  or,  rather,  comes  into  existence 
without  a  cause,  is  not  to  affirm  that  it  is  its  own  cause,  but 
to  deny  it.  In  reply  to  the  objection  that  "  whatever  is 
produced  without  a  cause  must  be  produced  by  nothing, 
which  is  impossible,"  it  is  to  be  said  that  this  also  begs  the 
question,  since  the  very  point  in  question  is  whether  every- 
thing must  have  a  cause  or  not.  The  idea  that  everything 
must  have  a  cause  is  evidently  not  a  product  of  demon- 
stration or  scientific  reasoning ;  and  hence,  if  it  exist,  must 
be  a  result  of  observation  and  experience.  All  our  argu- 
ments, concerning  causes  and  effects,  consist  of  both  an 
impression  of  the  memory  or  senses,  and  of  the  idea  of  that 
existence  which  produces  the  object  of  the  impression  or  is 


HUME.  195 

produced  by  it.  Now,  there  is  no  object  which  implies  the 
existence  of  any  other,  if  we  consider  these  objects  merely 
in  themselves,  and  never  look  beyond  the  ideas  which  we 
form  of  them.  We  infer  the  existence  of  one  object  from . 
that  of  another  only  through  habit  or  experience.  "  Thus, 
we  remember  to  have  seen  that  species  of  object  which  we 
call  flame,  and  to  have  felt  that  species  of  sensation  which 
we  call  heat ;  we  likewise  call  to  mind  their  constant  con- 
junction in  past  instances ;  we  therefore  call  one  a  cause, 
and  the  other  the  effect."  But  there  remains  unexplained 
the  idea  of  necessary  connection  (between  "  cause  "  and 
"effect ").  This  idea  is  not  a  necessary  one,  since  we  can 
at  least  conceive  a  change  in  the  course  of  nature  :  it  must 
rest  upon  association  of  perceptions ;  we  have,  in  fact,  "  no 
other  notion  of  cause  and  effect  but  that  of  certain  objects 
which  have  been  conjoined  together  habitually  in  past 
experience."  By  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect  we  not 
only  pass  beyond  our  present  perception  to  an  idea  of  an 
object  not  present,  but  to  the  idea  of  an  object  of  belief  or 
of  a  matter  of  fact  so-called,  and  hence  an  idea  having  the 
vivacity  of  a  present  perception,  or  an  impression.  The 
vivacity  of  this  idea  —  of  which  (the  vivacity)  our  belief 
is  a  consequence  —  depends  upon  the  rule,  that  "  when  an 
impression  becomes  present  to  us,  it  not  only  transports 
the  mind  to  such  ideas  as  are  related  to  it,  but  also  com- 
municates to  them  a  share  of  its  force  and  vivacity."  The 
communicated  force  and  vivacity  are  all  the  stronger  when 
the  impression  is  one  that  has  been  repeatedly  conjoined  in 
our  minds  with  the  idea  to  which  it  gives  rise,  and  com- 
municates a  share  of  its  vivacity.  From  the  foregoing  it 
follows  that  all  reasoning  by  the  principle  of  cause  and 
effect  —  all  probable  reasoning  —  is  a  species  of  sensation. 
"  All  reasonings  are  but  the  effects  of  custom,  and  custom 
has  no  influence  but  by  enlivening  the  imagination  and  giv- 
ing us  a  strong  conception  of  any  object."  In  answer  to 
the  objection,  that  the  relations  of  resemblance  and  con- 
tiguity also  augment  the  force  and  vivacity  of  our  ideas,  — 


196        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

it  may  be  admitted  that  besides  mere  force  and  vivacity, 
there  is  necessary  for  the  production  of  belief,  the  concep- 
tion of  an  order  or  a  system  among  our  ideas,  of  past  and 
present  objects,  —  an  order  necessitating  the  particular  man- 
ner of  our  thinking  or  judging  as  the  manner  of  our  receiv- 
ing impressions  is  necessitated.  Nevertheless,  the  only  ideas 
really  involved  in  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect  are  those 
of  contiguity,  succession,  and  constant  conjunction ;  and  the 
idea  of  necessary  connection  is  purely  subjective,  having  its 
only  ground  in  "  that  propensity  which  custom  produces 
in  us,  to  pass  in  thought  from  one  object  to  its  usual  atten- 
dant." As  a  result  of  the  foregoing  investigations  we  have 
the  following  definition  of  cause :  "  A  cause  is  an  object 
precedent  and  contiguous  to  another,  and  where  all  objects 
resembling  the  former  are  placed  in  like  relations  of  pre- 
cedency and  contiguity  to  those  that  resemble  the  latter," 
or  (more  subjectively  viewed)  "  an  object  precedent  and 
contiguous  to  another,  and  so  united  with  it  that  the  idea 
of  the  one  determines  the  mind  to  form  the  idea  of  the 
other,  and  the  impression  of  the  one  to  'form  a  more  lively 
idea  of  the  other." 

"  The  Relation  of  Identity: "  Objective  Existence.  —  If  all 
knowledge  is  mere  belief  occasioned  by  a  peculiar  asso- 
ciation of  ideas,  it  is  necessary  to  discover  for  the  apparent 
continued  existence  and  identity  of  objects,  external  and 
internal,  an  explanation  which  does  not  assume  their  real 
continuance  and  identity.  This  identity  corresponds  to 
nothing  that  the  senses  present  to  us,  for  neither  a  single 
object  nor  a  multiplicity  of  objects  of  sense  contains 
the  notion.  It  is  a  "  pure  fiction  of  the  imagination," 
which  is  given  reality  by  the  idea  of  duration,  and  the 
resemblance  of  perceptions,  and  a  succession  of  related 
objects,  "  considered  with  the  same  uninterrupted  progress 
of  the  imagination  as  attends  the  view  of  the  same  inva- 
riable object."  The  propensity  of  the  mind  to  "  feign  "  this 
identity  is  so  strong  as  to  multiply  the  perception  of  the 
obvious  fact  of  the  distinguishedness,  and  hence  separate- 


HUME.  197 

ness,  of  our  perceptions.  In  reality  there  is  no  such  thing 
as  identity,  either  in  the  "  external  world  "  or  in  ourselves : 
all  that  we  can  know  is  merely  "  bundles  of  perceptions," 
which  we  and  the  "  external  world "  merely  are.  This 
sceptical  conclusion,  though  of  course  opposed  to  ail 
dogmatism,  is  not  utterly  destructive  of  belief,  — it  has  no 
real  power  against  that  "  instinct  of  reason  "  which  makes 
us  believe  in  the  reality  of  ourselves  and  the  external 
world ;  and  hence  does  not  deprive  morality  and  religion 
of  all  real  basis  in  truth. 

II.  The  Passions.  — By  "Passions  "  Hume  seems  to  mean 
"  impressions  of  reflection  "  regarded  as  feeling.  Passions 
differ  fundamentally,  as  involving  either  of  the  two  primary 
feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain.  They  may  also  be  distin- 
guished as  calm  (as  the  "  sense  of  beauty,  of  deformity  in 
action,  of  composition"  of  external  objects),  and  violent 
(as  love  and  hate,  joy  and  grief,  humility  and  pride).  They 
may  be  distinguished  as  simple,  compound,  and  complex. 
They  may,  again,  be  distinguished  as  direct  and  indirect, 
the  former  being  such  as  "arise  immediately  from  good 
and  evil,  pleasure  and  pain,"  the  latter  such  as  "  proceed 
from  these  by  conjunction  with  other  ideas,  viz.,  the  ideas 
of  self  or  of  other  persons."  It  is  necessary  to  distinguish 
between  the  cause  and  the  object  of  the  passion,  and  be- 
tween the  quality  and  the  subject  of  the  quality  or  the 
cause  of  the  passion.  A  general  law  of  passion  is  that 
there  is  a  definite  ratio  between  the  relation  of  object  and 
cause  of  passion  to  that  between  passion  itself  and  the 
sensation  produced  by  the  cause,  considered  merely  in  itself. 
Passion  has  three  branches :  ( i )  pride  and  humility,  — 
passions  the  object  of  which  is  self;  (2)  love  and  hatred, 
—  passions  the  object  of  which  is  another;  (3)  will  and 
the  direct  passions.  Concerned  more  or  less  in  all  other 
passions  is  the  passion  of  sympathy.  Pride  and  humility 
are,  respectively,  pleasurable  and  painful.  Their  causes  are 
"  every  valuable  quality  of  mind  and  body,  and  every  pos- 
session and  relation."  Lo^e  and  hatred  are,  respectively, 


1 98        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

pleasurable  and  painful.  Their  causes  are  various,  but  are 
always,  directly  or  indirectly,  thinking  beings.  Love  at- 
tended by  appetite  is  benevolence  ;  hatred,  so  attended,  is 
anger.  Benevolence  implies  a  "desire  of  another's  pleas- 
ure, and  aversion  of  his  pain."  Love  and  humility  together 
constitute  the  compound  passion,  respect.  The  will  is  in- 
definable, except  as  the  "  internal  impression  we  feel  and 
are  conscious  of  when  we  knowingly  give  rise  to  any  new 
motion  of  our  body  or  new  perception  of  our  mind." 
There  is  no  liberty  of  the  will.  Belief  that  there  is,  is 
merely  a  consequence  of  (i)  a  confusion  between  sponta- 
neity, or  that  which  is  opposed  to  violence,  and  indifference, 
or  negation  of  necessity  and  causes;  (2)  a  false  sensation, 
or  experience  of  the  liberty  of  indifference;  (3)  religious 
prejudice.  The  will  is  moved  only  by  the  prospect  of 
pleasure  or  of  pain  :  reason  or  understanding  alone  neither 
causes  nor  prevents  volition,  and  it  merely  "  guides  "  the 
will.  "  Reason  is,  and  ought  only  to  be,  the  slave  of  the 
passions,  and  can  never  pretend  to  any  other  office  than  to 
serve  them."  There  is  in  reality  no  conflict  between  reason 
and  the  passions  in  relation  to  the  will.  The  supposition 

that  reason  influences  the  will  is  due  to  a  misconception 

K 

of  certain  passions,  such  as  benevolence,  resentment,  love  of 
life,  which  "produce  but  little  emotion  in  the  mind."  They 
determine  the  will ;  reason  does  not.  Passions  move  the 
will,  not  merely  by  their  violence,  or  strength,  —  and  not 
always  in  proportion  to  that,  —  but  also  by  their  perma- 
nence and  habitualness.  It  is  a  law  of  the  passions  that 
they  affect  one  another  by  association,  and  that  they  are 
greatly  affected  by  custom  and  repetition.  Custom  begets 
a  "  facility  in  the  performance  of  any  action  and  an  inclina- 
tion towards  it :  "  and  "  from  these  we  may  account  for  all 
its  other  effects,  however  extraordinary."  The  imagination, 
by  its  power  of  enlivening  our  ideas,  has  great  influence 
upon  the  passions,  and  hence  upon  the  movement  of  the 
will.  Of  the  "direct  passions,"  —  desire  and  aversion,  joy 
and  grief,  hope  and  fear, — only'the  last  two  require  special 


HUME.  199 

attention.  They  imply  uncertainty  (of  expectation)  :  and 
are  different  mixtures  of  joy  and  grief  with  different  degrees 
of  the  ingredient  of  uncertainty.  Curiosity,  or  the  love  of 
truth,  is  not  a  desire  of  truth  merely  on  its  own  account, 
but  as  possessing  a  certain  utility,  and  capable  of  arousing 
in  us  sympathy  with  others. 

III.  Morals.  —  The  moral  quality  of  actions  is  to  be 
found  not  in  any  merely  intellectual  perception  of  relations, 
or  act  of  reason,  that  may  precede  and  determine  them 
(since  reason  does  not  influence  the  will),  but  in  the  nature 
of  an  impulse  produced  by  a  feeling  of  pleasure  or  pain  ac- 
companying the  idea  of  an  object.  Our  decisions  regard- 
ing moral  rectitude  are  "  perceptions  :  "  morality  is  more 
"  properly  felt  than  judged  of,"  though  this  feeling  is  so 
"  soft  and  gentle  that  we  are  apt  to  confound  it  with  an 
idea."  "To  have  a  sense  of  virtue"  is  merely  to  "feel  a 
satisfaction"  of  a  particular  kind  from  the  contemplation  of 
character :  to  have  a  "  sense  of  vice  "  is  to  "  feel  uneasiness 
in  the  same  case."  The  sense  of  virtue  may  be  natural 
or  artificial  (/.  e.,  produced  by  "  experience  ").  All  virtuous 
actions  derive  their  merit  only  from  virtuous  motives.  The 
virtuous  motive  can  never  be  a  regard  to  the  virtue  of  the 
action  :  to  affirm  that  it  could,  would  be  to  argue  in  a 
circle.  Neither  self-love  nor  the  love  of  mankind  can  be 
the  principle  of  virtuous  motivation,  since  the  first  is  the 
source  of  all  injustice  and  violence,  and  the  second  does 
not  really  exist.  An  action  is  virtuous  which  gives  pleasure 
to  a  disinterested  observer,  the  approbation  or  disapproba- 
tion of  the  observer  depending  upon  the  exercise  of  sympa- 
thy, which,  therefore,  is  a  chief  source  of  moral  distinction. 
Of  the  virtues,  justice  is  to  be  regarded  as  artificial.  The 
foundation  of  it  is  partly  self-interest,  partly  also  "  morality," 
or  the  "  pleasure  received  from  the  view  of  such  actions  as 
tend  to  the  peace  of  society,  and  an  uneasiness  from  such 
actions  as  are  contrary  to  it,"  —  a  disposition  depending 
upon  the  force  of  public  opinion  and  on  private  edu- 
cation. Of  the  natural  virtues  some  have  their  peculiar 


200        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

merit  in  their  being  agreeable  to  their  possessors ;  others  in 
their  being  so  to  other  persons.  Among  the  virtues  whose 
peculiar  merit  consists  in  their  usefulness  to  others  than 
their  possessors  are  modesty  and  benevolence.  The  merit 
of  love  is  in  its  agreeableness  to  one's  self,  etc.  Besides 
the  virtues  usually  so  termed,  there  are  certain  "  natural 
abilities,"  which,  as  procuring  for  us  the  love  and  esteem  of 
mankind,  may  be  regarded  as,  in  an  important  sense,  virtues. 
In  most  of  the  virtues  are  to  be  found  all  the  conditions 
requisite  for  the  operation  of  sympathy,  which  is,  without 
doubt,  the  chief  source  of  moral  distinctions. 

IV.  Religion. — According  to  Hume's  own  confession  (as 
we  have  seen)  the  sceptical  conclusions  of  his  theory  of 
knowledge  were  in  some  respects  unsatisfactory;  and  he 
preferred  to  think  that  while  he  had  confuted  mere  dog- 
matism, he  had  left  room  for  faith  or  belief  regarding  pos- 
sible objects  transcending  experience,  rather  than  to  feel 
that  he  had  upheld  absolute  scepticism  in  that  regard. 
Accordingly,  he  shows  an  inclination  —  as  Kant  did,  after 
him  —  to  look  with  favor  upon  the  ideological  argument 
for  the  being  of  a  God ;  though  he  points  out  that  that 
argument  could  only  establish  the  existence  of  a  Creator 
who,  though  he  might  be  all-benevolent,  could  not,  in  view 
of  the  imperfection  of  the  created  world,  be  conceived  as 
all-powerful.  In  a  purely  scientific  point  of  view,  neither 
the  world  of  matter  nor  that  of  mind  furnishes  any  warrant 
for  our  going  beyond  experience ;  and  there  would  be  no 
warrant  for  our  stopping  short  of  infinity  itself  in  our  re- 
gressive search  for  a  cause  of  the  world,  if  once  we  should 
step  beyond  the  bounds  of  experience.  Theoretically,  the 
"  whole  matter  of  religion  is  a  riddle,  an  enigma,  an  inexpli- 
cable mystery ;  "  morally,  there  must  be  something  in  it. 

Result.  —  In  the  doctrine  of  Hume  we  have  empiricism 
resulting  in  scepticism.  Hume  simply  carries  farther  the 
theory  of  Ix>cke  as  it  left  the  hands  of  Berkeley.  On  the 
principle  of  pure  empiricism,  mind  and  God  as  well  as 
matter  are  nothing  real.  Hume  is  justified  in  calling  the 


LEIBNITZ.  201 

object  of  knowledge  only  a  bundle  of  merely  individual 
"perceptions,"  if  there  is  no  bond  between  phenomena 
except  what  is  given  in  sense  as  such.  Is  there  no  other 
bond  ;  does  the  "  mind  "  of  itself  contribute  nothing  towards 
knowledge  ?  And  does  not  its  contribution  objectify  that  of 
sense?  The  suggestion  of  this  question  seems  to  be  the 
chief  service  to  philosophy  of  Hume's  teaching.  The  at- 
tempt (by  Reid,  Kant,  and  others)  to  answer  it  constitutes 
the  beginning  of  a  new  epoch  in  the  history  of  philosophy. 

§  72- 

Gottfried  Wilhelm  Leibnitz*  (1646-1716).  —  Leibnitz, 
who  was  a  son  of  a  professor  in  the  University  of  Leipsic, 
where  he  was  born,  attended  school  in  Leipsic  and  the 
universities  of  Leipsic  and  Jena.  He  became  an  omnivor- 
ous reader  in  his  father's  library,  and  acquired  even  before 
entering  the  university  at  the  age  of  fifteen,  a  large  ac- 
quaintance with  ancient  authors,  the  Scholastics,  and  the 
writings  of  the  Protestant  theologians.  At  the  same  time 
with  his  reading,  he  disciplined  himself  in  habits  of 
logical  thinking  and  going  to  the  roots  and  principles  of 
things.  At  the  universities  he  gave  particular  attention 
to  the  study  of  law,  mathematics,  and  philosophy.  Declin- 
ing a  professorship  offered  him  at  Altorf,  he  took  up  juris- 
prudence, and  soon  gained  a  recognition  which  secured  him 
favor  and  high  trust.  He  was  sent  (1692)  by  the  Elector 
of  Mainz  on  an  embassy  to  the  court  of  Louis  XIV.  and  on 
a  mission  to  London.  At  Paris  and  London  he  made  the 
acquaintance  of  a  number  of  men  eminent  in  science  and 
philosophy,  —  Huyghens,  the  Dutch  mathematician  ;  Ar- 
nauld,  the  Cartesian  ;  Newton ;  the  English  physicist  Boyle  ; 
Oldenburg,  the  secretary  of  the  Royal  Society.  On  his  way 
between  Paris  and  London  he  tarried  to  see  Spinoza,  of 
whom  Oldenburg  was  a  close  friend.  At  the  same  time  he 

1  Works  of  Leibnitz;  Zeller's  "Geschichte  der  Neuern  Philo- 
sophic;" Ueberweg,  "  History  of  Philosophy;"  Erdmann;  Noack  ; 
"  Encyclopaedia  Britannica." 


2O2        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

is  said  to  have  carried  on  very  actively  his  studies  in  science 
and  philosophy,  and  was  "  able  to  announce  an  imposing  list 
of  discoveries  and  plans  for  discoveries  arrived  at  by  means 
of  a  new  logical  art,  in  natural  philosophy,  mathematics, 
mechanics,  optics,  hydrostatics,  pneumatics,  and  nautical 
science,  besides  new  ideas  in  law,  theology,  and  politics, 
and  a  calculating  machine  for  multiplying,  dividing,  extract- 
ing roots,  as  well  as  adding  and  subtracting."1  In  1676  his 
discovery  of  the  Differential  Calculus  was  announced.  In  the 
same  year  he  became  librarian  of  the  ducal  library  at  Han- 
over, and  counsellor  to  the  court.  A  number  of  other  posi- 
tions of  distinction  were  held  by  him  :  he  was  appointed  privy 
councillor  of  justice  by  several  Governments,  among  them 
that  of  Russia,  first  president  (and  president  for  life)  of  the 
Berlin  Society  (after  1 744  Academy}  of  Science  ;  was  made 
by  Austria  Baron  of  the  Empire  and  Imperial  Privy  Coun- 
cillor, etc.  He  was  commissioned  by  each  of  the  Govern- 
ments of  Germany,  Russia,  and  Austria  to  plan  an  Academy 
of  Science.  His  last  years  were  embittered  by  controversy 
(with  Newtonians),  by  the  death  of  his  friend  and  favorite 
pupil,  Princess  Sophie  Charlotte,  of  the  house  of  Branden- 
burg, and  by  the  neglect  of  former  friends  and  patrons. 
Only  a  single  mourner,  it  is  reported,  followed  his  remains  to 
the  tomb ;  the  French  Academy  alone,  in  the  learned  and 
scientific  world,  took  cognizance  of  his  death.  Leibnitz  is 
frequently  placed  on  a  level  with  Aristotle  as  to  the  origi- 
nality and  catholicity  of  his  mind  and  attainments ;  and  the 
comparison  seems  just,  though  Leibnitz  hardly  bears  the 
same  relation  to  modern  philosophy  that  Aristotle  does  to 
the  ancient.  Personally,  he  is  said  to  have  been  frank, 
benevolent,  and  inclined  to  conciliate  favor. 

Works.  —  The  philosophical  works  of  Leibnitz  fall  natu- 
rally into  two  general  groups,  one  of  which  consists  of 
those  writings  suggesting  or  containing  the  exposition  of 
his  final  and  distinctive  doctrine,  and  the  other  of  writings, 
earlier  in  time,  and  expounding  positions  which  proved  to 

1  "  Encyclopaedia  Britannica,"  art.  Leibnitz. 


LEIBNITZ.  203 

be  merely  tentative  or  only  secondary  in  importance.  To 
the  latter  group  or  class  belong,  with  others  :  the  "  Disputatio 
metaphysica  de  Principio  Individui "  (1663),  Scholastic 
in  doctrine ;  "  Dissertatio  de  Arte  Combinatoria  "  (1666), 
a  logical  treatise  growing  out  of  the  study  of  Raymond 
Lullius;  "  De  Stilo  Philosophico  Nizolii "  (1670)  ;  "  Metho- 
dus  Nova  Docendae  Discendaeque  Jurisprudentiae,"  etc. 
(1669);  "  De  Vita  Beata ;  "  "  Meditationes  de  Cognitione, 
Veritate  et  Ideis"  (1684)  :  to  the  former  group  or  class 
belong,  "  Letters  to  Arnauld  "  (1671  and  1690)  ;  "Systeme 
Nouveau  de  la  Nature  et  de  la  Communication  des  Sub- 
stances" (1695);  "Nouveaux  Essais  sur  PEntendement 
Humain  "  (i  765),  which  were  ready  for  publication  in  1 704, 
but  (owing  to  the  occurrence,  soon  after,  of  the  death  of 
Locke,  in  reply  to  whose  "  Essay  Concerning  Human  Un- 
derstanding" they  were  composed)  were  not  then  published ; 
"  Essais  de  Th^odicde  sur  la  Bont£  de  Dieu,  la  Libert^  de 
1'Homme,  et  1'Origine  du  Mai"  (1710),  an  intended  reply 
to  the  sceptic  Bayle  ;  "  La  Monadologie,"  a  brief  epitome  of 
Leibnitz's  system ;  "  Principes  de  la  Nature  et  de  la 
Grace  "(1714?),  a  still  briefer  epitome  of  his  system ;  and 
Letters  to  Clarke  "SurDieu,  1'Ame,  1'Espace,  la  DureV 
(1715-1716). 

Leibnitz's  Earlier  Doctrines.  —  Leibnitz  (as  he  himself 
indicates  in  the  "Systeme  Nouveau  de  la  Nature,"  at  the 
beginning)  successively  occupied,  before  arriving  at  his 
final  standpoint,  positions  identical  with  or  nearly  akin  to 
those  of  certain  of  the  Scholastics,  of  Bacon,  of  Descartes,  of 
the  Atomists  (Democritus,  Gassendi),  and  of  Aristotle.  In 
the  "  De  Principio  Individui "  he  maintains  the  "  nominal- 
istic "  view  that  the  real  and  distinctive  character  of  a 
thing  is  to  be  found  in  that  thing  as  it  exists ;  that  what- 
ever exists  is  by  its  very  nature  as  existent  an  individual,  — 
as  opposed  to  the  "  realistic "  view  that  it  is  constituted 
by  a  principle,  positive  or  negative,  actually  separate  from 
the  thing  itself  as  existent.  It  appears,  however,  that  the 
nominalism  of  Leibnitz  was  of  the  moderate  sort  (first)  ad- 


2O4        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

vocated  by  Durand  de  St.  Pourcain,  of  the  fourteenth  cen- 
tury, who  held  the  universal  and  individual  to  be  the  very 
same  thing,  only  regarded  from  different  points  of  view,  the 
individual  being  the  thing  as  completely  determined.1  As 
far  as  it  goes,  this  position  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  final 
standpoint  of  Leibnitz.  In  the  "  De  Arte  combinatoria  " 
and  certain  other  works  the  more  modern,  mathematico- 
mechanical  view  makes  its  appearance :  knowledge  is 
treated  as  pure  calculation,  all  occult  qualities  and  powers, 
all  attributes,  in  fact,  that  are  supposed  incapable  of  a  mere- 
ly mechanical  explanation,  are  denied  to  bodies.  At  the 
same  time,  however,  more  importance  is  attached  to  the 
Aristotelian  than  to  the  Cartesian  physics.  It  should  be 
noted,  too,  that  the  nominalistic  and  anti-Aristotelian  view 
that  the  genus  is  merely  the  collective  totality  of  individ- 
uals is  criticised  as  undermining  demonstrative  (mathe- 
matically deductive)  science  as  opposed  to  induction,  — 
which  is  at  most  merely  probable  in  its  results.  Appended 
to  the  "  De  Arte  Combinatoria  "  is  an  attempted  mathe- 
matical proof  of  the  existence  of  God.  The  influence  of 
Bacon  is  especially  apparent  in  the  "  Methodus  nova 
Docendse  Discendaeque  Jurisprudentise, "  in  which,  after 
the  manner  of  the  "  De  Scientiarum  Augmentis  "  of  Lord 
Verulam,  is  given  a  survey  of  the  sciences  and  their  rela- 
tions, with  a  great  show  of  system,  with  the  use,  however, 
of  the  deductive  method.2  In  the  "  Meditationes  de  Cog- 
nitione,  Veritate  et  Ideis "  are  repeated,  developed,  and 
supplemented,  Descartes'  distinctions  regarding  ideas  as 
obscure  or  clear,  confused  or  distinct,  etc.  As,  however, 
Leibnitz's  views  on  this  subject  remained  unchanged, 
and  reappear  in  his  final  general  standpoint,  they  may 
be  passed  over  here.  In  the  "  Systeme  de  la  Nature " 
Leibnitz  confesses  that  in  his  dissatisfaction  with  Aristotle 
as  first  understood  by  him  he  adopted  the  conception  of 
the  atom  because  of  its  definiteness,  but  saw  later  that  no 
real  principle  of  unity  could  be  found  in  matter  alone,  and 

1  See  Ueberweg,  Erdmann,  etc.  2  Noack. 


LEIBNITZ. 

that  the  key  to  the  solution  of  the  difficulty  lay  in  the 
"substantial  forms,"  or  "first  entelechies,"  of  Aristotle. 
Thence  he  was  (through  the  influence  of  Bruno,  apparently) 
led  directly  to  the  notion  of  the  spiritual  atom,  or  the 
monad,  though  the  name  "  monad  "  was  not  made  use  of 
until  many  (nearly  thirty)  years  after  the  notion  was 
adopted  (i.e.,  not  till  about  1697).  Regarding  Leibnitz's 
attitude  towards  his  predecessors,  it  should  be  observed 
that,  to  employ  his  own  expression  (in  the  "Systeme  de  la 
Nature"),  he  "sought  to  reooncile  Plato  with  Democ- 
ritus,  Aristotle  with  Descartes,  the  Scholastics  with  the 
Moderns,  theology  and  morals  with  reason."  Leibnitz's 
philosophy  in  its  catholicity  and  conciliatory  character 
partakes  of  the  mind  and  disposition  of  its  author. 

Final  Standpoint :  Substance  and  the  Monad.  —  The  ulti- 
mate elements  of  being'  cannot,  according  to  Leibnitz,  be 
material  atoms/ since  whatever  is  material  is  extended,  com- 
posite, passive,  and  dependent,  —  lacking  in  a  real  principle 
of  unity,  and  incapable  of  action  or  the  exertion  of  force. 
/A  real  ultimate  principle  of  unity  and  activity  can  only  be 
an  immaterial  atom,  perfectly  simple,  self-determining,  and, 
since  the  only  notion  of  a  being  capable  of  action  is  that 
taken  from  the  idea  of  our  own  souls,  spiritual  in  nature 
This  spiritual  atom  (which,  seemingly  after  the  example  of 
Bruno,  ~LeiBnitz~ terms  the  Monad),  singly  or  in  combi- 
nation, is  substance,  or  the  sole  underlying  reality  of  the 
universe ;  all  else  is  phenomenal.  Substance  is  either 
simple  or  composite,  and  since  so-called  matter  is  infinitely 
divisible,  there  is  an  infinite  number  of  simple  substances 
or  monads.  As  simple,  the  monad  is  not  subject  to  nat- 
ural generation  and  decay,  as  material  bodies  are  ;  it  is  not 
created  nor  annihilated,  except  by  the  absolute  divine  will. 
Though,  as  simple,  it  is  without  parts,  the  monad  yet  has, 
for  otherwise  it  would  be  nothing  conceivable,  internal 
qualities  and  aspects  by  which  it  is  distinguished  from 
every  other  monad.  The  finite  monad,  as  finite,  is  ever 
changing ;  but  as  simple,  and  as  an  activity,  it  is  self- 


206        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY.    ' 

determining  and  changes  according  to  a  law,  is  a  subject 
of  development,  every  state  being  a  result  of  preceding 
states,  —  the  present  being  "pregnant  with  the  future." 
As  self-determining,  it  transcends  the  law  of  natural  action 
and  reaction;  its  relation  to  other  monads  is  merely  a 
representational  or  ideal  one.  /The  internal  actions  of  the 
monad  are,  in  general  terms,  either  "  perceptions,"  which 
are  representations  of  what  is  external  to  it  and  its  states, 
or  "  appetitions,"  which  are  its  active  tendencies  to  con- 
stant change  from  one  perception  to  another.  It  is  by  its 
power  of  representation  that  the  monad  enters  into  accord 
and  combination  with  others,  forming  composite  substances. 
In  every  such  combination  there  is  some  single  monad  in 
which  it  is  "  represented "  and  which  forms  its  centre ; 
and.  conversely,  every  monad  forms,  in  a  single  regard, 
the  centre  of  a  combination  of  monads;  and  substance  is 
throughout  organic  in  constitution ;  in  every  point  of  it  is 
virtually  represented  every  other,  every  point  is,  according 
to  its  place,  a  representative,  reflection,  or  mirror  of  the 
whole  universe  of  substance.  In  so  far  as  monads  are  posi- 
r  tively  representative,  they  are  active ;  in  so  far  as  they  are 
represented  in  and  by  other  monads,  they  are  passive :  so 
that,  in  each  monad,  activity  and  passivity  are  combined, 
the  latter  constituting  a  limitation  of,  or  check  upon,  the 
former,  —  thus  rendering  the  monad  in  so  far  finite.  The 
activity  of  one  monad  corresponds  to  the  passivity  of  other 
monads  represented  by  it,  and  vice  versa.  There  is,  there- 
fore, virtually  a  universal  reciprocity  and  harmony  of  the 
monads,  the  centre  or  uniting  principle  being,  as  it  were, 
situated  in  a  single  monad,  the  monad  of  monads,  —  God. 
This  correspondence  and  harmony  are  not  temporal  and 
real,  but  pre-established,  ideal,  and  eternal :  the  monads, 
once  having  received  their  nature  in  the  absolute  act 
of  their  creation,  are  pure  substances  and  forever  self- 
determining. 

Representations.  —  As  the  monad  is  of  a  spiritual  nature, 
a  sort  of  soul,  its  acts  of  representation  are  ideas,  though 


5 


LEIBNITZ.  2O7 


not  necessarily  conscious  ideas,  as  the  Cartesians  wrongly 
maintained.  Ideas  or  acts  of  representation  are,  in  fact, 
of  three  degrees,  —  unconscious  (as  in  dreamless  sleep  or  in 
a  swoon),  semiconscious,  and  conscious.  To  unconscious 
representation  the  term  "  perception  "  is  applicable ;  to 
conscious  representation,  as  conscious,  the  term  "apper- 
ception." Monads,  whose  representations  are  wholly 
unconscious,  are  "  simple  monads  ;  "  those  whose  represen- 
tations are  semiconscious  (as  in  the  case  of  elementary 
memory  in  animals)  are  "  souls  "  in  a  narrow  sense  of  the 
term ;  those  whose  representations  are  fully  conscious  are 
"  spirits."  These  distinctions  are  not  absolute  :  the  human 
soul,  which  is  a  "  spirit,"  may  sink  into  such  a  condition  of 
lethargy  as  to  become  animal  (as  in  dreamless  sleep  or  in 
swooning).  As  directly  implied^ln  the  foregoing,  the 
monad  rises  or  falls  in  the  scale  of  being  according  to  the 
character  of  its  ideas. 

Ideas.  —  Ideas  may,  or  may  not,  be  such  as  fully  repre- 
sent to  us  an  object ;  if  they  do,  they  are  clear,  if  not, 
obscure.  When  by  means  of  an  idea  I  clearly  distinguish 
the  marks  of  the  object  which  it  represents,  the  idea  is 
distinct ;  when  I  do  not,  it  is  confused.  When  it  fully 
represents  the  object  in  all  its  attributes  and  relations,  it  is 
adequate,  when  not,  inadequate.  An  idea  is  intuitive  if  it 
immediately  presents  all  elements  of  the  conception  of  its 
object ;  it  is  merely  symbolic  when  it  does  not  do  so.  A 
perfect  knowledge  is  a  knowledge  contained  in  ideas  that 
are  adequate  (adequateness  implying  distinctness,  which  in 
turn  implies  clearness),  and  intuitive.  Such  knowledge  pre- 
supposes such  an  ordered  and  complete  analysis  of  con- 
ceptions that  the  notion  sought  is  self-evident,  its  own 
ground  or  explanation.  This  it  is  completely  only  as  per- 
fectly simple  or  free  from  contradiction.  (Leibnitz  seems 
to  have  conceived,  in  a  vague,  general  manner,  a  catalogue 
or  table  of  ultimate  simple  notions,  which,  by  the  aid  of  an 
exact  system  of  designations,  should  form  the  basis  of  an 
absolute  a  priori  science,  similar  to,  but  more  truly  uni- 


2O8        A  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

versal  than,  mathematics.  He  was,  however,  doubtful  as  to 
the  possibility  of  such  notions  for  us.  They  would  be  ana- 
logues in  [subjective}  consciousness  of  the  supposed  atom 
in  space.)  The  highest  principles  of  knowledge  are, 
according  to  the  foregoing,  the  principles  of  identity  or 
contradiction  (principium  contradictions}  and  of  ultimate 
ground,  or  sufficient  reason  (^principium  rationis  sufficiently) . 
The  principle  of  contradiction  is  a  "  formal  principle,"  and 
governs  the  activity  of  pure  reason,  or  the  faculty  of  uni- 
versal and  necessary  ideas,  or  ideas  growing  out  of,  and 
representing,  the  nature  of  the  monad,  sub  specie  ceternitatis . 
Such  are  immediately  apperceived  by  the  monad  in  its 
developed  consciousness  of  itself.  By  the  principle  of 
sufficient  reason,  we  rise  from  given  facts  to  principles, 
which  are  merely  geneflM  and  probable,  and  at  most  possess 
a  merely  moral  necessity,  and  which  constitute  "  regulated 
experience."  To  these  two  may  be  added  a  third  (which 
is  a  synthesis  of  the  two),  of  secondary  importance:  the 
principium  indiscernibilium,  or  the  principle  that  there  are 
in  nature  no  two  things  perfectly  similar.  (This  is  a  relic 
of  the  nominalistico-realistic  position  once  held  by  Leib- 
nitz.) As  to  origin,  —  all  ideas,  since  the  monad  is  self- 
determining,  arise  from  the  soul  itself:  universal  and 
necessary  ideas  exist  in  the  monad  eternally,  either  as 
inclinations,  dispositions,  impulses,  or  as  fully  apperceived 
forms  of  thought  and  being ;  and  ideas  of  mere  individual 
and  contingent  fact  follow  necessarily,  according  to  the  law 
of  ground  and  consequent,  from  other  ideas  whether  con- 
scious or  unconscious.  It  is  true,  however,  even  as  regards 
universal  and  necessary  ideas  that,  as  the  empirical  psycho- 
logists have  held,  all  ideas  originate  in  sense,  that  there  is 
nothing  in  intellect  which  was  not  already  in  sense,  and  that 
for  every  conception  there  must  have  been  a  perception ;  but 
it  is  also  true  that  even  in  sense,  intellect  is  present,  and 
that  reflection  merely  brings  out  of  our  perceptions  what  we, 
as  spiritual  beings,  have  beforehand  put  into  them.  All  acts 
of  learning  are  the  bringing  forth  of  new  ideas  out  of  old, 


LEIBNITZ.  209 

confused,  and  unconscious  ones,  the  assisting  of  the  natural 
tendency  of  unconscious  ideas  to  become  conscious. 

Appetitions.  —  The  succession  of  the  acts  of  the  soul  is 
on  their  dynamical,  as  on  their  ideal  and  static,  side,  deter- 
mined according  to  the  laws  of  contiguity  and  sufficient 
reason:  each  effort  or  appetition  )is  determined  by  an  im- 
mediately preceding  state  of  soul.  Each  effort,  however, 
must  be  an  idea,  conscious,  semiconscious,  or  unconscious. 
Unconscious  appetition  is  the  "  impulse  of  development ; " 
semiconscious,  "  instinct."  Appetition  risen  into  conscious- 
ness, or  become  arTobject  of  apperception,  isjgjjl.  Will  is 
(of  course)  not  free,  in  the  sense  of  being  arbitrary :  it  is 
free  only  in  so  far  as  depends  on  the  fact  that  the  soul 
is  an  automaton,  or  acts  from  within.  The  supposition  of 
a  free  will,  in  the  sense  of  undetermined  will,  has  its  basis 
in  the  fact  that  the  real  causes  of  some  of  our  acts  are 
unconscious.  The  will  is  more  nearly  free,  because  less 
restrained  by  an  inherent  passivity,  the  higher  the  order  of 
its  ideas,  and  the  more  it  is  determined  from  the  higher 
nature  of  the  soul.  As  its  acts  are  predetermined,  its  good- 
ness is  never  a  moral  goodness,  but  only  a  sort  of  natural 
perfection,  the  degree  of  the  perfection  corresponding  to 
the  character  of  the  ideas  dominating-  the  will.  The  end 
of  all  appetition  as  such  is  some  form  of  pleasure.  In  the 
case  of  semiconscious  appetition,  there  is  first  a  combina- 
tion of  impulses,  giving  rise  to  a  certain  (felt)  tendency  to- 
wards a  definite  idea.  This,  if  not  fully  realized,  is  longing 
or  fear;  if  realized,  pleasure  or  pain.  If  there  be  combined 
with  the  tendency,  memory  or  imagination,  a  preponder- 
ating inclination  results,  which  decides  the  will.  The  good, 
or  that  which  is  will  in  this  stage  of  appetition,  is  whatever 
produces  pleasure  or  satisfaction ;  evil,  or  that  which  is 
shunned,  is  whatever  produces  pain.  In  higher  natures, 
the  pleasure  aimed  at  is  an  enduring  one,  or  happiness, 
since  only  such  pleasure  accords  with  the  eternal  nature  of 
reason.  (Hence  the  importance  of  right  education,  or  en- 
lightenment, in  view  of  human  welfare.)  As  reason  is  not 
VOL.  i.  — 14 


2IO        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

merely  individual  but  also  universal,  happiness  includes, 
besides  self-satisfaction,  satisfaction  in  the  joy  or  perfection 

another,  and  is  (therefore)  love.  And  the  end  of 
human  action  —  whether  of  the  individual  or  of  the  race 
—  is  human  perfection  and  happiness  through  reason,  or 
love, — philanthropy.  This  is  the  highest  good.  From 
philanthropy  flows  natural  right.  This  has  the  three  forms 
of  justice  (in  the  narrow  sense),  equity,  and  piety.  (Three 
corresponding  formulae  are,  —  Neminem  Iczde,  suum  cuique 
tribue,  hones te  vive.}  Justice  in  the  narrow  sense  (jus 
strictutri)  is  rightness  in  matters  of  exchange,  — "  commu- 
tative justice."  Equity  (aquitas)  is  the  obligation  to 
secure  to  every  one  his  deserts  (universal  welfare), — 
(Aristotle's)  distributive  justice.  Piety  {pietas}  is  right- 
ness  towards  the  divine  order  of  things  (and  presupposes 
a  belief  in  God,  a  divine  order  of  the  world,  and  retribu- 
tion). Positive  or  arbitrary  right  consists  in  the  ordering 
of  given  relations,  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of 
natural  right :  it  necessarily  differs  among  different  peoples, 
but  is  not  therefore  contradictory  to  natural  right. 

The  External  World.  —  As  regards  the  representational 
values  of  ideas,  it  has  to  be  said,  first  and  in  general  terms, 
that  as  the  highest  principles  of  knowledge  are  those  of 
contradiction  and  sufficient  reason,  phenomena  in  which 
these  principles  can  most  clearly  and  distinctly,  or  ade- 
quately, be  discerned,  must  be  regarded  as  the  highest  mani- 
festations of  being  as  such.  The  composite  or  bodily  is,  as 
such,  without  a  principle  of  unity :  it  is  self-contradictory ; 
the  simple  or  monadic  is  of  the  opposite  character.  Again, 
that  which  is  immediately  given  in  experience  is  neces- 
sarily imperfect,  since  it  reflects  imperfectly  the  idea  of 
sufficient  ground,  points  beyond  itself  for  its  explanation. 
So  far,  therefore,  as  these  principles  fail  to  appear  in  a 
given  phenomenon,  it  is  mere  phenomenon.  The  phe- 
nomena of  space  and  time  —  to  be  specific  —  are,  as  such, 
merely  phenomena ;  space  is  merely  a  phenomenal  form 
under  which  things  appear  in  confused  perception.  The 


LEIBNITZ.  2 1 1 

explanation  of  mere  phenomena  is  a  purely  mechanical 
explanation  such  as  the  Cartesians  gave  (of  physical  na- 
ture). But  since  real  being  (substance)  is  active  force 
and  not  mere  motion,  the  only  real  explanation  of  the  ex- 
ternal world  is  a  dynamical  one,  one  governed  by  the  law 
of  sufficient  reason,  or,  since  the  principle  of  sufficient 
reason  necessitates  a  knowledge  of  ultimate  end  and  pur- 
pose, the  law  of  final,  as  opposed  to  secondary,  causes. 
Now,  of  nature  as  an  organic  force,  or  rather  organism  of 
forces,  two  special  laws  may  be  predicated  :  ( i )  as  governed 
throughout  by  a  single  end,  nature  is  continuous,  never 
makes  any  leaps,  —  there  can  be,  for  example,  no  (New- 
tonian) action  at  a  distance;  (2)  as  substance  is  neither 
created  nor  destroyed,  the  sum  of  "  living "  (or  active) 
force  (not  of  motion,  as  the  Cartesians  maintained),  or  MV* 
(product  of  the  mass  by  the  square  of  the  velocity) ,  is  for- 
ever the  same.1 '  According  to  the  law  of  continuity,  the 
universe  is  an.  infinite  series  of  beings  of  infinite  varieties  of 
perfection ;  for,  in  the  first  place,  though  the  existence  of 
two  or  more  exactly  similar  monads  is  in  a  manner  con- 
ceivable, yet  there  is,  in  reality,  no  sufficient  reason  why 
there  should  be  ,two  or  more  monads  precisely  alike  (prin- 
cipium  indiscernibilium),  and,  in  the  second  place,  that 
there  be  no  leaps  in  nature,  every  possible  degree  of  dif- 
ference must  be  contained  in  the  monads  collectively  re- 
garded. (The  real  sufficient  reason  and  principle  of  identity 
and  continuity  in  the  universe  is,  of  course,  God.)  As 
regards  body  and  soul,  each  has  its  nature  and  existence, 
not  through  the  other,  but  from  a  precedent  being  of  its 
own  kind,  though  there  is  no  body  without  a  soul,  no  soul 
without  a  body,  and  there  is  a  constant  harmony  between 
them.  This  connection  of  body  and  soul  is,  in  fact,  but  a 
special  instance  under  the  general  law  of  pre-established 
harmony.  In  this  union  of  body  and  soul  we  have,  on 

1  According  to  the  doctrine  of  the  present  day,  the  doctrine  of  the 
"  Conservation  of  Energy,"  it  is  the  sum  of  the  "  living,"  or  kinetic, 
and  the  "  dead,"  or  potential,  forces  that  is  constant. 


212        A   HISTORY  OF  MO  DERM  PHILOSOPHY. 

one  side,  a  being  that  comes  into  and  passes  out  of  being, 
namely,  the  body,  and  on  the  other,  a  being  that  is  eternal, 
undergoing  no  change  except  that  of  metamorphosis,  or 
transformation  from  a  lower  to  a  higher  form  of  existence 
(which  must  not  be  confounded  with  metempsychosis). 
The  changes  of  the  body,  as  existing,  are  by  the  law  of 
continuity  gradual  only,  take  place  as  a  result  of  the  enter- 
ing and  leaving  the  body  of  a  few  particles  at  a  given  time. 
The  soul  is  contained,  in  germ  and  as  central  monad,  in  the 
corporeal  seed  that  develops,  after  the  union  of  the  sexes, 
into  the  human  body. 

God.  —  ( i )  By  the  law  of  the  sufficient  reason,  we  must 
infer  the  existence  of  an  eternal,  supra-mundane,  omnipo- 
tent power.  (2)  By  that  of  final  cause,  we  infer  the  exis- 
tence of  an  eternal  supra-mundane  will  and  end  of  all 
things.  (3)  From  the  fact  that  the  contingent  generally 
presupposes  the  necessary,  we  infer  the  existence  of  a 
single  necessary  being.  (4)  From  the  existence  of  neces- 
sary truths,  we  must  infer  that  of  a  necessary  mind  as  their 
"  place,"  —  a  divine  understanding.  Thus  we  arrive  at  the 
truth  of  the  existence  of  God.  (5)  We  may  further  argue 
God's  existence  from  the  very  idea  of  him,  as  did  the  Car- 
tesians, provided  the  Cartesian  argument  be  supplemented 
with  the  addition  that  the  idea  of  God  is  not  self-contra- 
dictory (since  it  embraces  "realities"  or  "perfections" 
only).  (6)  A  still  further  proof  of  God's  existence  is  as 
follows :  if  God  is  possible,  he  exists ;  for  if  he  were  not, 
he  would  not  even  be  possible,  and  nothing  else  would 
exist;  but  other  things  —  for  example,  I  myself — exist, 
ergo,  etc.  (Proofs  i,  2,  and  3,  it  may  be  noted,  ares 
teleological  proofs,  proof  4  is  psychological,  proof  5  onto- 
logical,  proof  6  partly  ontological  and  partly  teleological.) 
The  attributes  of  God  are  not  so  strictly  a  matter  of  proof 
as  is  his  existence.  As  the  individual  (human)  soul 
is  indestructible  and  maintains  a  separate  existence  after 
death,  there  is  possible  no  universal  all-absorbing  being 
(Spinoza's  God).  The  idea  of  individual  consciousness 


LEIBNITZ.  2 1 3 

and  existence  is  incompatible  with  that  of  consciousness 
and  existence  as  a  part  of  a  universal,  all-absorbing  spirit. 
Further,  the  beauty  and  order  of  the  universe  were  nought 
"were  the  variety  of  existence  in  innumerable  separate 
souls  reduced  to  a  sabbath  of  quietude  "  in  a  single  indi- 
vidual being.  <^God  is  a  separate  individual,  a  distinct 
monad.  \  Since  he  is  the  "  place  "  of  eternal  truths,  he 
must  be  conceived  as  possessing  wisdom ;  since  he  is  the 
source  and  end  of  all  acts  aiming  at  the  better  life,  or  per- 
fection, he  possesses  goodness;  since  perfection  includes 
satisfaction  in  the  weTfare~~br  happiness  of  others,  he  is 
loye^.  Since  he  is  the  sufficient  reason  of  the  existence  of 
all  things,  he  isjgQwer.  His  chief  attribute  is  necessarily 
wisdojn ;  by  this,  all  acts  of  his  will  are  determined,  as  the 
strivings  of  the  monad  are  determined  by  its  ideas.  Hence 
the  world  of  nature  is  the  best  possible  natural  world,  and 
the  world  of  spirit  (of  "  grace  "  )  is  the  happiest  possible ; 
and  the  two  are  in  the  highest  possible  harmony.  God  is 
the  author  of  evil  (as  well  as  of  the  good)  because  he  is 
the  author  of  that  which  is,  by  its  very  nature,  finite,  im- 
perfect (it  is  not  finite  because  of  a  will  to  make  it  such). 
There  can,  in  other  words,  be  only  one  perfect  or  infinite 
being.  Things  are  good  or  evil,  not  in  themselves,  but 
in  their  relation  to  the  general  nature  and  end  of  existence. 
From  this  point  of  view,  the  world  of  finite  beings  must  be 
deemed  the(jiest  possible  world  of  finite  things!}  That  all 
sorts  of  good  may  —  in  accordance  with  the  law  of  con- 
tinuity—  be  realized,  there  is,  necessarily,  inequality.  This 
is,  abstractly  and  metaphysically  speaking,  a  necessary  evil. 
From  this  necessary,  metaphysical  evil  flow  two  others,  — 
physical  evil,  or  pain,  and  moral  evil,  or  sin ;  inequality 
is  necessarily  felt,  and  there  are  necessarily  imperfect 
degrees  of  rationality  in  action.  But  evil  of  whatever 
nature  has  a  negative  rather  than  a  positive  existence. 
God  does  not  will  it ;  he  merely  suffers  it.  God's  choice 
of  the  present  world  among  all  conceivable,  worlds,  was 
governed  by  moral  necessity ;  he  created  the  world  accor- 


214        A   Iff  STORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

ding  to  a  "divine  mathematics"  The  world,  therefore,  is 
the  harmony  of  the  principles  of  freedom,  or  "  grace,"  and 
of  necessity,  or  nature ;  Ideological  and  mechanical  laws 
are  everywhere  in  perfect  accord.  And  since  moral  neces- 
sity is  the  necessity  of  the  idea  of  the  good,  or  happi- 
ness, or  complete  perfection  of  personality,  the  reality  of 
happiness  or  personal  perfection  is  a  thing  of  mathematical 
certainty.  The  contemplation  of  the  world  in  its  perfection 
must  result  in  tranquillity  of  mind,  and  yield  the  deepest 
satisfaction.  Man's  capacity  to  apprehend  this  perfection, 
a  capacity  which  he  possesses  by  virtue  of  the  possession  of 
reason  and  the  knowledge  of  the  eternal  verities,  renders 
him  a  denizen  of  the  City  of  God,  —  of  which  God  is  sole 
ruler,  as  he  is  the  architect  of  the  realm  of  nature.  In 
that  society  there  is  no  crime  without  punishment,  no  good 
deed  without  proportionate  recompense,  and  as  complete 
virtue  and  enjoyment  as  are  possible.  ^  ' 

Result. — The  theory  of  Leibnitz  is  a  rationalistic  ideal- 
ism (the  opposite  of  Berkeley's  empirical  idealism).  Its 
cardinal  features  —  and  those,  naturally,  which  have  had 
the  most  important  influence  upon  succeeding  thinkers  — 
are  its  conciliatory  aim,  its  monadism,  or  dynamic  atomism, 
its  assertion  of  the  spjontaneity  of  thought  (as  against  the 
sensational istic  doctrine  of  the  mere  passivity  or  receptivity 
of  thought),  the  doctrine  of  pre-established  harmony,  its 
determimsm  and  eudaemonism,  its  optimism,  or  attempted 
reconciliation  of  mechanical  and  Ideological  views  of  na- 
ture. The  course  of  philosophical  thought  since  Leibnitz, 
has  demonstrated  that  his  rationalism  was  somewhat  too 
subjective  and  formal,  and  required  to  be  supplemented  by 
its  opposite  empiricism,  as  was  in  fact  done  in  the  system 
of  Kant. 

§  73- 

Walther  Ehrenfried,  Count  von  Tschirnhausen1  (1651- 
1 708) .  —  Von  Tschirnhausen  was  a  native  of  Upper  Lusatia. 

1  See  Zeller's  "  Geschichte  der  deutschen  Philosophic." 


TSCHIRNHA  US  EN.  2 1  5 

He  resided  for  a  long  time  in  Holland  and  France  (Paris). 
He  took  courses  in  mathematics  and  physics  in  the  Univer- 
sity of  Leyden,  and  afterwards  travelled  very  extensively, 
and  made  the  acquaintance  of  distinguished  scholars  and 
artists.  Among  his  friends  were  Spinoza,  the  mathemati- 
cian Huyghens,  and  Leibnitz.  He  was  elected  member  of 
the  French  Academy.  His  death  is  said  to  have  deeply 
grieved  Leibnitz. 

Works.  —  Works  of  Tschirnhausen  are,  —  "  Medicina 
Mentis  sive  Artis  inveniendi  Praecepta  generalia  "  (1689), 
—  his  chief  work,  —  and  dissertations  in  the  Leipsic 
"Acta  Eruditorum  "  and  in  the  "Me" moires"  of  the  Paris 
Academy. 

Philosophy.  —  Tschirnhausen  emphasizes  four  "  funda- 
mental facts"  of  consciousness,  —  (i)  the  consciousness 
of  ourselves  (as  shown  by  Descartes),  through  which  we 
get  the  idea  of  mind;  (2)  the  consciousness  of  agreeable 
and  painful  feelings,  whence  we  derive  the  idea  of  good 
and  evil ;  (3)  the  consciousness  of  our  comprehending  some 
things  and  not  others,  whence  we  derive  the  notion  of  the 
understanding,  and  of  the  true  and  the  false ;  (4)  the  con- 
sciousness of  passivity  in  ourselves  and  of  our  having  im- 
pressions, upon  which  the  knowledge  of  external  existences 
is  based.  All  knowledge  begins  with  these  inwardly  expe- 
rienced facts :  all  knowledge  is  based  on  experience.  To 
constitute  real  knowledge  experience  has  to  undergo  a 
reduction  to  the  third  sort  of  consciousness  above  men- 
tioned, /.  <?.,  to  terms  of  the  understanding,  or  to  conceptions 
(rationalia}  ;  which  must  be  discriminated  from  percep- 
tions (sensibilia)  and  from  imaginations  (imaginabilid} . 
From  the  simplest  conceptions  expressed  in  genetic  defi- 
nitions —  or  definitions  explaining  the  origin  of  the  thing 
defined  (for,  as  Spinoza  showed,  all  things  must  flow  from  a 
single  primal  nature) — must  be  deduced,  by  analysis,  axioms ; 
by  synthesis,  theorems,  etc.  That  is  to  say,  knowledge  is 
a  product  of  experience  transformed  by  the  application  of 
"  mathematical "  method,  or  mathematics  verified  by  expe- 


2l6        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

rience.  The  method  of  knowledge  is  the  same  for  all 
branches  of  knowledge.  According  to  subject-matter, 
knowledge  is  knowledge  either  of  sensibilia  (and  imagina- 
bilia),  rationalia,  or  realia.  The  ultimate  elements  of 
sensibilia  are  the  solid  and  the  fluid,  of  rationalia  the 
point  and  the  line,  of  realia,  extension  and  motion.  The 
science  of  realia  is  physics,  which,  naturally,  is  the  highest 
of  the  sciences ;  the  science  of  rationalia  is  mathematics ;  of 
the  passions  produced  in  us  by  sensibilia  and  imaginabitia 
and  of  the  will  as  being  subject  to  or  free  from  these  pas- 
sions, is  ethics.  The  knowledge  of  realia  delivers  us  from 
the  bondage  of  sensibilia  and  imaginabilia :  physics  is  the 
basis  of  ethics.  The  science  of  science  in  general,  the  phi- 
losophy of  method  (the  only  branch  of  philosophy  treated 
in  extenso  by  Tschirnhausen)  is  philosophia  prima  (ex- 
pounded in  "  Medicina  mentis"). —  Tschirnhausen  is  a  fore- 
runner, as  regards  theory  of  philosophic  method,  of  Wolff. 

§  74- 

Samuel  Puffendorf1  (1632-1694).  —  Puffendorf,  born  in 
Saxony,  began  the  study  of  theology  at  Leipsic,  but  aban- 
doned it  for  that  of  law,  which  he  studied  chiefly  at  Jena. 
In  1 66 1  he  accepted  the  chair  of  the  Law  of  Nature  and 
Nations  at  Heidelberg,  —  a  chair  created  for  him.  He  was 
afterwards,  at  different  times,  professor  in  the  University  of 
Lund  (Sweden),  historiographer -royal  of  Sweden,  historio- 
grapher and  privy-councillor  of  Frederick  III.  of  Branden- 
burg. A  recent  writer  speaks  of  him  as  one  to  whom 
"  scant  justice  has  been  done,"  and  as  at  once,  "  philosopher, 
lawyer,  economist,  historian,  and  even  statesman." 

Works.  —  Works  of  Puffendorf  are,  —  "  Elementa  Juris- 
prudentiae  Universalis  Libri  duo"  (circa  1660),  "  De  Statu 
Imperii  Germanici"  (1667),  "  De  Jure  Naturae  Gentium" 
(1692),  and  "De  Officio  Hominis  et  Civis"  (1695). 

Philosophy.  —  Puffendorf  bases  right  on  the  divine  law  or 

1  Hallam's  "  Literature  of  Europe,"  Part  IV.  pp.  165-171  ;  see  also 
Zeller  and  Erdmann. 


PUFFENDORF.  —  THOMASIUS.  2 1 7 

will,  but  maintains,  nevertheless,  that  it  may  be  discovered 
by  reason,  and  that  moral  science  is  as  certain  as  mathe- 
matical. "  Common  consent "  and  "  self-interest "  are  ( 
insufficient  as  bases  for  a  doctrine  of  right.  Society  takes  ) 
its  rise  from  the  "  nature  of  man,  his  wants,  his  powers  of 
doing  mischief  to  others,"  and  hence  it  may  be  said  that  , 
the  source  of  law  is  self-preservation.  On  the  other  hand,  ^ 
it  is  a  duty  to  live  for  the  common  good.  In  fact,  besides 
duties  to  ourselves  there  are  duties  to  others  and  duties  to 
God.  Among  the  minor  principles  laid  down  by  Puffendorf 
are,  —  that  free  consent  and  knowledge  of  the  whole  sub- 
ject are  required  for  the  validity  of  a  promise,  that  there 
can  be  no  obligation  without  a  corresponding  right,  that 
veracity  is  not  always  obligatory,  that  property  is  grounded 
in  an  express  or  tacit  contract  of  mankind,  made  while  all 
was  yet  in  common,  that  each  should  possess  a  separate 
portion,  that  the  right  of  the  husband  to  rule  the  wife  is 
grounded  in  a  tacit  or  express  promise  of  obedience, 
that  the  power  of  a  master  over  his  servant  is  not  by  nature 
nor  by  the  law  of  war,  but  originally  by  a  contract  founded 
on  necessity.  The  ruler  of  the  State  derives  his  authority, 
not  from  a  divine  source,  but  from  the  State-compact.  Re- 
sistance to  authority  is  justifiable  only  in  certain  very  special 
instances.  Tolerance  should  be  shown  in  religion  except 
as  regards  non-belief  in  God  and  providence.  —  Puffendorf 
is  a  follower  —  though  also  a  critic  —  of  Hobbes  and  Gro- 
tius.  He  is  a  forerunner  of  Wolff  in  the  theory  of  law. 

§  75- 

Christian  Thomasius1  (1655-1728).  —  Thomasius  was 
an  anti-theological,  anti-Scholastic,  and  in  general  anti- 
conservative,  professor  of  law  who  is  sometimes  styled  the 
father  of  the  German  Illumination  (to  be  spoken  of  here- 
after). He  received  from  his  father  and  in  Leipsic  Uni- 
versity a  thorough  training  in  philosophy  and  its  history,  and 

1  See   Erdmann's  "  Grundriss   der  Geschichte  der  Philosophic ; " 
also  Zeller's  "Geschichte  der  deutschen  Philosophic." 


21 8         A   HISTOKY  OF  MODEXN  PHILOSOPHY. 

took  up  law,  at  first  following  Grotius  and  Puffendorf.  He 
sympathized  with  the  French  in  their  breach  with  the  past, 
and  both  advocated  and  practised  strenuously  the  avoidance 
of  pedantry  and  the  use  of  the  German  tongue  as  a  vehicle 
of  learned  communication  in  the  universities.  He  acquired 
great  popularity  and  influence,  and  though  driven  from  his 
professorship  at  Leipsic,  and  forbidden  to  lecture  or  write, 
because  of  his  radicalism,  he  received  an  appointment  at 
Halle  as  "  second,"  and  then  as  "  first  "  professor  of  law, 
and  as  rector  of  the  university,  —  in  the  founding  of  which 
he  had  been  instrumental.  He  seems  to  have  been  a  sup- 
porter and  popularizer  of  other  men's  ideas  rather  than  a 
profound  originator,  and  an  Illuminationist  rather  than  a 
philosopher.  He  may  be  treated  as,  so  to  say,  a  detheol- 
ogizer  and  naturalizer  of  Scholastic  philosophic  thought, 
and  a  forerunner  of  Wolff. 

Works. — The  principal  work  of  Thomasius  is  entitled 
"  Fundamenta  Juris  Naturae  et  Gentium  ex  Sensu  Communi 
deducta  "  (1705).  Other  works  are  "  Institutiones  Juns- 
prudentiae "  (1688),  "  Introductio  ad  Philosophiam  auli- 
cam  "  (1688), — an  attack  on  Scholastic  logic. 

Philosophy.  —  For  Thomasius,  philosophy  is  a  non-tech- 
nical, non-speculative,  readily  intelligible  theory  of  human 
existence  on  its  human  side  as  such.  He  expressly  and 
absolutely  separates  it  as  wisdom  of  this  world  from  theol- 
ogy as  "God-wisdom,"  and  as  expressly  and  absolutely 
attempts  to  avoid  all  syllogizing,  all  use  of  technical  phra- 
seology. He  will  avoid  all  prejudice  and  sectarianism ;  he 
will  be  a  common-sense,  eclectic  philosopher.  As  to  sub- 
ject-matter and  end,  philosophy  is  to  him  that  branch  of 
human  knowledge  which  teaches  man  how  he  should  live 
happily,  /'.  <?.,  in  inward  and  outward  peace,  in  this  world. 
Philosophy  thus  practically  reduces  itself,  with  Thomasius, 
to  ethics.  The  Thomasian  ethics  has  a  certain  basis  in 
(Lockean)  psychology.  The  norm  of  action  is  found  in  a 
happy  commingling  of  certain  ground-impulses  in  human 
nature,  —  as  desire  of  bodily  enjoyment,  property,  indepen- 


THOMASIUS.  219 

dence,  honor,  and  rule  over  others.  Out  of  the  relation  of 
those  to  external  influences  spring  the  affects  or  passive 
conditions  of  the  soul,  of  which  there  are  the  two  general 
classes,  hope  and  fear.  Men  are  naturally  filled  with  preju- 
dice, ruled  by  passion,  and  in  constant  strife.  A  few  have 
in  themselves  the  true  norm  of  action,  and  are  capable  of 
being  teachers  and  rulers.  By  the  principles  of  right  (in 
the  broad  sense)  alone  are  they  taught  to  do  that  which  will 
tend  to  freedom  from  prejudice,  to  self-dependence  in  theo- 
retical matters,  to  inward  and  outward  peace  in  practical,  and 
so  to  the  longest  and  happiest  life  for  man.  These  princi- 
ples are:  (i)  Do  not  to  others  what  you  would  not  have 
done  to  yourself;  (2)  Do  to  others  what  you  would  have 
done  to  yourself;  (3)  Do  to  yourself  what  you  would 
have  others  do  to  you.  The  first  of  these  is  the  principle 
of  all  compulsory  or  perfect  duties,  is  the  sum  and  sub- 
stance of  justice  (jusfum),  or  right  in  the  narrow  sense, 
and  has  reference  to  the  preservation  of  external  peace. 
The  second  is  the  principle  of  the  fitting  (decorum ) ,  and  has 
reference  to  attainment  of  external  peace  through  benevo- 
lence. The  third  is  the  principle  of  morals  (honestum} ,  and 
relates  to  the  attainment  of  inner  peace.  Duties  growing  out 
of  the  second  and  third  principles  are  imperfect,  because 
non-compulsory.  Duties  may  be  divided  into  duties  to 
God,  to  ourselves,  and  to  others.  But  since  the  human 
and  the  divine  have  nothing  to  do  with  one  another,  only 
such  duties  to  God  are  subjects  of  philosophy  as  are  condi- 
tional to  the  fulfilment  of  duties  to  ourselves  and  to  others. 
The  office  of  the  State  is  the  preservation  of  external  peace, 
external  right,  among  religious  societies  ;  otherwise  the  State 
is  separate  from  religion.  This  relation  of  Church  and 
State  is  the  principle  of  what  is  termed  by  Thomasius  his 
Territorial  System.  In  religion  he  sympathized  with  the 
Pietists,  and  advocated  mutual  tolerance  of  sects. 


22O        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 


Christian  Wolff  (1679-1754).  —  Christian  Wolff  was 
the  son  of  a  tanner  of  Breslau,  who  intended  him  for  a 
theologian.  He  studied  at  a  gymnasium  in  Breslau  and  at 
the  University  of  Jena.  Though  distinguished  at  the  gym- 
nasium for  attainments  in  theology,  at  the  university  he 
gave  his  attention  rather  to  mathematics,  physics,  and  phi- 
losophy, Scholastic  and  anti-Scholastic.  At  the  gymnasium 
he  read  Descartes'  works  and  Tschirnhausen's  "  Medicina 
Mentis,"  and  when,  leaving  Jena  (1699),  he  went  to  Leipsic 
to  take  his  master's  degree,  he  habilitated  with  a  thesis, 
written  in  the  Cartesian  spirit,  on  "  The  Universal  Philo- 
sophy, treated  by  the  Mathematical  Method."  At  Leipsic, 
he  early  prepared  a  dissertation  on  Universal  Practical  Phi- 
losophy, the  fruit  of  a  study  of  the  works  of  Grotius  and 
Puffendorf,  to  whom  his  practical  philosophy  owed  much. 
This  dissertation  gained  him  the  recognition  of  Leibnitz, 
whose  views  he  soon  adopted,  and  a  privat-docentship  in 
the  University  of  Leipsic,  his  lectures  being  on  the  subjects 
of  mathematics  and  philosophy.  Through  Leibnitz's  influ- 
ence he  was,  in  1707,  appointed  Professor  of  Mathematics 
in  the  University  of  Halle  ;  he  lectured  also  on  physics  and, 
later,  on  philosophy.  By  the  easy  intelligibility  and  the 
general  impressiveness  of  his  lectures  he  gained  great  popu- 
larity as  a  teacher;  his  exposition  was  lucid  and  metho- 
dical, and  he  spoke  in  German  instead  of  Latin,  and  with 
great  fluency  and  naturalness  of  manner.  But  by  rational- 
istic views  in  theology  he  excited  the  hostility  of  Pietistic 
colleagues,  who,  bringing  undue  influence  to  bear  with  the 
king  against  him,  procured  a  cabinet  decree  depriving  him 
of  his  position,  banishing  him  from  the  domain  on  pain  of 
death  by  the  halter,  and  proscribing  his  works  (1723). 
Settling  at  the  University  of  Marburg,  whence  he  had  pre- 
viously received  a  call  to  a  professorship,  he  lectured  there, 

1  Zeller,  "  Geschichte  der  deutschen  Philosophic  ;  "  Erdmann, 
"Grundriss  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophic;"  Noack  ,  etc. 


WOLFF.  22 1 

with  even  greater  applause  than  at  Halle,  until  1 740.  In  the 
mean  time  his  philosophy  became  universally  known,  he 
was  elected  member  of  the  French  Academy,  and  won  the 
admiration  of  Frederick  the  Great,  successor  to  Frederick 
William,  who  had  driven  him  from  Halle,  and  his  writings 
were  reported  upon  favorably  by  a  commission  appointed 
to  examine  them ;  and  in  1 740  he  was  restored  to  his 
former  university,  and  afterwards  honored  in  various  ways, 
dying  while  professor,  Vice-Chancellor  of  the  University, 
privy  councillor,  etc.  He  did  not  regain  his  former  popu- 
larity as  lecturer,  —  in  fact,  lectured  to  empty  benches ; 
but  his  philosophy  was  at  the  time  of  his  death,  and  had 
long  been,  the  ruling  philosophy  in  Germany. 

Works.  —  Wolffs  earlier  works  are  in  German,  his  later 
in  Latin.  His  most  important  German  work  is  entitled, 
"  Verniinftige  Gedanken  von  Gott,  der  Welt  und  der  Seele 
des  Menschen ;  auch  aller  Dinge  iiberhaupt  "  ("  Rational 
Conceptions  on  God,  the  World,  and  the  Soul  of  Man ;  also 
All  Things  in  General").  (The  first  two  words  of  this  title 
occur  in  the  titles  of  most  of  Wolffs  German  works ;  they 
represent  the  spirit  of  this  system.)  Titles  of  some  of  his 
Latin  works  (which  are  largely  restatements  in  more  scien- 
tific form  of  the  German  works)  are :  "  Philosophia  Ra- 
tionalis  sive  Logica"  (1728),  "Philosophia  Prima  sive 
Ontologia"(i729),  "Cosmologia  Generalis"(i73i),  "Psy- 
chologia  Empirica "  (1732),  "  Psychologia  Rationalis" 
(x  734) >  "  Theologia  Naturalis  "  (i  736-1 737),  "  Philosophia 
Practica  Universalis  "  ( 1 738-1 739) . 

Philosophy:  Stand-point  and  Method.  —  Wolff,  as  a 
true  disciple  of  Tschirnhausen  and  of  Thomasius,  lays  em- 
phasis upon  two  things  as  prime  requisites  of  philosophy ; 
viz.,  precision  and  intelligibility  of  method,  and  utility  of 
end  or  result.  By  philosophy  Wolff  understands  the  science 
of  universal  conceptions,  —  the  science  which  seeks  to  de- 
monstrate how  the  possible,  or  universally  conceivable,  can  be 
in  reality.  Its  method  is  necessarily  an  a  priori  method : 
philosophy  begins  with  pure  conceptions,  whatever  their 


222        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY 

origin,  and  merely  draws  from  them  that,  and  only  that, 
which  is  contained  in  them.  This  method,  like  the  geo- 
metrical, is  not  only  a  priori,  but  demonstrative  and  certain. 
Philosophy,  therefore,  though  engaged  with  truth  in  gen- 
eral, is  quite  distinct  from  empirical  science,  which,  instead 
of  being  a  priori,  necessary,  and  certain,  is  a  posteriori, 
contingent,  and  uncertain. 

The  Divisions  of  Philosophy.  —  As  there  is  in  man  a  fac- 
ulty of  cognition  (facultas  cognoscitiva}  and  a  faculty  of 
appetition  or  volition  {facultas  appetitiva),  philosophy  is 
theoretical  philosophy  (philosophia  theoretica  sive  metaphy- 
sical) and  practical  philosophy  (philosophia  prac  tic  a).  In- 
troductory to  theoretical  philosophy,  and  to  a  certain  extent 
forming  a  part  of  it,  is  the  science  of  logic,  having  a  "  theo- 
retical" part,  treating  (in  Aristotelian  manner)  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  formal  thought;  and  a  practical  part,  treating 
(more  in  the  modern  manner)  of  the  grounds,  limits,  and 
forms  of  knowledge,  and  of  the  practical  uses  of  logical 
method.  The  material  sciences  embraced  under  the  term 
"  theoretical  philosophy  "  are  ontology,  cosmology,  psychol- 
ogy, natural  theology ;  under  the  term  "  practical  philoso- 
phy "  universal  practical  philosophy,  ethics,  economics, 
politics. 

Ontology.  —  Ontology  is  the  theory  of  being  in  general, 
and  its  categories  and  kinds.  This  is  philosophia  prima. 
Its  highest  principles  are  those  of  contradiction  and  suffi- 
cient reason.  The  latter  depends  on  the  former,  as  is 
proved  in  the  following  manner  :  "  Suppose  A  and  B  to  be 
precisely  alike.  If  it  is  possible  that  there  can  be  anything 
which  has  not  a  sufficient  reason,  then  a  change  may  take 
place  in  A  which  does  not  in  B  If  B  be  substituted  for  A. 
But  since  from  the  very  fact  that  A  and  B  are  precisely 
alike,  it  follows,  if  we  assume  that  the  principle  of  sufficient 
reason  is  not  a  valid  principle,  that  A  and  B  are  not  precisely 
alike,  and  since,  on  the  contrary,  it  is  impossible  that  a 
thing  can  both  be  and  not  be,  the  principle  in  question 
must  be  indisputably  correct :  everything  has  its  sufficient 


WOLFF.  22.3 

reason  for  being."  1  Leibnitz  incorrectly  assumed  that  these 
two  principles  were  independent  of  one  another,  and  that 
the  latter  was  axiomatic.  The  main  problem  of  philosophy, 
—  to  show  how  the  possible  can  be  actual,  —  is  solved  by 
the  conception  of  determination,  the  actual  being  that  which 
combines  into  one  definite  or  determinate  nature  many  pos- 
sible distinctions,  or,  rather,  being  that  determinate  nature 
itself.  The  possible  is  the  non-contradictory,  and  the 
sufficient  reason  of  the  determinate  being  is  a  certain 
determinant  (or  cause,  in  the  Aristotelian  sense).  If  the 
determinant  be  in  the  determinate  thing  itself,  that  thing 
is  absolutely  necessary;  if  in  another  thing,  contingently, 
or  hypothetically,  necessary.  Determinations  or  qualities 
of  a  thing  following  from  its  own  nature  are  attributes; 
those  not  so  following,  are  modes.  The  highest  reality 
is  that  which  is  most  determinate  in  nature,  and  vice  versa. 
The  attributes  of  the  actual  may  be  termed  realities. 
Truth  is  formal  order  or  consistence.  Being  is  either  sim- 
ple or  composite.  Simple  being  is  being  without  extension, 
time,  space,  motion,  form,  becoming,  etc.,  which  character- 
ize composite  being  only.  Simple  beings  are  monads, 
metaphysical  points,  eternal  and  completely  individual,  or 
distinct  in  themselves  and  'from  one  another ;  they  alone 
are  true  substances.  They  are  subject  to  no  real  change  : 
that  which  belongs  to  them  is  always  present  in  them. 
They  are  active,  instead  of  passive,  are  centres  of  determi- 
nate and  determining  force.  A  portion  of  them  only  (says 
Wolff  in  his  later  philosophizing)  have  the  faculty  of  idea- 
tion, the  rest  are  merely  natural  atoms  (atomi  nature*}. 
(This  is,  of  course,  an  important  departure  from  the  doctrine 
of  Leibnitz.)  To  composite  beings  belong  all  those  attri- 
butes above  denied  to  simple  beings,  —  extension,  time, 
space,  motion,  form,  becoming,  etc.  Extension  is  the  co- 
existence of  different  things  external  to  one  another. 
Things  co-existent  are  contemporaneous ;  successive  are 

1  See  "  Verniinftige  Gedanken  von  Gott,  der  Welt  u.  der  Seele," 
etc.,  near  the  beginning. 


224        ^    HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

things  of  which  the  ending  of  one  must  precede  the  begin- 
ning of  another.  Time  is  order  of  succession  in  a  constant 
series ;  space,  order  of  co-existence  of  contemporaneous 
things.  Force  is  the  sufficient  reason  of  activity,  etc.  The 
composite  is  material,  temporal,  and  a  plurality,  subject  to 
real  change  or  succession  of  qualities  :  it  is  finite. 

Cosmology.  —  The  world  is  a  machine,  —  a  plurality  or 
multiplicity  of  interrelated  bodies,  the  changes  of  which 
occur  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  motion.  The  ultimate 
elements  of  bodies  are  simple  substances,  monads.  Inter- 
mediate in  nature  between  these  and  bodies  are  certain 
secondary  elements  of  bodies  composed  of  simple  sub- 
stances. These  are  termed  corpuscles  (some  of  them 
being  "primitive,"  some  "derivative"  corpuscles),  and 
are,  for  empirical  science,  ultimate  elements.  They  are 
not  sensible,  though  bodily.  The  philosophy  of  these  is 
physics ;  that  of  the  real,  ultimate  elements  universal  or 
transcendental  cosmology.  The  latter  is  theoretically  prior 
to  the  former.  Physics  is  partly  empirical  science,  partly 
dogmatic  or  mathematical  science.  Dogmatic  physics  may 
also  be  termed  the  science  of  nature.  It  begins  with  the 
corpuscles  and  their  motion,  and  mathematically  deduces 
bodies  from  them,  /.  e.,  from  the  corpuscula  derivitiva. 
Bodies,  and  even  the  corpuscles,  being  phenomenal,  or 
objects  of  confused  ideas,  no  strictly  mechanical  derivation 
of  them  from  ultimate  substances  is  possible ;  all  explana- 
tion is  necessarily  physical  or  teleological,  /.  <?.,  an  explana- 
tion of  phenomena  by  their  relations  to  other  phenomena 
or  to  certain  a  priori  ends  in  nature.  Nature  is  an  organic 
whole  ;  what  takes  place  in  any  portion  or  at  any  given  time 
has  its  sufficient  reason  in  the  given  whole.  As  the  ulti- 
mate elements  are,  in  part  at  least,  natural  atoms,  the 
harmony  of  parts  is  due,  not  to  a  representative  faculty,  but 
to  correspondent  passive  and  active  principles  in  nature; 
viz.,  inertia  and  moving  force  (another  deviation  from 
Leibnitz).  Different  kinds  of  force  are  required  for  the 
explanation  of  different  classes  of  phenomena.  The  sum 


WOLFF.  225 

of  "  living  force  "  is  constant.  The  laws  of  nature  are  not 
unconditionally  necessary ;  above  them  are  unconditional 
ends :  they  are  subject  to  the  laws  of  contradiction  and 
sufficient  reason.  Nature  is  accordingly,  in  a  sense,  contin- 
gent, and  miracles  are  possible.  When  a  miracle  occurs,  the 
succeeding  order  of  nature  is,  however,  different  from  the 
foregoing,  unless  the  peculiar  consequence  of  the  miracle 
be  annulled  by  a  further  miracle.  As  an  instance  in  proof 
of  a  teleological  order  in  nature  may  be  cited  the  fact  that 
the  light  of  the  stars  serves  as  a  guiding  light  for  men  at 
night. 

Psychology.  —  The  fact  of  consciousness  is  a  proof  of  a 
soul,  and  the  unity  of  thought  is  demonstrative  evidence  of 
the  soul's  simplicity,  immateriality,  pre-existence,  immortal- 
ity, etc.  The  essence  of  the  soul  is  a  power  of  representa- 
tion (vis  representatives),  the  various  faculties,  so-called, 
being  but  modifications,  or  forms,  of  this.  This  power 
changes  with  surroundings,  external  and  internal.  The  chief 
forms  of  its  activity  are  cognition  (vis  cognoscitivd)  and 
desire  (vis  appetitiva) .  The  faculty  of  cognition  has  two 
forms,  —  a  lower,  having  to  do  with  confused  ideas,  and 
comprising  sensation,  imagination,  and  memory;  and  a 
higher,  having  to  do  with  clear  and  distinct  ideas,  and  com- 
prising attention,  understanding,  and  reason.  All  ideas 
originate  in  sensations,  which  are  copies,  or  representations, 
of  sensible  things  in  the  soul.  The  senses  apprehend  form, 
magnitude,  position,  motion,  but  not  the  ultimate  elements, 
nor  even  the  corpuscles.  Clearness  of  ideas  in  perception 
depends  on  velocity  of  motion  in  the  nerves ;  distinctness, 
on  its  distribution  among  fibres  of  nerves ;  etc.  The  move- 
ments in  the  brain  corresponding  to  imagination  are  slower 
than  those  corresponding  to  sensation.  Ideas  are  recalled 
in  the  imagination  by  others  with  which  they  have  been 
associated,  because  they  once  constituted  with  those  others  a 
single  state  of  mind.  The  peculiar  function  of  the  higher 
faculty  of  knowledge,  is  reflection,  which  includes  attention, 
comparison,  discrimination ;  in  its  highest  form,  reason,  this 
VOL.  i.  —  i ; 


226        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

is  the  perception  of  the  connection  between  universal  truths, 
or  a  priori  demonstration.  Since  knowledge  originates 
in  experience,  reason  is  in  the  last  analysis  not  absolutely 
pure,  but  points  back  to  the  senses.  As  vis  representativa, 
the  soul  has  an  inherent  tendency  to  change  continually  its 
condition.  This,  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  the  object  of 
the  tendency,  is  desire  (vis  appetitiva).  The  idea  of  a 
physical  object  carries  with  it  a  tendency  to  motion.  The 
motive  forces  of  desire  are  the  cognition  of  perfection  and 
that  of  imperfection,  or  pleasure  and  pain.  Whatever  im- 
proves our  condition,  /.  e.,  makes  it  more  nearly  perfect,  is 
good,  i.  e.,  an  object  of  desire ;  the  opposite  is  evil.  A 
confused  idea  of  a  good  is  appetite,  a  clear  one,  will.  All 
volition  has  its  sufficient  reason  in  ideas,  acting  as  motives, 
i.  <?.,  is  determined,  not  free.  The  soul  progresses  to  ever 
greater  perfection.  The  union  of  body  and  soul  is  expli- 
cable only  on  the  hypothesis  of  a  pre-established  harmony 
between  them.  The  a  priori  science  of  the  soul  is  rational 
psychology ;  the  a  posteriori  is  empirical  psychology ;  the 
former  presupposes  the  latter  and  what  necessarily  flows 
therefrom. 

Natural  Theology.  —  Natural  or  rational  theology  must 
be  strictly  distinguished  from  sacred  theology ;  it  has  noth- 
ing whatever  to  do  with  the  mysteries  of  faith,  but  merely 
ascertains  the  rational  conception  of  God's  being  and  at- 
tributes. The  rational  proofs  of  God's  existence  are  of  two 
classes  (and  natural  theology  has  two  corresponding  parts), 
—  proofs  from  the  consideration  of  the  world,  or  a  posteriori 
proofs,  and  proof  from  the  idea  of  the  most  perfect  being, 
a  priori  proof.  The  contingency  of  the  world  is  a  proof  of 
the  fact  of  a  necessary  being.  The  idea  of  the  most  per- 
fect being  necessarily  includes  among  its  "  realities  "  that  of 
existence.  Our  notion  of  God's  nature  is  determined  by 
the  laws  of  our  thought,  — by  the  fact  that  we  must  judge 
of  it  by  its  consequences  in  the  world  in  which  we  are. 
God,  as  the  source  and  harmony  of  all  things,  must  be  con- 
ceived as  having  clear  and  distinct  ideas  of  all  existences, 


WOLFF.  227 

/.  e.,  as  omniscient.  His  power  is  infinite  within  the  sphere 
of  the  possible ;  /.  <?.,  he  is  limited  by  the  eternally  finite 
nature  of  that  which  he  creates.  Otherwise,  he  is  free. 
He  might  have  existed  eternally  without  creating  the  world, 
had  he  seen  fit.  As  he  is  perfect,  the  world  is  the  best  of 
all  possible  worlds.  Though  not  created  expressly  for  man, 
human  ends  are  embraced  in  its  plan.  (Daylight  assists 
the  transaction  of  the  daily  business  of  men ;  by  the  help 
of  the  sun,  manufacture  of  dials  is  possible,  the  meridian 
may  be  ascertained,  etc. ;  in  the  night,  men  may  sleep  or 
catch  birds  or  fishes  for  their  use,  etc.)  Without  man 
there  would  be  no  recognition  of  the  glory  of  God  as  the 
Creator. 

Practical  Philosophy.  —  Human  nature  contains  in  itself 
the  foundation  and  end  of  all  morality ;  the  highest,  indeed 
the  only,  law  of  which  is,  Do  that  which  renders  thee  and 
thy  condition  more  perfect ;  omit  to  do  that  which  renders 
thee  and  thy  condition  less  perfect.  "Perfection"  in  action 
has  regard  not  merely  to  the  doer's  intent,  but  also  to  the 
consequences  of  the  action ;  it  includes  happiness,  or  the 
approval  of  conscience  or  reason.  The  will  must  not  be 
determined  by  hope  or  fear,  but  by  the  understanding 
alone,  the  enlightenment  and  education  of  which  is  of  su- 
preme importance  to  human  welfare.  The  highest  good 
(beatitudo  philosophica}  is  continual  progress  towards  higher 
perfection.  Duties  are  duties  to  ourselves,  to  others,  and 
to  God,  flowing,  respectively,  from  our  relation  to  our  per- 
fection as  individuals,  our  dependence  upon  one  another, 
and  our  knowledge  of  divine  perfection  as  reflected  in 
nature.  The  value  of  external  service  to  God  depends 
solely  upon  its  moral  influence  on  man,  its  moral  utility. 
Duty  is  the  foundation  of  natural  right,  which  is  the  same 
for  all  men.  According  as  right  is  or  is  not  a  matter  of 
compulsion,  it  is  "  perfect"  or  "imperfect."  The  obligation 
of  a  person  to  perform  a  benevolent  action  is  an  obligation 
which  no  one  can  be  compelled  by  another  to  fulfil,  and 
is,  as  a  right,  "  imperfect."  The  subject  of  natural  law  has 


228        A  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

four  branches,  —  duties,  property,  general  social  life,  and 
the  State.  Society  rests  on  the  two  facts  of  the  obligation 
to  promote  as  much  as  possible  the  perfection  of  self  and 
others,  and  of  an  express  or  a  tacit  contract  which  subjects 
the  wills  of  some  to  those  of  others.  Marriage  and  the 
parental  relation  are  of  the  nature  of  a  contract  regarding 
the  begetting,  preservation,  education  of  offspring.  The 
only  true  marriage  is  monogamic  marriage.  The  grounds 
for  divorce  are  adultery,  malicious  abandonment,  and  the 
like.  Slavery  is  permissible  under  certain  circumstances, 
e.  g.,  when  the  slave  has  deliberately  chosen  it.  The  State 
rests  upon  a  contract  implied  in  the  fact  that  the  lower  organ- 
ism (the  family)  is  not  equal  to  supplying  the  needs  and 
comforts  of  life  and  defending  men  against  injury.  The 
State  can  rightfully  interfere  with  the  natural  liberty  of  the 
individual  only  for  the  common  good.  The  voice  of  the 
people  is  the  ultimate  source  of  authority.  Passive  resist- 
ance to  authority  is  always  justifiable  when  authority  con- 
flicts with  natural  right;  active  resistance  is  proper  only 
when  rights  reserved  by  the  constitution  of  a  State  are 
infringed.  Rulers  stand  in  a  relation  to  subjects  similar  to 
that  of  parents  to  children.  It  is  incumbent  upon  the  State 
to  care  for  the  welfare  of  its  subjects,  even  in  the  minutest 
details ;  it  must  care  for  all  forms  and  means  of  educa- 
tion, —  schools,  academies,  universities,  churches,  theatres, 
books,  etc. ;  for  all  charitable  interests,  including  the  pro- 
vision of  asylums  for  the  poor  and  for  orphans,  the  education 
of  physicians,  for  all  economic  interests,  fostering  agriculture, 
determining  relation  of  industries ;  for  the  general  habits  of 
eating,  drinking,  amusement,  recreation,  refreshment,  etc. 
Atheists  and  deists  must  be  expatriated  and  denied  hon- 
orable burial.  The  object  of  punishment  is  correction  of 
criminals  and  prevention  of  crime,  —  light  punishment  in- 
flicted with  strictness  is  better  than  a  severer  one  not  so 
inflicted.  Merely  an  extension  of  natural  right  or  law  is 
the  right  or  law  of  nations.  The  State  as  a  person  enters 
into  relations  similar  to  those  into  which  individual  persons 


WOLFFIANS  AND  ANTI-WOLFFIANS.  22$ 

enter.  There  is  a  necessary  and  natural  right  and  a  positive 
right  among  States  as  among  those  social  organisms  enter- 
ing into  the  make-up  of  a  State. 

Result.  —  The  philosophy  of  Wolff  is  very  largely  merely 
a  formulation  and  systematization  of  what  had  been  taught 
by  Leibnitz,  as  is  sufficiently  obvious.  But  (as  Wolff  himself 
claimed)  it  possesses,  in  relation  to  that  of  Leibnitz,  a  cer- 
tain independence  and  originality,  and  constitutes  in  certain 
scientific  regards  an  advance  upon  that.  The  deviations  of 
the  philosophy  of  Wolff  from  that  of  Leibnitz  were  such  as 
to  add  determinateness,  solidity,  and  comprehensiveness  to 
philosophy,  in  at  least  a  formal  regard,  —  to  increase  the  ob- 
jectivity of  its  results.  Besides  the  deviations  already  noted, 
may  be  mentioned  the  conscientious  application  of  a  sci- 
entific method,  the  attempt  to  determine  and  deduce  the 
categories  of,  at  least,  formal  thought,  the  limiting  of  the 
range  of  miracle,  the  separation  of  morals  from  dogma,  the 
broadening  of  the  scope  of  philosophy  so  that  its  content 
became  coextensive  with  all  possible  objects  of  knowledge, 
and,  finally,  the  "teaching  of  philosophy  to  speak  German." J 
Wolff,  like  Melanchthon,  taught  the  "  whole  German  world  " 
philosophy,  and  has  exercised  a  great  influence  in  modern 
thinking.  Among  his  pupils  was  even  Kant  himself.  He 
propounded  no  new  great  principle,  but  he  reckoned 
squarely  with  those  extant,  and  so  in  a  manner  set  philos- 
ophy on  a  new  footing.  He  deserves,  it  would  seem, 
somewhat  more  attention  from  students  of  the  history  of 
philosophy  than  he  usually  receives. 

§  77- 

Wolffians  and  Anti-  Wolffians. 2  —  The  philosophy  of 
Wolff,  for  reasons  that  are  perhaps  obvious,  found  nu- 
merous adherents  and  also  met  with  considerable  oppo- 
sition. Among  the  followers  of  Wolff  perhaps  the  most 

1  Schwegler,  "  Handbook  of  the  History  of  Philosophy." 

2  See  Zeller,  "  Geschichte  der  deutschen  Philosophic ; "  Noack  ; 
Erdmann. 


230        A    HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

important  were  Georg  Bernhard  Bilfinger  (1693-1750), 
Alexander  Gottlieb  Baumgarten  (1714-1762),  Georg 
Friedrich  Meier  (1718-1777),  Johann  Heinrich  Lambert 
(1728-1777).  Of  the  opponents  were  Franz  Buddeus 
(1667-1729),  Andreas  Riidiger  (1673-1731),  Christian 
August  Crusius  (1712-1776),  Joachim  Georg  Daries 
(1714-1792).  —  Bilfinger,  professor  in  Tubingen  and 
Petersburg,  follows  Leibnitz  in  his  conciliatory  attitude 
towards  theological  dogma  ;  otherwise  he  is  a  Wolffian. 
He  distinguishes  a  mediate  as  well  as  an  immediate  re- 
presentation in  the  monads,  regards  every  psychological 
change  as  a  passing  from  an  idea  to  a  resulting  appetition, 
or  vice  versa,  points  out  the  necessity  for  a  logic  of  the 
imagination  (as  well  as  of  the  understanding,  which  alone 
Wolffs  logic  was) .  —  Baumgarten  is  especially  noted  as  the 
author  of  the  first  modern  "  system  "  of  aesthetics  (a  logic 
of  the  imagination  which  Bilfinger  had  desiderated).  By 
^Esthetics  he  understands  the  science  of  the  lower,  or  sensi- 
ble, faculties  of  the  mind.  The  subject  of  aesthetics  is, 
according  to  Baumgarten,  the  perfection  of  sensible  phe- 
nomena as  such,  or  the  harmony  of  the  manifold  in  phe- 
nomena. But  this  is  the  beautiful :  beauty  is,  precisely, 
perfection  as  apprehended  by  the  senses  (for,  as  Leibnitz 
pointed  out,  the  sensible  apprehension  of  perfection  affords 
pleasure).  Baumgarten's  "Esthetics"  relates  chiefly  to 
poetry, —  belongs  to  the  class  of  works  of  which  Aristotle's 
"  Poetic  "  is  the  earliest  extant  representative.  It  is  said 
to  have  been  made  by  Kant  the  basis  of  his  lectures  on  the 
subject  it  treats.  Baumgarten  expounded  (with  great  practi- 
cal success)  Wolffs  doctrines  as  a  whole,  out-Wolffing  Wolff 
in  the  matter  of  logical  analysis  and  elaborate  terminology. 
His  text-books  were  very  popular ;  Kant  was  distinctly 
influenced  by  them.  —  Meier  was  also  a  successful  writer 
on  aesthetics  and  the  Wolffian  philosophy.  Meier  em- 
phasized "  common-sense  "  and  practicality  as  the  primary 
requisites  in  a  sound  philosophy,  was  a  Lockean  in  psycho- 
logy, attempted  a  reconciliation  of  the  imperfection  of  the 


THE  ANT2-WOLFFIANS,  231 

world  and  the  perfection  of  God  through  a  distinction  be- 
tween an  essential  and  external  perfection  in  God,  the  for- 
mer being  absolute  and  unchangeable.  Meier's  works  were 
employed  by  Kant  similarly  as  were  Baumgarten's. —  Lambert 
—  a  personal  friend  of  Kant — attempted  the  application 
of  Wolffian  doctrines  and  methods  to  Lockean  psychology. 
In  a  work  entitled  the  "  New  Organon,"  he  deals  with  the 
questions  whether  the  human  understanding  can  attain  to 
certain  knowledge  of  the  ultimate  truth,  whether  it  can 
avoid  confusing  truth  and  error,  whether  speech  is  really 
a  help  or  a  hindrance  to  the  attainment  of  knowledge, 
whether  the  understanding  must  not  always  be  blinded  by 
illusion  or  not.  His  most  important  discussions  are  those 
relating  to  the  last  of  these  questions.  Lambert  divides 
illusions  into  physical  illusions  (illusions  of  the  senses), 
psychological  illusions  (illusions  of  consciousness,  imagina- 
tion, memory),  moral  illusions  (illusions  of  feeling),  patho- 
logical illusions  (illusions,  due  to  the  condition  of  the 
nerves).  Lambert  was  highly  esteemed  personally  and 
as  a  philosopher  by  Kant,  and  is  regarded  as  occupying 
an  intermediate  position  between  Wolff  and  Kant.  —  The 
Anti-Wolffians  objected,  some  more,  others  less,  strongly 
to  the  (supposed)  fatalism  involved  in  the  principle  of 
sufficient  reason,  determinism,  pre-established  harmony, 
the  mechanical  explanation  of  nature,  and  optimism ;  con- 
ceived the  criterion  of  truth  to  be,  not  the  certainty  of  the 
mathematico-logical  understanding,  but  liveliness  of  feeling, 
supernatural  illumination  (Buddeus),  immediate  thought- 
necessity  (Crusius),  or  a  high  degree  of  probability  (Rudi- 
ger)  ;  treated  reason  as  subordinate  to  revelation,  and  moral 
activity  as  obedience  to  the  (revealed)  will  of  God.  Bud- 
deus was  a  syncretist,  including  in  his  "  system  "  supersti- 
tions, church-dogmas,  etc.  According  to  Rtidiger,  all 
things,  even  mind  and  God,  have  a  material  origin,  —  the 
soul  is  extended,  though  simple.  Crusius  held  the  same 
view.  He  criticised  the  ontological  proof  of  God's  exist- 
ence (as  did  after  him  Kant,  an  admirer  of  his) ,  as  con- 


232        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

founding  the  existence  of  God  with  the  thought  of  that 
existence.  His  proofs  of  God's  existence  were  those  of 
"  sufficient  cause  "  (not  the  "  fatalistic  "  "  sufficient  reason  " 
of  Leibnitz  and  Wolff )  and  the  "  contingency  of  the 
world."  The  highest  principle  of  philosophy  (according 
to  Crusius)  is  that  of  "  conceivability,"  which  is  stated, — 
That  which  is  not  conceivable  is  false ;  what  cannot  be 
conceived  as  false  is  true.  The  immortality  of  the  soul 
is  not  proved  from  its  nature  as  a  substance,  but  from  the 
fact  that  it  (immortality)  alone  unites  desert  and  happi- 
ness (compare  Kant).  Daries,  who  is  less  hostile  towards 
Wolff,  affirms  contingency  and  imperfection  to  be  con- 
sequences of  freedom  in  God,  —  or  of  a  free  understanding 
and  will,  as  distinguished  from  a  necessary  understanding 
and  will  in  God,  —  not  of  the  character  of  the  finite  as  such. 
Our  duties  grow  out  of  natural  ends  recognized  as  depend- 
ent on  the  will  of  God. 

§  78- 

The  French  "Illumination"  —  The  English  philosophy 
of  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century,  —  Deism,  Lock- 
ism,  the  Newtonian  Physics,  etc.,  —  transplanted  to  France 
by  Voltaire,  Montesquieu,  and  English  works  that  went 
across  the  Channel,  found  in  a  prevailing  revolt  against 
ecclesiastical  and  political  tyranny  a  hospitable  soil  and 
bore  abundantly  its  peculiar  fruit.  The  new  epoch  pro- 
duced by  it  in  French  thinking  is  commonly  known  in  the 
history  of  philosophy  as  the  "  French  Illumination."  The 
names  of  men  to  be  spoken  of  in  this  connection  are  those 
of  Voltaire,  Montesquieu,  Rousseau,  who  may  be  classed  as 
Deists ;  Condillac  and  De  Tracy,  sensationalists ;  Bonnet, 
Robinet,  and  Diderot,  semi-materialists  ;  D'Holbach, 
Lamettrie,  Helv£tius,  Cabanis,  pure  materialists.  Perhaps 
the  most  important  contribution  to  philosophy  as  a  science 
made  by  these  "philosophers  "  was  that  of  the  Holbachian 
materialism. 


VOLTAIRE.  233 

§  79- 

Francois  Marie  Arouet  de  Voltaire*  (1694-1778). — 
Voltaire  was  educated  at  a  Jesuit  college  in  Paris.  He 
took  up  the  profession  of  letters,  and  soon  became  a  popular 
idol.  On  account  of  an  "  affair  of  honor  "  he  was  obliged 
to  leave  France,  and  he  spent  three  years  in  England.  In 
England  he  came  under  the  influence  of  Newtonian  and 
Deistic  doctrines.  He  returned  to  France  a  Newtonian,  a 
Deist,  and  an  admirer  of  the  English  constitution.  A  pub- 
lished work  of  his,  Deistical  in  sentiment,  caused  his  banish- 
ment. He  went  to  Holland.  On  the  removal  of  the  ban 
in  1735  he  returned  to  France,  and  took  up  his  abode  with 
a  certain  Madame  du  Chatelet  in  Lorraine  as  her  preceptor. 
At  the  invitation  of  Frederick  the  Great  of  Prussia,  himself 
a  "  freethinker,"  Voltaire  spent  three  years  at  the  Prussian 
court.  He  quarrelled  with  Frederick,  and  went  to  Switzer- 
land to  reside.  On  a  visit  to  Paris  in  1778  he  was  received 
with  great  enthusiasm.  His  death  occurred  shortly  after- 
wards. The  clergy  refused  burial  to  his  body  in  Paris :  his 
life  (an  industrious  one)  had  been  largely  spent  in  antag- 
onizing ecclesiastical  bigotry  and  intolerance. 

Works. — Voltaire's  philosophy  (such  as  it  is)  is  to  be 
found  chiefly  in  the  following-named  works  :  "  Lettres  phi- 
losophiques  sur  les  Anglais"  (1734),  "  Examen  important 
de  my  lord  Bolingbroke  "  (1736),  "  Etemens  de  la  Philoso- 
phic de  Newton,"  etc.  (1738),  "  La  Metaphysique  de  New- 
ton, ou  Parallel  des  Sentimens  de  Newton  et  de  Leibnitz  " 
(i  740),  —  ridicules  the  Leibnitzian  optimism,  —  "  Candide, 
ou  sur  1'Optimisme "  (1757),  " Dictionnaire  Philosophique " 
(1764),  "  Le  Philosophe  ignorant"  (1767),  —  probably 
contains  the  best  exposition  of  his  general  world-view,  — 
"  Re'ponse  au  '  Systeme  de  la  Nature  '  "  (1772),  —  an  in- 
tended refutation  of  atheism. 

Philosophy.  —  The  philosophy  of  Voltaire  is  that  of  Locke 
and  of  the  English  Deists.  He  opposes  (with  ridicule)  the 

1  See  Franck  and  Noack ;  Works  of  Voltaire. 


234        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

doctrine  of  "  innate  ideas,"  — the  "  mind  has  to  be  sent  to 
school  to  learn  what  it  already  knows  "  if  that  doctrine  be 
true.  Not  ideas,  but  reason,  is  innate  :  "  God  gave  all  men 
the  same  reason,  and  by  this,  when  it  develops,  men  per- 
ceive the  same  necessary  principles,  just  as  he  has  given 
them  organs  which,  when  they  have  the  degree  of  their 
energy,  perpetuate  necessarily  and  in  the  same  manner  the 
race  of  the  Scythian  and  that  of  the  Egyptian."  Voltaire 
so  far  dissents  from  Locke's  polemic  against  the  notion  of 
universally  prevalent  ideas  as  to  maintain  that  the  idea  or 
instinct  of  justice  is  universal.  Metaphysics  (in  any  real 
sense)  he  repudiates  as  idle  curiosity,  ruinous  to  common- 
sense  and  morality.  Common-sense  and  the  dictates  of 
common  morality  are  a  sufficient  basis  of  theoretical  belief, 
which,  after  all,  has  its  end,  not  in  itself,  but  in  action. 
Voltaire  contends,  however,  in  his  fashion,  for  belief  in 
God,  freedom,  and  immortality.  The  denier  of  God  is,  he 
says,  refuted  with  the  single  "  Vous  existez,  done  il  y  a  un 
Dieu"  ("You  exist,  therefore  there  is  a  God  ").  The  sup- 
position of  a  God  is  "so  convenient,  so  necessary,  indeed 
(the  idea  of  justice  and  the  manifestation  of  design  in  the 
world  require  it),  that  man  would  have  to  invent  a  God  if 
he  did  not  exist."  We  are  necessarily  and  forever  ignorant 
of  God's  nature ;  one  must  be  God  to  know  God.  We 
must,  as  no  society  can  exist  without  justice,  suppose  him 
to  be  just.  It  is  of  course  irrational  to  "  believe  in  a  God 
who  promenades  in  a  garden,  talks,  becomes  man,  and 
dies  on  a  cross."  —  Liberty  is  the  power  to  think  or  not  to 
think  of  a  thing,  to  move  or  not  to  move,  at  will.  Proof 
of  liberty  is  found  in  the  fact  of  an  irresistible  feeling  of  it, 
the  fact  that  the  opponents  of  liberty  admit  the  existence  of 
this  feeling  and  give  the  lie  to  their  professed  opinions  by 
their  conduct,  and  that  if  we  are  not  free,  we  must  conceive 
God  as  acting  unworthily  of  the  Supreme  Being  in  so  creat- 
ing us  as  that  we  should  be  deceived  on  this  point.  Our 
passions  do  not  disprove  liberty  any  more  than  (some)  dis- 
ease does  (all)  health  :  the  will  is  not  necessarily  determined 


MONTESQ  UIE  U.  235 

by  what  the  understanding  thinks,  since  will  and  understand- 
ing are  not  two  separate  entities,  acting,  as  it  were,  physically 
on  one  another,  but  are  activities  of  one  and  the  same 
being,  who  both  judges  and  wills  (in  other  words,  moral 
necessity  must  not  be  confounded  with  physical)  ;  the  pre- 
vision of  God  does  not  necessarily  conflict  with  liberty, 
since  the  mere  knowledge  of  an  action  before  it  is  per- 
formed does  not  differ  from  the  knowledge  of  it  after  it  is 
performed ;  God's  prevision  may  be  conceived  as  like  that 
of  one  who  knows  beforehand  what  course  of  action  will 
in  a  given  instance  be  pursued  by  a  person  whose  character 
he  knows ;  man's  freedom  does  not  interfere  with  God's 
infinite  power,  since  it  is  the  effect  of  that ;  we  may  be 
conceived  as  possessing  liberty  from  God  as  the  general, 
in  an  action,  does  from  a  king  who  has  given  him  carte 
blanche.  Liberty  is  not  the  liberty  of  indifference :  if  it 
were,  we  should  be  inferior  to  idiots,  imbeciles,  and  brutes. 

Result.  —  Voltaire  is  one  of  the  founders  of  the  "Eclair- 
cissement"  or  (French)  "  Illumination."  He  exercised  a 
very  wide  influence  upon  popular  thinking,  and  (without 
being  himself  really  a  philosopher  in  the  strict  sense  of  the 
term)  made  certain  philosophical  notions  universal  com- 
monplaces of  thought  among  men  of  the  eighteenth  and 
even  of  the  nineteenth  century.  "  We  are  all,"  in  the 
words  of  Professor  Du  Bois  Reymond,  "  more  or  less 
Voltairians." 

§  80. 

Charles  de  Secondat,  Baron  de  la  Brede  et  de  Montes- 
quieu1 (1689-1755).  —  Montesquieu,  born  near  Bordeaux, 
received  thorough  early  training,  studied  law,  became  a 
counsellor  in  and  was  for  twelve  years  president  of  the  pro- 
vincial Parliament  of  Bordeaux.  He  resigned  his  position 
in  1726  to  devote  himself  to  philosophical,  historical,  and 
political  studies.  He  was  elected  member  of  the  Bordeaux 
Academy,  and  contributed  to  its  Proceedings.  In  1728  he 

i  See  Franck  and  Noack. 


236        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

was  elected  member  of  the  French  Academy,  and  in  the 
same  year  began  a  tour  through  "  Europe  to  observe  men, 
things,  and  constitutions."  He  spent  a  year  in  Italy,  and 
eighteen  months  in  England,  becoming  possessed  with  a 
decided  admiration  for  English  character  and  customs  and 
the  English  Constitution,  —  an  admiration  which  had  its 
effect  in  a  changed  manner  of  living,  as  well  as  in  certain 
doctrines  contained  in  his  chief  work,  written  a  few  years 
after  his  return  to  France. 

Works.  —  The  philosophical  works  by  which  Montes- 
quieu is  known  are  :  "  Lettres  Persanes  "  (1720),  —  a  sa- 
tirical criticism  of  certain  social,  political,  ecclesiastical 
(and  literary)  conditions  in  France  at  the  beginning  of  the 
eighteenth  century ;  "  Considerations  sur  les  Causes  de  la 
Grandeur  et  la  Decadence  des  Remains  "  (i  734),  "  L'Esprit 
des  Lois  :  ou  du  Rapport  que  les  Lois  doivent  avoir  avec  la 
Constitution  de  chaque  Gouvernment,  les  Mceurs,  le  Climat, 
la  Religion,  le  Commerce,"  etc.  (1748).  These  works  re- 
ceived a  wide  reading,  and  exercised  a  powerful  influence 
on  popular  opinion,  —  "  L'Esprit  des  Lois  "  becoming  one 
of  the  recognized  causes  of  the  French  Revolution. 

Philosophy.  —  "  All  things,"  says  Montesquieu,  "  have 
their  laws :  divinity  has  its  laws ;  the  material  world  its 
laws ;  superhuman  intelligences  their  laws ;  animals  their 
laws,  man  his  laws."  Laws  are  the  relations  existing  be- 
tween primordial  reason  and  the  various  sorts  of  being,  and 
the  relations  of  these  beings  to  one  another.  With  law 
there  naturally  co- exists  freedom  :  God  does  not  foreknow 
all  the  individual  acts  of  self-determination.  But  his  free- 
dom, though  "  ruling  as  a  king  within  its  sphere,"  obeys  the 
larger  sphere  "  like  a  slave."  As  the  laws  of  the  universe  as 
a  whole  have  their  source  in  the  primordial  reason,  so  hu- 
man laws  originate  in  human  reason,  are  the  self-determi- 
nations of  that  reason.  They  are,  ideally,  adapted  to  the 
particular  people  for  whom  they  exist :  adapted  to  the  gen- 
eral nature  of  things,  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  the  diversity 
of  existing  conditions,  on  the  other ;  they  are  not  arbitrary, 


ROUSSEAU.  237 

artificial,  Utopian.  There  are,  in  the  nature  of  the  case, 
three  most  general  species  of  government,  —  the  republic, 
the  monarchy,  and  the  despotism.  For  the  security  of  the 
State  it  is  requisite  that  the  citizens  have  a  grade  of  eleva- 
tion corresponding  to  the  nature  of  the  government ;  pri- 
vate virtue  is  the  fundamental  principle  of  action  in  popular 
States :  in  aristocracies  it  is  less  necessary ;  in  a  mon- 
archy honor,  in  a  despotism  terror,  occupies  the  place  of 
virtue.  The  principle  of  the  republic  becomes  corrupt  not 
only  when  the  spirit  of  equality  is  lost,  but  when  it  becomes 
extreme ;  monarchy  is  destroyed  by  the  enfeeblement  of 
intermediary  powers  (as  the  nobility)  ;  the  despotic  gov- 
ernment is  already  corrupt.  Political  liberty  consists,  not 
in  power  to  do  what  one  likes,  but  only  in  the  power  to  do 
what  one  should  like :  it  is  the  right  to  do  all  that  the  laws 
permit.  The  powers  of  the  government  are  three,  —  legis- 
lative, judicial,  and  executive ;  and  security  in  government 
requires  that  these  powers  be  in  distinct  hands,  or,  at  least, 
that  the  judicial  be  kept  entirely  independent  of  both  ex- 
ecutive and  legislative  powers.  The  abuse  of  power  cannot 
always  be  prevented,  even  in  the  most  moderated  States : 
it  must  set  limits  to  itself.  Between  laws  and  the  Christian 
religion  there  is  such  connection  that  "  that  which  seems  to 
have  no  other  object  than  the  felicity  of  the  other  life  con- 
stitutes our  happiness  also  in  this." 

§  81. 

Jean  Jacques  Rousseau*  (1712-1778). — Rousseau  was 
early  left  without  parents'  care,  and  received  but  little  primary 
training  from  any  source.  He  read  Plutarch  and  romances. 
After  failures  to  obtain  a  practical  foot-hold  in  the  world, 
and  some  wanderings  and  escapades,  he  was  taken  into 
the  house  of  a  Madame  de  Warens,  who  felt  interest  enough 
in  him  to  have  his  education  looked  after  and  to  become 
mistress  to  him.  He  studied  Latin,  mathematics,  music, 
and  the  Port  Royal  logic ;  and  read  the  works  of  Locke, 
1  Noack  ;  "  Encyclopaedia  Britannica  ; "  Franck. 


238        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Leibnitz,  Descartes,  and  Malebranche.  Losing  Madame 
de  Warens'  favor,  he  went  to  Lyons,  and  in  1741  to  Paris. 
He  at  first  copied  and  composed  music,  afterwards  held  for 
a  time  the  post  of  private  secretary  to  the  ambassador  to 
Venice,  got  into  the  society  of  the  celebrated  Encyclopedistes, 
contributed  to  the  "  Encyclopedic,"  and  won  fame  by  taking 
a  prize  offered  by  the  Academy  of  Dijon  for  the  best  essay 
on  the  "  Effect  of  the  Progress  of  Civilization  on  Morals  " 
(1749).  His  literary  success  brought  him  offers  of  favor, 
of  which,  however,  he  did  not  avail  himself  to  any  great 
extent.  He  copied  music,  wrote  operettas,  comedies, 
novels,  and  essays.  After  a  number  of  years  of  both  popu- 
larity and  prosperity  (a  Madame  d'Epinay  caused  to  be 
built  for  him  a  fine  residence  in  the  valley  of  Montmorency, 
near  Paris),  Rousseau  fell  under  condemnation  because  of 
alleged  Deism,  immorality,  and  what-not  in  his  writings,  and 
was,  by  his  enemies,  driven  about  from  place  to  place.  He 
found  refuge  finally  in  England,  under  the  auspices  of 
Hume,  in  the  year  1765.  Quarrelling  with  his  benefactor, 
he  returned  to  France  the  next  year.  He  was  permitted 
to  return  to  Paris  on  condition  that  he  would  not  publish 
anything  on  religion  or  the  government.  He  gained  a  live- 
lihood for  himself  and  a  woman  with  whom  he  had  infor- 
mally united  himself  some  years  before  but  did  not  until 
now  marry,  by  copying  music.  Stories  of  poverty,  domestic 
infelicity,  sorrow,  and  sickness  are  related  of  him  at  this 
time.  In  1778  he  determined  to  accept  an  oft-repeated 
invitation  of  a  certain  Marquis  de  Girardin  to  live  on  an 
estate  of  his  near  Paris.  He  died  suddenly  (by  his  own 
hand,  some  have  imagined)  a  few  months  after  accepting 
the  invitation.  His  importance  in  the  history  of  philosophy 
seems  to  be  more  that  of  a  personal  force  and  stimulator  of 
other  men  than  that  of  a  scientific  thinker. 

Works.  —  Of  Rousseau's  works  we  may  mention  here : 
"Discours  sur  POrigine  et  les  Fondemens  de  I'lne'galite' 
parmi  les  Hommes"  (1753);  "La  Nouvelle  He'loise" 
(1761)  ;  "£mile,  ou  sur  1'Fxlucation"  (1762),  containing 


ROUSSEAU.  239 

the  "  Profession  de  Foi  du  Vicaire  Savoyard,"  Rousseau's 
answer  to  the  materialism  of  his  day  and  the  statement  of 
his  views  on  God  and  natural  religion ;  •'*  Du  Contrat  Social, 
ou  Principes  du  Droit  Politique "  (1762),  closely  con- 
nected with  the  "  Discours  sur  1'Origine,"  etc. 

Philosophy :  God  and  Nature.  —  I  receive  impressions 
from  objects,  which  I  am  able  to  distinguish  from  myself, 
even  though  they  were  merely  ideas  ;  hence  they  exist.  I 
distinguish  from  myself  as  merely  feeling  or  receiving  im- 
pressions, myself  as  judging,  exercising  a  power  of  reflection, 
—  a  power  which  only  an  active,  intelligent  being  can  pos- 
sess ;  therefore  I,  as  well  as  objects,  exist.  I  perceive 
matter  now  in  motion,  and  now  at  rest,  and  seek  a  cause. 
1  perceive  that  if  nothing  acts  upon  matter,  it  does  not 
move ;  that,  therefore,  its  natural  condition  is  one  of  rest. 
I  distinguish  in  myself  a  voluntary  cause  of  motion;  but 
the  visible  universe  is  not  an  animal  which  moves  itself, 
and  its  movements  must  have  an  external  cause ;  matter 
receives  and  communicates  motion,  but  does  not  originate 
it.  We  have  to  attribute  motion  to  will  as  its  cause  :  there 
is  no  action  without  will.  Will,  then,  moves  the  world  and 
animates  nature :  this  is  the  first  article  of  my  creed. 
Matter  moving  according  to  law  reveals  an  intelligence,  — 
the  second  article  of  my  creed.  Intelligence  implies  com- 
paring and  choosing.  Hence  there  exists  a  judging,  choos- 
ing, willing,  or  acting,  being  as  the  cause  of  all  things. 
The  designs  of  this  being  I  do  not  comprehend ;  but  I 
perceive  co-ordination  and  order  everywhere,  and  cannot 
resist  the  conviction  that  the  world  is  guided  by  a  wise, 
powerful,  and  consequently  a  good  will.  My  spontaneous 
attitude  towards  this  being  is  that  of  a  feeling  of  awe  and 
gratitude ;  and,  according  to  a  simple  dictate  of  nature  her- 
self, I  worship  this  being.  I  do  not  find  a  written  revela- 
tion of  him.  Man's  freedom  is  only  apparent :  his  will  is 
necessarily  determined  by  his  understanding ;  he  wills  the 
good  only  as  he  judges  the  true.  His  freedom,  so  called, 
consists  merely  in  his  willing  what  is,  and  what  he  holds  to 


240        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

be,  suited  to  him.  As  free,  man  is  animated  by  an  immaterial 
substance  —  the  third  article  of  my  creed.  The  evil  that 
man  does,  returns  upon  himself,  without  affecting  the  order 
of  the  world.  The  only  evil  in  the  world  is  what  he  does 
and  suffers.  That  the  soul  is  immortal  I  do  not  know,  but 
I  cannot  conceive  the  dissolution  and  death  of  it  as  of  the 
body.  I  assume  that  it  does  not  die,  because  this  assump- 
tion comforts  me  and  is  not  in  itself  irrational.  What  hap- 
piness or  punishment  there  may  be  besides  those  which 
result  from  the  contemplation  of  the  highest  being  and 
from  the  judgments  of  conscience,  I  do  not  know ;  but  I 
must  think  that  men  will  be  rewarded  according  to  their 
deserts,  and  that  justice  is  done  already  in  this  life.  I  can 
conceive  no  greater  good  that  any  being  could  expect  to 
realize  hereafter  than  to  be  permitted  to  live  according  to 
its  nature.  The  moral  disorder  of  the  world  does  not 
shake,  but  rather  confirms,  my  faith  in  providence.  I  en- 
deavor to  shun  the  two  extremes  of  heartless  freethinking 
and  blind  credulity,  —  I  dare  confess  God  before  the 
philosophers,  and  preach  humanity  to  persecutors.  The 
various  religions  of  men  are  so  many  modes  of  worship, 
differing  merely  according  to  requirements  of  climate, 
government,  spirit  of  the  people,  etc. ;  they  are  essentially 
the  same,  and  good  only  so  far  as  God  is  in  them.  Reli- 
gion is  essentially  of  the  heart.  The  duties  of  religion  are 
independent  of  the  affairs  of  men,  but  no  religion  absolves 
from  the  duties  of  morality,  which  are  alone  truly  essential. 
The  State.  —  The  State  rests  upon  a  contract  by  which 
all  individuals  alienate  to  the  community,  or  general  will, 
their  natural  rights.  Outside  society  man  exists  in  a  state 
of  nature,  which  is  not,  indeed,  a  state  of  war,  but  a  state 
similar  to  that  in  which  brutes  live  :  instinct,  instead  of 
reason,  ruling  action.  But  self-preservation  and  the  satis- 
faction of  need  are  with  difficulty  secured  in  such  a  condi- 
tion, and  to  obviate  the  difficulty  society  is  established. 
The  alienation  of  rights  through  which  society  is  established 
is  an  alienation  of  personal  freedom  and  property.  The 


ROUSSEAU.  241 

purpose  of  the  alienation  is  a  redistribution  and  equaliza- 
tion of  rights ;  a  legitimation  of  what  were,  before  the 
alienation,  rights  merely,  as  it  were,  by  usurpation.  In 
society  the  general  will  (la  volonte  generate),  or  the  will  of 
the  people,  is  sovereign,  since  the  civil  order  should  in  its 
essence  be  as  little  as  possible  removed  from  the  state  of 
nature.  The  general  will  is  infallible,  and  always  attains  to 
justice,  since  justice  is  merely  what  the  general  will  deter- 
mines :  "  if  the  people  wrong  itself,  no  one  has  a  right  to 
interfere."  The  general  will  must  be  ascertained,  not  through 
assemblies  of  deputies  or  representatives,  but  from  a  direct 
expression  through  meetings  of  the  populace.  At  each 
meeting  of  the  populace  it  must  be  formally  decided 
whether  or  not  the  sovereign  (the  people)  pleases  to  main- 
tain the  existing  form  of  government,  and  whether  or  not 
it  pleases  to  leave  the  administration  of  the  government 
with  those  who  actually  have  it  in  charge.  The  change  of 
the  existing  form  of  government  is  not  revolution ;  there 
is  no  revolution,  whatever  the  State  chooses  to  do  being 
ipso facto  legal.  The  general  will  must  be  executed  by  a 
power  directly  subject  to  itself.  The  monarchy,  therefore, 
is  the  worst  form  of  government,  the  republic  the  best. 
Religion,  like  property,  must  be  under  the  control  of  the 
State.  As  individuals,  men  may  think  as  seems  reasonable 
to  them,  but  as  citizens  they  must  recognize  the  public 
religion.  The  essentials  of  this  religion  are  the  belief  in  an 
intelligent,  benevolent,  prescient,  providential  God,  a  future 
life,  the  happiness  of  the  just,  the  punishment  of  the 
wicked,  the  sanctity  of  the  social  contract.  Non-believers 
must  be  punished  with  death.  (At  this  point  appears  most 
plainly  the  connection  between  Rousseau's  Deism  and  his 
theory  of  Society.) 

Morality  and  Education.  —  Man  is  born  good  :  instinct, 
primal  sentiment,  unaltered,  tend  spontaneously  to  the 
good.  Goodness  is  life  according  to  nature,  or  to  what 
we  are  by  nature.  Goodness  has  to  be  attained  by  recall- 
ing conscience  to  the  sentiment  of  good  and  evil,  which 
VOL.  i.  — 16 


242        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

sophistry  and  conventionality  have  obscured.  This  is  the 
problem  of  education.  Education  is  of  a  threefold  nature  : 
it  conies  from  nature,  from  men,  and  from  things.  As 
coming  from  nature,  it  is,  so  far  as  the  human  teacher  is 
concerned,  negative.  The  teacher  must,  in  dealing  with 
the  very  young,  let  nature  have  her  way  almost  entirely, 
must  "  keep  the  child  from  doing  anything."  And  even 
in  later  stages  of  instruction  the  teacher  must  not  so  much 
give  information  as  cause  the  child,  by  the  exertion  of  its 
natural  powers,  to  discover  of  itself  what  it  should  know. 
The  successive  stages  in  education  are  (i)  education  of 
the  body  and  the  senses  (till  the  twelfth  year)  ;  (2)  intel- 
lectual education  (from  the  twelfth  to  the  fifteenth  year)  ; 
(3)  moral  education  (from  the  fifteenth  to  the  twentieth 
year).  Intellectual  education  should  be  entirely  utilita- 
rian, —  history,  language,  and  literature  must  be  proscribed, 
and,  in  their  stead,  the  practical  arts  and  sciences  pursued ; 
moral  education  should  be  sentimental ;  religious  educa- 
tion must  begin  late,  to  avoid  superstition.  Females 
must  be  educated  solely  with  reference  to  wifehood.  The 
natural  man,  who  is  the  beginning  of  the  process  of  educa- 
tion, is  not  a  "  savage  banished  to  the  primal  wilderness," 
but  a  "  savage  who  is  to  dwell  in  towns,"  and  to  see  with 
his  own  eyes  and  feel  with  his  own  heart ;  in  a  word,  to 
be  ruled  by  reason. 

Result.  —  Rousseau  belongs  almost,  if  not  quite,  as  much 
to  the  third  as  to  the  second  period  of  Modern  Philosophy. 
In  him,  at  least,  individual  self-consciousness  receives  some- 
thing like  its  due.  His  Deism,  however,  connects  him 
with  the  second  period. 

§  82. 

Charles  Bonnet  (1720-1793).  —  Bonnet,  though  of 
French  descent,  was  born  in  Switzerland,  and  always  lived 
there.  He  early  began  studies  in  natural  history,  and 
made  therein  important  discoveries,  which  won  him  mem- 
bership in  the  Royal  Society  of  London,  the  Academy 


BONNET.  243 

of  Sciences  in  Paris,  in  Gottingen,  in  Stockholm,  etc.  In 
him  were  combined  with  the  attributes  of  the  scientist 
those  of  poet  and  metaphysician.  He  applied  in  physical 
speculation  Leibnitzian  metaphysical  principles.  He  pos- 
sesses considerable  importance  in  the  history  of  the  doc- 
trine of  organic  evolution. 

Works.  —  Bonnet's  principal  philosophical  works  are  : 
"  Essai  Analytique  sur  les  Facultes  de  1'Ame  et  sur  la  Me- 
chanique  de  ses  FaculteV  (1759);  "La  Palingenesie 
philosophique,  ou  Id£es  sur  1'Etat  pass£  et  sur  1'Etat  futur 
des  Etres  vivants  "  (1769). 

Philosophy.  —  Man  is  the  product  of  the  union  of  a 
certain  soul  with  a  certain  body.  The  nature  of  the  union 
of  body  and  soul,  we  do  not  understand.  To  the  union 
we  owe  our  ideas :  all  ideas,  that  is  to  say,  originate  in 
sense,  and  depend  upon  the  operation  of  the  nerve -fibres. 
To  understand  ideas,  we  must  understand  fibres  and  their 
action.  There  are  different  fibres  for  different  sorts  of 
sensation  (a  statement  which  appears  to  be  an  anticipation 
of  the  current  theory  of  the  specific  energy  of  the  nerves) . 
A  fibre  that  has  once  undergone  movement  has  acquired 
a  tendency  to  reproduce  the  movement  once  impressed 
upon  it.  The  second  impression  made  in  such  fibre  natu- 
rally differs  from  the  first.  The  mind  recognizes  the  dif- 
ference by  means  of  a  difference  in  the  felt  resistance 
offered  by  a  fibre  to  movement.  The  conscious  effort  of 
the  soul  to  prolong  received  impressions  is  attention.  The 
persistence  of  impressions  in  the  brain  is  the  ground  of 
memory.  Memory  is  the  basis  of  personality.  Reflection, 
comparison,  astonishment,  surprise,  etc.,  have  a  physical 
basis.  In  will  the  soul  is  self-determining,  —  possesses 
freedom.  The  soul  is  not  self-conscious,  —  cannot  really 
know  by  self-observation  its  own  activities :  these  are 
known  only  by  physiological  observation  and  reflection.  All 
souls  survive  after  death,  and  continue  to  exist  in  union 
with  bodily  organs.  The  body  of  the  soul  after  death  is 
a  new  body,  though  already  present  in  germ  in  the  actual 


244        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

body.  Its  substance  is  an  etherealized  matter  analogous 
to  fire  or  electric  fluid,  and  of  great  mobility.  In  the  uni- 
verse there  is  a  single  scale  of  life,  including  all  animals 
and  plants,  together  with  man.  This  scale,  since  the  inter- 
val between  the  finite  and  infinite  is  infinite,  contains  an 
infinitude  of  degrees  of  perfection.  All  beings  gradually 
rise  in  the  scale  of  perfection,  one  degree  leading  to  the 
next  higher,  and  so  on ;  and  all  are  animate.  The  stimu- 
lating agency  of  all  activity  is  pleasure  and  pain ;  the  end 
of  all  activity  is  happiness. 

§  83. 

Jean  Baptists  Robinet  (1735-1820).  —  Robinet  was 
educated  as  a  Jesuit,  but  left  the  order  to  become  a  phi- 
losopher. He  went  to  Holland  to  think  and  write.  For 
a  number  of  years  he  was  engaged  in  translating  English 
novels,  in  writing  for  journals,  and  on  other  of  the  less  am- 
bitious kinds  of  literary  work.  His  chief  work  is  entitled 
"De  la  Nature"  (1761-1768). 

Philosophy.  —  According  to  Robinet  there  is  everywhere 
compensation,  the  correlation,  or  equilibrium,  of  good  and 
evil,  being  and  non-being.  The  changing  existence  of 
finite  beings  is  a  continual  interchange  of  these  two  prin- 
ciples ;  there  is  no  nutrition  without  waste,  no  activity 
which  does  not  destroy.  This  being  the  case,  all  beings 
may  be  regarded  as  only  varieties  of  the  animal  type. 
Instinct  (Leibnitz's  "appetition")  is  the  universal  law 
of  nature.  There  is  no  soul  without  body,  no  body  with- 
out soul.  Above  the  changing  finite,  which  is  the  union 
of  being  and  non-being,  are  the  immutable  infinite  (or 
God),  and  its  correlative,  Nothing.  God  is  unknowable. 
Anthropomorphism  must  be  avoided  in  the  doctrine  of 
God.  The  only  categories  that  can  be  applied  to  him 
are  those  of  cause  and  infinitude.  Creation  is  eternal,  but 
not  the  world  or  created  objects.  Knowledge  has  a  sen- 
sible origin.  Morality  is  an  instinct.  —  Robinet  follows 
Locke  in  the  theory  of  knowledge,  Leibnitz  in  that  of 


CONDILLAC. 


245 


being,  Hutcheson  in  that  of  morality.  Some  have  found 
in  his  doctrines  anticipations  of  the  Natur- Philosophic  of 
Schelling. 

§  84. 

Etienne  Bonnot  de  Condillac^  (1715-1780).  —  Con- 
dillac  was  of  a  noble,  but  not  wealthy,  family.  Though 
he  entered  the  Church,  he  was  an  abbe  only  in  name. 
Most  of  his  life  seems  to  have  been  spent  in  retirement 
as  student  and  writer.  He  was  in  his  youth  a  friend 
of  Rousseau.  At  one  time  he  was  tutor  to  the  Duke 
of  Parma  (grandson  of  Louis  XV.),  on  whose  account 
several  of  his  works  were  written. 

Works.  —  Of  Condillac's  works  the  following  seem  to 
be  the  most  important :  "  Essai  sur  1'Origine  des  Con- 
naissances  Humaines "  (1746);  "Traite'  des  Systemes  " 
(1749),  —  criticises  the  systems  of  Malebranche,  Spinoza, 
Leibnitz,  etc. ;  "  Trait<§  des  Sensations  "  (1754)  ;  "  Trait6 
des  Animaux  "  (1755);  "  L'Art  de  Raisonner"  (1755); 
"La  Logique"  (1780);  "  La  Langue  des  Calculs  "  (pub. 
1798).  The  principal  work  is  " Trait6  des  Sensations." 

Philosophy :  Origin  of  Ideas.  —  Condillac  is,  in  general, 
a  Lockean  first  (in  the  "Essai  sur  1'Origine,"  etc.),  then 
(in  the  "Trait6  des  Sensations")  an  emendator,  his 
emendation  consisting  in  the  reduction  of  the  sources  of 
knowledge  from  two  to  one ;  *'.  e.,  in  treating  reflection 
as  a  form  of  sensation.  Beginning  with  the  simplest  order 
of  sensations  (those  of  smell),  he  seeks  to  show  how  the 
higher  follow,  as  the  mind  develops,  in  the  order  of  their 
degree.  The  mind  receives,  as  tabula  rasa,  a  number 
of  impressions,  —  has  a  number  of  "  perceptions,"  —  one 
of  which  predominates  in  vividness  in  relation  to  the  rest, 
and  fixes  the  (passive)  energy  of  the  mind  upon  itself, 
thus  begetting  attention.  This  act  of  attention  is  suc- 
ceeded by  others,  the  earlier,  however,  not  becoming  lost. 
These  being  conjoined  in  a  single  act  of  attention,  there 

1  Franck,  Works  of  Condillac,  and  "  Encyclopaedia  Britannica." 


246        A    HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

arises  the  idea  of  past  and  present  impressions ;  /.  <?.,  of 
memory  as  well  as  of  attention.  The  act  of  attending  to 
the  two  impressions  or  "  attentions "  at  the  same  time 
is  comparison,  which,  as  implying  the  perception  of  resem- 
blance and  difference,  is  judgment.  Upon  judgment  fol- 
low reasoning  and  reflection,  which  is  attention  passing 
successively  over  the  various  parts  of  an  object.  Attention, 
memory,  comparison,  judgment,  reasoning,  reflection,  are 
but  different  stages  of  attention.  From  sensation  arise 
also  the  "  affections  "  of  the  mind,  —  desire,  volition,  etc., 
—  through  the  mediation  of  the  feelings  of  pleasure  and 
pain  (which  indeed  are  the  sources  of  attention).  Atten- 
tion directed  to  a  present  disagreeable  impression,  in  con- 
trast with  a  past  agreeable  sensation,  makes  us  feel  the 
need  of  change  in  our  condition.  This  feeling,  together 
with  the  idea  of  the  thing  conceived  as  agreeable,  consti- 
tutes desire,  which  may  be  defined  as  the  "  action  of  the 
understanding  determined  towards  a  particular  object  by 
the  uneasiness  caused  by  the  privation  of  that  object." 
From  desire  flow  all  other  affections.  Desire,  strengthened 
by  the  idea  of  the  attainability  of  its  object,  is  transformed 
into  will.  The  mass  of  remembered  and  present  sensa- 
tions constitutes  the  /.  Self- consciousness,  or  the  power 
to  say  /,  depends  on  memory.  The  knowledge  of  the 
body  and  of  external  objects  — ;'.  e.,  of  magnitude,  motion, 
position,  distance  —  comes  to  us  only  through  the  opera- 
tion of  the  sense  of  touch  :  by  the  other  four  senses  we 
do  not  get  "  outside  "  of  our  minds  at  all.  The  seat  of  all 
sensation  is  the  soul  (not  the  body,  —  Condillac  denies 
being  a  materialist),  and,  in  the  last  analysis,  we  know 
only  our  own  thoughts.  —  Condillac  employs,  to  explain 
the  growth  of  experience,  the  fancy — which  has  become 
a  familiar  one  —  of  a  statue,  organized  similarly  as  a  human 
being,  caused  by  an  experimenter  gradually  and  systemati- 
cally to  acquire  knowledge  and  power  of  action. 

The  Method  of  Knowledge.  —  The    fundamental   prin- 
ciple of  thought  and  the  test  of  truth  is  the  logical  principle 


DE   TRACY.  247 

of  identity.  Thought  is  purely  analytical,  the  discovering 
of  propositions  by  means  of  the  mere  explication  of  given 
propositions.  The  ideal  norm  of  method  in  all  sciences 
is  mathematics.  Science  is  merely  well-formed  language 
(langue  bienfaite) ,  In  this  sense,  it  presupposes  a  "  given  " 
knowledge  of  the  external  and  internal  worlds,  —  "  evi- 
dence of  fact"  and  "evidence  of  feeling;  "  hence,  while 
mathematics  is  our  "method,"  nature  is  our  "guide." 

§  85. 

Destutt  de  Tracy  (1754-1836).  —  De  Tracy,  who  was 
of  a  "  noble "  family,  was  educated  at  the  University  of 
Strasburg,  and  adopted  the  profession  of  his  father,  who 
had  died  as  a  field-marshal.  He  sat  in  the  Constitutional 
Assembly,  and  always  remained  loyal  to  the  political  princi- 
ples of  1 789.  For  political  reasons  he  retired  from  the 
post  of  field-marshal,  to  which  he  had  been  appointed,  and 
devoted  himself  to  science,  in  company  with  Cabanis  and 
Condorcet.  During  the  Reign  of  Terror  he  was  imprisoned, 
and  came  near  ending  his  life  on  the  guillotine.  During  his 
imprisonment,  which  lasted  almost  a  year,  he  became  intro- 
spective in  mental  habit,  and,  through  the  influence  of  the 
study  of  Locke  and  Condillac,  formed  the  resolve  to  aban- 
don the  study  of  the  natural  sciences  for  that  of  mind. 
Under  the  Empire  he  was  senator,  during  the  Restoration 
made  peer  of  France.  He  was  elected  to  the  French 
Academy,  and  was  an  important  member  of  the  Academy 
of  Moral  and  Political  Sciences.  He  had  the  highest  con- 
fidence as  to  the  truth  of  his  philosophical  and  political 
convictions,  and  was,  it  is  told,  deeply  saddened  at  their 
becoming,  or  seeming  to  become,  obsolete. 

Works.  —  The  principal  works  of  De  Tracy  are  :  "  Ele" - 
ments  dTddologie  "  (1804-1824),  and  "  Commentaire  sur 
1'Esprit  des  Lois"  (1819).  The  former  includes  the  fol- 
lowing special  treatises  :  "  Traite1  de  VolonteY '  "  Grammaire 
Ge"ne"rale,"  "  Logique,"  "  Ideologic." 

Philosophy  :  The  Problems  of  Philosophy.  —  Philosophy 


248        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

has  the  three  problems  of  (i)  giving  an  account  of  the 
means  of  knowledge,  (2)  applying  these  means  to  our  will, 
(3)  applying  them  to  the  study  of  external  objects.  To 
these  correspond  three  groups  of  sciences :  ( i )  ideology, 
grammar,  logic;  (2)  political  economy,  morals,  politics; 
(3)  physics,  geometry,  arithmetic. 

Ideology.  —  Ideology  is  the  "  first  philosophy,"  upon 
which  all  other  sciences  depend  for  their  foundation  and 
method.  All  ideas  and  faculties  originate  in  sensation ;  to 
think  is  to  feel  (Denser,  c'est  sentir) .  The  immediate  ob- 
jects of  the  faculty  of  thinking  or  feeling  may  be  termed 
"  sensations,"  "  sentiments,"  "  ideas,"  "  perceptions."  These 
are  of  four  classes, —  "  sensations  proper,"  "  memories,"  "  re- 
lations between  sensations,"  "desires."  Four  correspond- 
ing faculties  are :  sensibility,  properly  so  called,  memory, 
judgment,  will.  Sensibility  is  the  property  of  our  nature 
by  virtue  of  which  we  receive  impressions  of  various  sorts 
and  have  consciousness.  Our  "  external "  sensations  are 
caused  by  the  action  of  objects  upon  the  extremities  of  the 
nerves  :  "  internal  "  sensations  by  the  action  of  the  nerves 
in  the  interior  of  the  body  resulting  from  the  functioning 
of  organs  or  lesions  of  different  parts  of  the  body,  etc. 
Memory  depends  on  certain  permanent  conditions  of  the 
brain.  Judgment  is  directly  involved  in  the  connecting, 
in  a  feeling  of  agreement,  of  sensations.  Desire  and  will 
are  respectively  passive  and  active  conditions  of  the  same 
form  of  thinking  faculty.  All  acts  of  the  thinking  faculty, 
will  included,  are  subject  to  the  law  of  necessity.  Our 
knowledge  of  external  objects  as  such  comes  through  the 
feeling  of  resistance  acquired  through  voluntary  movement. 
Ideology  is  a  part  of  zoology  (/'.  <?.,  in  later  terminology, 
psychology  is  a  part  of  biology).  De  Tracy's  ideology  is 
a  combination  of  the  physiological  psychology  of  Cabanis 
with  the  "  introspective  "  psychology  of  Condillac,  the  latter 
element  predominating. 

Morals.  —  Man,  as  having  desires,  has  a  capacity  for  suf- 
fering and  enjoyment,  has  needs,  rights,  duties.  His  rights 


HELV&TIUS.  249 

are  determined  by  his  needs,  his  duties  by  his  power  of 
satisfying  these.  The  fundamental  principle  of  morals  is 
that  our  "  rights  are  always  without  limit,  our  duties  are 
always  only  the  general  duty  of  satisfying  our  needs  :  every 
one  has  the  right  to  do  what  he  pleases  and  can ;  there  is 
neither  justice  nor  injustice." 

Politics.  —  The  true  government  is  one  of  pure  represen- 
tation under  one  or  more  leaders,  —  a  government  sprung 
from  and  founded  on  the  general  will,  having  for  its  princi- 
ple reason,  its  means  liberty,  its  effects  happiness  —  a  gov- 
ernment in  which  the  rulers  are  servants,  and  punishment 
is  simply  for  the  prevention  of  wrong.  Here  we  have  in  a 
nutshell  the  "  philosophy  "  of  the  moving  spirit  of  the  French 
Revolution. 

Residt.  —  De  Tracy  has  been  called  the  "logician  or 
metaphysician  "  of  the  "  sensualistic  school." 

§  86. 

Claude  Adrien  Helvetius^  (1715-1771).  —  Helve' tius, 
who  was  the  son  of  the  court-physician  at  Paris,  and  edu- 
cated at  the  College  of  Louis-le-Grand,  had,  it  would  seem, 
neither  externally  nor  internally  very  favorable  conditions 
given  him  for  the  attainment  of  philosophic  wisdom.  He 
had  influential  friends,  was  wealthy,  vain  of  his  person, 
without  taste  for  really  scientific  pursuits,  ambitious  to 
shine  in  polite  society,  —  was,  in  short,  a  spoiled  favorite 
of  earthly  fortune.  He  held  a  lucrative  political  office  for 
a  number  of  years,  and  feasted  his  friends  frequently  after 
he  retired  from  it.  The  publication  of  Condillac's  "  Trait6 
des  Sensations  "  excited  his  intellectual  vanity  to  attempt 
the  production  of  a  philosophical  work,  the  result  of  his 
attempt  being  the  (once)  famous  "  De  1'Esprit."  He  died 
of  an  attack  of  gout.  He  left  behind  a  name  for  kindliness 
and  for  liberality  in  giving.  In  his  youth  he  was  fond  of 
reading  Locke. 

l  Noack  ;  Martineau,  "  Types  of  Ethical  Theory,"  vol.  ii. 


250        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Works.  —  Besides  the  "  De  TEsprit"  (1758),  which  is 
his  best  work,  he  composed  numerous  other  works,  of 
which  we  may  mention  here  "  De  PHomme  ;  de  ses 
Faculte's  intellectuelles  et  de  son  Education"  (1772), 
—  which  is  a  new  version  of  the  earlier  work,  —  and  "  Les 
Progres  de  la  Raison  dans  le  Recherche  du  Vrai"  (1775). 
There  were  published  in  various  languages,  fifty  editions  of 
the  "  De  1'Esprit  "  in  a  short  time. 

Philosophy.  —  The  opinions  of  Helvetius  were  very  largely 
borrowed  from  writers  of  the  empirico-sensualistic  school. 
In  man,  says  Helvetius,  all  is  the  result  of  bodily  organiza- 
tion, and  is  to  be  explained  by  corporeal  sensibility.  The 
law  of  man's  nature  is  to  seek  pleasure  and  avoid  pain.  By 
this  law  —  the  law  of  interest  —  he  acquires  ideas,  or  the 
impressions  of  relations,  and  the  power  of  understanding ; 
by  this  law  also  are  his  actions  determined :  man  is  a 
machine  set  in  motion  and  kept  running  by  corporeal 
sensibility.  The  passions  of  man,  which  have  their  origin 
purely  in  the  impulse  to  seek  pleasure  and  avoid  pain, 
are  of  two  sorts, —  those  depending  immediately  on  the 
bodily  sensations,  and  those  depending  on  ideal,  that  is, 
artistic  and  social,  sensations.  Both  sorts  centre  in  self- 
love,  by  which  even  the  most  disinterested  actions  are  ex- 
plainable. "  If  a  man  does  good  to  his  fellows,  if  he 
sacrifices  himself  for  his  father,  his  son,  or  his  country,  it  is 
because  he  finds  in  doing  that  action,  in  imposing  a  sacri- 
fice upon  himself,  a  pleasure  greater  than  the  sufferings 
which  may  follow  it.  An  action  which,  besides  procuring 
pleasure  for  ourselves,  also  benefits  others,  receives  the 
name  of  virtue ;  but  all  virtue  has  for  its  final  purpose  the 
satisfying  of  self-interest."  The  problem  of  morals  and 
legislation  is  to  combine  the  interest  of  the  whole  with 
that  of  the  individual.  There  is  and  can  be  no  conflict 
between  virtue  and  justice,  on  the  one  hand,  and  interest, 
on  the  other.  Rather  are  the  passions  necessary  to  the 
highest  virtue.  The  virtue  of  him  who  is  incapable  of 
passion  is  a  passive  virtue,  —  the  virtue  of  indolence.  We 


DIDEROT.  25 1 

require  passion  to  prevent  us  from  gravitating  continually 
towards  indolence  and  inactivity ;  hence  the  passions  must 
be  encouraged,  strengthened.  To  this  end  it  is  necessary 
to  gratify  them,  to  excite  them  with  promised  rewards  and 
threatened  punishment,  to  elaborate  them  by  means  of 
education.  Without  them  there  is  nothing  good  or  beau- 
tiful or  great  among  men.  The  unhappiness  of  men  is 
merely  the  consequence  of  an  unenlightened  self-love.  Let 
men  be  educated  to  a  full  consciousness  of  their  moving 
principle.  All  men  are  by  nature  equal  in  capacity  of 
self- enjoyment,  since  all  have  the  same  natural  power  of 
sensibility ;  the  differences  among  them  are  differences 
of  education.  Legislators  should  exercise  the  power  they 
have  to  mould  by  education  the  characters  and  manners 
of  the  people  as  they  please.  They  should  employ  this 
power  for  the  increase  of  the  happiness  (the  greatest  pos- 
sible physical  pleasure)  of  man.  —  Helv£tius  has  exercised 
an  influence,  through  Bentham,  upon  Nineteenth  Century 
Utilitarianism. 

§87. 

Denis  Diderot  (1713-1784). — Diderot  was  educated 
at  a  Jesuit  school  at  Langres  (his  birthplace)  and  at  the 
College  d'Harcourt  in  Paris.  Refusing  to  adopt,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  wish  of  his  father,  the  profession  of  law,  he 
chose  that  of  letters,  in  which  after  many  years  of  hard  labor 
and  privation  he  acquired  great  eminence,  particularly  as 
chief  editor  of,  and  contributor  towards,  the  great  French 
"  Encyclopedic."  Though  not  a  very  systematic  thinker, 
he  is  regarded  as  one  of  the  most  original  and  fertile  minds 
of  France  of  the  eighteenth  century. 

Works.  —  Diderot's  standpoint  twice  changed  :  he  was  a 
"theist,"  a  "deist,"  and  an  "atheist"  (or  rather  natural- 
istic pantheist)  in  succession.  His  "  Principes  de  la  Philo- 
sophic Morale,  ou  Essai  sur  la  V£rit£  et  sur  la  Vertu  "  ( 1 745) 
—  a  free  rendering  of  Shaftesbury's  "  Inquiry  Concerning 
Virtue  and  Merit  "  —  was  written  by  him  as  a  "theist."  In 


252        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

his  "Pens£es  Philosophiques  "  (1746),  "Promenade  d'un 
Sceptique  "  (1747),  "Lettre  sur  les  Aveugles"  (1749), 
"  Lettres  sur  les  Sourds  et  Muets  "  (1751),  and  in  his  articles 
for  the  "  Encyclopedic,  ou  Dictionnaire  Raisonne"  des  Scien- 
ces, des  Arts,  et  des  Metiers"  (175 1-175 7), he  is  generally 
deist.  (The  "  Encyclopedic  "  was  a  sort  of  mouthpiece  of 
the  deistic  and  materialistic  thinkers  in  France  in  the  mid- 
dle of  last  century.)  His  atheistic  views  are  expressed  in 
his  "Pense"es  sur  1' Interpretation  de  la  Nature"  (1754), 
"  Entretien  entre  d'Alembert  et  Diderot"  (1769),  "  Le 
Reve  d'Alembert"  (1769),  —  a  sequel  to  the  "Entre- 
tien,"—  "Sur  la  Matiere  et  le  Mouvement  "  (1770). 

Philosophy.  —  In  his  first  period  Diderot  regards  ortho- 
dox theism  as  the  only  metaphysical  doctrine  favorable 
to  virtue,  and  deism  as  shallow.  In  his  second,  or  as  a 
deist,  he  thinks  that  even  atheism  is  preferable  to  super- 
stition, and  that  metaphysic,  in  the  ordinary  sense,  is  as 
nothing  compared  with  common-sense,  that  the  only  wea- 
pons of  warfare  against  atheism  are  the  Newtonian  physics, 
that  natural  religion  is  the  only  religion  superior  to  all  cavil 
or  objection.  In  his  third  period  Diderot  maintains  the 
view  that  the  first  principle  of  things  is  matter  endowed 
with  a  psychic  force,  or  life.  Everywhere  there  is  sensi- 
bility and  activity,  though  in  the  lower  and  lowest  grades 
of  being  these  are,  as  it  were,  imprisoned.  "  Body  is, 
according  to  some  philosophers,  in  itself  without  action 
and  without  force.  This  is  a  monstrous  error,  contrary 
to  all  good  physics,  to  all  good  chemistry.  In  itself,  by 
the  nature  of  its  essential  qualities,  whether  it  be  considered 
in  molecules  or  in  masses,  it  is  full  of  activity  and  force." 
This  new  view  takes  with  Diderot,  first,  the  shape  of  a 
(quasi-Leibnitzian)  dynamic  atomism,  and  afterwards  of  a 
pure  monism,  since  he  denies  all  real  independent  existence 
of  individuals,  and  asserts  that  only  of  one  individual, — 
the  All.  Man  is  a  part  of  nature ;  the  soul  is  not  separate 
from  the  body,  psychology  is  merely  physiology  of  the 
nerves.  In  the  properties  and  conditions  of  our  sense- 


LAMETTRIE.  253 

organs  lie  also  the  conditions  and  qualities  of  moral  con- 
duct. Freedom  of  will  is  a  delusion.  Diderot  approves  the 
ethics  of  Epicurus,  and  the  Hobbean  view  of  natural  right, 
though  not  of  society,  for  he  maintains  that  laws  are  for 
the  good  of  all,  not  of  one  alone.  Beauty,  says  Diderot,  is 
relative  to  us,  but  is  an  object  of  thought,  and  not  of  sen- 
sation. Our  ideas  of  beauty  (i.  e.,  order,  arrangement,  pro- 
portion, harmony)  arise  to  us  from  our  needs  and  the  na- 
tural exercise  of  our  faculties.  By  means  of  the  standard 
thus  gained  we  judge  of  the  beauty  of  beings  surrounding  us. 

§88. 

Julien  Offray  de  Lamettrie  (1709—1752).  —  Lamettrie, 
after  a  thorough  early  training,  took  courses  in  medicine  at 
the  universities  of  Rheims  and  Leyden.  At  the  latter  uni- 
versity he  heard  the  celebrated  Boerhaave.  He  entered  the 
army  in  the  capacity  of  a  physician,  and  while  sick  with 
fever,  or  at  least  in  consequence  of  observations  he  made 
upon  his  mental,  in  connection  with  his  bodily,  condition 
during  the  illness,  conceived  the  idea  of  explaining  all 
thought  as  a  consequence  of  bodily  organization,  and  wrote 
a  treatise  embodying  and  developing  the  idea.  The  trea- 
tise provoked  hostile  criticism,  and  he  wrote  others  in  reply 
to  critics.  His  opinions  caused  his  exile  from  France,  and 
even  from  Holland.  He  took  refuge  with  Frederick  the 
Great,  with  whom  he  lived  in  greatest  intimacy,  and  by 
whom  he  was  made  member  of  the  Prussian  Academy  of 
Sciences. 

Works.  —  Of  Lamettrie's  numerous  works,  the  most 
important  are:  "Histoire  Naturelle  de  PAme"  (1745), 
"  L'Homme-Machine  "  (1748).  Others  are  "  L'Homme 
Plante"  (1748).  "  Discours  sur  le  Bonheur,  la  Volupte", 
1'Art  de  Jouir "  (1751).  He  was  formerly  supposed  to 
be  the  author  of  (D'Holbach's)  "Systeme  de  la  Nature." 

Philosophy.  —  Matter  possesses  the  power  to  feel,  think, 
and  move.  Human  thought  and  will  originate  in  sensation. 
All  memory  is  explicable  by  organic  or  bodily  conditions. 


254        A  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

What  we  eat  and  drink  determines  our  thought  and  action. 
Physicians,  not  metaphysicians,  are  the  true  philosophers. 
Happiness  depends  on  sensuous  enjoyment.  Such  enjoy- 
ment may  be  enhanced  by  reflection  :  the  educated  man 
has  higher  enjoyment  than  the  ignorant.  There  is  every 
probability  of  a  Supreme  Being,  but  there  is  nothing  absurd 
in  the  idea  of  an  eternal  machine.  Belief  in  God  is  not 
without  real  value  for  mankind,  though  religion  does  not 
necessarily  have  morality  as  a  consequence.  Death  is  an- 
nihilation. Life  is  a  farce. 

§89. 

Paul Heinrich  Dietrich,  Baron  (THolbach*  (1723-1789). 
—  D'Holbach,  though  a  native  of  Bavaria,  was  educated, 
and  spent  most  of  his  life,  in  Paris.  Inheriting  great  wealth, 
he  became  a  generous  patron  of  artists,  men  of  letters, 
philosophers,  and  kept  open  house,  as  it  were,  for  his 
learned  friends  (among  whom  were  Condillac,  Helvetius, 
Diderot,  Hume,  Turgot,  and,  for  a  time,  Rousseau),  who 
dubbed  him  "  maitre  d'hotel  de  la  philosophic."  At  his 
house,  dinners  were  regularly  eaten  by  his  friends  on  Sun- 
days and  Thursdays,  and  at  table,  political,  religious,  and 
philosophical  questions  were  debated.  D'Holbach  had  a 
varied  learning,  and  was  a  collaborator  on  the  "  Encyclo- 
pedic," for  which  he  translated  articles  from  Dutch  and 
German  on  scientific  topics.  His  personal  character  seems 
to  have  been  an  unusually  attractive  one  ;  he  was  not  only 
hospitable,  but  remarkable  for  courtesy,  gentleness,  modesty, 
and  benevolence. 

Works.  —  D'Holbach  is  now  known  chiefly  by  his  "  Sys- 
teme  de  la  Nature,  ou  des  Lois  du  Monde  Physique  et  du 
Monde  Moral"  (1770),  which  has  rightly  been  called  the 
"  Systematic  chef-d'oeuvre  of  French  Materialism  in  the 
Eighteenth  Century."  Other  works  of  his  are  "  Christia- 
nisme  deVoil£  "  (1767),  "Le  Bon  Sens,  ou  Id£es  naturelles 
oppose"es  aux  Idees  surnaturelles  "(1772),"  Systeme  Social, 
1  Noack;  D'  Holbach,  "System  of  Nature"  (trans.). 


D'HOLBACff.  255 

ou  Principes  Naturals  de  Morale  et  de  la  Politique  "  (i  773), 
—  aims  to  lay  down  a  system  of  morals  and  politics  inde- 
pendent of  religious  systems. 

Philosophy.  —  Though  man  imagines  a  realm  of  existence 
beyond  nature,  there  is  nothing  for  him  outside  nature,  — 
nature  is  the  all.  Nature  shows  us  nothing  but  matter  and 
motion.  Motion,  like  extension,  is  contained  immediately 
in  the  notion  of  matter,  the  sole  existent.  Motion  is  uni- 
versal, —  there  is  no  rest.  All  particular  motions  are  com- 
municated motions,  —  there  is  no  independent  motion.  By 
means  of  motion  of  various  kinds  all  particular  things  origi- 
nate from  matter.  These  motions  are  governed  by  un- 
changeable laws,  fundamental  among  which  are  those  of 
attraction  and  repulsion,  "  sympathy "  and  "  antipathy," 
"love"  and  "hate,"  —  in  a  word,  the  law  that  everything 
seeks  itself :  the  law  of  gravitation  in  the  physical  world,  the 
law  of  self-love  in  the  moral.  Man  is  a  part  of  nature  :  he  is 
a  material  being  purely.  He  experiences  an  external  and  an 
internal  motion,  and  imagines  that  he  has  not  only  a  natural 
body,  but  also  an  immaterial  soul.  But  all  mental  activity  is 
only  movement  in  the  brain,  a  function  of  the  brain.  An 
immaterial  being  could  not  feel  nor  think.  There  is  no  free 
activity,  —  all  feeling,  thought,  willing,  are  ceaselessly  subject 
to  necessity.  To  be  free,  man  must  be  stronger  than  nature, 
or  outside  nature.  Mechanism  everywhere  rules  in  nature, 
and  the  law  of  the  mechanical  association  of  ideas  explains 
all  supposed  freedom.  We  suppose  ourselves  free  because 
we  are  not  conscious  of  our  real  motives.  The  ideas  of 
merit  and  guilt,  reward  and  punishment,  have  meaning 
through  the  fact  (and  only  through  it)  that  they  help  to 
control  passion.  The  soul  is  inseparable  from  the  body, 
is  born,  changes,  and  dies  with  it :  life,  the  condition  of 
the  soul's  existence,  is  merely  the  sum  of  bodily  motions, 
and  ceases  when  those  motions  cease.  Immortality,  then, 
is  a  delusive  idea.  But  the  fear  of  death  is  irrational : 
death  is  but  sleep.  The  loss  of  the  idea  of  heavenly  im- 
mortality is  compensated  for,  in  a  practical  regard,  by 


256        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  idea  of  an  immortality  upon  earth  in  the  minds  and 
lives  of  men.  The  appeals  of  priesthood  to  the  ecclesi- 
astical idea  of  immortality  as  a  moral  motive  may  be 
replaced  by  the  appeal  to  the  idea  of  immortality  in  the 
visible  world.  Animated  by  this  idea,  men  would  not  be 
subject  to  the  fear  of  death,  and  would  live  lives  of  help- 
fulness to  their  fellow-men.  To  contribute  to  the  happi- 
ness of  our  fellow.-men  is  to  be  truly  useful.  Utility  is 
the  criterion  of  morality.  All  men  desire  happiness  :  every 
one  seeks  his  own :  self-love  is  the  fundamental  law  of 
morals.  The  idea  of  God  is  a  superstitious  offspring  of 
ignorance,  unrest,  unhappiness.  Men  need  the  word  "  God  " 
only  to  designate  unknown  causes.  The  idea  of  God,  like 
that  of  the  soul,  is  a  consequence  of  the  error  of  mentally 
separating  soul  and  body,  spirit  and  matter.  It  is  purely 
negative,  and  useless.  The  world  needed  no  creator :  the 
attributes  of  the  uncreated  indestructible  elements  are  ade- 
quate to  its  production.  If  there  were  a  God,  where  should 
he  be  located?  If  in  nature,  he  would  be  merely  matter  or 
motion  ;  if  outside  nature,  he  would  be  immaterial,  and 
would  have  no  place.  The  idea  of  God  is  not  merely  use- 
less, it  is  chimerical,  absurd,  the  cause  of  all  evil  in  society. 
—  The  doctrine  of  D'Holbach  is  the  purest  expression  of 
materialism  in  modern  philosophy,  and  the  last  word  on  the 
subject. 

§  9°- 

Pierre  Jean  Cabanis l  ( 1 75  7-1 808) .  —  Cabanis  studied 
with  priests  at  Cosnac  (his  birthplace)  ;  he  studied  also 
at  the  College  of  Brives,  and  at  Paris.  Though  for  some 
years  student  and  professor  of  belles-lettres  (and  ambitious 
of  literary  distinction),  he  turned  to  the  study  of  medicine, 
took  his  degree  in  1783.  became  professor  of  hygiene  in  a 
school  in  Paris,  administrator  of  hospitals,  and  lecturer  in 
the  National  Institute.  During  the  period  of  the  Revolu- 
tion he  was  closely  associated  with  Mirabeau,  labored  to- 

1  Noack  ;  "  Rapports  du  Physique  et  du  Moral,"  etc. 


CABANIS.  257 

gather  with  him  for  the  cause  of  public  education,  and 
attended  him  as  physician  in  his  last  illness.  He  was  at 
one  time  member  of  the  Council  of  Five  Hundred  and  of 
the  Senate.  Among  his  friends  were,  besides  Mirabeau, 
Diderot,  D'Alembert,  D'Holbach,  Condorcet,  Condillac, 
Voltaire,  Franklin,  and  Jefferson. 

Works.  —  Cabanis'  philosophical  works  are  a  series  of 
memorials,  published  first  (1802)  under  the  title  "Traite' 
du  Physique  et  du  Moral  de  l'Homme,M  again  (1805) 
under  the  title,  "  Rapports  du  Physique  et  du  Moral  de 
1'Homme." 

Philosophy.  —  All  knowledge,  says  Cabanis,  is  knowledge 
of  phenomena.  So-called  first,  or  metaphysical,  causes,  are 
beyond  our  ken.  All  mental  or  psychical  phenomena  must 
be  referred  to  the  bodily  organization  as  their  sole  cause  : 
the  mental  (or  moral)  is  only  the  physical  considered  under 
certain  particular  points  of  view  :  psychology  is  but  an  aspect 
of  physiology.  Living  or  animate  nature  is  distinguished 
from  non-living  or  inanimate  nature  by  the  universal  charac- 
teristic of  sensibility,  or  the  capacity  to  feel.  But  there  forces 
itself  upon  us  the  "  conjecture  that  between  animal  sensi- 
bility, on  the  one  hand,  and  plant  impulse,  and  even  elec- 
tive affinity  and  attraction  of  gravitation,  on  the  other,  there 
is  an  analogy ;  that  vegetable  impulses,  chemical  attraction, 
universal  gravitation,  are  a  sort  of  instinct  which,  though 
varying  and  indefinite  in  the  lower  stages,  develops  more 
and  more  in  the  following,  and  exhibits  in  the  higher  a  sug- 
gestion of  will  and  inclination."  Sensibility,  then,  must  be 
regarded  as  of  physical  origin  and  principle.  There  may 
be  sensibility  without  the  consciousness  of  it,  or  without 
sensation.  Sensibility  arrives  at  consciousness  in  the  brain, 
the  function  of  which  is  to  "  think  "  (to  work  over  the  nervous 
impressions  received  from  without),  as  that  of  the  stomach 
is  to  digest ;  to  "  secrete  thought,"  as  that  of  the  liver  is  to 
"  secrete  bile."  But  even  when  unconscious  it  may  be  the 
determining  condition  of  movement.  It  is  excited  to  ac- 
tivity by  impressions  from  without :  these  impressions  are 

VOL.  i. — 17 


258        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

transmitted  to  a  distributing  centre,  whence  the  nerves 
convey  them  to  the  muscles.  The  medium  of  conduction 
is,  Galvanism  seems  to  show,  electricity.  The  sympathetic 
connection  of  the  parts  of  the  organism  with  one  an- 
other through  the  nervous  system  renders  preposterous  the 
"  statue  "  of  Condillac.  The  operations  of  the  organism  by 
which  perceptions,  conceptions,  judgments,  determinations 
of  will,  are  brought  about,  instead  of  occurring  singly  and 
without  affecting  one  another,  occur  in  connection  with  one 
another  and  modify  one  another.  From  the  motions  of  the 
brain  resulting  from  external  or  internal  impressions  con- 
veyed to  it,  arise  all  operations  of  the  soul  or  mind ;  from  the 
impressions  of  outer  sense  arise  ideas  ;  from  those  of  inner 
sense  or  feelings  in  the  internal  bodily  organs,  instincts,  — 
as,  for  example,  the  maternal  instinct,  which  arises  from 
the  action  of  inner  organs  during  the  period  of  gestation. 
Through  the  brain  (and  nerves)  also  the  mind  acts  on  the 
body.  Les  nerfs,  voila  tout  rhomme !  In  the  nervous 
system  —  and  especially  the  brain  —  is  the  identity  of  the 
physical  and  moral  which  the  method  of  natural  science 
postulates.  —  Cabanis  outgrew  (if  we  may  say  so)  this  pure 
materialism,  and  held  to  the  belief  in  a  universal  intelli- 
gence and  will  above  the  physical  world.  His  earlier 
doctrine  is  a  complete  anticipation  in  many  respects  of  the 
physiological  psychology  of  the  present  moment. 

§  91. 

The  German  "Illumination"  {Aufklarung) >  —  There 
were  in  the  conditions  of  the  age  in  which  the  Leibnitzo- 
Wolffian  philosophy  flourished,  reasons  why  that  philosophy 
should  (in  general)  give  place  to  a  philosophy  the  object  of 
whose  interest  should  be,  not  truth  in  general  and  for  its 
own  sake,  but  a  limited  aspect  of  it  and  for  utility's  sake,  — 
why,  in  other  words,  that  would-be  universalistic,  scientific 
rationalism  should  give  place  to  a  pronouncedly  limited, 
merely  humanistic,  and  even  individualistic  one.  There 

1  Zeller,  Erdmann,  Noack. 


THE   GERMAN  "  ILLUMINATION."  259 

was  in  the  very  spirit  of  the  age  in  Germany  a  distinct  sub- 
jectivism which  revolted  against  custom,  authority,  and  law 
in  all  matters,  and  sought  to  determine  everything  anew  and 
from  inner  original  sources.  This  was  reinforced,  as  regards 
philosophy,  by  an  influx  of  French  materialism  (particularly 
at  the  court  of  the  gallicized  Frederick  the  Great)  and  of 
English  empirical  psychology,  deism,  and  moral  philosophy. 
Even  in  the  Leibnitzo-Wolffian  philosophy,  indeed,  there 
was  an  element  that  was  entirely  in  harmony  with  all  this. 
To  say  nothing  of  a  certain  individualism  implied  in  its 
doctrine  of  monads,  its  insistence  upon  common  intelli- 
gibility and  practicality  as  prime  requisites  of  a  sound 
philosophy,  upon  the  paramount  importance  of  an  "  enlight- 
ened understanding  "  as  a  condition  to  human  welfare  and 
happiness,  was  calculated  to  throw  the  weight  of  its  influ- 
ence with  the  common  mind  entirely  in  the  direction  of  a 
rather  narrow  rationalism,  much  narrower  than  the  system 
of  Wolff  (as  a  system  which  professed  to  take  all  knowledge 
for  its  province)  would  admit  of, —  a  rationalism  that  de- 
spised "  metaphysics  "  and  "  mysticism,"  and  extolled  "  com- 
mon sense  "  and  "  sound  understanding."  It  was  therefore 
in  every  way  natural  that  the  prime  object  of  interest  in 
philosophy  should  be  man,  and  the  question  of  his  present 
and  future  welfare  and  happiness,  that  thought  should 
centre  upon  his  inner  experiences  and  his  faculties;  that 
self- contemplation  and  diaries,  confessions,  autobiographies, 
etc.,  resulting  from  it  should  become  a  fashion ;  that  philo- 
sophical discussion  should  run  mainly  along  the  lines  of 
empirical  psychology,  aesthetics  (utilitarian),  moral  philos- 
ophy (equally  utilitarian),  natural  theology,  and  should  be 
unsystematic  and  not  altogether  profound.  Such  at  least  was 
the  case.  By  far  the  most  important  thinkers  of  the  En- 
lightenment, as  it  is  usually  termed,  are  Moses  Mendelssohn 
and  Lessing.  Besides  these  two  should  be  mentioned  here  : 
Hermann  Samuel  Reimarus  (1694-1768),  a  pronounced 
Woffian  (except  as  to  the  doctrine  of  pre-established 
harmony),  who  sharply  opposed  to  the  ruling  orthodox 
theology  the  teachings  of  a  rationalistic  natural  theology 


260        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

(containing  a  distinction  of  teleology  into  internal  and 
external  which  was  adopted  by  Kant),  and  taught  a  pro- 
nounced eudaemonism ;  Johann  Georg  Sulzer  (1720- 
1779),  noted  chiefly  as  a  writer  in  aesthetics,  but  author  of 
an  ethico-physical  treatise  in  which  the  ground  is  taken 
(for  example)  that  the  divine  goodness  appears  in  the  fact 
that  cherries  do  not  ripen  in  the  winter,  because  then  they 
would  not  taste  so  well  as  in  the  summer,  —  an  instance  of 
the  superficially  anthropomorphic  teaching  in  the  teleology 
of  this  period;  Nicolaus  Tetens  (1736-1805),  a  Leibnitzo- 
Lockian,  who  was  one  of  the  "  first  to  co-ordinate  feeling  as 
a  fundamental  faculty  with  understanding  and  will,"  and 
was  esteemed  and  followed  by  Kant  as  a  psychologist,  and 
was  in  turn  capable  of  appreciating  and  being  influenced 
by  Kant;  Johann  Georg  Heinrich  Feder  (1740-1820),  a 
representative  eclectic  of  the  "  common  sense,"  utilitarian 
type,  who,  together  with  Christoph  Meiners,  established  a 
"  Philosophical  Library  "  for  the  purpose  of  combating  the 
Kantian  Criticism;  Johann  Bernhard  Basedow  (1723- 
1790),  a  successful  popular  pedagogist,  one  of  whose  doc- 
trines may  here  be  mentioned  because  of  the  contrasts  it 
offers  to  a  corresponding  one  of  Kant's,  —  viz.,  that  the 
doctrines  of  the  existence  of  God  and  the  immortality  of 
the  soul  must  be  true  because  belief  in  them  is  morally 
beneficial.1  We  may  now  turn  to  the  two  most  important 
Illuminationists,  Mendelssohn  and  Lessing. 

§  92- 

Moses  Mendelssohn*  (1729-1786).  —  Moses  Mendels- 
sohn was  the  son  of  a  Jewish  teacher  and  author,  of  Dessau. 
He  went  to  Berlin  at  the  age  of  fourteen,  and  in  the  face  of 
many  and  great  difficulties  gained  a  livelihood  (as  a  private 
teacher,  and  as  a  book-keeper  and  manager  of  a  silk  estab- 
lishment), carried  on  his  studies,  and  won  the  recognition 
of  thinkers  and  scholars.  Early  educated  as  a  Jew,  he  was 
always  at  heart  a  Jew,  and  labored  most  nobly  for  the  eleva- 
tion of  his  race,  translating  portions  of  the  Old  Testament 
1  See  Erdmann,  §  300,  II.  2  Zeller,  Erdmann,  Noack. 


MOSES  MENDELSSOHN.  26 1 

into  German,  preparing  a  Jewish  ritual,  championing  the 
cause  of  free  thought  and  universal  toleration,  and  empha- 
sizing certain  central  truths  of  universal  religion.  In  the 
formation  of  his  philosophical  opinions  he  was  much  in- 
fluenced by  personal  intercourse  with  Lessing  and  Nicolai', 
both  pronounced  Illuminationists,  and  by  a  study  of  the 
works  of  Locke,  Shaftesbury,  Hutcheson,  the  Scotch  school, 
Rousseau,  Spinoza,  Leibnitz,  and  Wolff,  —  nearly  all  thinkers 
of  a  rationalistic  type,  and  instrumental  in  bringing  about 
the  philosophical  Illumination  throughout  Germany  in  the 
eighteenth  century. 

Works.  —  Works  of  Mendelssohn  are  :  "  Philosophische 
Gesprache  "  (Philosophical  Dialogues),  (1755)  ;  "  Briefe 
liber  die  Empfindungen "  (Letters  on  the  Sensations), 
(I755)  >  "Phsedon,  oder  iiber  die  Unsterblichkeit  der 
Seele"(Phaedo,  or  on  the  Immortality  of  the  Soul),  (1767)  ; 
"  Morgenstunden,  oder  Vorlesungen  iiber  das  Dasein 
Gottes "  (Morning  Hours,  or  Lectures  on  the  Existence 
of  God),  (1785). 

Philosophy.  —  The  only  worthy  end  of  human  endeavor 
is  the  happiness  and  perfection  of  human  individuals. 
"  Humanity  "  is  a  mere  dead,  fixed  abstraction.  "  Science," 
as  such  merely,  is  likewise  an  empty  abstraction.  The 
prime  requisite  for  the  attainment  of  human  happiness  is  a 
knowledge  of  human  nature,  which  is  gained  only  by  a  care- 
ful psychological  investigation.  This  investigation  must  be 
conducted,  first  of  all,  observation-wise  ;  reason  (the  rea- 
soning faculty)  of  itself  is  liable  to  err,  and  must  be  con- 
trolled by  the  more  primitive  understanding,  whose  material 
is  sensations  and  intuitions.  The  final  criterion  of  truth  is 
practical  need,  —  the  heart.  Between  (and  co-ordinate  with) 
cognition  and  desire  lies  feeling,  which  is  either  pleasurable 
or  painful.  A  pleasurable  feeling  results  from  the  idea  of 
perfection,  a  painful  one  from  the  opposite.  A  feeling 
produced  by  perfection  in  a  sensible  form  is  a  sensation  of 
sensible  beauty.  The  impulse  towards  the  realization  of  the 
idea  of  perfection  is  the  fundamental  impulse  in  human 


262         A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

nature,  and  the  highest  law  of  our  will.  Stated  as  an  injunc- 
tion, this  law  is  :  "  Make  the  inner  and  outer  condition  of  thy- 
self and  others  as  faultless  as  thou  canst."  Indispensable 
for  the  fulfilment  of  this  injunction  and  the  realization  of 
the  idea  of  perfection  is  a  rational  faith  in  God,  in  the  divine 
government  of  the  world,  and  in  the  immortality  of  the  soul. 
Now,  the  existence  of  God  follows  for  us  from  the  idea  of 
the  most  perfect  being  :  the  idea  is  self-contradictory  unless 
God  be.  The  being  of  God  follows,  further,  from  the  con- 
tingent nature  of  the  world.  That  the  soul  is  immortal 
follows  from  such  considerations  as  that :  Nature  knows 
no  real  annihilation;  a  rational  being,  striving  by  the  ne- 
cessity of  its  nature  towards  perfection,  cannot  reasonably 
be  hindered  in  its  destiny  ;  the  rational  necessity  of  retribu- 
tion is  not  satisfied  in  the  present  existence ;  without  the 
hope  of  immortality  human  life  must  be  a  life  of  stupefac- 
tion and  despair.  But  if  the  soul  endures,  so  must  its  chief 
attributes,  thought  and  will;  and  its  existence  must  be  a 
happy  one,  since  it  is  impossible  that  God,  the  perfect 
being,  could  destine  it  for  eternal  wretchedness.  These 
principles  relative  to  human  happiness,  God,  and  immor- 
tality are  for  Mendelssohn  almost,  if  not  quite,  axiomatic. 
Metaphysics  he  deems  to  have  every  whit  the  evidence, 
/'.  <?.,  the  certainty  and  comprehensibility,  that  mathematics 
boasts ;  it  is  only  because  mathematics  has  a  system  of 
well-chosen  symbols,  is  not  concerned  with  the  existence 
of  objects,  and  does  not  immediately  affect  our  interests, 
that  a  prejudice  in  its  favor  exists.  Descartes,  indeed, 
showed  clearly  and  distinctly  the  mathematical  certainty 
and  intelligibility  of  metaphysics  in  his  demonstrations 
of  the  existence  of  the  ego  and  of  God.  Without  this 
certainty  and  intelligibility  metaphysics  were  of  course 
valueless. 

§  93- 

Gotthold  Ephraim  Lessing*    (1729-1781). —  Lessing, 
the  most  original  and  profound  of  the  Illuminationists,  or 
1  Zeller,  Erdmann,  Noack;  Works  of  Lessing. 


LESSING.  263 

German  rationalists,  was  the  son  of  a  preacher  and  author, 
received  an  uncommonly  good  training  in  mathematics  and 
the  classics  at  the  Latin  school  of  his  native  place,  Kamenz, 
in  Upper  Lusatia,  and  at  the  "  great  school  of  St.  Afra  in 
Meissen,"  and  attended  the  University  of  Leipsic  (to  be- 
come, as  he  phrased  it,  not  a  scholar,  but  a  man)  and  after- 
wards the  university  at  Wittenberg,  where  he  took  his 
master's  degree.  Instead  of  making  theology  or  medicine 
his  profession,  as  his  father  desired,  he  was  drawn  by  a 
social  nature,  literary  tastes,  and  a  desire  to  become  a  pol- 
ished man  of  the  world,  into  the  society  of  actors  and 
dramatists,  and  finally  chose  literature  as  a  calling.  His 
works  fall  chiefly  in  the  departments  of  the  drama  and 
aesthetic  criticism  and  of  philosophico-theological  criticism. 

Works.  —  Lessing's  philosophical  views  are  to  be  found 
principally  in  his  "  Das  Christenthum  der  Vernunft "  (The 
Christianity  of  Reason),  (1752-1753)  ;  "  Ueber  die  Wirk- 
lichkeit  der  Dinge  ausser  Gott "  (  On  the  Reality  of  Things 
outside  God),  (1763)  ;  and  "  Die  Erziehung  des  Menschen- 
geschlechts "  (On  the  Education  of  the  Human  Race), 
(1780). 

Philosophy.  —  Profound  and  comprehensive  in  thought  as 
Lessing  is  universally  acknowledged  to  be,  his  place  is 
primarily  among  the  great  writers  rather  than  among  the 
great  philosophers  of  the  world.  He  himself  avowed  that 
he  was  not,  and  would  not  be,  a  philosopher,  —  that  the 
pursuit  was  nobler  than  the  fixed  possession  of  truth.  His 
importance  in  relation  to  the  history  of  philosophy  lies 
chiefly  in  the  fact  of  his  force  and  influence  as  a  critic,  and 
as  suggester  of  fruitful  points  of  view.  It  is  as  a  champion 
of  the  higher  reason  rather,  perhaps,  than  the  enlightened 
understanding  of  which  Mendelssohn  is  the  purest  repre- 
sentative, that  Lessing  has  a  place  among  the  Illumination- 
ists.  His  metaphysical  principles  are  those  of  Leibnitz  as 
modified  by  the  influence  of  Spinoza,  on  the  one  hand,  and, 
on  the  other,  the  individualistic  thinkers  of  France  and 
England,  with  all  of  whom  he  had  a  learned  acquaintance. 


264        A  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  monads  are  to  Lessing  real  individuals,  actually  exist- 
ing partialized  "  perfections  "  or  "  realities  "  in  the  Leib- 
nitzo-Wolffian  sense,  of  God  :  they  are  parts  of  God,  who  is 
therefore  something  other  than  the  ideal  totality  of  things. 
They  are  in  God,  and  we  can  have  no  conception  of  things 
outside  God.  They  exist  by  the  fact  that  God  through 
them  presents  to  himself  the  world :  they  are  not  sub- 
stances, in  the  Leibnitzian  sense,  nor  Spinozistic  modes. 
They  are  individualized,  though  (and  hence)  partialized, 
perfections  of  God.  God  is  not  in  things,  constituting  their 
substance,  as  Spinoza  taught,  nor  is  he  outside  things,  as 
the  Deists  held.  He  is  that  which  comprehends  all  things 
in  its  representative  power;  he  is  transcendent  persona- 
lity. In  this  attempt  to  reconcile  individualism  and  pan- 
theism, Lessing  seems  more  a  Leibnitzian  than  a  Spinozist ; 
but  he  finds  no  use  for  the  doctrine  of  a  pre-established 
harmony,  so  cardinal  in  Leibnitz's  system.  He  holds,  how- 
ever, to  the  Leibnitzian  determinism  :  we  lose  nothing  by 
the  loss  of  freedom  except  the  bare  capacity  to  choose,  and 
ought  to  be  thankful  that  we  "  must"  All  things  are  bound 
together  in  a  web  of  causes  and  effects  and  tend  towards 
the  one  best  thing.  The  human  soul,  as  tending  towards 
perfection,  requires  infinite  room,  an  immortality,  for  its  full 
activity.  A  sine  qua  non  to  the  attainment  of  the  goal  of 
perfection  and  happiness  is  intellectual  enlightenment ;  in- 
deed, man's  end  is  not  merely  perfection  and  happiness, 
but  these  through  enlightenment.  Immortal  existence  em- 
braces a  plurality  of  existences  for  each  individual,  a  series 
of  soul-wanderings  under  the  guidance  of  a  divine  provi- 
dence. The  end  of  the  individual's  existence  lies  in  the 
individual.  The  State  is  but  a  means  to  this  end  :  the  ideal 
State  is  just  that  State  in  which  the  individual  is  a  law  and 
end  unto  himself.  Such  an  ideal  State  has  yet  to  be  real- 
ized. In  the  past  there  has  been  a  gradual  development 
towards  the  complete  realization  of  this  ideal,  which  will 
be  fully  realized  only  when  pure  reason  prevails.  In  the 
past,  revelation  has  guided  men ;  but  revelation  is  an  in- 


ITALIAN  PHILOSOPHY.  26$ 

ferior  sort  of  reason,  and  suited  only  to  the  lower  conditions 
of  men.  There  was,  first,  the  Jewish  revelation,  then  the 
Christian.  From  the  "  Christian  religion,"  or  religion  that 
honors  Christ  as  a  supernatural  being,  must  be  distinguished 
the  "  religion  of  Christ,"  —  the  religion  of  piety,  human 
love,  and  the  doing  good  for  good's  sake ;  /.  e.,  of  reason. 
In  general,  religions  founded  on  revelations  and  creeds 
must  be  regarded  as  of  an  inferior  order,  as  having  only  a 
temporary  value,  and  as  deriving  all  their  usefulness  from 
the  success  with  which  they  adapt  natural  religion  to  special 
conditions  of  life.  To  the  higher  reason,  the  dogmas  of 
the  Trinity,  original  sin,  and  atonement  have  a  certain 
meaning,  it  is  true.  God  finds  it  better,  for  perfection's 
sake,  to  give  man  laws  and  pardon  his  transgressions  of 
them  than  to  leave  him  without  laws.  But  the  traditional 
orthodoxy  is  a  horrible  product  of  madness.  —  Lessing  an- 
ticipates in  important  respects  the  philosophy  of  history 
and  of  religion  of  the  next  period. 

§  94- 

Italian  Philosophy.  —  Italian  philosophy,  in  what  we  have 
designated  as  the  second  period  of  modern  philosophy, 
may  be  described,  in  general  terms,  as  principally  either  a 
repetition  of  Cartesianism,  or  else  of  Lockianism,  particularly 
in  the  form  of  Condillacism.  Cartesians  were  Tommaso 
Cornelio  (1614-1684)  ;  Michelangelo  Fardella  (1650- 
1718),  who  studied  three  years  in  Paris  with  Malebranche 
and  Arnauld  ;  Cardinal  Giacintho  Gerdil  (i  718-1802) ;  Vin- 
cenzo  Miceli  (1713-1 781)  ;  and  numerous  others.  Lockian 
were  Francesco  Soave  (who  translated  into  Italian  Locke's 
"  Essay,"  and  wrote  many  works  in  the  spirit  of  Locke), 
G.  C.  Bini,  F.  Barkovich,  M.  De  Tomaso,  and  others.  The 
philosophies  of  Wolff  and  Leibnitz  had  each  an  adherent  or 
two.  The  most  important  single  name  is  that  of  Giovanni 
Battista  Vico,  commonly  known  as  the  "  founder  of  the 
philosophy  of  history"  in  modern  times,  of  whom  it  is 
necessary  to  give  some  account. 


266        A    Hf STORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

§    95- 

Giovanni  Battistd  Vico  (1668-1744).  —  Vico,  educated 
at  the  University  of  Naples,  occupied  at  one  time  the  chair  of 
rhetoric  there,  but  was  for  most  of  his  life  unrecognized  by 
the  world,  though  a  laborious  student  and  author  of  a  num- 
ber of  works. 

Work.  —  Vico's  fame  as  a  philosopher  rests  chiefly  upon 
his  "  Principii  della  Scienza  Nuova  d'  intorno  alia  Commune 
Natura  delle  Nazioni  "  (2d  edition,  1730). 

Philosophy.  —  According  to  Vico,  human  history,  like 
nature,  is  governed  by  law,  and  to  be  understood  must  be 
viewed  as  the  physicist  views  nature.  The  laws  of  history 
are  a  product  of  an  inborn  sentiment  —  at  first  instinctive 
merely,  but  finally  conscious  and  voluntary  —  governing 
human  conduct.  They  assume  at  first  a  religious  guise,  as 
primitive  man  is  incapable  of  philosophical  reflection ;  next 
they  appear  as  abstract,  though  unreasoned,  formulae ;  and 
finally  as  reasoned  principles.  Under  all  forms  they  remain 
substantially  the  same.  Corresponding  with  the  three  stages 
in  the  development  of  law  are  three  stages  in  the  progress 
of  civilization,  called  the  divine,  the  heroic,  and  the  human. 
These  stages  repeat  themselves  in  the  history  of  the  same 
nationality ;  so  that  history  obeys  a  "  law  of  cycles."  His- 
tory is  the  manifestation  of  a  divine  providence  operating 
through  the  spontaneous  activity  of  human  nature.  Vico's 
method  is  a  professed  synthesis  of  the  a  priori  method 
(of  Plato  and  Descartes),  and  the  empirical  method  (of 
Bacon)  ;  and  his  philosophy  aims  to  be  at  once  a  theodicy 
and  a  history. 

§  96. 

American  Philosophy^  —  In  American  philosophy  we 
have  the  well-known  Calvinist  theologian  Jonathan  Ed- 
wards (1703-1758),  who  appears  to  hold  the  position  of 

1  See  Porter's  "  Philosophy  in  America  "  (in  vol.  ii.  of  Ueberweg) ; 
also  "  Mind,"  vol.  iv. ;  "Journal  of  Speculative  Philosophy,"  vol.  ii. ; 
Edwards  on  the  Will. 


AMERICAN  PHILOSOPHY.  267 

being  the  most  original  and  acute  —  if  not  the  most  sound 
—  of  American  philosophers.  Among  Edwards's  principal 
works  are  a  "  Treatise  on  the  Religious  Affections  "  (i  746)  ; 
"  A  Careful  and  Strict  Inquiry  into  the  Modern  Notion  of 
Free  Will,"  etc.  (1754),  his  chief  work;  and  "Disserta- 
tion concerning  the  Nature  of  True  Virtue  "  (1788).  In 
his  doctrine  of  the  will  Edwards  advocates  a  theory  of 
necessitarianism  not  unlike  that  of  Hobbes  and  Locke,  to 
the  effect  that  the  only  freedom  possessed  by  man  is  the 
freedom,  not  to  will,  but  merely  to  act  as  he,  governed 
by  the  "strongest  motive,"  "wills."  Liberty  of  choice, 
so-called,  is  a  self-contradictory  notion,  since  it  implies 
a  choice  of  choice,  a  choice  of  that  choice,  and  so  on  ad 
infinitum.  Necessity  in  the  will,  instead  of  being  incon- 
sistent with  the  notion  of  virtue,  is  alone  consistent  with  it. 
In  his  doctrine  of  virtue  Edwards  maintains  that  virtue  is 
benevolence,  or  (as  he  defines  it),  "love  towards  universal 
being  as  such,  or  God; "  he  distinguishes  between  the  "  ap- 
probation of  mere  conscience  "  and  that  of  "  inclination," 
the  "  heart,"  "  disposition,"  or  "  religious  affections,"  which 
is  generated  by  the  divine  inworking,  and  is  necessary  to 
constitute  virtue  true  virtue  or  real  love  to  universal  being 
as  such,  or  God.  Moral  evil  is  a  product  of  the  merely 
natural  as  distinguished  from  the  divine  principle  in  man. 
God  permits,  but  is  not  himself  the  author  of,  evil.  Ed- 
wards has  had  a  considerable  number  of  followers,  among 
the  most  important  of  whom  are  his  son  Jonathan  Edwards 
(1745-1801),  once  president  of  Union  College;  Samuel 
Hopkins  (1721-1803),  a  clergyman  who  had  studied 
philosophy  with  the  elder  Edwards;  Nathaniel  Emmons 
(1745-1840),  a  clergyman  and  theologian;  Timothy 
Dwight  (1752-1817),  once  professor  in  and  president  of 
Yale  College;  Charles  G.  Finney  (1792-1875),  professor 
at  and  president  of  Oberlin  College ;  Edwards  A.  Park 
(1808),  professor  in  Andover  Theological  Seminary;  and 
others. 


268        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 


DIVISION   III.     THIRD   PERIOD   OF   MODERN 
PHILOSOPHY. 

§  97- 

The  Characteristics  and  Divisions  of  the  Third  Period 
of  Modern  Philosophy.  —  If  the  Second  Period  of  modern 
philosophy  is  characteristically  a  period  of  formal  analysis 
and  reflection,  the  Third  Period  —  extending  from  the 
third  quarter  of  the  eighteenth  century  onwards  —  is  a 
period  of  synthesis  and  speculative  deduction.  The  pro- 
blems of  method  and  the  origin  of  knowledge  recur,  but 
in  closer  relation  with  that  of  content  and  being ;  and 
this  because  being  and  knowledge  are  recognized  as  hav- 
ing a  common  centre,  self-consciousness.  Thought  in  this 
period  is  empiricistic,  intuitionalistic,  rationalistic,  as  in  the 
second ;  but  empiricism,  intuitionism,  rationalism,  as  forms 
of  self-consciousness,  are  seen  to  have  an  organic  relation. 
As  regards  the  results  of  the  thinking  of  this  period,  they 
cannot,  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  be  mere  dogmatism  nor 
mere  scepticism  in  the  theory  of  knowledge  and  being,  nor 
unqualified  mechanicism  in  the  theory  of  nature,  nor  pure 
determinism  in  the  theory  of  the  will ;  they  are,  in  fact, 
respectively,  idealism  (subjective  or  absolute),  organicism, 
and  what  we  may  call,  for  want  of  a  better  term,  "  liberta- 
rianism."  To  a  very  large  extent,  systems  in  this  period 
group  themselves,  in  their  actual  historical  connections,  by 
nationalities,  but  may  in  general  be  grouped  as  follows,  as  re- 
gards the  rubrics  "empiricism,"  "intuitionism,"  "rational- 
ism "  :  empiricistic  are  the  English  systems ;  intuitionalistic 
the  Scotch,  French,  and  Italian  ;  rationalistic  the  German 
systems ;  miscellaneous,  the  American.  The  intuitionalistic 
systems  always,  of  course,  contain  a  large  element  of  mere 
empiricism.  The  order  in  which  it  is  most  practicable  to 
take  up  the  systems  is  as  follows:  (i)  the  Scotch,  (2)  the 
French,  (3)  the  German,  (4)  the  Italian,  (5)  the  English, 
(6)  the  American. 


SCOTCH  SYSTEMS.  —  REID.  269 


(i)  Scotch  Systems.  —  Of  the  Scotch  systems  of  the  Third 
Period,  the  following  are  here  treated  ;  viz.,  those  of  Thomas 
Reid,  Dugald  Stewart,  Thomas  Brown,  Sir  William  Hamil- 
ton, James  Ferrier.  Ferrier  does  not  belong  to  the  "  Scotch 
school,"  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  term  "  Scotch  school," 
but  is  a  decided  opponent  of  its  principles.  But  just  on 
account  of  his  opposition  to  those  principles,  is  it  conve- 
nient to  place  him  in  the  same  group  with  the  other  Scotch 
philosophers,  though  he  is  not  even  an  intuitionist. 

§  99- 

Thomas  Reid1  (1710-1796).  —  Reid,  who  was  the  son 
of  a  clergyman,  was  born  not  far  from  Aberdeen.  He 
studied  theology  at  Mareschal  College,  Aberdeen,  where  he 
graduated  at  the  age  of  sixteen.  He  had  as  instructor  in 
philosophy  George  Turnbull.  From  him  Reid,  it  is  said, 
learned  more  than  from  all  other  masters  and  writers  put 
together.  For  ten  years  after  graduation,  Reid  acted 
as  librarian  of  the  college,  continuing  his  studies  mean- 
while. He  presided  as  pastor  over  a  parish  in  Aberdeen- 
shire  for  some  years  (with  indifferent  success)  ;  and  in 
1752,  on  the  merits  of  some  brief  treatises,  among  them 
one  on  Aristotle's  Logic,  was  appointed  professor  of 
moral  philosophy  in  King's  College,  Aberdeen.  From 
1764  to  1780  he  occupied  the  chair  of  moral  philosophy 
in  the  University  of  Glasgow.  He  is  described  as  having 
been  singularly  modest,  cautious,  sincere,  and  devout,  and 
as  very  positive  in  his  convictions. 

Works.  —  Reid's  chief  works  are  :  "  Enquiry  into  the 
Human  Mind  on  the  Principles  of  Common  Sense " 
(1764),  "Essays  on  the  Intellectual  Powers  of  Man" 
(1785),  "Essays  on  the  Active  Powers  of  the  Human 
Mind"  (1788).  These  works  had  their  origin  chiefly  in 

1  McCosh,  "Scottish  Philosophy;"  Noack  ;  Porter's  "Philosophy 
in  Great  Britain  and  America ;  "  Works  of  Reid  ;  etc. 


2/O        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

a    purpose    to   refute    Humian    scepticism    and   Lockian- 
Berkeleyan  subjective  idealism. 

Philosophy :  Standpoint  and  Method.  —  At  first  a  Ber- 
keleyan  in  philosophy,  Reid,  according  to  his  own  account 
of  himself,  was  driven  by  an  impulse  received  from  the 
scepticism  of  Hume  to  the  position  which  has  come  to  be 

\J  known  as  the  standpoint  of  "  Common  Sense."  He  at  one 
time  renounced  philosophy  (as  ordinarily  understood,  at 
least),  and  declared  that  the  hopeless  condition  of  philos- 
ophy in  his  day  was  owing  to  the  fact  that  philosophy  had 
undertaken  to  sit  in  judgment  on  common  sense.  His 
philosophical  importance,  such  as  it  is,  seems  to  depend 
chiefly  on  his  doctrine  of  sensation  and  perception,  and  of 

^  the  a  priori  element  in  knowledge.  We  may  notice  also 
his  classification  of  the  powers  of  the  mind.  The  method 
of  philosophy  is,  according  to  Reid,  the  method  of  observa- 

v/  tion  :  philosophy  is  the  empirical  science  of  mind.  There 
are  certain  principles  of  the  common  human  understanding 
which  are  the  basis  of  all  thought  and  science,  as  presup- 
posed by  every  investigation.  Such  are  the  following :  we 
think,  remember,  draw  conclusions  ;  "  fresh  and  living  mem- 
ory equals  in  certainty  and  evidence  consciousness  itself;" 
we  may  have  as  clear  and  indubitable  knowledge  of  the 
activities  of  our  minds  as  of  the  external  world ;  our 
thoughts  are  .manifestations  of  a  thinking  principle  which 
we  call  "  ego ;  "  some  things  exist,  not  of  themselves,  but 
only  in  and  by  another  as  its  property  or  characteristic ; 
there  must  for  most  of  the  activities  of  the  mind  be  given 
something  different  from  them,  which  is  their  object ;  there 
are  certain  things  about  which  all  men  of  all  times  and 
peoples  agree;  all  things  may  be  admitted  about  which 
there  is  agreement  among  sane-minded  men. 

Sensation  and  Perception.  —  We  have  immediate  knowl- 
edge of  the  "  external  world  ;  "  we  do  not  conclude  from  a 
resemblance  of  an  idea  to  an  object  to  the  existence  and 
nature  of  the  object,  since  we  should  have  to  know  before- 
hand the  object  itself  in  order  to  compare  the  two.  Such 


REID.  271 

resemblance,  moreover,  does  not  exist.  The  (Lockian) 
doctrine  of  representative  ideas  is  therefore  false,  —  a  mere 
begging  of  the  question.  In  perception  there  is  not  only  a 
feeling,  an  "  impression  "  produced  upon  or  in  sense,  but 
an  immediate  primitive  act  of  judgment  affirming  the  ex- 
istence of  an  object  of  the  sensation.  The  sensation  is  a 
"  sign  "  or  "  suggestion,"  upon  the  occurrence  of  which  the 
mind  spontaneously  and  at  once  applies  its  inner  principles'" 
to  the  determination  of  the  object,  and  exercises  belief  in 
its  existence  as  determined.  The  sensation  is  not  to  be 
considered  as  a  ground  of  inference  to  the  external  world, 
since  the  act  of  perception  is  not  a  mediate  but  an  im- 
mediate or  direct  act  or  process.  Ideas  regarded  as  indi- 
vidual existences  which  are  intermediaries  between  objects 
and  the  mind,  are  mere  fictions  :  ideas  exist  in  and  with  (not 
merely  after)  the  "  primitive  judgment  "  of  perception,  and\ 
become  independent  objects  of  the  mind  only  in  conse^ 
quence  of  a  "  resolving  and  analyzing  "  of  the  natural  and 
original  judgment,  or  an  act  of  "simple  apprehension." 
Our  knowledge  of  ourselves  is  as  direct  as  that  of  the  ex-^ 
ternal  world  :  "  it  is  not  by  first  having  the  notions  of  mind 
and  sensation,  and  then  comparing  them  together  that  we 
perceive  the  one  to  have  the  relation  of  a  subject  or  sub- 
stratum, and  the  other  that  of  an  act  or  operation ;  on  the 
contrary,  one  of  the  related  things  —  to  wit,  sensation  — 
suggests  to  us  both  the  correlate  and  the  relation."  In  this 
doctrine  of  sensation  and  perception  is  contained,  besides 
the  refutation  of  the  theory  of  representative  ideas,  the 
Humian  notion  of  the  individual  independence  of  "  percep- 
tions," and  the  Lockian  doctrine  of  knowledge  as  the  per- 
ception of  agreement  or  difference  between  two  separately 
presented  ideas ;  also  a  refutation  of  the  doctrine  that  the 
mind  is  at  first  a  mere  tabula  rasa.  The  mind,  that  is  to 
say,  contributes  something  of  itself  towards  knowledge. 

"  Common  Sense."  —  We  ascribe  to  reason  two  offices, 
or  two  degrees.  The  first  is  to  judge  of  things  self-evident ; 
the  second,  to  draw  conclusions  which  are  not  self-evident 


272         A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Irom  those  that  are.  The  first  of  these  is  the  province,  and 
the  sole  province,  of  common  sense.  The  principles  of 
common  sense  (which  it  is  important  to  determine,  since 
every  man  is  competent  to  judge  of  them,  and  opinions 
which  contradict  first  principles  are  both  false  and  ab- 
surd) are  of  two  classes,  —  contingent  and_necessary.  Of 
the  former  class  there  are  twelve,  as  follows :  ( i )  Every- 
thing of  which  I  am  conscious  exists  ;  (2)  The  thoughts  of 
which  I  am  conscious  are  the  thoughts  of  a  being  which  I 
call  myself,  my  mind,  my  person;  (3)  Those  things  did 
really  happen  which  I  distinctly  remember ;  (4)  We  know 
our  own  personal  identity  and  continued  existence  as  far 
back  as  we  can  distinctly  remember;  (5)  Those  things  do 
really  exist  which  we  distinctly  perceive  by  our  senses,  and 
are  what  we  perceive  them  to  be;  (6)  We  have  some  de- 
gree of  power  over  our  actions  and  the  determination  of 
our  wills;  (7)  The  natural  faculties  by  which  we  distinguish 
truth  and  error  are  not  fallacious ;  (8)  There  is  life  and  intelli- 
gence in  our  fellow-men  with  whom  we  converse  ;  (9)  Cer- 
tain features  of  the  countenance,  sounds  of  the  voice,  and 
gestures  of  the  body  indicate  certain  thoughts  and  disposi- 
tions of  the  mind;  (10)  There  is  a  certain  regard  due  to 
human  testimony  in  matters  of  fact,  and  even  to  human 
authority  in  matters  of  opinion;  (n)  There  are  many 
events  depending  on  the  will  of  man  in  which  there  is  a 
self-evident  probability,  greater  or  less  according  to  circum- 
stances; (12)  In  the  phenomena  of  nature,  what  is  to  be 
will  probably  be  like  what  has  been  in  similar  circum- 
stances. Necessary  truths  are  of  the  following  classes  :  ( i ) 
grammatical  principles;  (2)  logical  axioms;  (3)  mathe- 
matical axioms;  (4)  axioms  in  matters  of  taste;  (5)  prin- 
ciples in  morals,  —  e.  g.,  An  unjust  action  has  more  demerit 
than  an  ungenerous  one;  (6)  metaphysical  principles,— 
e.  g.,  (a)  The  qualities  we  perceive  by  our  senses  must  have 
a  subject,  which  we  call  body,  and  the  thoughts  we  are  con- 
scious of  must  have  a  subject,  which  we  call  mind ;  (b) 
Whatever  begins  to  exist  must  have  a  cause  which  produced 


'REID.  273 

it ;  (c)  Design  and  intelligence  in  the  cause  may  be  in- 
ferred with  certainty  from  marks  or  signs  of  them  in  the 
effect.  The  principles  of  common  sense  are  established 
upon  the  general  consent  of  mankind,  as  shown  particu- 
larly in  the  language  of  men. 

The  "Powers  of  Man."  —  The  human  "powers,"  or 
"  faculties,"  are,  first  of  all,  "  intellectual  "  and  "  active." 
The  intellectual  powers  are,  external  sense,  memory,  con- 
ception, abstraction,  judgment,  reasoning,  taste,  moral  per- 
ception, consciousness,  and  the  social  operation  of  the 
mind.  To  sense-perception  may  be  attributed  direct 
knowledge  of  external  existence  (including  space)  ;  to 
memory  an  immediate  knowledge  of  the  past  and  of  per- 
sonal identity ;  to  conception,  the  forming  of  notions  of 
individual  things,  of  the  meanings  of  words  (and  of  im- 
aginary existences)  ;  to  abstraction,  the  formation  of  general 
conceptions  (universals  have  no  existence  except  in  the 
mind)  ;  to  judgment,  the  framing  of  the  principles  of  com- 
mon sense  ;  to  reasoning,  ratiocination  ;  to  taste,  the  being 
pleased  or  displeased,  together  with  the  power  of  judgment 
(the  beauty  and  sublimity  of  objects  of  sense  being  "de- 
rived from  the  expression  they  exhibit  of  things  intellectual, 
which  alone  have  original  beauty  ").  Active  powers  can  be 
attributed  only  to  subjects  having  thought,  understanding, 
and  will.  There  is  no  efficient  cause  in  nature  as  known  to 
"  natural  philosophy  :  "  "a  physical  cause  is  not  an  agent ; 
it  does  not  act,  but  is  acted  on,  and  is  passive  as  to  its 
effect."  Will  (or  the  form  of  active  power,  which  in  itself 
is  not  directly  known)  is  to  be  distinguished  from  desire 
and  the  affections.  It  is  free  (as  we  know  directly  from 
the  testimony  of  consciousness,  the  fact  of  moral  obligation, 
etc.).  "I  grant  that  all  rational  beings  are  influenced, 
and  ought  to  be  influenced,  by  motives.  But  the  relation 
between  motive  and  action  is  of  a  very  different  nature  from 
the  relation  between  an  efficient  cause  and  its  effect.  An 
efficient  cause  must  be  a  being  that  exists  and  has  the  power 
to  produce  the  effect.  A  motive  is  not  a  thing  that  exists. 
VOL.  i.  — 18 


2/4        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

It  is  only  a  thing  conceived  in  the  mind  of  the  agent. 
Motives  imply  liberty  in  the  agent,  otherwise  they  have  no 
influence  at  all."  The  principles  of  action  are  mechanical 
(as  instincts  and  habits),  animal  (appetites,  desires,  and 
affections),  rational  (regard  for  our  good  upon  the  whole, 
and  a  regard  to  duty).  Duty,  right  and  wrong,  and  the 
first  principles  of  morals  are  discovered  by  the  "  moral 
faculty."  Moral  principles  relate  to  virtue  in  general,  to 
the  different  kinds  of  virtue,  and  to  the  comparison  of  vir- 
tues. Of  the  first  sort  an  example  is,  Some  things  in  human 
conduct  merit  approbation  and  praise,  others  blame  and 
punishment ;  of  the  second,  We  ought  to  prefer  a  greater 
to  a  less  good ;  of  the  third,  Unmerited  beneficence  should 
yield  to  compassion  to  the  miserable.1 

Result.  —  Reid  is  evidently  to  be  classed  as  an  intuitionist, 
with  all  his  empiricism.  From  the  fact  of  its  antagonistic 
relation  to  the  pronounced  scepticism  of  Hume,  Reid's  in- 
tuitionism  has  a  more  critical  and  more  positive  character 
than  that  of  Lord  Cherbury,  with  which  it  may  naturally 
be  compared.  Reid,  though  not  usually  regarded  as  the 
founder,  is  the  chief,  of  the  "  Scotch  school "  of  (empirical) 
intuitionists.  His  teachings  have  had  not  a  little  influence 
also  outside  of  his  own  country :  Rousseau  in  France, 
Jacobi,  Fries,  and  others  in  Germany,  owing  a  decided 
debt  to  him. 

§  ioo. 

Dugald  Stewart*  (1753-1828). — Dugald  Stewart,  who 
was  a  son  of  Matthew  Stewart,  professor  of  mathematics 
in  the  University  of  Edinburgh,  was  educated  at  Edin- 
burgh High  School  and  at  Glasgow  University.  At  Glasgow 
he  gave  special  attention  to  mathematics  and  philosophy. 
He  was  a  pupil  and  became  a  friend  and  follower  of  Reid. 
For  a  time  he  acted  as  a  substitute  for  his  father  in  the 
chair  of  mathematics,  and  then  as  associate  professor  of 

1  See  Porter. 

2  See  McCosh,  Franck,  Noack,  etc. 


DUGALD  STEWART.  2?$ 

mathematics,  in  the  University  of  Edinburgh.  During  one 
session  he  lectured  on  morals  in  the  same  institution.  In 
1785  he  took  the  chair  of  moral  philosophy,  which  he 
occupied  for  the  next  twenty-seven  years,  exercising  a  large 
and  wholesome  influence  for  the  promotion  of  philosophi- 
cal culture. 

Works.  —  Stewart's  principal  works  are  :  "  The  Elements 
of  the  Human  Mind  "  (three  volumes,  1792,  1814,  1827)  ; 
"Outlines  of  Moral  Philosophy"  (1793);  "Philosophical 
Essays"  (1810)  ;  "A  General  View  of  the  Progress  of 
Metaphysical,  Ethical,  and  Political  Philosophy  since  the 
Revival  of  Letters  "  (1815  and  1821,  in  the  "  Encyclopaedia 
Britannica  ")  ;  "The  Philosophy  of  the  Active  and  Moral 
Powers  "  (1828). 

Philosophy.  —  Stewart,  even  more,  if  possible,  than  Reid, 
makes  of  philosophy  the  empirical  science  of  mind.  His 
general  position  is  substantially  that  of  Reid.  Peculiar 
to  him  seem  to  be  the  following  assertions  :  ( i )  Our  con- 
viction of  the  independence  of  the  perceived  object  de- 
pends partly  on  the  "  repetition  of  the  act  of  perception  " 
in  reference  to  one  and  the  same  perceived  object,  partly 
on  the  natural  belief  of  "  common  sense  "  in  a  fixed  order 
of  nature ;  (2)  There  are  three  (instead  of  two)  classes 
of  sensible  qualities,  the  third  class  (mathematical  quali- 
ties) being  constituted  by  extension,  form,  etc.,  which  are 
posited  directly  as  exterior,  and  are  presupposed  by  the 
other  primary  qualities;  (3)  Though  we  are  aware  of 
both  subject  and  object  in  perception,  we  are  conscious,  in 
the  strict  sense  of  the  term,  only  of  the  former,  —  we  are 
certain  of  ourselves,  or  subject,  only  by  inference  from  the 
sensation  or  the  act  of  thinking;  (4)  The  association  of 
ideas  (a  topic  to  which  Stewart  gave  extended  attention) 
is  not  to  be  deduced  from  custom,  but  custom  from  the 
association  of  ideas;  (5)  Our  power  over  the  association 
of  our  ideas  is  not  one  of  arbitrary  will  merely,  but  one 
of  knowledge  of  the  principles  of  cause  and  effect,  ground 
and  consequence ;  (6)  Our  ideas  succeed  one  another 


2/6        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

in  dreams  according  to  the  same  law  as  in  waking  con- 
sciousness, the  difference  between  the  two  states  being  due 
solely  to  the  influence  of  the  will. 

§  101. 

Thomas  Brown1  (1778-1820).  —  Brown,  who  was  the 
son  of  a  Presbyterian  clergyman,  was  born  near  Edinburgh, 
educated  in  and  near  London,  and  at  the  University  of 
Edinburgh.  At  the  university  he  manifested  the  liveliest 
interest,  and  displayed  great  acuteness,  in  philosophical 
studies.  He  studied  law,  and  afterwards  medicine,  and 
became  in  the  latter  a  successful  practitioner.  In  1810 
he  was  appointed  adjunct  professor  of  moral  philosophy 
in  the  University  of  Edinburgh,  having  previously  acted 
once  as  a  substitute  for  Stewart  during  an  illness  of  the 
latter.  He  died  comparatively  young,  of  overwork.  Brown 
(like  Stewart)  was  an  eloquent  lecturer. 

Works.  —  Philosophical  works  of  Brown  are,  "  An  In- 
quiry into  the  Relations  of  Cause  and  Effect"  (1804;  3d 
edition  1818)  ;  "Lectures  on  the  Philosophy  of  the  Hu- 
man Mind"  (1820);  "  Physiology  of  the  Human  Mind" 
(1820).  He  made  contributions  to  the  "Edinburgh 
Review,"  —  of  which  he  was  one  of  the  founders,  — 
among  them  an  article  on  Kant. 

Philosophy.  —  Under  the  same  stimulus  (the  teachings 
of  Hume)  which  called  forth  from  Reid  his  peculiar  anti- 
sceptical  theories  of  perception  and  intuitive  cognition 
in  general,  Brown  put  forth  a  doctrine  that  was  almost 
more  sceptical  than  otherwise,  —  quite  antagonistic  in 
important  respects  to  that  of  his  predecessors  in  the  Scotch 
school.  Brown  limits  knowledge  to  phenomena.  He  re- 
jects the  notion  of  occult  "powers"  or  "faculties"  of  the 
mind,  and  reduces  the  mind  to  a  series  of  "  states  "  (if  not 
quite  to  Hume's  "bundle  of  perceptions").  These  he 
5rings  under  two  general  heads ;  viz.,  "  simple  suggestion," 
or  the  reproduction  of  the  ideas  of  absent  objects,  and 
1  McCosh,  "  Scottish  Philosophy,"  etc. 


BROWN.  277 

"relative  suggestion,"  or  the  perception  of  relation  among    ) 
ideas.     Consciousness   with   Brown   is  not  separate   from    /  J 
the   states  of  the  mind,   it   is  merely  the  "  whole  series  ^ 
of  states  "  of  the   mind.      External  bodies  are    perceived 
through  sensations  of  resistance  (which  must  not  be  con- 
founded with  those  of  touch),  outness,  extension,    inter- 
preted by  means  of  an  intuited  idea  of  cause ;   all  that  we 
really  know  being  merely  sensations.      Regarding  causa- 
tion,  Brown  says :    "  When  we  say  that  B  will  follow  A 
to-morrow,  because  A  was  followed   by  B  to-day,  we  do 
not  prove  that  the  future  will  resemble  the  past,  but  we 
take  for  granted  that  the  future  is  to_jesejnbje_the  past.  \S 
We  have  only  to  ask  ourselves  why  we  believe  in  this  simi- 
larity of  sequence ;   and  our  very  inability  of  stating  any  ~ 
ground  of  inference  may  convince  us  that  the  belief  which  1 
it  is  impossible  for  us  not  to  feel  is  the  result  of  some  other 
principle   of  reasoning "    (than   from   mere   experience)  •     *" 
namely  mtuilkmr-~  (If  we  substitute  "  custom^for  "  intui\  \/ 
tion,"  we  get  Hume's  doctrine  of  causation.     Brown,  in/ 
fact,  says  that  the  difference  between  Reid  and  Hume  wa'sV 
one  of  terms  rather  than  of  opinion.)     Brown  gives  a  table 
of  subjective  categories,  as  follows:     (i)  "Coexistence," 
including  "position,"   "resemblance  or  difference,"  "de- 
gree,"    "  proportion,"     "  comprehension,"    "  whole    and 
parts;"     (2)   "Succession,"  including  "casual    priority," 
"causal  priority."      Emotions  are   "immediate,"    "retro- 
spective," and  "  prospective."      Will  is  mere  desire,  voli- 
tion the  strongest  desire.     The  moral  faculty  consists  of\ 
the  "  emotions  "  of  "  approbation  "  and  "  disapprobation."   ' 
Brown    strongly    advocates    the    application   of    physical1] 
methods  of  inquiry  to  the  study  of  the  mind. 

Result.  —  In  Brown  the  principle  of  intuitionism  ap- 
pears in  closest  union  and  also  in  sharpest  contrast  with 
its  opposite,  that  of  scepticism.  Brown,  it  is  obvious, 
deviates  considerably  from  the  positions  of  his  predecessors 
in  the  Scotch  school.  His  philosophy  "occupies  an  in- 
termediate place  between  the  earlier  Scotch  school  and 


2/8        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  later  analytical  or  associational  psychology." l  To 
some  extent  a  follower  of  Brown  was,  as  we  shall  see,  the 
German  Beneke.  Brown  seems  to  have  influenced  J.  S. 
Mill's  thinking. 

§  102. 

Sir  William  Hamilton  z  (1788-1856).  —  Hamilton  was 
the  son  of  Dr.  William  Hamilton,  professor  of  anatomy  and 
botany  in  the  University  of  Glasgow.  By  the  death  of  the 
father  a  few  years  after  the  birth  of  the  son,  the  entire 
bringing  up  of  the  son  devolved  upon  the  mother,  said  to 
have  been  a  woman  of  unusual  ability  and  force  of  char- 
acter. William  received  an  excellent  education.  At  the 
University  of  Glasgow  he  distinguished  himself  as  a  student 
in  logic  and  moral  philosophy;  at  Oxford  he  sustained 
an  examination  on  an  unprecedentedly  wide  range  of  read- 
ing, and  acquired  very  high  distinction  in  philosophical 
studies.  His  reading  included,  besides  other  things, 
almost  all  the  writings  of  Aristotle  and  the  philosophical 
works  of  Cicero.  He  had  already  chosen  as  profession 
medicine,  and  had  made  preparatory  studies  in  it,  but 
instead  of  practising  medicine,  he  studied  law,  or  rather 
pretended  to  study  law ;  for  his  chief  occupation  while  an 
"advocate"  was  reading  in  the  Scotch  libraries.  In  1820, 
after  failure  as  an  advocate,  he  was  appointed  to  the  chair 
of  universal  history  in  the  University  of  Edinburgh,  and 
in  1836  to  the  chair  of  logic,  having  in  the  mean  time  won 
a  name  as  a  philosophical  writer  by  articles  published  in 
the  "  Edinburgh  Review."  A  paralytic  stroke  (in  1844), 
much  illness,  and  certain  minor  misfortunes  fell  to  his  lot 
and  interfered  with  the  execution  of  important  designs  of 
his  in  philosophy.  He  was  greatly  aided  in  his  work  by 
his  wife,  but  for  the  assistance  of  whom  as  amanuensis  his 

1  See  "  Encyclopaedia  Britannica." 

a  See  W.  H.  Monck's  "Sir  William  Hamilton"  ("English  Phi- 
losophers"); "  Encyclopaedia  Britannica ;"  Hamilton's  Lectures  on 
"  Logic  "  and  "  Metaphysics  ;  "  O.  W.  Wight's  "  Philosophy  of 
Hamilton  ;  "  Veitch,  "  Memoir  of  Sir  William  Hamilton." 


HAMILTON.  279 

lectures  (generally  written  the  night  before  delivery  in  the 
class-room)  could  not  have  been  given  to  his  classes. 
'Hamilton  has  the  reputation  of  having  been  the  most 
erudite  of  all  philosophers,  and  also  of  having  been  an 
unusually  lucid  expositor  of  philosophic  truth. 

Works.  —  Hamilton's  principal  works  are,  "  Discussions 
in  Philosophy,  Literature,  and  Education  "  (1852-1853),  — 
a  collection  of  articles  previously  published  in  the  "Edin- 
burgh Review,"  among  them  the  celebrated  one  on  the 
"  Philosophy  of  the  Unconditioned ;  "  "  Notes  and  Disserta- 
tions "  accompanying  an  edition  of  Reid's  works  (1846), 
—  very  important ;  Lectures  on  "  Logic  "  and  on  "  Meta- 
physics "  (1859-1860). 

Philosophy  :  General  Conception  of  Philosophy.  —  Phi- 
losophy, in  the  full  sense  of  the  term,  is  a  knowledge  of 
causes  and  of  effects  in  their  causes ;  in  a  narrower  sense, 
it  is  the  knowledge  of  mind  as  the  "  universal  and  principal 
concurrent  cause  in  every  act  of  knowledge."  It  has  its 
origin  primarily  in  the  necessity  the  mind  feels  to  "  connect 
causes  with  effects  "  and  to  "  carry  up  our  knowledge  into 
unity ;  "  secondarily,  in  the  feeling  of  wonder.  As  to  the 
methods  of  philosophy,  the  "  one  necessary  condition  of 
its  possibility  is  the  decomposition  of  effects  into  their 
constituted  causes,"  —  analysis.  This  is  the  fundamental 
problem  of  philosophy.  But  we  analyze  that  we  may  com- 
prehend ;  and  we  comprehend  only  inasmuch  as  we  are 
able  to  reconstruct  in  thought  the  complete  effects  which 
we  have  analyzed  into  their  elements.  This  mental  recon- 
struction is  the  final,  the  consummative  procedure  of  phi- 
losophy, —  synthesis.  Analysis  and  synthesis  are,  properly 
understood,  the  two  correlative  necessary  parts  of  the  same 
method,  —  the  one  possible  method  of  philosophy.  The 
aberrations  of  philosophy  have  all  been  so  many  viola- 
tions of  the  one  method.  There  are  two  practical  condi- 
tions of  the  study  of  philosophy  :  viz.,  first,  the  renunciation 
of  all  prejudices,  the  exercising  of  (provisional)  doubt : 
and,  second,  the  subjugation  of  the  passions,  particularly 


280        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

sloth  and  pride.  The  parts  of  philosophy  answer  to  the 
three  questions :  ( i )  What  are  the  facts  or  phenomena 
to  be  observed?  (2)  What  are  the  laws  which  regulate- 
these  facts,  or  under  which  these  phenomena  appear? 
(3)  What  are  the  results  not  immediately  manifested 
which  these  facts  warrant  us  in  drawing?  The  parts  of 
philosophy  are  accordingly  the  phenomenology  of  mind,  or 
empirical  psychology ;  the  nomology  of  mind,  or  rational 
psychology ;  ontology,  or  inferential  psychology,  or  meta- 
physics proper. —  Hamilton  occupied  himself  systematically 
chiefly  with  phenomenological  and  nomological  investiga- 
tions :  he  produced  no  ontology  proper.  Wre  may  indicate 
the  most  general  results  of  his  psychology,  and  then  take 
up  points  relating  to  the  higher  theory  of  knowledge  and 
being. 

Phenomenology.  —  Mental  phenomena  are  possible  only 
under  a  certain  condition ;  namely,  consciousness,  or  the 
knowledge  that  the  ego  exists  in  some  determinate  state. 
Consciousness  may  be  "  compared  to  an  internal  light  by 
means  of  which,  and  which  alone,  what  passes  in  the  mind 
is  rendered  visible.  It  is  simple,  and  always  resembles 
itself,  except  in  intensity.  It  is  not  a  special  phenomenon, 
but  comprehends  within  itself  all  phenomena."  As  knowl- 
edge it  is  immediate  :  it  affirms  its  object  explicitly,  and 
the  subject  implicitly.  Whatever  appears  in  conscious- 
ness is  there ;  consciousness  possesses  entire  veracity,  and 
is  the  basis  of  all  thought.  Necessary  to  every  act  of  con- 
sciousness is  attention,  which  has  three  degrees,  being 
either  a  mere  vital,  irresistible  act,  or  an  act  determined 
by  desire,  or  an  act  determined  by  volition.  Attention 
is  to  consciousness  what  the  contraction  of  the  pupil  of 
the  eye  is  to  sight.  The  phenomena  in  consciousness 
may  be  divided  into  three  classes,  —  phenomena  of 
knowledge,  or  cognition,  of  feeling,  and  of  conation 
(desire  and  will).  The  classes  of  phenomena  are  not 
independent  of  each  other :  in  "  every  simplest  modifi- 
cation of  mind,  knowledge,  feeling  and  desire  or  will, 


HAMILTON.  28l 

go  to  constitute  the  mental  state ;  and  it  is  only  by 
scientific  abstraction  that  we  are  able  to  analyze  the 
state  into  elements."  Of  the  three,  knowledge  is  cer- 
tainly first  in  order,  and  both  knowledge  and  feeling  are 
presupposed  by  will.  Cognition  and  feeling  are  always 
in  inverse  ratio  to  one  another.  The  cognitive  faculty  has 
the  following  forms :  ( i )  Presentative  Power,  comprising 
external  perception  and  self-consciousness;  (2)  Conserva- 
tive Power,  or  Memory  ;  (3)  Reproductive  Power,  com- 
prising Suggestion  (which  is  without  will),  Reminiscence 
(with  will)  ;  (4)  Representative  Power  or  Imagination ; 
(5)  Elaborative  Power,  or  Comparison,  Faculty  of  Rela- 
tions; (6)  Regulative  Power,  or  Reason,  Common  Sense. 
The  feelings  fall  into  two  classes :  one  class  comprising 
feelings  that  accompany  the  energies  of  the  cognitive 
powers,  —  Contemplative  Feelings,  or  Sentiments ;  the 
other,  feelings  that  accompany  the  energies  of  the  cona- 
tive  powers,  —  Practical  Feelings,  or  Sentiments.  To  the 
former  class  belong  the  feelings  of  tedium,  beauty,  sub- 
limity, truth ;  to  the  latter,  feelings  relating  to  self-pre- 
servation, enjoyment  of  existence,  preservation  of  the 
species,  to  our  tendency  towards  development  and  per- 
fection, to  the  moral  law.  Feelings  as  pleasurable  are  the 
accompaniments  and  reflexes  of  the  spontaneous  and 
unimpeded  exertion  of  a  power  of  whose  energy  we  are 
conscious ;  as  painful,  the  accompaniments  and  reflexes 
of  the  overstrained  or  repressed  exertion  of  such  a  power. 
—  Hamilton  does  not  discuss  conations. 

Perception:  " Natural  Realism"  and  " Natural  Dual- 
ism"—  Hamilton  rejects  the  Brownian  criticisms  of  the 
doctrine  of  Reid,  and  takes  up  a  position,  akin  to  that 
of  Reid,  styled  by  him  Natural  Realism.  We  have,  ac- 
cording to  Hamilton,  a  direct  and  immediate  conscious- 
ness of  the  external  world ;  our  belief  in  its  reality  is 
simply  the  consequence  of  our  knowledge,  immediate 
feeling,  perception  of  it.  We  do  not  have  a  direct  per- 
ception of  material  substance  :  all  that  we  know  of  that, 


282        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

all  that  we  can  really  designate  by  the  name  "  matter,"  is 
the  aggregate  of  extension,  solidity,  figure,  motion,  divisi- 
bility, roughness,  smoothness,  etc.,  which  appear  to  us. 
We  are,  it  is  true,  compelled  by  our  mental  constitution 
to  attribute  these  as  properties  to  an  independently  subsist- 
ing something;  but  of  this  in  itself  we  know  absolutely 
nothing.  We  know  matter  only  in  its  effects,  —  phe- 
nomena. The  same  is  true  as  regards  mind;  the  term 
mind  is  merely  a  common  name  for  the  states  of  knowing, 
willing,  feeling,  etc.  Qualities  are  of  three  sorts  :  primary 
(<?. g.,  extension),  which  are  modes  of  the  non-ego;  sec- 
ondary (e.  g.,  color) ,  which  are  modes  of  the  ego ;  and 
secundo-primary  (e.g.,  resistance),  whidh  are  modes  of 
both  ego  and  non-ego.  To  the  ego  belongs  not  merely 
the  pure  mind,  but  also  the  body  so  far  as  it  is  merely 
animate ;  to  the  non-ego,  the  extra-corporal  world  and  the 
body  so  far  as  extended.  We  apprehend  the  three  sorts 
of  qualities  directly :  the  primary,  through  our  body  con- 
sidered as  a  part  of  the  non-ego  ;  the  secondary,  through 
our  body  as  animate ;  the  secundo-primary,  through  the 
body  under  both  characters  (as  encountering  and  feel- 
ing resistance).  The  consciousness  of  a  resisting  thing 
external  to  consciousness  as  such  presupposes  a  posses- 
sion of  the  notions  of  space  and  motion  in  space.  Space 
is,  in  fact,  an  a  priori  notion.  It  is  also  an  empirical 
perception  got  through  the  perception  of  different  colors 
bordering  upon  each  other.  The  doctrine  of  Natural 
Realism  is  upheld  by  the  enlightened  common  sense  of 
mankind.  Consciousness  of  object  is  involved  in  the 
consciousness  of  mental  operations  relating  to  object.  To 
accept  (as  does  Brown)  the  existence  of  the  external 
world  on  account  of  the  natural  belief  in  its  existence, 
and  yet  to  deny  the  truth  of  our  natural  belief  in  the 
immediate  perception  of  it,  is  absurd.  Mediate  knowledge 
presupposes  immediate.  It  is  impossible  to  the  upholders 
of  the  doctrine  of  representative  perception  to  show  that 
the  representation  resembles  the  object,  etc.  In  percep- 


HAMILTON.  283 

tion  we  not  only  cognize  the  external  world,  but  distin- 
guish it  from  ourselves,  —  we  apprehend  the  existence 
of  matter  and  mind  as  separate.  Natural  Realism  involves 
Natural  Dualism. 

Latent  Modifications  of  the  Mind :  Memoty  and  the  As- 
sociation of  Ideas.  —  The  most  important  problem  in  this 
connection  is,  not  the  explanation  of  the  phenomenon  of 
retention,  for  that  follows  easily  from  the  "  self-energy  "  of 
the  mind,  and  is  "  involved  in  the  very  conception  of  its 
power  of  self-activity,"  but  the  phenomenon  of  forgetfulness, 
or  the  vanishing  of  a  mental  activity.  How  can  an  activity 
which  has  once  existed  be  abolished  "  without  a  laceration 
of  the  vital  unity  of  the  mind  as  a  subject,  one  and  indivi- 
sible ?  "  The  solution  of  this  problem  is  to  be  sought  for 
in  the  theory  of  obscure  or  latent  modifications  or  mental 
activities,  real,  but  beyond  the  sphere  of  consciousness. 
The  infinitely  greater  part  of  our  spiritual  treasures  lies 
always  beyond  the  sphere  of  consciousness,  hid  in  the 
obscure  recesses  of  the  mind.  There  are  two  degrees  of 
latency :  first,  one*  such  that  the  latent  knowledge  may  be 
applied  how  and  when  we  will  to  apply  it ;  second,  one 
such  that  whole  systems  of  knowledge  may  lie  uncon- 
sciously in  the  mind,  unless  by  some  abnormal  condition  of 
mind  they  are  thrown  into  consciousness.  Latent  modifi- 
cations are  explained  by  the  hypothesis  of  the  constancy  of 
the  quantum  of  mental  energy  with  a  continual  change  of 
the  ideas  among  which  this  energy  is  distributed,  the  newer 
ideas  naturally  attracting  to  themselves  a  relatively  larger 
amount  of  that  energy,  and  the  older  being  crowded  out  of 
consciousness.  Though  memory  is  known  to  be  greatly 
dependent  on  corporeal  conditions,  latent  modifications  do 
not  admit  of  a  physiological  or  materialistic  deduction  : 
they  must  be  referred  to  the  unity  and  self-activity  of  mind, 
in  virtue  of  which  mental  activities  which  have  once  been 
determined  persist.  By  this  conception  of  latent  modifica- 
tions may  be  explained  the  Association  of  Ideas,  the  general 
law  of  which  (which  may  be  called  the  Law  of  Redin- 


284        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

tegration)  is  that  "  thoughts  which  have  once  co-existed  in 
the  mind  are  afterwards  associated,  or  that  those  thoughts 
suggest  each  other  which  had  previously  constituted  parts 
of  the  same  entire  or  total  act  of  cognition." 

Necessary  Cognition.  —  The  marks  of  necessary  truth 
are,  —  incomprehensibility  (or  inexplicability) ,  simplicity, 
necessity  and  universality,  comparative  evidence  and  cer- 
tainty. Necessity  is  positive  or  negative.  Positive  neces- 
sity occurs  when  a  proposition  is  conceivable  and  its 
contradictory  opposite  is  inconceivable ;  negative,  when  the 
proposition  and  its  contradictory  opposite  are  both  equally 
conceivable.  According  to  the  logical  law  of  the  "  Ex- 
cluded Middle,"  one  of  the  propositions  must  be  true; 
hence  inconceivability  is  not  a  test  of  truth.  Space  —  to 
take  an  illustration  —  cannot  be  conceived  either  as  finite  or 
as  infinite ;  but  it  must  be  one  or  the  other  of  these.  The 
same  is  true  as  regards  time  also.  From  the  foregoing  it 
follows  that  only  positive  necessity  is  a  test  of  truth.  Ex- 
amples of  positively  necessary  notions  are  existence  and  its 
modifications,  identity,  contradiction,  "  excluded  middle," 
the  intuitions  of  space  and  time.  The  positively  necessary 
notions  may  be  described  as  "  so  many  positive  exertions 
of  mental  vigor ;  "  the  negatively  necessary  notions  are,  on 
the  other  hand,  consequences  of  the  "  imbecility  of  the 
human  mind."  The  truth  of  one  of  the  inconceivable 
mutually  contradictory  notions  may  sometimes  (as  in  the 
case  of  the  notion  of  freedom,  which  is  postulated  by  the 
moral  faculty)  be  shown  by  non-theoretical  considerations. 

The  Law  of  the  Conditioned  and  its  Applications : 
Causation.  —  It  is  a  law  of  finite,  or  human,  thought  that 
the  conceivable  is  in  every  relation  bounded  by  the  incon- 
ceivable, or,  more  definitely,  "All  positive  thought  lies 
between  two  extremes,  neither  of  which  we  can  conceive  as 
possible,  yet  as  mutual  contradictions  the  one  or  the  other 
we  must  recognize  as  necessary."  This  law  receives  ex- 
emplification in  our  formation  of  judgments  of  causation. 
"  When  we  are  aware  of  something  which  begins  to  be, 


HAMILTON.  285 

we  are  by  the  necessity  of  our  intelligence  constrained  to 
believe  that  it  has  a  cause.  But  what  does  the  expression 
that  it  has  a  cause  signify?  If  we  analyze  our  thought,  we 
shall  find  that  it  simply  means  that  as  we  cannot  conceive 
any  new  existence  to  commence,  therefore,  all  that  now 
is  seen  to  arise  under  a  new  appearance  had  previously 
an  existence  under  a  prior  form.  We  are  utterly  unable 
to  realize  in  thought  the  possibility  of  the  complement 
of  existence  being  increased  or  diminished.  We  are 
unable,  on  the  one  hand,  to  conceive  nothing  becoming 
something,  or,  on  the  other,  something  becoming  nothing. 
Ex  nihilo  nihil,  in  nihilum  nil  posse  reverti,  expresses 
in  its  purest  form  the  whole  intellectual  phenomenon  of 
causality."  Between  causes  and  effects  there  is  an  "ab- 
solute tautology," — cause  and  effect  have  the  same  con- 
tent, only  in  different  forms.  "  Gunpowder  is  the  effect  of 
a  mixture  of  sulphur,  charcoal,  and  nitre,  and  these  three 
substances  again  are  the  effect  —  result  —  of  simpler  con- 
stituents, and  these  constituents  again  of  simpler  elements 
either  known  or  conceived  to  exist.  Now,  in  all  these  series 
of  compositions  we  cannot  conceive  that  aught  begins  to 
exist.  The  gunpowder,  the  last  compound,  we  are  com- 
pelled to  think,  contains  precisely  the  same  quantum  of 
existence  that  its  ultimate  elements  contained  prior  to  their 
combination.  Well,  we  explode  the  powder.  Can  we 
conceive  that  existence  has  been  diminished  by  the  an- 
nihilation of  a  single  element  previously  in  being,  or  in- 
creased by  the  addition  of  a  single  element  which  was  not 
heretofore  in  nature?  '  Omnia  imitantur :  nihil  interit? 
is  what  we  think,  what  we  must  think."  The  principle* 
that  every  event  should  have  its  cause  is  necessary  and 
universal,  and  is  imposed  on  us  as  a  condition  of  our 
human  intelligence.  As  to  the  origin  of  the  principle  of 
causality,  there  are  possible  in  all  eight  different  theories, 
—  that  it  is  a  result  of  both  external  and  internal  percep- 
tion, of  internal  perception  alone,  of  induction  and  gen- 
eralization, of  association,  custom,  habit,  of  pure  intelligence, 


286        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  expectation  of  the  constancy  of  nature,  of  the  law  of  the 
conditioned.  The  principle  of  causality  is,  in  fact,  a  con- 
sequence, or  rather  special  form,  of  the  Law  of  the  Condi- 
tioned ;  our  inability  to  conceive  either  the  commencement 
of  time  or  the  infinite  non-commencement  of  it,  is  an  in- 
ability mentally  to  create  or  annihilate  it ;  our  inability 
to  conceive  space  as  beginning  or  ceasing  to  be,  is 
an  inability  mentally  to  create  or  annihilate  it ;  and,  in 
general,  our  inability  to  conceive  existence  as  beginning  or 
ceasing  is  an  inability  mentally  to  create  or  annihilate  it. 
In  this  last  inability  is  the  explanation  of  the  entire  pheno- 
menon of  causality.  The  necessity  of  the  principle  of 
causality  is,  as  appears  immediately  from  the  foregoing,  a 
negative  necessity,  a  consequence  of  "  powerlessness ;  "  and 
the  principle  may  consequently  be  true  or  false.  (It  is,  in 
fact,  to  a  certain  extent,  false,  as  is  proved  by  the  fact  of 
moral  freedom.)  Another  application  of  the  "  Law  of  the 
Conditioned  "  occurs  in  the  use  of  the  notion  of  substance 
and  phenomenon,  or  accident.  The  phenomenon  which, 
conceived  in  entire  isolation,  would  be  unthinkable,  be- 
cause unconditioned,  refers  us  to  an  underlying  substance  ; 
and  substance  in  like  manner  to  phenomenon. 

The  Unconditioned :  the  Infinite  and  Absolute.  —  The 
two  inconceivable  extremes  to  which  the  conditioned  is  the 
mean  are  comprehended  under  the  name  "  unconditioned." 
The  unconditioned,  as  the  extreme  of  perfect  illimitation, 
or  "unconditionally  unlimited,"  is  the  Infinite;  as  the 
opposite  extreme,  or  as  the  "  unconditionally  limited,"  is 
the  "  absolute."  By  the  Law  of  the  Conditioned  we  can 
know  only  the  conditionally  limited,  or  existence  in  special 
modes.  From  this  it  follows  that  we  know  neither  mind 
nor  matter  in  themselves ;  nor  can  we  know  ultimate 
being,  or  God.  God  by  the  Law  of  Excluded  Middle  must 
be  either  the  Absolute  or  the  Infinite ;  but  which  of  these  he 
is,  we  have  (outside  revelation)  no  means  of  knowing. 

Result.  —  Hamilton  combines  with  the  doctrines  espe- 
cially characteristic  of  the  Scottish  school  the  negativism 


FERRIER.  287 

of  the  Kantian  theory  of  knowledge  ;  and  perhaps  the  most 
characteristic  single  feature  of  his  doctrine  is  the  (pseudo- 
Kantian?)  doctrine  of  the  relativity  of  knowledge.  The 
influence  of  Hamilton's  teachings  has,  it  is  scarcely  neces- 
sary to  remark,  been  very  wide  and  marked,  —  marked 
even  where  it  might  not  naturally  be  expected  ;  as,  for  ex- 
ample, in  the  case  of  Spencer.  American  metaphysics  has 
in  the  past  been  largely  Hamiltonian.  —  We  may  mention 
here  the  most  important  Hamiltonian,  Henry  Longueville 
Mansel  (1820-1871),  Professor  at  Oxford  and  Dean  of  St. 
Paul's.  His  chief  works  are  "  Prolegomena  Logica  "  (185 1), 
"Metaphysics"  ("Encyclopaedia  Britannica,"  1857,  sepa- 
rately, 1860),  "  Limits  of  Religious  Thought "  (1858),  "  Phi- 
losophy of  the  Conditioned."  Mansel,  however,  differs 
from  Hamilton  in  his  doctrine  of  the  Self  and  his  doctrine 
of  Causation.  The  self  is  a  "  fact  of  consciousness,  not  an 
inference  from  it,"  is  constituted  by  consciousness.  The 
conditions  essential  to  personal  existence  are  time  and  free 
agency.  Of  causation  we  know  in  our  consciousness  of  de- 
termining our  volitions,  and  only  so  ;  we  do  not  know  it  as 
something  outside  consciousness. 

§    103. 

James  Frederick  Ferrier  1  ( 1 808-1 86 1 ) .  —  Born  in  Edin- 
burgh, Ferrier  was  educated  at  the  Edinburgh  High  School, 
under  a  private  tutor,  and  at  the  universities  of  Edinburgh, 
Oxford,  and  Heidelberg.  He  was  appointed  professor  of 
civil  history  in  the  University  of  Edinburgh  in  1842,  and 
professor  of  moral  philosophy  and  political  economy  at  the 
University  of  St.  Andrews  in  1845.  He  married  a  daughter 
of  Professor  John  Wilson  ("Christopher  North").  His 
rather  premature  death  has  been  the  cause  of  deep  regret 
among  a  large  number  of  admirers  of  his  speculative 
genius. 

Works,  —  Ferrier's  principal  philosophical  work  is  en- 
titled "  Institutes  of  Metaphysic  "  (1854  ;  2d  edition,  1856). 
1  Ferrier's  "  Institutes  of  Metaphysic." 


288        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Other  works  are,  an  "  Introduction  to  the  Philosophy  of 
Consciousness"  (1838-1839),  "  The  Crisis  of  Modern  Spec- 
ulation "  (1841),  "Berkeley and  Idealism"  (1842),  "Lec- 
tures on  Greek  Philosophy"  (1866).  The  clearness  of 
Ferrier's  insight  and  the  lucidity  of  his  exposition  gave 
some  foundation  for  the  assertion  of  one  writer  that  "  Fer- 
rier's works  are  perhaps  the  best  propaedeutic  to  the  study 
of  metaphysics  in  the  English  language." 

Philosophy  :  Introduction.  —  Philosophy  in  its  ideal  per- 
fection is  a  body  of  reasoned  truth.  A  system  which  is 
reasoned  without  being  true  falls  short,  indeed,  of  perfection, 
but  is  of  higher  value  than  a  system  which  is  true  without 
being  reasoned.  The  failure  of  philosophy  hitherto  has 
been  chiefly  due  to  its  not  being  strictly  reasoned,  —  its 
proscription  of  necessary  truth,  its  neglect  to  go  back  to 
the  beginning.  —  The  law  of  identity  is  the  general  expres- 
sion and  criterion  of  all  necessary  truth ;  and  the  canon  of 
all  philosophy  is,  "  Affirm  nothing  except  what  is  enforced 
by  reason  as  a  necessary  truth,  /.  e.,  as  a  truth  the  supposed 
reversal  of  which  would  involve  a  contradiction  ;  and  deny 
nothing  unless  its  affirmation  involves  a  contradiction,  that 
is,  contradicts  some  necessary  truth  or  law  of  reason." 
The  present  system  starts  from  a  single  self-evident  propo- 
sition, and  deduces  from  it  others  in  a  series  of  demon- 
strations each  of  which  professes  to  be  as  strict  as  any 
demonstration  in  Euclid,  while  the  whole  of  them  together 
constitute  one  great  demonstration.  The  ground  and  only 
justification  of  the  existence  of  philosophy  is  the  assumption 
that  the  original  dowry  of  man  is  inadvertency  and  error ; 
the  mission  of  philosophy  is,  negatively  reviewed,  to  correct 
the  inadvertencies  of  man's  ordinary  thinking.  Psychology 
also  "which  is  the  abettor  and  accomplice  of  common 
opinion  after  the  act,"  must  come  in  for  a  share  of  casti- 
gation.  Positively  viewed,  the  purpose  of  philosophy,  or 
metaphysic,  is  the  substitution  of  true  ideas  —  that  is,  of 
necessary  truths  of  reason  —  in  place  of  the  oversights  of 
popular  opinion  and  errors  of  psychological  science.  In 


FERRIER.  289 

conformity  with  this  double  purpose  of  philosophy,  its 
method  is  governed  by  the  canon  of  proposition  and  coun- 
ter-proposition, —  the  confronting  of  the  errors  of  common 
and  psychological  opinion  with  the  necessary  truths,  or  laws 
of  reason,  which  they  violate.  The  propositions,  with  their 
demonstrations,  are  the  "  Institutes  of  Metaphysic."  The 
general  unintelligibility  of  former  systems  —  e.g.,  those  of 
Plato,  Spinoza,  Leibnitz,  Hegel  —  is  due  to  their  neglect  to 
exhibit  the  contrast  of  the  true  and  the  false,  —  philosophical 
and  popular  opinion.  The  parts  of  philosophy  and  their 
order  appear  upon  a  consideration  of  the  distinction  (first 
made  by  Aristotle)  between  what  is  first  in  the  order  of  na- 
ture and  what  is  first  for  us.  Being  (what  is)  is  first  in  the 
order  of  nature  :  being  as  known  is  first  for  us,  while  being  is 
last.  Two  main  parts  of  philosophy  are,  then,  Ontology 
(theory  of  being)  and  Epistemology  (theory  of  knowledge)  ; 
we  "  pass  to  the  problem  of  absolute  existence  only  through 
the  portals  of  the  solution  to  the  problem  of  knowledge. 
But  even  after  we  have  fixed  the  meaning,  the  conditions, 
the  limits,  the  object,  and  the  capacities  of  knowledge,  it 
seems  quite  possible,  indeed  highly  probable,  that  absolute 
existence  may  escape  us  by  throwing  itself  under  the  cover, 
or  within  the  pale,  of  our  ignorance  ;  "  it  is  necessary,  there- 
fore, to  institute  an  inquiry  into  the  nature  of  ignorance,  — 
into  what  we  are,  and  can  be,  ignorant  of.  Hence  a  third 
part  of  philosophy,  Agnoiology  (theory  of  ignorance).  As 
Being  must  be  either  that  which  we  know  or  that  which 
we  do  not  know,  or  neither  of  these,  we  shall  be  able,  after 
having  given  theories  of  both  knowledge  and  ignorance,  de- 
monstratively to  fix  its  character.  —  The  first  question  of 
philosophy  is,  not,  What  is  knowledge  ?  for  that  question,  in 
the  form  in  which  it  is  stated,  is  ambiguous,  and  hence  un- 
answerable, but,  What  is  the  one  feature  which  is  identical, 
invariable,  and  essential  in  a  variety  of  knowledge,  —  the 
Ens  unum  in  omnibus  notitiis  ?  The  answer  to  this  ques- 
tion is  the  first  proposition  of  Epistemology,  —  the  absolute 
starting-point  of  metaphysic. 
VOL.  i.  — 19 


2QO        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Epistemology.  — "  Proposition  i.  Along  with  whatever 
any  intelligence  knows,  it  must,  as  the  ground  or  condi- 
tion of  its  knowledge,  have  some  cognizance  of  itself, 
That  is  to  say,  self,  or  the  'me,'  is  the  common  centre, 
the  continually .  known  rallying-point,  in  which  all  our 
cognitions  meet  and  agree,  the  ens  unum,  et  semper  co- 
gnitum,  in  omnibus  notitiis."  This  proposition,  as  the 
starting-point  of  all  knowledge,  cannot,  strictly  speaking, 
be  demonstrated,  —  it  is  an  axiom.  Explanation  may  be 
employed  to  show  its  axiomatic  character.  Common  opin- 
ion and  ordinary  psychology  assume  that  consciousness  is 
possible  without  self-consciousness.  The  thing  known  is 
and  must  be  always  object  plus  subject  (Prop,  ii.)  ;  and 
the  unit  or  minimum  of  knowledge  is  constituted  by  object 
and  subject  taken  together.  Ordinary  thought  conceives 
subject  and  object,  ego  and  non-ego,  as  separable  (Coun- 
ter-Prop.). Matter  per  se,  the  whole  material  universe 
by  itself,  is  of  necessity  absolutely  unknowable  (Prop.  iv.). 
The  demonstration  of  this  proposition  is  as  follows :  The 
whole  material  universe  by  itself  or  per  se  is  a  mere  col- 
lection of  objects  without  a  subject  or  self.  But  it  was 
proved  by  Prop.  ii.  that  the  only  things  which  can  possibly 
be  known  are  objects  plus  a  subject  or  self.  Therefore 
the  whole  material  universe  by  itself,  or  per  se,  is  of  neces- 
sity absolutely  unknowable.  Again,  object  plus  a  subject 
is  the  minimum  scibile  per  se  (by  Prop.  hi.).  But  the 
whole  material  universe  per  se  being  a  mere  collection  of 
objects  without  a  subject,  is  less  than  the  minimum  scibile 
per  se.  Therefore  the  whole  material  universe,  being  less 
than  the  least  that  can  be  known  by  itself,  is  of  necessity 
absolutely  unknowable"  (Counter- Prop.).  —  The  material 
universe  as  such  is  an  object  of  cognition.  There  is  a  uni- 
versal unchanging  element  (ego),  and  a  particular  fluctuating 
element  (non-ego),  in  every  cognition  (Props,  vi.  and  vii.). 
Ordinary  opinions  and  popular  psychology  assume  the  op- 
posite ;  and  by  this  assumption,  especially  in  the  form  of  the 
doctrine  of  abstraction,  the  science  of  the  human  mind,  as  it 


FERRIER.  291 

is  called,  has  done  incalculable  mischief  to  the  cause  of  truth. 
"  All  knowledge  and  all  thought  are  concrete,  and  deal  only 
with  concretions,  —  the  concretion  of  the  particular  and 
the  universal."  The  ego,  or  self,  or  mind,  per  se  is  of  ne- 
cessity absolutely  unknowable ;  it  is  known  only  in  some 
particular  state,  or  in  union  with  some  non-ego  (Prop.  x.). 
Mere  objects  of  sense  can  never  be  objects  of  knowledge ; 
/'.  e.,  the  senses  by  themselves  are  not  competent  to  place 
any  knowable  or  intelligible  thing  before  the  mind  (Prop, 
x.).  That  alone  can  be  represented  in  thought  which  can 
be  presented  in  knowledge  :  it  is  impossible  to  think  that 
of  which  knowledge  has  supplied  and  can  supply  no  sort  of 
type  (xi.).  The  material  universe  per  se  and  all  its  quali- 
ties per  se  are  not  only  absolutely  unknowable,  they  are  of 
necessity  absolutely  unthinkable  (xii.).  There  is  no  mere 
phenomenal  in  cognition ;  the  phenomenal  by  itself  is 
absolutely  unknowable  and  inconceivable  (xiv.).  The 
substantial  in  cognition  is  object  plus  subject,  matter  mecum, 
universal  and  particular,  etc.  (xvi.).  There  is  no  mere 
relative  in  cognition  (xviii.).  There  is  an  absolute  in 
cognition,  —  something  absolute  is  knowable,  and  is  known 
by  us  (xx.).  The  absolute  in  cognition  is  object  plus  sub- 
ject; matter  mecum,  universal  and  particular,  etc.  (xxi.). 
The  main  result,  then,  of  Epistemology  (which  attempts  to 
answer  the  question,  What  is  knowledge  ?)  is  that  knowl- 
edge is  the  apprehension  of  one's  self  along  with  all  that 
one  apprehends,  of  object  plus  subject.  The  only  way  of 
transcending  one's  consciousness  is  by  conceiving  other 
consciousnesses  like  one's  own. 

Agnoiology.  —  Ignorance  is  an  intellectual  defect,  imper- 
fection, privation,  or  shortcoming.  The  law  of  all  igno- 
rance is  that  "  we  can  be  ignorant  only  of  what  can  possibly 
be  known ;  "  in  other  words,  there  can  be  an  ignorance  only 
of  that  of  which  there  can  be  a  knowledge  (in.)-  There 
is  no  ignorance  of  objects  per  se  or  out  of  relation  to  mind  ; 
hence  no  ignorance  of  matter  or  mind  per  se,  of  universal  or 
particular,  etc.,  per  se.  The  object  of  ignorance  is  always 


292        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN'  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  synthesis  of  the  particular  and  the  universal,  object  plus 
subject,  etc.  —  In  the  Agnoiology,  says  Ferrier,  the  "  ship 
of  Speculation  is  put  upon  a  new  track,  the  great  waters  of 
Reason  are  spread  before  her  in  a  direction  heretofore  un- 
traversed."  The  doctrine  of  ignorance  has  been  missed, 
partly  because  philosophers  have  wavered  as  to  the  precise 
object  of  knowledge,  and  partly  because  they  have  been  too 
much  occupied  with  the  quantity  of  ignorance  to  think  of 
its  nature  or  quality. 

Ontology.  —  What  truly  is,  or  Absolute  Existence,  is  either 
first  that  which  we  know,  or  that  which  we  are  ignorant 
of,  or  that  which  we  neither  know  nor  are  ignorant  of. 
The  counter-proposition  is  (in  substance)  "  Whatever  we  do 
not  know,  we  must  be  ignorant  of;  in  other  words,  it  is 
impossible  neither  to  know  nor  to  be  ignorant  of  a  thing." 
(The  error  in  this  position  lies  in  the  overlooking  of  the 
fact  that  the  Law  of  Excluded  Middle  applies  only  to  non- 
contradictory  things.  Of  the  contradictory,  or  the  abso- 
lutely or  in  itself  unknowable,  there  is  neither  knowledge 
nor  ignorance.)  Absolute  Existence  is  not  what  we  neither 
know  nor  are  ignorant  of  (since  it  is  not  the  contradictory)  ; 
it  is  either  that  which  we  know  or  that  which  we  are  igno- 
rant of.  It  is  not  matter,  nor  the  universal,  nor  the  particu- 
lar, nor  the  ego  per  se  ;  for  of  these  things  we  can  neither 
know  nor  be  ignorant.  Absolute  existence  is  the  synthesis 
of  subject  and  object,  of  universal  and  particular,  ego  and 
non-ego.  All  absolute  existences  are  contingent  except 
one ;  in  other  words,  there  is  One,  but  only  One,  Absolute 
Existence  which  is  strictly  necessary ;  and  that  existence  is 
a  supreme  and  everlasting  mind  in  synthesis  with  all  things 
(Prop.  xi.).  The  demonstration  of  this  proposition  is  as 
follows :  "  To  save  the  universe  from  presenting  a  contra- 
diction to  reason,  intelligence  must  be  postulated  in  con- 
nection with  it ;  because  everything  except  the  synthesis 
of  subject  and  object  is  contradictory,  and  is  that  of  which 
there  can  be  no  knowledge  and  no  ignorance.  But  more 
than  one  intelligence  does  not  require  to  be  postulated: 


FRENCH  SYSTEMS.  2Q3 

because  the  universe  is  rescued  from  contradiction  as  effec- 
tually by  the  supposition  of  one  intelligence  in  connection 
with  it  as  by  the  supposition  of  ten  million,  and  reason 
never  postulates  more  than  is  necessary.  Therefore  all 
absolute  existences  are  contingent  except  one,  etc.  The 
ninth  proposition  (relating  to  the  origin  of  knowledge)  of 
the  ontology  is,  together  with  its  demonstration,  as  follows : 
Matter  is  not  the  cause  of  our  perceptive  cognitions;  in 
other  words,  our  knowledge  of  material  things  is  not  an 
effect  proceeding  from,  and  brought  about  by,  material 
things.  For  matter  is  the  particular  part  or  peculiar  ele- 
ment of  some  of  our  cognitions,  —  of  those  which  we 
term  '  perceptions.'  But  the  part  of  cognition  cannot  be 
the  cause  of  a  cognition.  Therefore,  etc."  The  question, 
What  is  the  origin  of  knowledge?  is  unanswerable,  be- 
cause unaskable.  No  existence  at  all  can  be  conceived 
by  any  intelligence  anterior  to  and  aloof  from  knowledge. 
Knowledge  of  existence,  the  apprehension  of  one's  self 
and  other  things,  is  alone  true  existence. 

Result.  —  A  strong  light  is  thrown  by  Ferrier  upon  his 
own  doctrines  and  their  opposites  by  a  wealth  of  accurate 
knowledge  of  the  history  of  philosophy.  The  expressed 
and  implied  criticism  in  his  teachings  bear  not  alone  upon 
doctrines  which  his  immediate  philosophical  environment 
made  it  necessary  to  oppose,  —  the  doctrines  of  the  "  Scotch 
school,"  —  but  upon  doctrines  of  philosophers  of  every  age. 

§   104. 

(2)  French  Systems. —  It  is  particularly  convenient  to  take 
up  the  French  systems  at  this  point,  because  they  are,  in  a 
very  noticeable  degree,  repetitions  and  continuations  of  the 
Scotch.  We  have  to  treat  of  Maine  de  Biran,  Pierre  Laromi- 
guiere,  Pierre  Paul  Royer-Collard,  Victor  Cousin,  Theodore 
Jouffroy,  Robert  de  Lamennais,  Auguste  Comte.  The  last 
two  named  have  no  other  than  a  merely  national  identity 
with  the  others  of  this  group.  Comte  logically  affiliates  with 
the  English  group.  Lamennais  shows  German  influence. 


294        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

§   105. 

Maine  de  Biran 1  (i 766-1824).  — Maine  de  Biran  spent 
most  of  his  not  very  eventful  life  in  retirement,  engaged  in 
reflection.  He  was  at  one  time  member  of  the  company 
of  "  Life-Guards  "  of  Louis  XVI.,  and,  again,  of  the  Coun- 
cil of  the  Five  Hundred,  and  of  both  Chambers,  and  was 
Councillor  of  State,  etc.  He  several  times  carried  off 
honors  from  the  learned  academies  of  Paris,  Berlin,  Copen- 
hagen, etc.  Personally,  he  is  said  to  have  been  a  man  of 
great  modesty. 

Works. — We  may  mention  of  his  works,  which  are 
chiefly  psychological :  (i)  "  Sur  PInfluence  de  1'Habitude  " 
(1803);  (2)  "Sur  la  Decomposition  de  la  Pense"e" 
(crowned  by  the  Institut  in  1805);  "Apperception" 
( 1 8 1 1 )  ;  "  Nouvelles  Considerations  sur  les  Rapports  du 
Physique  et  du  Moral  de  FHomme "  (1811,  published 
J834)  ;  (3)  "  Essai  sur  les  Fondements  de  la  Psychologie 
et  sur  les  Rapports  avec  1'Etude  de  la  Nature  "  (published 
J8S9)  ;  "Nouveaux  Essais  d'Anthropologie  "  (1823,  post- 
humously published).  These  works  represent  (as  indi- 
cated) three  different  stages  of  thought. 

Philosophy:  First  Stage.  —  Maine  de  Biran  occupies, 
first,  the  general  standpoint  of  Bacon,  Locke,  and  Condillac, 
in  whom  he  sees  the  true  philosophers.  He  proposes  to 
carry  the  method  of  physics  over  into  metaphysics.  The 
understanding  is  merely  the  ensemble  of  the  habitudes  of 
the  brain.  A  distinction  —  not  made  by  Condillac  —  has 
to  be  made  between  sensation  as  a  passive,  and  perception 
as  an  active,  condition  of  mind ;  the  latter  involving,  as 
the  former  does  not,  a  certain  volitional  activity.  A  dis- 
tinction is  also  to  be  made  between  passively  formed  "  cus- 
toms "  and  active  "  habits." 

Second  Stage.  —  The  sensationalist  theory  (of  Con- 
dillac) fails  to  explain  the  characteristic  attribute  of  man. 
It  takes  as  its  basis  the  facts  of  animal  life  merely,  —  the  facts 

1  Franck ;  Cousin,  "  Fragments  Philosophiques." 


MAINE  DE  BIRAN.  295 

of  unconscious  affections  in  the  physical  nature  of  man. 
But  the  use  of  these  facts  to  explain  man's  characteristic 
quality  is  a  misuse  of  them.  The  animal  is  without  real 
consciousness,  —  does  not  know  that  it  exists.  Man  feels 
and  knows  the  me  (moi).  The  me  is  to  be  distinguished 
from  what  is  merely  physical,  and  for  the  reason  that  it 
perceives  itself  and  distinguishes  itself  from  its  object.  It 
is  an  error  to  look  for  the  me  in  fibres,  as  does  the  mate- 
rialist ;  and  it  is  equally  an  error  to  see  its  nature  in  the 
abstract  conceptions  of  the  a  priori  philosophers.  The  me 
does  not  present  itself  as  object,  but  as  subject.  It  is  not 
to  be  comprehended  as  an  absolute,  independent  of  con- 
sciousness, but  is  apprehended  in  self-observation ;  and  yet 
only  on  condition  that  it  reveals  itself,  or  acts,  /.  e.,  pre- 
sents itself  as  will.  Descartes  said,  Je  pcnse,  done  je  suis  ; 
but  we  may  more  truthfully  say,y<?  veux,  done  je  suis,  —  "I 
will,  therefore  I  am ;  "  the  will  is  the  self-manifestation 
of  the  me.  All  attempts  to  derive  the  me,  and  also  the 
feeling  of  personality,  from  mere  sensation  are  vain.  The 
me  has  a  double  character:  (i)  it  is  an  individual  force 
(not  a  substance;  substance  is  the  category  of  pantheism)  ; 
(2)  it  is  inseparably  united  to  a  resisting  organism.  This 
double  character  is  directly  evident  to  consciousness. 
From  the  consciousness  of  the  me's  activity  we  acquire 
the  universal  and  necessary  notions  of  force,  causality, 
unity,  liberty.  These  notions  are  not  innate,  since  they  de- 
pend on  a  prior  activity  of  the  will,  but  they  are  absolutely 
different  in  character  from  mere  general  ideas  produced 
by  external  observation.  They  are  sui  generis;  instead 
of  becoming  less  real,  as  do  ideas  derived  from  sensible 
perceptions  when  made  the  subjects  of  abstraction,  they 
become  more  so.  It  is  only  by  the  complete  abuse  of  the 
spirit  of  system  that  the  notion  of  liberty  can  be  treated  as 
a  mere  abstraction.  The  will,  even  when  following  the 
stimulus  of  desire,  knows  itself  to  be  responsible  and  free. 
To  understand  completely  human  nature  it  is  necessary  to 
consider  its  two  inseparable  interacting  elements  —  one  of 


296        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

which,  affection,  is  variable  and  relative,  while  the  other, 
the  will,  or  me,  is  permanent  and  absolute  —  in  the  suc- 
cessive modes  of  their  combination.  There  result  four 
"systems;"  the  affective  system  (/<?  systeme  affectif),  the 
sensitive  system  (le  systeme  sensi/if),  the  perceptive  system 
(le  systeme  perceptif},  and  the  reflective  system  (le  systeme 
reflectif}.  The  first  comprehends  the  animal  life,  —  pains, 
pleasures,  instinctive  phantasies,  images,  etc.,  but  no  will ; 
the  second  self-consciousness,  the  localization  of  affections 
in  the  organs,  referring  intuitions  to  space,  and  associating 
the  idea  of  cause  with  them,  the  beginning  of  memory  and 
generalization,  and  will  in  the  lowest  degree ;  the  third, 
attention,  which  involves  a  higher  degree  of  volitional 
effort,  the  seeking  of  objects  of  knowledge,  exercising  active 
touch  and  judging  of  externality,  distinguishing  primary 
and  secondary  qualities,  classification,  formation  of  general 
ideas,  intelligence  being  occupied  in  this  system  with 
external  objects  calling  it  forth;  the  fourth,  all  acts  of 
intelligence  concerned  with  its  own  nature,  the  me  here 
distinguishing  itself  completely  from  its  opposite,  becoming 
completely  conscious  of  the  notions  of  which  it  is  the  source, 
—  the  universal  and  necessary  ideas,  —  and  establishing 
upon  them  the  mathematical  and  metaphysical  sciences. 

Third  Stage. —  There  is  something  higher  even  than 
will.  Will  is  incapable  of  being  or  becoming  all  that  intelli- 
gence perceives.  In  the  presence  of  the  idea  of  the  good, 
the  will  feels  a  certain  defect  in  itself,  requires  aid.  The 
mere  light  of  reason  is  insufficient.  God  is  the  only  suc- 
cor, —  who  is  both  the  source  of  light  in  the  world  of 
intelligence,  and  of  power  in  the  sphere  of  will.  The  me 
conscious  of  its  weakness,  is  in  a  new  relation  ;  it  is  presented 
with  the  alternative  of  submission  to  sensible  nature,  towards 
which  its  lower  tendencies  carry  it,  or  of  union  with  the  divine 
nature,  the  need  of  which  (union)  its  higher  instincts  make 
for  it.  The  higher  life  thus  opened  to  the  me  is  the  life  of 
spirit,  —  of  love,  —  instead  of  will ;  it  is  the  life  on  which  man 
turns  towards  the  source  of  light  and  force,  intelligence  and 


LAROMIGUJ&RR.  297 

will,  and  identifies  itself  with  God,  the  absolute  Truth  and 
absolute  Good.  Below  this  highest  life  are  the  "life  of 
man  "  (/.  e.,  the  life  of  will,  including  the  systemes  sen- 
sitif,  perceptif,  et  reflexif),  and  the  "animal  life"  (systeme 
affectif).  By  will  man  rises  out  of  the  animal  life,  by 
love  out  of  the  "life  of  man,"  into  the  life  of  spirit.  This 
life  is  exalted  above  both  Stoicism  (which  is  self-asser- 
tion) and  Quietism  (which  is  all  submission)  ;  it  is  a  life 
of  both  will  and  submission,  effort  and  prayer,  —  the  life 
of  Christianity. 

Result.  —  Maine  de  Biran  may  be  said  to  have  begun  in 
France  the  revolt  against  sensationalism  begun  in  Scotland 
by  Reid,  in  Germany  by  Kant,  etc.  He  is,  indeed,  some- 
times styled  the  French  Kant,  and  not  inappropriately  on 
other  accounts  than  the  one  here  implied.  He  is  admitted 
to  be  an  original  thinker,  —  the  most  original  of  the  French 
philosophers  since  Descartes,  or  perhaps  Malebranche ; 
and  his  thought  is  strongly  marked  by  that  twofold  energy 
of  self-distinction  and  self-identification  which  marks  the 
thought  of  Kant  (and  German  philosophy  after  him) .  Most 
of  the  French  philosophers  who  follow  in  our  account  were 
largely  indebted  to  him. 

§   106. 

Pierre  Laromiguiere  (1756-1839)  was  teacher  ot  phi- 
losophy in  Toulouse  and  at  the  Ecole  Normale  in  Paris. 
We  mention  his  "Foments  de  Metaphysique  "  (1788), 
and  "  Lecons  de  Philosophic,  ou  Essai  sur  les  Facult£s  de 
1'Ame  "  (1815—1818).  Laromiguiere.  once  a  close  follower 
of  Condillac,  departs  from  the  doctrine  of  his  master  in  an 
important  respect,  in  that  he  consciously  makes  the  mind 
essentially  active  instead  of  passive :  with  him,  not  mere 
sensation,  but  attention,  is  the  primary  faculty  of  the  mind. 
This  is  in  fact  a  revolt  against  the  whole  principle  of  sensa- 
tionalism. From  attention  are  deduced,  on  the  one  hand, 
comparison  and  reasoning,  which  together  with  it  constitute 
the  understanding ;  and  on  the  other,  desire,  together  with 


298         A    HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

preference  and  liberty  springing  from  it.  The  material  of 
knowledge  originates  in  sensibility,  which  is  either  (i)  simple 
sensibility,  or  (2)  reflection,  or  (3)  the  feeling  of  relation, 
or  (4)  the  sense  of  right  and  wrong.  The  idea  of  God  is 
immediately  given  to  us. 

§    107. 

Pierre  Paul  Royer-Collard  (1763-1845).  —  Royer-Col- 
lard  graduated  at  the  College  of  Charmont,  afterwards  read 
mathematics  and  philosophy,  making  the  works  of  Plato, 
Descartes,  and  Leibnitz,  and  especially  Reid,  the  main 
objects  of  his  studies.  He  was  at  various  times  advocate 
in  the  Parliament  at  Paris,  member  of  the  Council  of  Five 
Hundred,  professor  of  philosophy  in  the  College  of  France, 
president  of  the  Commission  of  Public  Instruction,  president 
of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  etc.  He  published  no  in- 
dependent philosophical  work.  His  "  Fragments  Philoso- 
phiques  "  were  issued  by  Jouffroy,  with  a  French  translation 
of  Reid's  works  (1828-1835). 

Philosophy.  —  Royer-Collard  opposed  the  sensationalism 
and  materialism  of  the  school  of  Condillac  with  weapons 
of  doctrine  borrowed  from  Reid.  The  method  of  philo- 
sophy is  identical  with  that  of  natural  science  :  principles 
are  to  be  sought  through  the  collecting,  sifting,  and  arrang- 
ing of  observed  facts.  The  ideas  of  substance,  cause,  time, 
space,  originate,  not  in  sense,  but  in  consciousness  as  such. 
In  perception  we  infer  directly,  or  without  reasoning,  the 
external  world ;  the  truth  of  perception  in  general  depends 
on  the  will  of  God  ;  the  ego  is  in  all  phenomena  of  conscious- 
ness. That  it  is  identical,  memory  teaches  us.  Time  and 
space  are  objective,  eternal,  infinite,  and  infinitely  divisible  ; 
what  they  are  in  themselves  we  do  not  know,  and  never 
shall  know.  We  could  never  become  aware  of  a  reality 
outside  of  ourselves  but  for  perception,  etc.  —  Royer- 
Collard  is  the  founder  of  the  doctrine  of  eclecticism,  of 
which  the  chief  expounder  is  Victor  Cousin,  to  whom  we 
now  turn. 


COUSIN.  299 

§    108. 

Victor  Cousin*  (1792-1867).  —  Cousin  was  educated 
at  the  Lyce"e  Charlemagne  and  at  the  Ecole  Normale  in 
Paris,  at  which  latter  place  he  heard  the  lectures  of  Laromi- 
guiere  and  Royer-Collard  on  philosophy.  At  the  lycee  he 
distinguished  himself  in  the  classics,  and  at  the  normal 
school  in  philosophy.  Here  he  became  a  maltre  de  con- 
ferences, and  on  the  resignation  of  Royer-Collard  at  the 
Sorbonne  was  appointed  as  his  successor  there.  The  liber- 
ality of  his  political  opinions,  together  with  his  popularity 
and  influence  as  a  lecturer,  excited  the  distrust  of  the  Gov- 
ernment, and  he  was  in  1820  deprived  of  his  professorship. 
He  had  already  acquired  some  familiarity  with  German 
philosophy  and  had  personally  met  both  Schelling  and 
Hegel;  and  in  the  interval  of  seven  years  which  elapsed 
after  his  dismissal  before  he  again  became  a  public  lecturer 
on  philosophy,  he  renewed  his  acquaintance  with  German 
philosophy  and  its  greatest  living  representative  when  on  a 
stay  in  Berlin.  At  the  same  time  he  undertook  a  trans- 
lation of  the  works  of  Plato,  and  published  editions  of 
the  works  of  Descartes  and  Proclus,  as  well  as  impor- 
tant original  works.  In  1828  he  was  reinstated  at  the 
Sorbonne,  and  lectured  for  three  years  with  the  highest  dis- 
tinction. In  1 830  he  was  made  member  of  the  Academy, 
in  1832  peer  of  France,  and  in  1840  minister  of  Public  In- 
struction, as  such  exercising  an  important  influence  towards 
the  improvement  of  education  in  France.  In  1848  he  re- 
tired to  private  life.  He  is  quite  as  worthy  (if  indeed  not 
more  worthy)  of  a  place  in  the  history  of  philosophy  for 
the  stimulus  he  gave  to  philosophical  thinking  and  learning 
as  for  what  he  himself  accomplished  as  a  philosopher.  A 
large  number  of  pupils  have  under  his  inspiration  written, 
translated,  edited,  commentated  works  in  philosophy ;  e.  g., 
Barthe"lemy  Saint-Hilaire,  Emile  Saisset,  Jules  Simon,  Paul 

1  Franck;  Cousin,  "  Fragments  Philosophiques;  "  "Encyclopaedia 
Britannica  ;  "  Ravaisson's  "  Philosophic  en  France  au  xu:e  Siecle  ; " 
"  Cousin,"  by  Jules  Simon  ;  Morell. 


300        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Janet,  Adolphe  Franck,  Charles  de  Rdmusat,  M.  Wadding- 
ton,  Ph.  Damiron,  Renouvier,  Haure"au,  Janet,  Taine,  etc. 

Works.  —  Of  Cousin's  numerous  philosophical  works  the 
following  are  perhaps  the  most  worthy  of  mention  :  "  Cours 
de  Philosophic"  (1818,  published  1836),  revised  and  pub- 
lished as  "  Du  Vrai,  du  Beau,  et  du  Bien  "  ("  The  True,  the 
Beautiful,  and  the  Good"),  (1854)  ;  "Fragments  Philoso- 
phiques  "  (1826);  "Cours  d'Histoire  de  la  Philosophic" 
(1827  and  1840);  "Cours  d'Histoire  de  la  Philosophic 
Moderne"  (published  1841);  "Cours  d'Histoire  de  la 
Philosophic  Morale  au  xvme  Siecle"  (1840)  ;  "  Lecons  de 
Philosophic  sur  Kant"  (1842)  ;  "  Nouveaux  Fragments" 
(1847).  The  "Fragments  Philosophiques "  (1826)  are 
regarded  as  containing  the  best  statement  of  his  views, 
though  the  "  Du  Vrai,  du  Beau,  et  du  Bien "  is  the  more 
widely  known.  Cousin  translated  a  large  number  of  stand- 
ard works  on  the  literature  of  philosophy. 

Philosophy :  The  Genesis  of  Cousin's  System.  —  The 
genesis  of  Cousin's  philosophy  (as  described  by  himself) 
is  substantially  as  follows :  Laromiguiere  taught  him  men- 
tal analysis ;  from  Royer-Collard  he  learned  the  fact  of 
universal  and  necessary  truths,  after  the  Scotch  method ; 
Maine  de  Biran  taught  him  to  see  volitional  activity  in  all 
consciousness,  —  the  three  together  grounding  him  in 
psychology,  the  "  basis  of  all  science ;  "  his  ontological 
conceptions  came  to  him  from  Germany,  —  /.  <?.,  from 
Kant,  Jacobi,  Fichte,  Schelling,  and  Hegel. 

Divisions  of  Cousin's  System.  —  Cousin's  system  falls 
naturally  under  the  heads :  method,  psychology,  ontology, 
ethics,  and  the  history  of  philosophy. 

Method.  —  The  method  of  philosophy  is  (according  to 
Cousin)  that  of  (self-) observation  and  induction,  which  may 
be  called  the  "psychological  method."  This  method  as- 
sumes that  there  are  certain  primary  "  facts  of  conscious- 
ness." These  it  attempts  to  discover  and  analyze  and  raise 
to  the  dignity  of  laws,  —  necessary  and  universal  truths. 
Some  of  these,  by  their  self-evidence,  take  the  rank  of  intu- 


COUSIN.  3OI 

itions  and  afford  stepping-stones  by  which  the  mind  to  a 
certain  extent  rises  out  of  and  above  mere  consciousness 
or  phenomena  into  the  realm  of  being  as  such. 

Psychology.  —  The  method  just  described  yields  within 
consciousness  the  following  general  truths.  There  are  three 
great  classes  of  "  facts  of  consciousness," —  facts  of  sensation, 
of  reason,  and  of  will.  i.  Those  of  will  are  —  as  Maine  de 
Biran  has  shown  —  facts  of  personality  :  the  will  is  the  me  ; 
prior  to  the  development  of  the  will,  man  is  merely  a  natu- 
ral being.  With  will,  and  will  alone,  is  he  personality.  A 
distinction  must  be  drawn  between  conscious,  or  reflective, 
volition  and  a  certain  primary  volition  of  which  we  must 
become  cognizant  before  conscious  volition  can  occur,  — 
an  unconscious  volition  such  as  artistic  genius  manifests. 
It  is  unconscious  rather  than  conscious  volition  that  con- 
stitutes the  essence  of  personality.  2.  Will  is  the  basis  of 
the  self-activity  of  reason,  and  its  independence  of  sensa- 
tion, without  which  it  would  not  be  reason.  The  facts  of 
reason  are  embraced  in  three  "  integrant  and  inseparable 
elements,"  viz.,  the  ideas  of  (i)  substance,  embracing  those 
of  the  absolute,  the  infinite,  etc. ;  (2)  cause,  embracing  those 
of  plurality,  difference,  the  conditioned,  the  finite,  the  phe- 
nomenal, etc. ;  (3)  the  union  of  these,  since  unity  and  plu- 
rality, identity  and  difference,  etc.,  presuppose  one  another. 
These  ideas  are  not  subjective  and  relative,  but  objective  and 
absolute  :  and  first  because  reason  (unlike  will,  which  is  in- 
dividual and  personal)  is  non-individual  and  impersonal,  is 
an  emanation  from  a  universal  reason,  or  God  ;  second,  it  is 
(as  observation  attests)  a  spontaneous  principle  having  an 
immediate  apperception  of  the  truth  germane  to  it.  Rela- 
tivity and  subjectivity  in  our  thinking  is  the  result  of  reflec- 
tion, which,  as  mediatory  in  nature,  admits  of  error's  creeping 
in  at  one  or  more  points  of  the  discursive  process  it  involves, 
—  which  cannot  occur  in  immediate  apperception. 

Ontology.  —  If  now  the  ideas  of  substance  and  cause  and 
the  syntheses  of  these  two  are  of  objective  significance, 
we  have  a  means  of  getting  at  external  reality  as  such, 


302        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  apprehending  supersensible  being.  In  other  words,  we 
know  that  there  is  a  real  cause  of  our  sensations  outside  us, 
that  there  is  a  real  nature  corresponding  to  the  idea  of  the 
ego,  and  that  there  is  a  real  being  (God)  above  ego  and 
the  external  world.  The  external  world,  causing  our  sen- 
sations, can  be  only  of  the  nature  of  force,  is  not  mechanical 
but  dynamical  in  constitution.  The  ego  which  we  perceive 
as  willing,  exercising  reason,  and  having  sensations,  has,  as 
possessing  these  attributes,  an  absolute  existence,  an  essen- 
tial and  ever-abiding  reality.  God,  as  the  synthesis  of  ego 
and  its  opposed  non-ego,  is  comprehensible.  He  is  both 
substance  and  cause,  —  cause  because  substance,  and  vice 
versa,  —  unity  and  multiplicity,  the  infinite  and  the  finite, 
humanity  and  nature ;  which  is  a  view  of  the  Deity  that 
avoids  the  error  of  pantheism,  since  this  makes  God  only 
substance,  thus  denying  the  freedom  of  the  ego  and  the 
independence  of  the  world.  God  creates  the  universe  out 
of  himself  by  a  spontaneous  non-reflective  exercise  of 
energy.  In  nature  his  creative  energy  appears  as  expan- 
sion (passage  from  unity  to  multiplicity)  and  contraction 
(the  reverse  process)  ;  in  us  as  self-distinction  and  self- 
identification  in  consciousness. 

Ethics.  —  The  basis  of  morality  is  reason ;  self-love  and 
sympathy  are  variable  and  uncertain  as  principles.  We  judge 
an  act  of  ours  to  be  good  or  bad  according  as  it  conforms  or 
does  not  conform  to  a  universal  rule  of  reason  called  the 
Good,  applied  to  such  acts  by  an  act  of  self-observation. 
From  the  idea  of  the  Good  flow  those  of  duty,  virtue,  and 
the  summum  bonum.  The  moral  commands  of  reason  are, 
since  man  is  essentially  free:  (i)  Maintain  thy  freedom ; 
(2)  Recognize  the  freedom  of  others  as  thy  own  (the  duty 
of  justice).  These  are  supplemented  by  obedience  to  the 
impulse  of  devotion,  or  self-sacrifice.  The  harmony  of 
reason,  freedom,  and  happiness  is  the  highest  good. 

History  of  Philosophy.  —  The  three  ideas  of  the  reason  — 
the  "  infinite,"  the  "  finite  "  and  their  synthesis  —  have 
been  the  foundation  of  philosophy  (as  of  life)  in  every  age. 


fOUFFROY.  303 

Of  the  three,  that  of  the  "  infinite  "  is  the  most  distinctive  in 
Oriental  thought,  that  of  the  "  finite  "  in  Greek  thought,  and 
their  synthesis  in  modern  thought.  Systems  of  philosophy 
as  they  have  appeared  in  history  may  be  classified  as  sen- 
sational, idealistic,  sceptical,  mystical.  These  are  all  imper- 
fect forms  of  the  one  true  philosophy,  eclecticism. 

Result.  —  Though  not  of  great  originality  or  profoundity 
(as  indeed  he  did  not  claim  to  be),  Cousin  has  had  a  very 
great  influence  on  the  thought  of  the  century,  particularly 
in  his  own  country  and  in  America.  He  was  a  remarkably 
skilful  popularizer  of  philosophical  truth. 

§   109. 

Theodore  Simon  Jouffroy  (1796—1842).  —  Jouffroy  was 
educated  at  the  College  of  Dijon  and  at  the  Ecole  Normale 
in  Paris,  where  he  had  Cousin  as  instructor  in  philosophy. 
He  became  an  assistant  instructor  in  the  Normal  School, 
lecturer  at  the  College  de  Bourbon  and  in  the  University 
of  Paris,  and  adjunct  professor  to  Royer  Collard  in  the 
last-named  institution.  He  was  at  one  time  member  of 
the  Chamber  of  Deputies.  He  was  elected  to  the  Academy 
in  1833. 

Works.  —  Original  works  of  Jouffroy  are  :  "  Melanges 
Philosophiques  "  (1833),  —  a  miscellany  of  philosophical 
writings;  "  Cours  de  Droit  Naturel  "  ("Course  in  Natural 
Right"),  (1835)  ;  "  Nouveaux  Melanges  Philosophiques" 
(posthumous)  ;  "  Cours  d'Esthe'tique  "  (posthumous).  (He 
translated  Reid's  works  and  the  "  Outlines  of  Moral  Philos- 
ophy "  by  Dugald  Stewart.  He  also  edited,  in  an  ab- 
ridged form,  Kant's  "  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft,"  1842.) 

Philosophy.  —  The  only  salvation  for  philosophy  —  as 
distinguished  from  physiological  psychology —  is  the  rec- 
ognition that  there  is  a  distinct  order  of  facts  for  it  to  deal 
with,  and  that  there  must  be  a  "  more  profound  observation 
of  human  nature  "  than  has  yet  been  employed.  Human 
nature  has  a  twofold  character :  it  is  both  free  and  subject 
to  necessary  laws ;  it  has  a  psychological  and  a  physiological 


304        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

side ;  it  is  personal  and  impersonal.  It  possesses  the 
faculties  of  liberty  of  will,  of  primitive  inclinations,  of 
voluntary  motion,  of  speech,  of  feeling  pleasure  and  pain, 
of  sensible  perception,  conception,  and  abstraction  (intel- 
lectual faculties).  Human  action,  as  a  part  of  a  universal 
order,  is  to  be  judged  according  to  the  degree  of  its  con- 
formity with  that,  or,  in  other  words,  with  the  destiny  of 
human  nature.  Beauty  is  that  which  affords  a  disinterested 
pleasure.  The  elements  of  beauty  are  order  and  propor- 
tion ;  its  conditions  are  unity  and  variety. 

§   no. 

Robert  de  Lamennais^  (1782-1854).  —  Lamennais  was 
educated  for  the  priesthood,  and  until  1834  was  a  stanch 
defender  of  the  faith  and  the  infallibility  of  the  authority 
of  the  Romish  Church  in  matters  of  religion.  After  1834 
he  appears  as  a  philosopher  pure  and  simple,  having  re- 
nounced the  Church. 

Works.  —  The  philosophical  works  of  Lamennais  cor- 
respond with  two  distinct  attitudes  of  thought.  His 
"  Essai  sur  1'Indifference  en  Matiere  de  Religion "  and 
"  De  la  Religion  considered  dans  ses  Rapports  avec 
1'Ordre  Politique  et  Civil "  (1825-1826)  are  works  in  which 
philosophy  appears  as  subservient  to  the  Church.  His 
"  Esquisse  d'une  Philosophic"  (1837-1841)  is  a  philo- 
sophical work  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  term. 

Philosophy :  Earlier  Standpoint.  —  All  individual  phi- 
losophical systems  necessarily  end  in  scepticism.  The 
individual  reason  alone  is  impotent  to  search  out  the  uni- 
versal truth.  This  is  in  the  possession  of  the  universal 
reason  of  humanity,  the  only  true  expression  of  which  is 
contained  in  the  faith  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church,  and 
the  only  organ  of  which  is  the  pope,  etc. 

Later  Standpoint.  —  Underlying  all  our  thoughts  and 
affirmations  is  the  idea  of  being  as  such,  —  God.  God  is 
the  positive  in  all  existence ;  outside  him  there  is  nothing. 

i  Noack. 


LAMENNAIS.  —  COMTE.  305 

God  alienates  himself  in  part  from  himself,  —  thus  creat- 
ing the  world  of  finite  existences,  which  is  consubstantial 
with,  though  in  a  manner  distinct  from,  him.  God,  though 
one,  contains  in  himself  a  triplicity  of  principles.  In  his 
intelligence  there  are:  (i)  the  "sole  thought  of  himself; 
(2)  representative  ideas  of  all  particular  beings;  (3)  some- 
thing which  determines  the  actual  distinction  of  particular 
ideas."  God  has  the  three  attributes  of  power,  intelligence, 
and  love,  and  in  all  that  exists,  this  triplicity  in  different 
degrees  recurs.  The  lowest  degree  of  manifestation  of 
God's  attributes  is  found  in  matter  as  such.  Impenetra- 
bility in  matter  corresponds  to  force,  or  power,  in  God, 
figure  to  intelligence  in  him,  and  cohesion  to  love. 
The  material  elements  —  ether,  light,  heat  —  are,  respect- 
ively, inferior  forms  of  God's  three  attributes,  —  power,  in- 
telligence, love.  The  divine  essence  communicates  itself 
in  all  its  purity  to  the  rational  free  soul.  Creation  is  the 
progressive  manifestation  of  all  that  which  is  in  God,  and 
in  the  same  order  in  which  it  is  in  God.  The  world  is  the 
best  possible.  All  that  could  be,  necessarily  was ;  there 
was  no  room  for  choice.  Lamennais  aims  to  avoid  pan- 
theism by  insisting  on  the  necessary  imperfection  of  the 
world  as  a  created  existence  (since  God  could  not  create 
another  God),  and  therefore  it  is  separateness  in  relation 
to  God. 

§   in. 

Angus te  Comte  *  (1798-1857).  —  Comte  was  born  at 
Montpellier.  He  attended  school  in  Montpellier  and  stu- 
died at  the  Ecole  Polytechnique  in  Paris,  from  which  he 
was  ejected  because  of  unwillingness  to  submit  to  what  was, 
perhaps,  an  arbitrary  exercise  of  authority.  For  some  years 
he  lived  in  Paris,  obtaining  a  not  very  liberal  livelihood  by 

i  See  Abridged  Translation  of  Comte's  "  Philosophic  Positive,"  by 
Harriet  Martineau  ;  "  A  General  View  of  Positivism "  (translated 
by  J.  H.  Bridges) ;  "  Positive  Philosophy  of  Auguste  Comte,"  by 
J.  S.  Mill;  "Encyclopaedia  Britannica ; "  Caird's  "Comte's  Social 
Philosophy." 
VOL.  I.  —  20 


306        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

teaching  mathematics.  Between  the  years  1818  and  1824 
he  was  a  pupil  of  the  Socialist  Saint-Simon.  At  first  an 
enthusiastic  admirer  of  the  Socialist,  he  came  to  despise  him 
as  a  charlatan,  and  declined  to  admit  himself  to  be  under 
any  great  intellectual  obligations  to  him.  In  1826,  in  con- 
sequence of  overwork  and  of  mental  anxiety  caused  by 
domestic  discord  and  financial  straits,  he  became  mentally 
deranged.  He  was  able,  however,  in  1828  to  resume  his 
work  as  teacher,  and  to  prepare  in  the  two  years  following  a 
volume  for  publication.  In  1832  he  was  appointed  repcti- 
teur,  or  assistant- instructor,  and  not  long  after  examiner, 
in  the  Ecole  Poly  technique.  In  1842  he  lost  his  place  as 
examiner,  and  lived  precariously,  supported  in  part  by  con- 
tributions of  friends  and  followers  in  France  and  England. 
In  1845,  having,  three  years  previously,  divorced  his  wife, 
he  fell  violently  in  love  with  a  certain  Madame  Clotilde 
de  Vaux,  whose  friendship  he  enjoyed  only  for  too  brief  a 
period,  since  she  died  the  next  year.  The  influence  of  her 
and  her  memory  upon  him  introduced  a  new  epoch  in  his 
mental  life,  promoting,  if  not  causing  outright,  a  tendency 
the  seeming  opposite  of  the  positivistic,  viz.,  a  phantastico- 
mystical  religious  tendency. 

Works.  —  Comte's  chief  philosophical  works  are  : 
"  Cours  de  Philosophic  Positive"  (1830-1842,  6  vols.)  ; 
"  Systeme  de  Politique  Positive,  ou  Traite"  de  Sociologie 
instituant  la  Religion  de  l'Humanit£  "  (1851-1854)  ;  "  Syn- 
these  Subjective  "  (1856). 

Philosophy :  the  Law  of  Human  Development.  —  "  Each 
of  our  leading  conceptions,  each  branch  of  our  knowledge, 
passes  successively  through  three  different  theoretical  con- 
ditions, —  the  theological,  or  fictitious ;  the  metaphysical, 
or  abstract;  the  scientific,  or  positive.  In  other  words, 
the  human  mind  by  its  nature  employs  in  its  progress 
three  methods  of  philosophizing,  the  character  of  which 
is  essentially  different,  and  even  radically  opposed ;  viz., 
the  theological  method,  the  metaphysical,  and  the  positive. 
Hence  arise  three  philosophies,  or  general  systems  of  con- 


COMTE.  307 

ceptions  on  the  aggregate  of  phenomena,  each  of  which 
excludes  the  others.  The  first  is  the  necessary  point  of  the 
human  understanding ;  the  third  is  its  fixed  and  definitive 
state.  The  second  is  merely  a  state  of  transition.  In  the 
theological  state,  the  human  mind,  seeking  the  essential 
nature  of  beings,  the  first  and  final  causes  (the  origin  and 
purpose)  of  all  effects,  —  in  short,  absolute  knowledge,  — 
supposes  all  phenomena  to  be  produced  by  the  immediate 
action  of  supernatural  beings.  In  the  metaphysical  state, 
which  is  only  a  modification  of  the  first,  the  mind  supposes, 
instead  of  supernatural  beings,  abstract  forces,  veritable 
entities  (that  is,  personified  abstractions)  inherent  in  all 
beings,  and  capable  of  producing  all  phenomena.  What 
is  called  the  explanation  of  phenomena  is  in  this  stage 
a  mere  reference  of  each  to  its  proper  entity.  In  the  final, 
positive  state,  the  mind  has  given  over  the  vain  search 
after  absolute  notions,  the  origin  and  destination  of  the 
universe,  and  the  causes  of  phenomena,  and  applies  itself 
to  the  study  of  their  laws,  —  that  is,  invariable  relations 
of  succession  and  resemblance.  Reasoning  and  observa- 
tion, duly  combined,  are  the  means  of  this  knowledge. 
What  is  now  understood  when  we  speak  of  explanation 
of  facts  is  simply  the  establishment  of  a  connection  of 
single  phenomena  and  some  general  facts,  the  number  of 
which  diminishes  with  the  progress  of  science.  The  theo- 
logical system  arrived  at  the  highest  perfection  of  which 
it  is  capable  when  it  substituted  the  providential  action 
of  a  single  being  for  the  varied  operations  of  numerous 
divinities  which  had  been  before  imagined.  In  tho  same 
way,  in  the  last  stage  of  the  metaphysical  system  was  sub- 
stituted one  great  entity  (Nature)  as  the  cause  of  all 
phenomena,  instead  of  the  multitude  of  entities  at  first 
supposed.  In  the  same  way,  again,  the  ultimate  perfection 
of  the  positive  system  would  be  (if  such  perfection  could 
be  hoped  for)  to  represent  all  phenomena  as  particular 
aspects  of  a  single  general  fact,  such  as  gravitation,  for 
instance."  Evidences  of  this  law  are  to  be  found  in  the 


308        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

history  of  the  sciences,  in  the  history  of  the  individual 
mind,  in  the  theoretical  considerations  that  the  mind  feels 
a  necessity,  in  dealing  with  numerous  and  complex  data, 
of  having  some  theory  by  which  to  connect  them ;  that 
it  could  in  the  beginning  have  only  such  a  degree  of  intelli- 
gence as  the  theoretical  conception  of  things  in  general 
embodies ;  that  the  theological  view  would  naturally  stimu- 
late inquiry,  and  lead  on  to  the  metaphysical  (which  is 
merely  transitional),  and  thence  to  the  positive.  The 
positive  view,  then,  is  the  scientifically  true  view;  Positive 
Philosophy,  the  true  philosophy. 

Characteristics  and  Problem  of  Positive  Philosophy. — 
Positive  philosophy  has  three  general  characteristics  :  ( i )  it 
regards  all  phenomena  as  subject  to  invariable  natural  law; 

(2)  it  attempts  accurately  to  discover  these  laws,  with  a 
view  of  reducing  them  to  the  smallest  number  possible ; 

(3)  it  rejects  speculation  about  origin  and  purpose,  and 
simply  analyzes  accurately  the  circumstances  of  phenomena, 
connecting  them  by  the  natural  relations  of  succession  and 
resemblance.     Every  sort  of  knowledge  reaches  the  posi- 
tive stage.      Every  branch  of  knowledge  becomes  a  part 
of  positive  philosophy  as  it  acquires  generality,  simplicity, 
independence.     Every  branch  must  sooner  or  later  acquire 
the  positive  character.      Social  phenomena,  as  being   the 
most  individual,   the  most  complex,   most  dependent  on 
others,  are  the  latest    to    be  brought  within   the  positive 
sphere,  —  sociology  the  latest  branch  of  positive  philoso- 
phy.    The  problems  of  positive   philosophy  are:     (i)   to 
establish  a  social  physics   (to  bring  sociology  fully  within 
the  sphere  of  the  positive)  ;   (2)   to  form  a  system  of  the 
positive   sciences.     The  former  problem  is   primary;   the 
latter,   secondary. 

Advantages  of  the  Positive  Philosophy.  — There  are  four 
advantages  to  accrue  from  the  study  of  the  positive  phi- 
losophy :  ( i  )•  the  discovery  by  experiment  of  the  laws 
which  rule  the  intellect  in  the  investigation  of  truth ; 
(2)  the  regulation  of  education ;  (3)  the  promotion  of 


COMTE.  309 

the  progress  of  the  special  sciences;  (4)  the  discovery 
of  a  basis  of  social  reorganization,  (i)  Introspective 
psychology  pursues  a  false,  illusory  method ;  the  mind 
cannot  observe  its  own  phenomena;  emotion  interferes 
with  accurate  observation;  the  method  of  introspection 
cuts  off  the  phenomena  of  mind  from  their  causes  and 
effects.  (2)  Education  is  theological  and  metaphysical 
chiefly ;  it  may  be  brought  to  the  positive  stage  by  positive 
philosophy.  (3)  The  positive  philosophy  will  supply  gen- 
eral principles  by  which  the  sciences  may  receive  new 
applications,  as  algebra  and  geometry  did  when  generalized 
by  Descartes.  (4)  Positive  philosophy  will  do  away  with 
the  existing  social  anarchy  by  doing  away  with  the  intel- 
lectual anarchy  —  the  existence  of  the  three  incompatible 
philosophies  —  of  which  it  is  the  consequence. 

The  Hierarchy  of  the  Positive  Sciences,  —  Human  effort 
is  either^  theoretical  or  practical.  We  have  to  do  here 
only  with  the  former.  Science,  or  theoretical  effort,  is 
either  abstract  or  concrete.  The  former  have  to  do  with 
laws,  and  are  fundamental.  With  them  alone  is  philosophy 
concerned.  The  order  of  science  must  be  determined  as 
nearly  as  possible  according  to  the  general  principle  that 
the  simpler  and  more  general  come  first,  and  the  more  com- 
plex and  particular  stand  last.  According  to  this  principle 
we  should  have  the  sciences  arranged  in  nearly  the  his- 
torical order  of  their  perfection,  as  follows :  Astronomy 
(geometrical  and  mechanical),  Terrestrial  Physics  (em- 
bracing Physics  properly  so  called  and  Chemistry)  and 
Organic  Physics  (including  Physiology  and  Social  Physics). 
The  principle  which  gives  this  order  to  the  whole  body 
of  science  arranges  the  parts  of  each  science.  The  fore- 
going arrangement  gives  the  sciences  in  the  order  of  the 
perfection,  the  simpler  and  more  precise  possessing  the 
higher  degree  of  perfection.  It  also  shows  the  order  in 
which  they  must  be  studied,  since  no  science  can  be 
"effectually  pursued  without  the  preparation  of  a  compe- 
tent knowledge  of  the  anterior  science  on  which  it  de- 


310        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

pends."  (The  advantage  of  all  this  for  Pedagogy  is  obvious.) 
The  positive  method,  though  always  fundamentally  the 
same,  receives  different  applications  in  the  different  sci- 
ences, and  to  be  thoroughly  understood  must  be  studied 
in  the  different  sciences.  A  variety  of  the  methods  appli- 
cable to  one  science  cannot  be  transferred  without  modi- 
fication to  another  science.  —  Mathematics,  omitted  from 
the  list  of  the  sciences  as  given,  is,  and  has  been  since  the 
time  of  Descartes  and  Newton,  the  basis  of  the  whole  of 
Natural  Philosophy,  rather  than  a  particular  science.  Re- 
garded as  a  particular  science,  it  would  stand  at  the  head 
of  the  list. 

Sociology.  —  We  pass  over  entirely  Comte's  treatment  of 
the  first  four  of  the  five  particular  sciences  which  constitute 
the  entire  circle  of  sciences,  and  speak  merely  of  the  fifth, 
Sociology,  a  science  of  which  he  claimed  to  be  the  founder.1 
Sociology,  or  the  Science  of  Society,  has  two  general  con- 
ditions to  consider;  viz.,  those  of  order  and  progress  in 
civilization,  the  two  being  necessarily  inseparable  aspects  of 
one  principle.  It  has  accordingly  the  two  general  divisions, 
—  Social  Statics  and  Social  Dynamics.  The  method  of 
Sociology  is  the  same  as  that  of  the  other  sciences,  —  the 
method  of  combined  induction  and  deduction.  So  far  as  it 
merely  observes  and  collects  facts  peculiar  to  its  sphere  and 
draws  from  them  empirical  laws,  it  is  inductive  in  its  pro- 
cedure ;  so  far  as  dependent  on  the  anterior  sciences  of 
Physiology,  Chemistry,  Physics,  etc.,  it  is  deductive  in  its 
procedure.  The  empirical  laws  it  arrives  at  by  induction, 
must  harmonize  with  the  deductions  from  the  principles 
drawn  from  anterior  sciences.  Social  Statics  has  for  its  "  ob- 
ject the  positive  study  of  the  mutual  action  and  reaction 
which  all  portions  of  the  social  system  continually  exercise 
upon  each  other."  The  elements  it  has  to  deal  with  are  the 

1  We  may  quote  here  a  remark  which  occurs  in  Professor  Huxley's 
"  The  Advance  of  Science  in  the  Last  Half  Century,"  to  the  effect  that 
Comte  "  had  no  adequate  acquaintance  with  the  physical  sciences 
even  of  his  own  time."  In  this  Comte  reminds  one  of  Bacon. 


COMTE.  3  1 1 

individual,  the  family,  and  society  as  such.  The  family  was 
"  originally  the  sole,  and  always  the  principal,  source  of  the 
social  feelings,  and  the  only  school  open  to  mankind  in  gen- 
eral in  which  unselfishness  can  be  learned,  and  the  feelings 
and  conduct  demanded  by  social  relations  be  made  habitual." 
Society  is  founded  on  a  division  of  employment  and  a  co- 
operation of  human  beings.  This  division  and  this  co-oper- 
ation require  a  wise  supervision,  which  can  be  exercised 
only  by  Positive  philosophers,  in  the  capacity  of  authorized 
educators.  Social  Dynamics,  which  treats  of  the  laws  of  the 
evolution  of  society,  has  for  its  fundamental  law  that  of  the 
"  constant  and  indispensable  succession  "  of  the  three  gen- 
eral states  —  theological,  metaphysical,  positive  —  through 
which  our  intelligence  passes  in  all  speculations.  Corre- 
sponding to  these  three  states  are  three  forms  of  social  life, 
—  the  military,  the  legal,  and  the  industrial.  The  most 
important  transition  yet  undergone  by  mankind  is  that 
which  gave  rise  to  industrial  organization,  which  substituted 
serfdom  for  slavery,  extended  the  influence  of  domestic 
affections,  tended  to  establish  castes,  and  to  unite  differ- 
ent populations,  etc.  Social  regeneration  must,  primarily, 
be  speculative  or  intellectual :  in  the  future  the  specula- 
tive class  will  rule,  because  of  the  need  men  will  naturally 
come  to  feel  for  its  influence  in  affairs  of  life. 

The  Religion  of  Humanity.  —  Society  is,  in  its  highest 
idea,  a  harmony  of  individual  and  collective  humanity. 
This  renders  it  obligatory  upon  the  individual  to  subordi- 
nate himself  to  collective  humanity,  to  live  a  life  of  unselfish 
love  and  sacrifice  as  far  as  may  be  possible.  Humanity  is 
the,  for  us,  Supreme  Being,  the  only  being  we  can  know 
and  worship.  This  Grand  Eire  is  most  perfectly  symbol- 
ized in  woman,  who,  accordingly,  living  or  as  preserved  in 
memory,  should  be  made  an  object  of  private  worship,  as 
collective  humanity  is  of  public  worship.  The  ministers  of 
the  religion  of  humanity  are,  in  the  family,  the  women  of 
the  family,  and  in  society  at  large,  a  class  of  (male)  priests 
who,  without  power  to  command,  have  authority  as  advisers 


312         A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

and  remonstrators,  as  the  instructors  of  youth  and  as  the 
sole  depositaries  of  the  medical  art.  Though  philosophers, 
they  subordinate  their  intellectual  powers  and  attainments 
to  the  ends  of  the  social  feeling,  which  is  the  essence  of  re- 
ligion. The  religious  motto  of  the  Positivist  is,  "  D  Amour 
pour  principe,  F Ordre  pour  base,  et  le  Progres  pour  but" 
by  "  progress  "  being  understood  the  continued  increase 
of  mastery  of  man's  defects  and,  in  particular,  those  of 
the  moral  nature. 

Result.  —  As  regards  Comte,  it  seems  sufficient  merely 
to  say  that  his  "  Positivism  "  is  essentially  that  "  scientific  " 
(semi-rationalistic)  empiricism  which  in  Hume  (who,  as 
pointed  out  by  J.  S.  Mill,  went  a  step  —  though  but  a  step 
—  beyond  the  position  of  Comte  even)  logically  led  to  the 
purest  scepticism.  We  turn  now  to  the  thinker  who  by 
almost  universal  acknowledgment  logically  put  an  end  to 
all  empiricism  in  philosophy,  —  Immanuel  Kant,  —  noting, 
as  we  leave  Comte,  that  his  doctrines  have  exercised  a  de- 
cided influence  upon  the  later  English  thinkers,  in  par- 
ticular J.  S.  Mill  and  Lewes,  and  some  of  the  Germans, 
e.  g.,  Eugen  Diihring. 

§   112. 

(3)  German  Systems.  —  Among  the  German  systems 
(rather  too  numerous  to  be  fully  specified  here)  taken  as  a 
group  there  appears  such  an  order  of  development  that  they 
may,  even  chronologically,  almost,  be  arranged  in  the  fol- 
lowing succession  :  (i)  Idealists, —  (a)  subjective,  as  Kant, 
Reinhold,  Fichte,  Schlegel,  Schleiermacher,  etc. ;  {b}  objec- 
tive, as  Schelling  and  his  disciples  ;  (c)  absolute,  as  Krause, 
Hegel,  etc. ;  (2)  Realists,  as  Jacobi,  Schopenhauer,  Herbart, 
etc. ;  (3)  Ideal- Realists,  as  Beneke,  Trendlenburg,  Von  Hart- 
mann,  Lotze,  etc.  (We  overlook,  for  the  present,  minor, 
sceptical,  and  materialistic  systems.)  The  German  systems, 
whether  regarded  individually  or  as  a  group,  exemplify  — 
as  it  scarcely  needs  be  said  —  more  fully  than  any  others 
of  this  period  the  conception  of  system,  or  totality.  Ger- 


KANT.  313 

man  philosophy  is  in  a  very  striking  degree  an  organic 
whole,  even  with  its  great  number  of  systems.  It  is  so  be- 
cause its  standpoint  is  virtually  that  of  the  "  whole,"  since 
it  is  in  a  very  eminent  degree  that  of  jr^-consciousness. 
The  founder  of  German  philosophy  and  its  ruling  genius  is, 
of  course,  Immanuel  Kant. 


(i)  Immanuel  Kant1  (1724-1804).  —  Immanuel  Kant, 
son  of  an  honest  and  industrious  saddler  of  limited  means, 
was  born  in  Konigsberg,  Prussia.  The  strong  piety  of  his 
parents  provided  a  thorough  religious  and  moral  training  at 
home  for  Immanuel,  and  would  have  destined  him  for  the 
ministry.  He  attended,  between  the  years  1732  and  1740, 
the  gymnasium  in  his  native  town,  at  whose  head  was  the 
Pietist  Franz  Albert  Schulz,  a  pastor,  and  at  one  time  pro- 
fessor of  theology  in  the  University  of  Konigsberg.  At  the 
gymnasium  Kant  showed  special  fondness  and  aptitude  for 
the  study  of  the  Roman  classics,  from  which  he  received 
impressions  that  had  a  life-long  influence  over  him,  —  all 
the  more  because  he  was  not  especially  familiar  with  the 
ancient  classics  in  general.  In  1  740  he  entered  the  Uni- 
versity of  Konigsberg,  primarily  to  study  theology,  though 
mathematics  and  philosophy  came  in  time  to  have  greater 
attractions  for  his  mind.  Thrown  almost  entirely  upon  his 
individual  resources  by  the  death  of  his  father  (in  1746), 
Kant  spent  nine  years  as  a  private  tutor,  in  several  families, 
continuing  meantime  his  learned  studies  and  interesting  him- 
self in  individual  social  culture  as  well.  Duly  qualifying 
as  a  privat-docent,  he  began  in  1755  what  proved  to  be 
an  unusually  successful  career  as  university  lecturer.  He 
lectured  first  on  mathematics  and  physics  ;  afterwards  on 
logic,  metaphysics,  morals,  physical  geography,  natural  the- 
ology, anthropology,  philosophical  encyclopaedia,  —  a  wide 
range  of  subjects.  After  fifteen  years  —  a  rather  long 

1  See  Watson's  "  Selections  from  Kant,"  Zeller,  Ueberweg,  Erd- 
mann,  Noack,  "  Encyclopaedia  Britannica,"  Caird,  Kant's  Works,  etc. 


314        A    HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

period,  considering  the  value  of  his  services  and  his  popu- 
larity —  as  privat- decent,  he  received  the  appointment  of 
professor  of  logic  and  metaphysics  in  the  university,  hav- 
ing in  the  interval  failed  in  the  attempt  to  secure  a  coveted 
appointment  as  professor  extraordinarius  in  mathematics, 
and  declined  offers  from  the  universities  of  Erlangen,  Jena, 
Halle,  as  well  as  the  chair  of  poetry  —  for  which  he  con- 
sidered himself  unsuited  —  at  Konigsberg.  He  held  his 
professorship  until,  in  1797,  the  approach  of  old  age  and 
failing  powers  caused  his  resignation.  HK  popularity  as  a^ 
lecturer  and  Ms  fame  as  a  writer  were  such  as  to  make  his 
name  a  very  great  one  in  Europe  even  long  before  his  death. 
( Privately  also  he  was  a  strong  personality  ;  not  only  intelli- 
gent on  general  topics,  but  also  of  a  very  social  disposition, 
he  had  many  friends  and  admirers,  and  particularly  among 
the  tradespeople  of  Konigsberg.)  He  felt  a  strong  interest 
in  the  humanitarian  political  movements  in  France  and 
America,  and  was  open  in  the  expression  of  his  convictions. 
His  early  Pietistic  training  had  a  life-long  influence  over 
him,  not,  however,  with  the  effect,  as  might  perhaps  be  ex- 
pected, of  preserving  the  hull,  but  the  real  kernel,  of  religion 
and  the  spirit  of  religious  liberty,  —  though  he  did  not,  it  is 
true,  dare  disobey  a  royal  mandate  (issued  a  propos  of  his 
treatise  on  religion)  that  he  should  be  silent  on  religious 
topics.  He  did  not  regularly  attend  church,  —  indeed,  never 
would  enter  a  church ;  though  his  duty  as  rector  of  the  uni- 
versity would  seem  to  have  required  him  at  stated  times  to 
do  so  at  the  head  of  academic  processions.  Physically  he 
was  weak  and  inferior ;  but  by  a  strict  regimen  in  living, 
maintained  health  and  power  to  labor  industriously. 

Kanfs  Earlier  Development  and  Works.  —  Considered 
with  reference  to  the  entire  course  of  his  philosophical 
development,  Kant  belongs  to  an  old  and  to  a  new  order 
of  things,  —  to  the  second  as  well  as  to  the  third  period  of 
modern  philosophy.  He  fully  imbibed  the  philosophic  and 
scientific  ideas  current  in  his  age  and  particularly  in  the 
universities  of  Germany,  and  it  was  only  quite  gradually 


KANT.  3  I  5 

that  he   outgrew,  as  far  as   that  might   be   possible,   the 
T  .gjhnitzQ-WoUEan  metaphysics  ar"jlh^ 


His  first  lectures,  based  on  the  works  of  recognized  author- 
ities, merely  repeated,  with  no  very  great  modification,  their 
views.  In  his  "  Allgemeine  Naturgeschichte  und  Theorie 
des  Himmels  "  ("Universal  History  of  Nature  and  Theory 
of  the  Heavens"),  (1755),  he  asserts  the  Leibnitzian  doc- 
trine of  the  compatibility  of  a  mechanical  with  a  teleologi- 
cal  explanation  of  nature,  though  rejecting  the  theory  of 
the  divine  creative  activity.  In  a  somewhat  later  work  on 
"  Optimism  "  (i  759),  and  in  works  on  the  Lisbon  Earthquake 
(1756),  he  upholds  the  Leibnitzian  thesis  that  "the  existing 
universe  is  the  best  possible,  and  all  parts  are  good  in 
view  of  the  whole."  In  the  "  Physicalische  Monadologie  " 
("Physical  Monadology"),  (1756),  there  is  a  departure 
from  Leibnitzo-Wolffian  principles  in  the  assertion  of  the 
existence  of  simple  substance  occupying  real  space,  and  of 
the  supremacy  in  logic  of  the  principle  of  identity  (over 
contradiction),  and  the  denial  of  pre-established  harmony, 
the  principium  identitatis  indiscernibilium,  and  the  validity 
of  the  ontological  proof  of  the  existence  of  God.  The  work 
"  Der  einzig  mogliche  Beweisgrund  zu  einer  Demonstration 
des  Daseins  Gottes  "  ("  The  only  Possible  Proof  of  the  Ex- 
istence of  God")  substitutes  for  the  ordinary  ontological, 
teleological,  and  cosmological  proofs  of  the  existence  of 
God  an  "  a  priori  proof"  reposing  on  the  principle  that 
possible  being  presupposes  necessary  being  as  its  cause,  and 
an  a  priori  proof  the  substance  of  which  is  that  unity  in 
the  world  points  to  the  existence  of  a  God.  Throughout 
the  greater  part  of  the  earlier  period  Kant  treats  space  as 
the  order  of  relation  between  bodies,  —  i.  e.,  as  objective 
or  quasi-objective,  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  his 
"  Physical  Monadology."  As  to  philosophical  method, 
Kant,  without  ceasing  to  insist  on  mathematics,  emphasizes 
more  than  Leibnitz  had  done  the  "  analysis  of  experience, 
and  the  explanation  of  phenomena  by  the  rules  which  such 
analysis  implies."  Finally,  steering  between  the  formalism 


316        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  the  Wolffian  and  the  unscientific  procedure  of  mere  em- 
piricism, Kant,  in  works  of  the  years  1765  and  1766,  viz., 
"  Nachricht  von  der  Einrichtung  seiner  Vorlesungen  tiber 
die  Philosophic,"  etc.  ("  Announcement  of  the  Arrangement 
of  his  Lectures  on  Philosophy"),  and  "Traume  eines  Geister- 
sehers  erlautert  durch  Traume  der  Metaphysik  "  ("  Dreams 
of  a  Spirit-seer  explained  by  Dreams  of  Metaphysics  "),  is  to 
be  found  declaring  against  a  priori  dogmatic  metaphysics, 
asserting  that  no  finished  philosophy  exists,  that  questions 
of  a  "  purely  ideal  nature,  which  do  not  fall  within  the 
sphere  of  sensible  experience,  are  not  merely  impossible 
and  beyond  the  horizon  of  human  knowledge,  but  are 
entirely  gratuitous  and  futile." 1  Here,  then,  is  Kant's 
"  first  direct  renunciation  of  and  attack  on  traditional  met- 
aphysics" (Zeller).  According  to  Kant's  own  confession 
(e.g.,  in  the  Preface  to  the  "Prolegomena"  mentioned  be- 
low), it  was  Hume's  criticism  of  the  category  of  causality 
that  "interrupted  his  dogmatic  slumber"  and  caused  him 
to  attempt  (as  he  did)  the  "  reform  of  metaphysics." 

Kant's  Later  Works.  —  The  first  positive  attempt  made 
by  Kant  towards  a  reformation  of  metaphysics  appears  in  a 
work  published  in  1770,  "  De  Mundi  sensibilis  atque  intelli- 
gibilis  Forma  et  Principiis."  This  consists  in  the  treating 
of  space  and  time,  not  indeed  as  purely  subjective  forms  of 
human  knowledge,  but  as  merely  "  phenomenal  correlates 
of  the  divine  omnipresence  and  eternity"  (Ueberweg).  A 
further  movement  would  have  been  to  treat  substance, 
causality,  and  other  categories  as  ideal,  and  not  real.  This 
was  positively  done  in  the  first  of  the  works  now  generally 
recognized  as  expounding  the  distinctively  Kantian  stand- 
point, viz.,  the  "  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft"  ("Critique 
of  Pure  Reason  "),  (1781).  Besides  the  "  Kritik  der  reinen 
Vernunft,"  we  have  to  mention  here  the  "  Prolegomena  zu 
einer  jeden  kiinftigen  Metaphysik  die  als  Wissenschaft 
wird  auftreten  konnen"  ("Prolegomena  to  every  Future 
Metaphysic  which  can  claim  to  be  a  Science  "),  (1783)  ; 
1  See  Noack. 


KANT.  3  1 7 

"  Grundlegung  zur  Metaphysik  der  Sitten  "  ("  Foundation 
of  the  Metaphysics  of  Ethics"),  (1785)  ;  "Metaphysische 
Anfangsgriinde  der  Naturwissenschaft "  ("  Metaphysical 
Principles  of  Natural  Science"),  (1787)  ;  second  edition 
of  the  "  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft,"  containing  im- 
portant additions  and  alterations  (1788);  "Kritik  der 
praktischen  Vernunft"  ("Critique  of  Practical  Reason"), 
(1788);  "Kritik  der  Urtheilskraft "  ("Critique  of  the 
Faculty  of  Judgment  "),  (1793)  ;  "  Die  Religion  innerhalb 
der  Grenzen  der  blossen  Vernunft  "  ("  Religion  within  the 
Limits  of  Mere  Reason"),  (1793);  "Metaphysik  der 
Sitten,"  —  I.  "  Metaphysische  Anfangsgriinde  der  Rechts- 
lehre,"  II.  "  Metaphysische  Anfangsgriinde  der  Tugend- 
lehre  "  ("  Metaphysics  of  Ethics,"  I.  "  Principles  of  Theory 
of  Right,"  II.  "Principles  of  Theory  of  Virtue"),  (1797). 

Philosophy  :  Introduction.  —  Philosophy  has  hitherto  pur- 
sued two  opposed  paths,  —  one  of— dogmatic-  assertion  andf  > ) 
of  implicit  confidence  in  human,  reason ;  the  other  of  ^ 
doubt  and  distrust  of  human  reason.  Neither  dogmatism 
nor  scepticism  —  for  these  are  the  two  paths  —  proves  its 
own  assertions  or  absolutely  disproves  those  of  the  other. 
There  remains  a  third  way ;  namely,  to  investigate  and  sur- 
vey—  to  "criticize"  —  the  faculty  of  human  reason  as  a 
faculty  for  a  priori  knowledge  of  that  which  transcends 
mere  experience ;  and  this  to  the  end  that  we  may  know 
how  to  avoid  the  subreptions  of  reason  and  the  illusions 
springing  therefrom.  Philosophy,  that  is  to  say,  is,  first  of 
all,  instead  of  dogmatism  (Leibnitzo-Wolffism)  or  scepti- 
cism (Humism),  "criticism."  After  criticism  has  done  its 
work,  metaphysics,  if  criticism  shall  show  it  to  be  possible, 
begins.  Now,  human  reason —  i.  e.  pure,  non-empirical, 
human  reason  —  has  the  three  branches  of  theoretical 
reason,  practical  reason,  and  the  faculty  of  judgment  inter- 
mediate between  the  two  former ;  and  the  critique  of  hu- 
man reason  is  a  critique  of  theoretical  reason,  a  critique 
of  practical  reason,  and  a  critique  of  the  faculty  of 
judgment. 


3l8        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  Critique  of  Pure  Reason :  Introduction ;  Problem 
of  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason.  —  "  Though  all  our  knowl- 
edge begins  with  experience,  it  does  not  follow  that  there- 
fore it  all  derives  from  experience."  1  There  is,  in  fact, 
an  element  in  knowledge  that  is  in  a  manner  inde- 
pendent of  experience,  an  element  that  may  properly  be 
designated  as  a  priori,  in  contradistinction  to  an  element 
deriving  immediately  from  experience  itself,  —  an  a  pos- 
teriori element.  Every  proposition  of  mathematics,  for 
example,  possesses  a  necessity  and  universality  character- 
istic of  a  priori  knowledge  alone.2  And,  in  physics,  such 
a  proposition  as  that  every  change  has  a  cause,  is  mani- 
festly universal  and  necessary,  i.  <?.,  a  priori.  There  is, 
further,  a  class  of  propositions  in  which  are  contained  deep 
interests  of  reason,  but  which,  transcending  the  bounds 
of  all  possible  experience,  make  it  necessary  to  determine 
the  possibility,  principle,  and  limits  of  all  a  priori  cogni- 
tion. A  priori  propositions  or  judgments  are  either  ana- 
lytic or  synthetic.  An  analytic  judgment  in  general  is  a 
judgment  the  predicate  of  which  adds  no  idea  to  the  sub- 
ject not  already  in  it  implicitly.  A  synthetic  judgment 
is  a  judgment  of  the  opposite  character,  —  its  predicate 
lies  outside  of  the  notion  constituting  the  subject.  In  an 
analytic  judgment,  the  connection  of  subject  and  predicate 
is  thought  through  identity;  in  the  synthetic  it  is  not  so 
thought.  Analytic  judgments  are  judgments  of  explication 
merely;  synthetic  judgments  are  judgments  of  extension. 
The  proposition,  "  All  bodies  are  extended,"  is  an  example 
of  an  analytic  proposition  ;  for  the  notion  of  extension 
is  contained  in  that  of  body.  In  the  proposition,  "All 
bodies  are  heavy,"  the  predicate  is  outside  the  notion 
of  body  as  such ;  and  the  proposition,  therefore,  is  syn- 
thetic. Now,  the  judgments  of  experience  as  such  are 

1  See  "The  Philosophy  of  Kant  in   Extracts"  (selected  by  Pro- 
fessor Watson,  of  Kingston),  from  which  the  following  brief  summary 
of  Kant's  "  Critiques"  is  very  largely  borrowed. 

2  Compare  Hume's  assertion  (above,  pp.  192-193). 


KANT.  319 

synthetic.  Only  by  experience  do  we  come  to  connect 
the  notion  of  weight  with  that  of  body ;  but  the  judgments 
of  experience  are  as  such  a  posteriori.  The  question 
arises,  Are,  and  if  so,  how  are,  a  priori  synthetic  judg- 
ments possible  ?  The  sciences  of  mathematics  and  natural 
philosophy  present  numerous  examples  of  a  priori  syn- 
thetic judgments ;  the  judgments  of  mathematics  are  in 
fact  all  such.  A  priori  synthetic  judgments  in  natural 
philosophy  are  such  as,  —  In  all  changes  of  the  corporeal 
world,  the  quantity  of  matter  remains  the  same ;  In  all 
communication  of  motion,  action  and  reaction  are  equal. 
All  notions  of  the  supersensible  are  ex  hypothesi  synthetic  : 
in  its  aim,  at  least,  metaphysics  consists  in  none  other 
than  a  priori  synthetic  judgments.  The  problem  of  pure 
reason  is  thus  comprised  in  the  question,  How  are  a  priori 
synthetic  judgments  possible  ?  /.  e.,  How  are  pure  mathe- 
matics, pure  natural  philosophy,  pure  metaphysics  possible  ? 
This  problem  has  to  be  solved  by  a  distinct  science,  —  the 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason ;  reason,  that  is  to  say,  which, 
though  present  in  all  experience,  is  not  derived  merely 
from  experience.  The  divisions  of  this  science  may,  anti- 
cipatorily,  be  laid  down  as  follows  :  ( i )  Theory  of  the 
Elements  of  Pure  Reason;  (2)  Theory  of  the  Method 
of  Pure  Reason ;  and  as  there  are  two  stems  of  cognition, 
—  sense,  which  receives,  and  understanding,  which  thinks, 
objects, — the  Theory  of  Elements  has  for  its  grand  divisions 
Transcendental  ^Esthetic  (or  the  Science  of  Sensibility) 
and  Transcendental  Logic  (Science  of  the  Understanding). 
The  science  thus  outlined  —  Criticism  —  may  be  termed 
Transcendentalism,  as  having  to  do  with  a  priori  knowl- 
edge, or  knowledge  transcending  experience  as  such.  It 
is  not  transcendent ;  i.  e.,  does  not  go  beyond  experience 
in  its  totality,  or  all  experience  whatever,  —  rather  it  shows 
the  fallacy  of  such  "  transcendent  "  use  of  reason. 

Transcendental  ^Esthetic.  —  If  we  take  away  from  "  what 
constitutes  our  consciousness  of  body  the  elements  of  it 
belonging  to  understanding,  —  as  substance,  force,  divisi- 


320        A   IlfS TORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

bility,  etc.,  —  and  the  elements  belonging  to  sensibility,  — 
as  impenetrability,  hardness,  color,  etc.,  —  there  still  re- 
main the  two  attributes  of  extension  and  figure.  "  These 
belong  to  pure  perception,  which  as  mere  form  of  sensi- 
bility, and  without  any  actual  object  of  sense  or  sensation, 
exists  in  the  mind  a  priori.  It  is  the  pure,  or  a  priori, 
principles  in  general  of  sensibility  that  form  the  subject- 
matter  of  the  Transcendental  ^Esthetic."  The  principles  of 
sensibility  are  comprised  in  the  two  forms  space  and  time. 
Space  is  the  form  of  what  may  be  designated  as  the  outer 
sense ;  time,  of  the  inner,  —  or  rather,  since  all  mental 
states,  whether  the  object  be  outer  or  inner,  presuppose 
time,  of  sensibility  in  general.  That  time  and  space  are 
pure,  and  not  empirical,  appears  from  the  facts  [among 
others]  that  they  are  in  a  manner  preconditions  to  the 
existence  of  phenomena ;  they  cannot  be  '  thought  away  ' 
or  abstracted  from,  though  objects  be  removed  from  them. 
That  they  are  forms  of  perception,  and  not  conception, 
is  proved  by  the  fact  that  their  parts  do  not  precede  the 
wholes  as  individuals  do  a  general  abstract  notion  formed 
from  them.  The  parts  of  time  and  space  are  not  logically 
subsumable  under  the  whole ;  space  is  essentially  a  unit, 
and  different  times  are  only  parts  of  the  same  time.  A 
further  proof  of  the  subjectivity  of  space  is  found  in  the 
fact  that  our  space-distinctions  are  ultimately  relative, 
as  shown  by  the  terms  "left,"  "right,"  etc.1  An  indirect 
proof  that  space  and  time  are  subjective  and  a  priori  is 
the  fact  of  the  practical  reality  of  the  science  of  pure 
mathematics.  Space  and  time  are  therefore  pure  percep- 
tions, and  as  such  render  possible  synthetic  propositions 
a  priori  of  a  certain  kind.  Their  limitation  consists  in  the 
fact  that  they  concern  objects  only  so  far  as  objects  are 
perceptions  of  sense ;  they  have  no  reference  to  so-called 
things-in-themselves.  Regarded  as  absolute  objective  re- 
alities, space  and  time  lose  their  values :  for  if  they  are 

1  See  Prolegomena,  §  13. 


K'ANT.  321 

conceived  as  substance,  they  become  self-subsistent  enti- 
ties, "  having  no  other  purpose  than  just  to  embrace  all 
that  is  actual ;  "  and  if  they  are  thought  as  attributes  or 
as  relations  among  things,  they  are  not  principles  of  the 
mathematical  knowledge  of  things.  As  pure  or  a  priori 
forms  of  perception  they  render  possible  the  science  of 
pure  mathematics.  If  they  were  empirical  perceptions, 
no  universal  and  necessary  propositions  could  be  based 
on  them ;  if  they  were  mere  conceptions,  they  would  fur- 
nish no  synthetic  propositions.  As  pure  and  non-empirical 
and  as  intuitions,  or  pure  perceptions,  they  are  both  a 
priori  and  synthetic,  and  hence  are  capable  of  supporting 
a  pure  mathematics.  It  is  possible  to  conceive  a  sort  of 
perception  which,  instead  of  being,  like  ours,  "possible 
only  through  the  perceptivity  of  the  subject  being  affected 
by  an  object,"  is  such  that  through  it  the  very  being  of 
the  object  is  given,  —  an  original  intellectual  perception 
such  as  can  belong  only  to  God.  It  is  possible  that  there 
are  other  beings  besides  human  beings,  having  a  form  of 
perception  like  ours  as  regards  space  and  time ;  so  their 
perceptions  must,  like  ours,  be  a  sensible,  not  an  intel- 
lectual, perception. 

Transcendental  Logic  :  Introduction.  —  Transcendental 
Logic  differs  from  ordinary  general  logic  in  that  it  does 
not  abstract  from  all  matter  of  cognition,  though  it  cer- 
tainly does  from  all  merely  empirical  matter  of  cognition  ; 
since,  in  order  to  show  how  the  understanding  thinks  what 
sense  has  received,  the  pure  conceptions  have  to  be  con- 
sidered, not  only  in  themselves,  but  in  their  relations  to  pure 
perception.  Transcendental  logic,  therefore,  instead  of  be- 
ing (like  the  ordinary'  Scholastic  logic)  subjective  and  gen- 
eral, is  objective, — a  logic  of  cognition  and  truth.  According 
as  it  treats  of  the  legitimate  application  of  pure  conceptions 
to  the  matter  of  pure  sense  or  of  their  illegitimate  employ- 
ment in  a  sphere  beyond  sense,  it  may  be  termed  either 
Analytic  or  Dialectic.  Analytic,  since  conceptions  have  to 
be  considered  both  in  themselves  and  in  their  applications 
VOL.  i.  —  21 


322         A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

to  objects  in  general,  has  two  parts,  —  the  Analytic  of  No- 
tions, and  the  Analytic  of  Judgments. 

The  Analytic  of  Notions  :  The  Categories.  —  The  office 
of  the  understanding  in  thinking  the  matter  of  sense  is  to 
bring  into  unity  in  various  ways  the  units  of  cognition  fur- 
nished by  sense.  This  it  does  through  various  forms  of 
activity,  or  functions.  As  all  acts  or  functions  are  judg- 
ments, what  the  various  forms  of  the  constitutive  activity 
of  the  understanding  are  in  relation  to  experience,  may  be 
determined  from  the  inspection  of  a  table  of  logical  judg- 
ments. Logical  judgments  may  be  viewed  with  regard  to 
quantity,  quality,  relation,  modality.  As  to  quantity,  judg- 
ments are  universal,  particular,  singular ;  as  to  quality,  judg- 
ments are  affirmative,  negative,  infinite ;  as  to  relation  they 
are  categorical,  hypothetical,  disjunctive  ;  as  to  modality, 
problematic,  assertoric,  apodictic.  The  pure  synthetic 
acts,  the  pure  conceptions  of  the  understanding,  or  the 
logical  categories,  are,  accordingly,  as  follows  :  of  quantity, 
—  unity,  plurality,  totality  ;  of  quality,  —  reality,  negation, 
limitation  ;  of  relation,  —  inherence  and  subsistence  (sub- 
stance and  accident) ,  causality  and  dependence  (cause  and 
effect),  communion  (reciprocity  of  action  and  reaction)  ;  of 
modality,  —  possibility  and  impossibility,  existence  (actual- 
ity) and  non-existence,  necessity  and  contingency.  The  first 
two  groups  of  categories,  which  have  to  do  with  objects  of 
perception,  may  be  denominated  mathematical  categories ; 
the  last  two,  having  to  do  with  the  existence  of  objects, 
dynamical  categories.  A  mere  glance  suffices  to  show  that 
the  third  in  each  of  the  four  groups  "  owes  its  origin  to  the 
union  of  the  second  with  the  first :  totality  is  merely  plural- 
ity regarded  as  unity ;  limitation  is  reality  in  union  with 
negation ;  reciprocity  is  substance  exchangeably  causal ; 
and  necessity,  lastly,  given,  as  it  were,  by  possibility 
itself." 

The  Transcendental  Deduction  of  the  Categories.  —  It 
has  now  to  be  shown  how  —  by  what  right  or  law  —  the 
categories  can  have  application  in  relation  to  objects  of 


KANT.  323 

experience,  or  furnish  conditions  of  the  very  possibility  of 
all  perception  and  experience  of  objects.  All  thought,  or 
activity  of  the  understanding,  consists  in  the  reference  to 
a  single  principle,  of  a  jnanifold  (furnished  by  sense).  Un- 
less it  be  possible  that  /  think  accompany  all  my  percep- 
tions, they  are  nothing  for  me.  And  this  reference  of  the 
elements  of  my  consciousness  to  myself  which  constitutes  a 
necessary  part  of  consciousness  depends  on  the  possibility 
of  my  conjoining  in  a  single  consciousness  the  given  ele- 
ments of  consciousness.  There  is,  therefore,  presupposed 
by  the  single  consciousness  and  the  accompanying  apper- 
ception of  self,  an  original  synthesis.  The  "  ultimate  prin- 
ciple of  the  possibility  of  all  perception  in  relation  to 
understanding  is,  then,  that  the  unity  of  every  perceptive 
complex  must  stand  under  conditions  of  the  original  syn- 
thetic unity  of  apperception."  Matter  of  sense  which  has 
submitted  to  this  condition  has  acquired  objectivity.  Now 
this  objectivity  is  a  fixed  unity  wrought  by  the  understand- 
ing under  the  guidance  of  self-consciousness ;  and  as  all 
acts  of  the  understanding  are  comprised  in  the  categories, 
the  categories,  at  the  same  time  as  they  are  instrumental 
in  objectifying  the  manifold  of  sense,  themselves  receive 
reality.  In  their  original  character  the  categories  have  no 
other  application  in  cognition  than  to  matter  of  experience, 
since  thought  or  judgment  requires  a  given  manifold,  with- 
out which  it  would  be  merely  ideal,  "  perceptions  without 
conceptions  being  blind,  conceptions  without  perceptions, 
empty." 

Analytic  of  Judgments.  — We  have  next  to  consider  the 
sense-conditions  under  which  the  application  takes  place, 
and  then  the  synthetic  propositions  (judgments)  which  a 
priori  result  from  the  categories  under  these  conditions  and 
underlie  all  other  a  priori  judgments. 

Schematism  of  the  Categories.  —  For  the  application  of 
the  categories  to  the  affections  of  sense  there  fs  required 
a  third  somewhat  (besides  affections  and  categories),  —  a 
tertium  quid,  —  partaking  of  the  characters  of  both,  like 


324        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY, 

both  non-empirical,  but  intellectual  in  one  aspect,  and 
sensuous  in  another.  This  tertium  quid  is  pure  time. 
Time  may  be  viewed  as  regards  range  or  extent  (as  ad- 
mitting the  existence  of  units  singly,,  in  a  group,  or  as  a 
sum)  ;  as  regards  content,  —  as  having  a  content  in  gen- 
eral, not  having  any  content,  having  a  definite  content ;  as 
regards  order  of  content, —  order  being  one  of  permanence, 
irreversible  succession,  reversible  succession,  i.  e.,  co-exist- 
ence ;  as  regards  comprehension. —  being  in  this  regard 
indefinite  and  particular  time,  definite  and  particular  time, 
and  universal  time.  These  time-relations  constitute  a 
system  of  schemata  by  which  the  categories  may  be 
mediated  with  the  affections  of  sense.  Time-extent  with 
its  modes  becomes  the  schema  of  the  general  category  of 
quantity,  with  its  modes ;  time-content  with  its  modes,  of 
quality  with  its  modes ;  time-order  with  its  modes,  of  rela- 
tion with  its  modes;  time-comprehension  with  its  modes, 
of  modality  with  its  modes.  According  to  this  arrange- 
ment, the  schema  of  substance,  e.  g.,  is  permanence  of  order 
of  time ;  of  cause,  irreversible  succession ;  of  reciprocity, 
co-existence  ;  of  necessity,  universal  time,  *'.  <?.,  always ;  etc. 
The  establishment  of  this  schematism  of  the  categories 
effects  the  mediation  between  understanding  and  sense  in 
both  directions  (/.  e.,  from  understanding  to  sense,  and 
vice  versa},  and  completes  the  demonstration  of  the 
theorem  that  knowledge  originates  within,  but  not  solely 
from  experience.  The  faculty  of  the  schemata  (and  hence 
also  the  mediator  between  pure  sense  and  pure  understand- 
ing) is  Transcendental  Imagination. 

The  System  of  Principles  of  the  Pure  Understanding.  — 
Distinguishing  the  activities  of  the  understanding  as  ana- 
lytic and  synthetic,  we  have  as  the  highest  principle  of  the 
former  the  law  that  "  no  subject  can  have  a  predicate  that 
contradicts  it,  /.  e.,  the  principle  of  contradiction ;  "  and 
as  the  highest  principle  of  the  latter,  the  law  that  "  every 
object  is  subject  to  the  necessary  conditions  of  a  syn- 
thetical unity  of  the  manifold  of  intuition  in  a  possible 


KANT.  325 

experience."  The  principle  of  contradiction  is,  for  the 
most  part,  merely  a  negative  criterion  of  truth :  it  has  a 
positive  use  in  enabling  us  to  deny  the  opposite  of  that 
which  "  exists  and  is  thought  as  a  concept  in  our  knowl- 
edge." It  is  a  general  and  altogether  sufficient  principle 
of  analytical  knowledge.  Our  highest  principle  of  syn- 
thetic judgment  shows  us  at  once  that  our  best  guide  to 
the  system  of  particular  synthetic  principles  is  the  table  of 
categories.  These  principles  are  :  (i)  All  intuitions  (sen- 
sations) are  extensive  magnitudes,  —  the  principle  of  the 
"  Axioms  of  Intuition "  (corresponds  to  the  category  of 
quantity)  ;  (2)  In  all  phenomena  the  real,  which  is  an 
object  of  sensation,  has  intensive  magnitude,  or  degree,  — 
the  principle  of  the  "  Anticipations  of  Perception  "  (cor- 
responding to  ^category  of  quality)  ;  (3)  Experience  is 
possible  only  through  the  idea  of  a  necessary  connec- 
tion of  phenomena,  —  the  principle  of  the  "  Analogies  of 
Experience"  (corresponding  to  the  category  of  relation). 
First  Analogy.  In  all  changes  of  phenomena,  substance 
remains  the  same,  and  its  quantum  in  nature  is  neither 
increased  nor  diminished,  —  the  Principle  of  Permanence 
(corresponding  to  category  of  substance).  Second  Anal- 
ogy. All  changes  occur  according  to  the  law  of  connection 
of  cause  and  effect,  —  principle  of  sequence,  according  to 
the  law  of  causality  (corresponding  to  the  category  of  cau- 
sality) .  Third  Analogy.  All  substances,  in  so  far  as  they 
can  be  conceived  as  coexisting  in  space,  are  in  complete 
reciprocity,  —  principle  of  coexistence  according  to  the 
law  of  reciprocity  (corresponding  to  category  of  re- 
ciprocity). (4)  Postulates  of  Empirical  Thought:  (a) 
What  agrees  with  the  formal  conditions  of  experience  (in 
intuition  and  conception)  is  possible ;  (£)  What  agrees 
with  the  material  conditions  of  experience  (sensation) 
is  actual;  (c}  That,  the  connection  of  which  with  the 
actual  is  determined  according  to  the  universal  conditions 
of  experience,  is  necessary  or  exists  necessarily.  — 
"  These  primary  principles  of  the  understanding  are  the 


326         A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

principles  a  priori  of  the  possibility  of  experience,  and 
have  no  application  whatever  to  anything  beyond  pos- 
sible experience." 

Ground  of  Distinction  of  Phenomena  and  Noumena.  — 
The  truth  that  the  categories  have  no  application  beyond 
experience,  overthrows  that  boasted  Ontology,  which  pre- 
sumes to  supply  in  a  systematic  form  various  sorts  of  syn- 
thetical knowledge  a  priori  of  things  by  themselves  (for 
instance,  the  principle  of  causality) ,  and  necessitates  the  sub- 
stitution of  the  more  modest  Analytic  of  the  Understanding. 
But  there  is  a  certain  sense  in  which  the  categories  may  be 
said  to  extend  farther  than  sensuous  perception;  and  the 
notion  of  noumenon,  i.  e.,  of  a  thing  which  can  never  be 
thought  as  an  object  of  the  senses,  but  only  as  a  thing  in  itself 
(by  the  pure  understanding)  is  not  self-contradictory.  For 
the  categories  apply  to  objects  in  general  without  regard  to 
the  special  mode  of  sensibility  in  which  they  may  be  given ; 
though  we  cannot  maintain  that  sensibility  is  not  for  us  the 
only  form  of  perception.  The  conception  of  the  nou- 
menon is  necessary  to  keep  sensuous  perception  from 
extending  to  things  in  themselves :  it  is  useful  as  a  limita- 
tive conception.  But  it  has  no  further  use,  and  the  real 
division  of  phenomena  from  noumena  and  of  the  world 
into  a  sensible  and  intelligible  world  is  inadmissible.  By 
means  of  the  conception  of  noumenon  the  understanding 
receives  a  sort  of  negative  extension  and  independence ;  it 
limits  itself,  instead  of  being  limited  merely  by  sensibility. 
Metaphysics,  as  a  priori  science  of  the  supersensible,  is 
impossible. 

Transcendental  Dialectic.  —  Inasmuch  as  the  activity  ol 
the  understanding  is  in  relation  to  knowledge,  as  distin- 
guished from  mere  thought,  dependent  upon  that  of  sense, 
which  is  changing  and  relative,  it  is  a  conditioned  activity. 
The  "principles"  of  the  understanding  are,  absolutely 
viewed,  rules  rather  than  principles.  The  faculty  of  pure 
principles,  the  activity  of  which  is  unconditioned,  is  pure 
reason.  Reason  does  not  "  look  to  experience,"  or  to  any 


KANT.  327 

object  but  to  the  understanding,  in  order  to  impart  a  priori 
through  notions  to  its  manifold  kinds  of  knowledge  a  unity 
that  may  be  called  the  unity  of  reason  (and  is  very  different 
from  the  unity  which  can  be  produced  by  the  understand- 
ing) .  Since  Reason  is  the  faculty  of  the  unconditioned,  the 
question  whether  pure  reason  contains  synthetical  principles 
and  rules  a  priori  must  be  answered  in  the  affirmative  or 
negative  according  as  it  is  determined  whether  or  not  the 
series  of  the  conditioned  extends  to  the  unconditioned.  If 
it  does  not,  the  objective  application  of  the  pure  principles 
of  reason  must  result  in  illusion.  As  in  general  logic  that 
part  of  the  subject  dealing  with  false  appearances  of  truth 
is  known  as  dialectic,  the  corresponding  division  in  this 
science  may  be  termed  Transcendental  Dialectic.  Logi- 
cally viewed,  reason  is  the  faculty  of  inference,  as  under- 
standing is  of  judgment ;  and  the  Transcendental  Dialectic 
naturally  falls  into  the  two  grand  divisions:  (i)  Concep- 
tions or  Ideas  of  the  Pure  Reason,  and  (2)  Syllogisms  of 
Pure  Reason. 

Conceptions  or  Ideas  of  Pure  Reason.  —  Reason  being 
the  faculty  of  inference,  its  conceptions  have  to  be  drawn 
from  the  forms  of  the  syllogism,  as  the  conceptions  of 
understanding  were  from  those  of  judgments.  Syllogisms 
are  categorical,  hypothetical,  and  disjunctive.  The  uncon- 
ditioned viewed  categorically  becomes  the  absolute  unity 
of  the  thinking  subject ;  hypothetically,  the  absolute  unity 
of  the  series  of  phenomena ;  disjunctively,  the  absolute 
unity  of  the  condition  of  all  objects  of  thought  in  general. 
The  Notions  or  Ideas  of  the  reason  are,  in  other  words, 
those  of  the  Soul,  of  the  World,  and  of  God.  These  Con- 
ceptions or  Ideas  of  the  reason  necessarily  have  no  corre- 
sponding object  in  sense,  and  may  therefore  be  termed 
transcendental.  They  are,  however,  not  mere  fancies,  but 
are  supplied  to  us  by  the  very  nature  of  reason,  and  refer  by 
necessity  to  the  whole  use  of  the  understanding.  And  they 
are  "  transcendent,"  as  overstepping  the  limits  of  all  expe- 
rience, which  can  never  supply  an  object  adequate  to  the 


328        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

transcendental  idea.  "  There  is  among  the  transcendental 
ideas  themselves  a  certain  connection  and  unity  by  which 
pure  reason  brings  all  its  knowledge  into  one  system. 
There  is,  in  the  progression  from  our  knowledge  of  our- 
selves (the  soul)  to  a  knowledge  of  the  world,  and  through 
it  to  a  knowledge  of  the  Supreme  Being,  something  so 
natural  that  it  looks  like  the  logical  progression  of  reason 
from  premises  to  a  conclusion." 

The  Syllogisms :  Dialectical  Conclusions  of  Pure  Rea- 
son. —  If  I  conclude  from  the  transcendental  or  subjective 
notion  of  the  thinking  subject,  which  contains  no  manifold- 
ness,  the  absolute  unity  of  the  real  subject  itself,  of  which  I 
have  no  notion,  I  employ  a  certain  dialectical  syllogism 
(which  we  will  call  the  transcendental  paralogism} .  Con- 
cluding from  the  fact  that  my  notion  of  the  unconditioned 
synthetic  unity  of  the  series  of  conditions  to  any  given 
phenomenon  is  always  self-contradictory,  the  correctness  of 
the  opposite  unity,  of  which,  however,  I  have  no  real  con- 
ception, gives  rise  to  a  second  class  of  dialectical  syllogisms, 
which  in  their  paired  opposition  may  be  termed  antinomies 
of  reason.  A  third  class  of  dialectical  syllogisms  —  which 
may  be  called  the  Ideal  of  Pure  Reason  —  arises  when  I 
conclude  from  the  totality  of  conditions  under  which  objects 
in  general,  so  far  as  they  can  be  given  to  me,  must  be 
thought,  the  absolute  synthetical  unity  of  all  conditions  of 
the  possibility  of  things  in  general,  or,  in  other  words,  when 
I  conclude  from  things  which  I  do  not  know  according  to 
their  mere  transcendental  notion,  a  Being  of  all  beings, 
which  I  know  still  less  through  a  transcendent  notion,  and 
of  the  unconditioned  necessity  of  which  I  can  form  no 
notion  whatever. 

Transcendental  Paralogism  :  Criticism  of  Rational  Psy- 
chology. —  The  idea  of  the  unconditioned,  applied  to  self- 
consciousness,  or  the  "  I  think,"  accompanying  all  synthetic 
activity  of  the  understanding,  requires  that  the  ego,  as  such 
consciousness,  be  regarded  as  logical  subject  of  all  its  states 
(i.e.,  as  substance),  as  simple  (in  quality),  as  a  unit  (in 


KANT.  329 

quantity),  as  distinct  from  a  certain  contraposed  other 
(modality).  But  a  paralogism  is  committed  when  asser- 
tions made  by  the  ego  as  merely  subjective,  or  as  merely 
conceived,  concerning  itself,  are  converted  into  assertions 
made  of  an  objective  somewhat  capable  of  being  given  in 
perception,  and  the  soul  is  asserted  to  be  a  substance,  to 
be  simple  and  individual  and  to  exist  independently  of  other 
substances.  It  would  be  equally  wrong,  indeed,  to  assert 
that  the  soul  is  not  a  simple,  single,  individual  substance,  or, 
in  other  words,  that  it  is  material  in  nature.  The  soul  not 
being  given  to  us  as  an  object  of  sense,  we  have  no  matter 
as  regards  it  to  which  the  categories  of  the  understanding  — 
substance,  simplicity,  unity,  individuality  —  can  apply.  Ra- 
tional Psychology  as  a  positive  science  or  as  anything  other 
than  a  criticism  of  ordinary  dogmatic,  empirical,  and  scep- 
tical views  of  the  soul,  is  an  impossibility. 

The  Antinomy  of  Pure  Reason :  Criticism  of  Rational 
Cosmology.  —  The  idea  of  the  unconditioned  applied  to 
phenomena  gives  rise  to  four  pairs  of  antithetical  ideas 
corresponding  to  the  four  classes  of  categories,  as  follows : 
(i)  The  finitude  and  infinitude  of  the  world  of  phenomena 
in  time  and  space;  (2)  The  infinite  and  the  finite  divi- 
sibility of  the  real  in  time  or  phenomena;  (3)  Free  and 
necessary  causation  of  phenomena ;  (4)  Existence  and  non- 
existence  of  a  necessary  Being  belonging  to  the  world  either 
as  part  or  as  the  cause  of  it.  Propositionally  expressed, 
these  ideas  are :  ( i )  The  world  has  a  beginning  in  time 
and  is  limited  in  space  (Thesis)  ;  The  world  has  no  begin- 
ning and  no  limits  in  space,  but  is  infinite  in  respect  to 
both  time  and  space  (Antithesis).  (2)  Every  compound 
substance  in  the  world  consists  of  simple  parts,  and  nothing 
exists  anywhere  but  the  simple,  or  what  is  composed  of  it 
(Thesis)  ;  No  compound  in  the  world  consists  of  simple 
parts,  and  there  exists  nowhere  in  the  world  anything  simple 
(Antithesis).  (3)  Causality  according  to  the  laws  of  na- 
ture is  not  the  only  causality  from  which  all  phenomena  of 
the  world  can  be  deduced ;  in  order  to  account  for  these 


330        A  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

phenomena  it  is  necessary  also  to  admit  another  causality, 
that  of  freedom  (Thesis)  ;  There  is  no  freedom,  but  every- 
thing in  the  world  takes  place  entirely  according  to  the 
laws  of  nature  (Antithesis).  (4)  There  exists  an  absolutely 
necessary  Being,  belonging  to  the  world  either  as  a  part  or 
as  the  cause  of  it  (Thesis)  ;  There  nowhere  exists  an  ab- 
solutely necessary  Being  either  within  or  without  the  world 
as  the  cause  of  it.  The  solution  of  the  first  of  the  forego- 
ing antinomies  is  found  by  a  distinction  between  the  in- 
finite and  indefinite.  An  infinite  (definite)  quantity  is  for 
us  an  impossible  notion ;  in  trying  to  realize  such  an  idea 
(which  we  get  only  by  a  misapplication  of  the  notion  of 
the  unconditioned  to  quantity),  we  merely  go  on  in  thought 
in  indefinitum.  The  whole  world  of  phenomena,  as  regards 
quantity,  is,  absolutely  speaking,  neither  infinite  nor  finite  for 
us  in  concrete  thought,  but  indefinite,  or  capable  of  further 
determination  (a  fact  tallying  with  the  subjectivity  of 
space) .  The  solution  of  the  second  antinomy  is  found  by 
distinguishing  between  the  infinitely  divisible  and  the  in- 
finitely divided,  —  the  latter  being  an  impossible  concep- 
tion. Body,  in  other  words,  is,  like  space,  divisible  in 
indefinitum  without  consisting  of  an  infinite  number  of  parts. 
"  What  applies  to  a  thing  by  itself  represented  by  a 
pure  notion  of  the  understanding,  does  not  apply  to  what 
is  called  substance,  phenomenon.  This  is  not  an  absolute 
subject,  but  only  a  permanent  image  of  sensibility,  nothing, 
in  fact,  but  perception,  in  which  nothing  unconditioned  can 
ever  be  met  with."  The  resolution  of  the  third  and  fourth 
antinomies  depends  on  the  distinction  between  phenomena 
and  noumena.  The  thesis  holds  true  of  the  world  regarded 
as  noumenon,  the  antithesis,  of  the  world  viewed  as  pheno- 
menon. Man's  knowledge  of  himself  through  mere  apper- 
ception is  proof  of  his  freedom  in  relation  to  nature,  or  the 
world  of  sense.  The  possibility  of  a  free  cause  appears, 
apart  from  the  fact  that  a  phenomenal  and  necessary  cause 
(antecedent)  cannot  originate  anything,  also  from  the  ex- 
istence of  practical  or  moral  imperatives,  through  which  man 


KANT.  331 

recognizes  himself  as  being  partly  outside  as  well  as  within 
the  world  of  phenomena.  "The  understanding  can  know  in 
nature  only  what  is  present,  past,  or  future.  It  is  impos- 
sible that  anything  in  it  ought  to  be  different  from  what  it 
is  in  reality,  in  all  these  relations  of  time.  If  we  look  only 
at  the  course  of  nature,  the  ought  has  no  meaning  what- 
ever." This  "  ought "  expresses  a  possible  action,  the 
ground  of  which  cannot  be  anything  but  a  mere  notion ; 
while  in  every  natural  action  the  ground  must  always  be  a 
phenomenon.  In  asserting  the  existence  of  a  natural  law 
of  causation,  we  do  not  —  if  we  distinguish  between  pheno- 
mena and  noumena  —  contradict  the  causality  of  freedom. 
It  is  a  peculiarity  of  the  Fourth  Antinomy  that  it  carries  us 
outside  of  the  world  of  phenomena,  "  since  there  cannot 
be  in  the  whole  series  of  dependent  existence  any  uncondi- 
tioned link  the  existence  of  which  might  be  considered  as 
absolutely  necessary." 

The  Ideal  of  Pure  Reason  :  Criticism  of  Transcendental 
Theology.  —  Further  removed  from  objective  reality  than 
the  Idea,  is  what  may  be  termed  the-  Ideal,  or  the  idea 
not  merely  in  concrete,  but  in  indiinduo ;  i.  e.,  an  indi- 
vidual thing  determinable  or  even  determined  by  the  idea 
alone.  Virtue  and  human  wisdom  in  its  perfect  purity  are 
ideas,  while  the  wise  man  (of  the  Stoics)  is  an  ideal,  /.  e., 
a  man  existing  in  thought  only,  but  in  complete  agreement 
with  the  idea  of  wisdom.  The  idea  gives  rules,  the  ideal 
serves  as  the  archetype  for  the  perfect  determination  of  the 
copy.  Reason  postulates  such  an  ideal  in  the  notion  of  an 
ens  realissimum,  i.  e.,  a  being  possessing  in  itself  all  pos- 
sible attributes  of  reality.  The  notion  of  the  ens  realis- 
simum  —  ens  originarium,  ens  summum,  ens  entium,  simple 
being,  cause  of  all  others  —  is  the  only  true  ideal  of  which 
human  reason  is  capable,  because  it  is  in  this  case  alone 
that  a  notion  of  a  thing  which  in  itself  is  general  is  com- 
pletely determined  by  itself  and  recognized  as  the  repre- 
sentation of  an  individual.  '•'  It  is  self-evident  that  in  order 
to  represent  the  necessary  and  complete  determination  of 


332         A  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

things,  reason  does  not  presuppose  the  existence  of  a  being 
that  should  correspond  to  this  ideal,  but  its  idea  only,  in 
order  to  derive  from  an  unconditioned  totality  of  complete 
determination  the  conditioned  one,  that  is,  the  totality  of 
something  limited."  To  suppose  the  existence  of  a  being 
corresponding  to  the  ideal,  is  to  apply  outside  of  experience 
an  idea  which,  though  having  the  highest  validity  in  ex- 
perience as  such,  has  for  us  no  application  outside  of  it. 
Upon  this  misapplication  of  the  ideal  of  pure  reason  rest  the 
three  speculative  proofs,  so  called,  of  the  existence  of  God, 
—  ontological,  cosmological,  physico-theological  ("  ideo- 
logical"). The  notion  of  the  ens  realissimum —  to  criti- 
cise the  ontological  proof  first,  since  the  others  depend 
upon  it  —  does  not  necessarily  imply  the  existence  of  such 
a  being.  Existence  is  not  an  attribute  ;  if  possessed  by  an 
ens  realissimum,  it  would  not  add  anything  to  the  notion 
of  it.  Hence  it  is  not  to  be  derived  from  it,  any  more 
than  a  hundred  real  dollars  are  derivable  from  the  mere 
notion  of  a  hundred  dollars.  We  never  mistake  the  mere 
notion  of  an  object  of  sense  for  the  existence  of  it.  The 
cosmological  proof,  or  proof  a  contingentia  mundi,  argues 
from  experience  to  the  existence  of  necessary  being,  as- 
suming that  necessary  being  implies  an  ens  realissimum. 
Rather  should  necessary  being  be  deduced  at  once  from 
the  notion  of  the  ens  realissimum,  and  the  a  posteriori 
position  of  the  cosmological  proof  be  dropped.  There  are 
four  fallacies,  however,  in  the  cosmological  proofs  besides 
this :  ( i )  The  application  of  the  principle  that  everything 
contingent  must  have  a  cause,  which  is  valid  in  the  world 
of  sense  only,  outside  that  sphere;  (2)  The  inference  of  a 
first  cause,  based  on  the  impossibility  of  an  infinite  ascend- 
ing series  of  given  causes  in  the  world  of  sense,  —  an  infer- 
ence which  the  principles  of  the  use  of  reason  do  not  allow 
us  to  draw  even  in  experience,  while  here  we  extend  that 
principle  beyond  experience,  whither  that  series  can  never 
be  prolonged ;  (3)  The  false  self-satisfaction  of  reason 
with  regard  to  the  completion  of  that  series,  brought  about 


KANT.  333 

by  removing  in  the  end  every  kind  of  condition,  without 
which,  nevertheless,  no  notion  of  necessity  is  possible,  and 
by  then,  when  any  definite  notions  have  become  impos- 
sible, accepting  this  as  a  completion  of  our  notion;  (4) 
The  mistaking  the  logical  possibility  of  a  notion  of  all 
united  reality  (without  any  internal  contradiction)  for  the 
transcendental,  which  requires  a  principle  for  the  practi- 
cability of  such  a  synthesis,  such  a  principle  being  ap- 
plicable to  the  field  of  possible  experience  only.  The 
physico-teleological  proof  possesses  a  certain  plausibility 
and  respectability,  as  being  the  oldest,  clearest,  most  in 
conformity  with  human  reason,  and  as  adding  life  to  the 
study  of  nature,  but  is  lacking  in  apodictic  certainty.  The 
principal  points  of  the  proof  are  :  (i)  There  are  every- 
where in  the  world  clear  indications  of  an  intentional  ar- 
rangement carried  out  with  great  wisdom,  and  forming  a 
whole  indescribably  varied  in  its  contents  and  infinite  in 
extent;  (2)  The  fitness  of  this  arrangement  is  entirely 
foreign  to  the  things  existing  in  the  world,  and  belongs  to 
them  contingently  only,  /.  <?.,  the  nature  of  different  things 
could  never  spontaneously,  by  the  combination  of  so 
many  means,  co-operate  towards  definite  aims,  if  these 
means  had  not  been  selected  and  arranged  on  purpose  by 
a  rational  disposing  principle,  according  to  certain  funda- 
mental ideas;  (3)  There  exists,  therefore,  a  sublime  and 
wise  cause  (or  many),  which  must  be  the  cause  of  the 
world,  not  only  as  a  blind  and  all-powerful  nature,  by 
means  of  unconscious  fecundity,  but  as  an  intelligence,  by 
freedom  ;  (4)  The  unity  of  that  cause  may  be  inferred  with 
certainty  from  the  unity  of  the  reciprocal  relation  of  the 
parts  of  the  world,  as  a  portion  of  a  skilful  edifice,  so  far  as 
our  experience  reaches,  and  beyond  it,  with  plausibility,  ac- 
cording to  the  principles  of  analogy.  The  argument  leaves 
out  of  account  the  sirtstance  of  the  world,  and  so  arrives  not 
at  a  creator,  but  an  architect  of  the  world,  who  may  be 
subject,  to  a  large  extent,  to  the  nature  of  the  material 
with  which  he  has  to  deal.  (To  prove  the  contingency  of 


334        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

matter  we  have  to  resort  to  an  a  priori  argument.)  The 
argument,  therefore,  merely  proceeds  from  a  contingent  ar- 
rangement in  the  world  to  a  contingent  cause, —  for  no  one 
can  pretend  that  omnipotence,  the  highest  wisdom,  absolute 
unity,  constitute  a  cause  proportionate  to  a  world  of  which 
experience  alone  teaches  us.  The  notion  of  the  highest 
cause  is,  therefore,  not  given  by  the  physico-theological 
proof.  This  proof  has  to  be  supplemented  by  the  cosmo- 
logical  with  its  (transcendental)  inference  from  contingency 
to  necessity,  and  from  necessity  to  the  ens  realissimum.  — 
These  three  "  proofs  "  being  the  only  possible  ones,  and  the 
last  two  being  —  considered  as  a  priori  proofs  —  reducible 
to  the  ontological  one,  it  follows  that  the  ontological  proof 
is  the  sole  a  priori  proof —  if  any  proof  so  far  transcending 
the  empirical  use  of  the  understanding  is  possible  at  all  — 
of  the  existence  of  the  Ideal  of  Pure  Reason,  or  God.  But 
as  no  object  can  be  given  corresponding  to  such  an  ideal, 
since  experience  is  conditioned,  while  by  hypothesis  the 
Ideal  is  unconditioned,  there  is  no  proof  of  the  existence  of 
God^  Transcendental  Theology,  therefore,  exists  only  as  a 
criticism  and  test  of  our  ideas  of  the  highest  reality,  and 
would  prove  itself  indispensable  if  by  an  ethico-theology 
the  "  flawless  ideal "  constituted  by  the  notion  of  the  Su- 
preme Being  were  proved  to  possess  objective  reality. 
Necessity,  infinity,  unity,  extra-mundane  existence,  eternity 
free  from  conditions  of  time,  omnipresence  free  from  con- 
ditions of  space,  omnipotence,  etc.,  —  all  these  are  trans- 
cendental predicates,  and  their  purified  notions,  which  are 
required  for  every  theology,  can  be  derived  from  transcen- 
dental theology  only. 

Transcendental  Theory  of  Method.  —  By  the  "  Trans- 
cendental Theory  of  Method"  (to  take  up  the  second 
grand-division  of  the  "  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  ")  is  to 
be  understood  the  determination  of  the  former  conditions 
of  a  complete  system  of  pure  reason.  This  involves  — 
(i)  a  theory  of  the  negative  aspect  of  reason,  which  theory, 
as  teaching  merely  how  error  shall  be  avoided,  may  be 


KANT.  335 

styled  the  Discipline  of  Pure  Reason;  (2)  a  theory  of  the 
positive  aspect  of  reason,  which,  as  presenting  the  standard 
—  a  system  of  principles  a  priori — for  the  proper  em- 
ployment of  reason,  may  be  termed  the  Canon  of  Pure 
Reason;  (3)  a  theory  of  pure  reason  as  a  system,  which 
may  be  termed  the  Architectonic  of  Pure  Reason ;  (4)  a 
History  of  Pure  Reason.  According  to  the  Discipline 
of  Pure  Reason,  neither  the  dogmatic  (/.  e.,  mathemati- 
cal), nor  the  polemical  or  merely  sceptical  use,  nor  the 
hypothetical  use  of  reason,  is  philosophical.  Philosophi- 
cal method  differs  in  kind,  not  merely  in  degree,  from 
mathematical ;  since  philosophy  deals  with  pure  con- 
ceptions, not  with  intuitions.  It  cannot,  therefore,  begin 
with  axioms  and  definitions,  and  it  employs  apodictic 
demonstration  in  a  way  peculiar  to  itself;  /.  e.,  it  is 
obliged  to  presuppose  that  which  it  demonstrates.  (The 
proposition,  that  everything  that  happens  has  its  cause, 
is  presupposed  in  any  proof  of  its  truth,  since  it  must 
be  assumed  as  a  condition  of  the  experience  by  appeal 
to  which  its  truth  is  shown.  The  proof  or  deduction 
of  the  categories  was  found  to  lie  in  the  fact  that  only 
through  them  was  experience  possible.)  The  polemical 
(including  the  sceptical)  use  of  reason  stands  in  the  way 
of  an  impartial,  all-sided  view  of  the  principles  of  the 
understanding,  and  has  value  chiefly  as  a  "  true  school- 
master to  lead  the  dogmatic  speculator  towards  a  sound 
criticism  of  the  understanding  and  of  reason."  Hypotheses 
are  inadmissible,  except  for  polemical  purposes,  in  dealing 
with  questions  of  pure  reason ;  since  reason,  independent 
of  all  experience,  knows  everything  either  a  priori  and 
as  necessary,  or  not  at  all.  There  are  three  rules  govern- 
ing the  proofs  of  Pure  Reason  :  ( i )  To  attempt  no  trans- 
cendental proofs  before  first  having  considered  whence 
we  should  take  the  principles  on  which  such  proofs  are 
to  be  based,  and  by  what  right  we  may  expect  our  con- 
clusions to  be  successful;  (2)  For  every  transcendental 
proposition  only  one  proof  can  be  found ;  (3)  Transcen- 


336        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

dental  proofs  must  never  be  apagogical,  or  circumstantial, 
but  always  os tensive,  or  direct.  According  to  the  Canon 
of  Pure  Reason,  the  "  highest  aim  to  which  the  speculation 
of  reason,  in  its  transcendental  employment,  is  directed, 
comprehends  three  objects,  —  the  Freedom  of  the  Will,  the 
Immortality  of  the  Soul,  and  the  Existence  of  God."  The 
purely  speculative  interest  of  reason  in  these  questions  is 
very  small :  the  interest  of  them  is  almost  wholly  practi- 
cal ;  /.  e.,  in  so  far  only  as  they  are  related  to  our  knowl- 
edge of  what  ought  to  be  done.  In  relation  to  these 
questions,  the  proper  mental  attitude  is  that  of  moral  be- 
lief. The  ordinary  understanding  has  just  as  much  (and 
just  as  little)  knowledge  upon  these  questions  as  the 
wisest  philosopher.  The  Architectonic  of  Pure  Reason 
defines  philosophy  in  a  "  Scholastic  "  or  "  logical "  aspect 
as  the  system  of  all  philosophical  knowledge,  and  points 
out  that  there  is  also  a  "  universal"  or,  so  to  say,  "  cos- 
mical,"  notion  of  philosophy,  according  to  which  phi- 
losophy is  the  science  of  the  relation  of  all  knowledge 
to  the  essential  aims  of  human  reason.  Philosophy  is 
cither  pure  or  empirical.  "  The  philosophy  of  pure  rea- 
son is  either  propaedeutic,  inquiring  into  the  faculties  of 
reason  with  regard  to  all  pure  knowledge  a  priori,  and 
called  critique,  or  the  system  of  pure  reason  (science), 
comprehending  in  systematical  connection  the  whole  (both 
true  and  illusory)  of  philosophical  knowledge  derived  from 
pure  reason,  and  called  metaphysic."  Metaphysic  is  either 
speculative  or  practical,  —  metaphysic  of  nature,  or  meta- 
physic of  morals.  The  metaphysic  of  nature,  so  far  as 
treating  of  understanding  and  reason  in  themselves  and 
their  connection  with  object  (being)  in  general,  is  On- 
tology ;  so  far  as  treating  of  the  sum  given  of  objects 
(nature),  is  Rational  Physiology.  The  employment  of 
reason  in  this  rational  study  of  nature  is  either  physical 
or  hyperphysical,  or,  more  accurately  speaking,  immanent 
or  transcendent.  Transcendent  Physiology  has  for  its 
object  either  an  internal  or  an  external  connection,  both 


KANT.  337 

transcending  every  possible  experience :  the  former  is  the 
physiology  of  nature  as  a  whole,  or  transcendental  knowl- 
edge of  the  world ;  the  latter  refers  to  the  connection 
of  the  whole  of  nature  with  a  Being  above  nature,  and 
is  therefore  transcendental  knowledge  of  God.  Immanent 
Physiology,  which  considers  nature  as  object  of  experience, 
has  two  parts,  —  Rational  Physic  and  Rational  Psychology. 
The  whole  system  of  metaphysics  consists,  then,  of — 
(i)  Ontology;  (2)  Rational  Physiology  (including  Ra- 
tional Physics  and  Rational  Psychology)  ;  (3)  Rational 
Cosmology;  (4)  Rational  Theology.  Empirical  Psy- 
chology is  not  properly  a  part  of  metaphysics :  "  it  is  a 
stranger  only,  whom  one  allows  to  stay  a  little  longer  until 
he  can  take  up  his  own  abode  in  a  complete  system  of 
anthropology,  the  pendant  to  the  doctrine  of  nature."  In 
the  History  of  Pure  Reason  it  is  made  to  appear  that 
hitherto  several  paths  to  the  goal  of  reason  have  been 
trodden  in  vain.  Considered  with  reference  to  the  object 
of  knowledge,  there  are  the  sensualistic  (Epicurus)  and 
intellectualistic  (Plato)  ;  as  regards  origin  of  knowledge, 
the  empiricistic  (Aristotle)  and  no-ologistic  (Plato)  ;  as 
regards  method,  the  dogmatic  (Wolff)  and  sceptical 
(Hume).  There  remains  the  critical  path,  —  the  only  one 
path  still  open,  —  which  bids  fair  to  lead  to  a  goal  as  yet 
through  long  centuries  unattained,  though  sought. 

Critique  of  Practical  Reason  :  The  Notion  of  Practical 
Reason.  —  Reason  is  practical  as  subjected,  or  rather  as 
subjecting  itself,  to  an  ideal,  a  moral  law.  The  moral  law 
we  know  as  a  fact  of  pure  reason.  From  this  fact  we  know 
also  as  a  fact  freedom,  since  the  moral  law  could  have  its 
ratio  essendi  in  freedom  only.  The  moral  law  is  the  ratio 
cognoscendi  of  freedom,  as  freedom  is  the  ratio  essendi  of 
the  moral  law.  Reason  as  practical,  demonstrates  itself  to 
be  what  as  theoretical  it  was  only  in  possibility,  and  thus 
the  harmony  of  the  two  aspects  of  reason  is  made  out. 

The  Analytic  of  Pure  Practical  Reason :  The  Princi- 
ples of  Pure  Practical  Reason.  —  Practical  principles  in 
VOL.  i.  —  22 


338        A  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

general  are  either  material,  which  presuppose  an  object  of 
the  faculty  of  desire  as  the  ground  of  determination,  and  so 
are  empirical  and  subjective,  or  else  formal,  which  pre- 
suppose only  the  idea  of  law,  and  hence  are  rational  and 
objective.  All  material  practical  principles  as  such  fall 
under  the  general  principle  of  self-love,  or  private  happiness, 

—  they  place  the  determining  principle  of  the  will  in  the 
lower  desires,  so  that,  if  there  were  no  purely  formal  laws  of 
the  will  adequate  to  determine  it,  we  could  not  have  any 
higher  desire  at  all.     On  the  other  hand,  since  the  bare  form 
of  the  law  is  the  object  of  reason  only,  the  will,  which  is 
determined  by  the  merely  formal  practical  principle,  is  in- 
dependent of  natural  phenomena  and  their  law,  —  the  law 
of  causality,  —  /.  e.,  is  a  perfectly  free  will.     The  fundamen- 
tal law  of  such  a  will  must  be,  Act  so  that  the  maxim  of  thy 
will  can  always  at  the  same  time  hold  good  as  a  principle  of 
universal  legislation.     (This  law  is  a  [the]  "  categorical  im- 
perative,"—  unconditional  command.)      Pure  reason,  that 
is  to  say,  is  practical  of  itself  alone,  —  gives  itself  its  law. 
This  principle,  the  principle  of  the  autonomy  of  the  will,  is 
the  sole  principle  of  moral  laws.     Heteronomy  of  the  will 

—  the  being  ruled  by  something  foreign  to  itself —  cannot  be 
the  basis  of  any  obligation,  but  is,  on  the  contrary,  opposed 
to  the  principle  thereof  and  to  the  morality  of  the  will.   The 
autonomy  of  the  will,  as  distinguished  from  the  mere  inde- 
pendence of  natural  law,  is  positive,  as  distinguished  from 
negative,  freedom.     The  moral  law  proves  that  we  belong 
to  a  supersensible  as  well  as  a  sensible  world,  and  permits 
us  to  view  nature,  in  spite  of  its  mechanism,  as  a  supersen- 
sible system,  —  /.  e.,  a  system  having  the  determining  prin- 
ciple of  its  causality  solely  in  the  pure  faculty  of  reason. 

The  Notion  of  an  Object  of  Pure  Practical  Reason.  — 
The  only  objects  of  the  practical  reason  are,  the  good  and 
the  evil,  —  the  former  being  always  an  object  necessarily 
desired  according  to  a  principle  of  reason,  the  latter  an 
object  necessarily  shunned,  according  to  a  principle  of  rea- 
son. Whether  or  not  any  action  which  is  possible  to  us  in 


KANT.  339 

the  world  of  sense  comes  under  the  rule  of  reason  which 
determines  the  good  and  the  evil,  is  a  question  to  be  de- 
cided by  the  practical  judgment.  And  instead  of  a  schema, 
as  in  the  case  of  the  sensibility,  we  have  the  law  as  exhibited 
in  concrete  in  objects  of  the  senses  :  this  law,  thus  exhib- 
ited, we  may  call  a  Type  of  the  moral  law.  The  rule  of 
judgment  according  to  laws  of  pure  practical  reason  is 
this :  Ask  yourself  whether,  if  the  action  you  propose  were 
to  take  place  by  a  law  of  the  system  of  nature  of  which  you 
were  yourself  a  part,  you  could  regard  it  as  possible  by  your 
will.  It  is  therefore  allowable  to  use  the  system  of  the 
world  of  sense  as  the  type  of  a  supersensible  system  of  things, 
provided  I  do  not  transfer  to  the  latter  the  perceptions  and 
what  depends  on  them,  but  merely  refer  to  it  the  form  of 
law  in  general,  laws  as  such,  being  identical,  no  matter  from 
what  they  derive  their  determining  principles. 

The  Motives  of  Pure  Practical  Reason.  —  An  action 
possesses  legality  only,  and  not  morality,  if,  though  it  takes 
place  according  to  the  moral  law,  it  be  determined  by  a 
mere  feeling  —  of  whatever  kind.  Pure  practical  reason 
does  not  aim  to  destroy  self-love,  but  merely  to  make  it 
rational :  it  does  "strike  down  "  self-conceit,  in  order  to  make 
room  for  respect  for  the  moral  law  as  such.  This  is  indeed 
a  feeling,  but  a  feeling  having  a  purely  intellectual  cause, 
the  only  feeling  which  we  know  quite  a  priori,  and  the 
necessity  of  which  we  can  perceive.  Through  this  feeling 
the  moral  law  becomes  a  subjective  determining  principle, 
—  a  real  material  principle.  Respect  for  the  moral  law  is, 
however,  not  so  much  a  motive  to  morality  as  morality 
itself  subjectively  considered  as  a  motive.  It  is  to  be 
observed  that  respect  for  the  moral  law  as  having  to  do 
with  sensibility  cannot  be  attributed  to  a  Supreme  Being, 
but  to  finite  beings  as  such  (the  feeling  of  obligation  is 
merely  a  concomitant  of  the  fact  that  with  the  noumenal 
nature  in  man  is  joined  a  phenomenal).  The  (apparent) 
contradiction  between  freedom  and  the  mechanism  of 
nature  in  one  and  the  same  action  is  removed  by  the 


340        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

consideration  that,  while  phenomenally  one's  acts  take 
place  in  accordance  with  natural  law,  they  cannot  nou- 
menally  or  morally  be  regarded  as  his  except  in  so  far 
as  they  are  rationally  understood  and  adopted  as  his,  or  are 
referred  to  laws  springing  from  his  consciousness  of  himself 
as  a  thing  in  himself.  A  further  difficulty  in  conceiving  the 
combination  of  freedom  with  the  mechanism  of  nature  in  a 
being  belonging  to  the  world  of  sense  —  a  difficulty  arising 
from  the  idea  of  God  as  the  cause  of  the  existence  of 
substance  —  is  resolved  as  follows :  God  does  not  create 
phenomena,  and  created  noumena,  as  having  a  principle  dis- 
tinct from  that  of  phenomena,  are  free  as  regards  them. 

Dialectic  of  Pure  Practical  Reason.  —  Reason  in  its 
practical  use,  as  in  its  speculative,  has  a  dialectic,  since  it 
seeks  to  discover  the  unconditioned  for  the  practically  con- 
ditioned. And  though  it  possesses  in  the  moral  law  the 
determining  principle  of  the  will,  it  seeks  an  unconditioned 
in  a  highest  object  of  pure  practical  reason,  —  a  Summum 
Bonum.  Virtue  is  doubtless  the  supreme  condition  that 
can  appear  to  us  as  desirable,  and  consequently  of  all  our 
pursuit  of  happiness,  and  therefore  the  supreme  good.  But 
it  does  not  follow  that  it  is  the  whole  and  perfect  good  as 
the  object  of  the  desires  of  rational  finite  beings ;  for  this 
requires  happiness  also,  and  that  not  merely  in  the  partial 
eyes  of  the  person  who  makes  himself  an  end,  but  even  in 
the  judgment  of  an  impartial  reason,  which  regards  persons 
in  general  as  ends  in  themselves.  Now,  inasmuch  as  virtue 
and  happiness  together  constitute  the  possession  of  the 
summutn  bonum  in  a  person,  and  the  distribution  of  happi- 
ness in  exact  proportion  to  morality  (which  is  the  worth  of 
the  person  and  his  worthiness  to  be  happy)  constitutes  the 
summutn  bonum  of  the  possible  world  ;  hence  this  sum- 
mum  bonum  expresses  the  whole,  the  perfect  good,  in  which, 
however,  virtue  as  the  condition  is  always  the  supreme 
good,  since  it  has  no  condition  above  it :  whereas  happi- 
ness, while  it  is  pleasant  to  the  possessor  of  it,  is  not  in 
itself  absolutely  and  in  all  respects  good,  but  always  presup- 


KANT.  341 

poses  morally  right  behavior  as  its  condition.  The  antin- 
omy of  practical  reason,  resulting  from  the  connection  of 
virtue  and  happiness,  is  as  follows :  Either  the  desire  of 
happiness  must  be  the  motive  to  maxims  of  virtue,  or  the 
maxim  of  virtue  must  be  the  efficient  cause  of  happiness. 
The  first  is  absolutely  impossible,  because  maxims  which 
place  the  determining  principle  of  the  will  in  the  desire  of 
personal  happiness,  are  not  moral  at  all,  and  no  virtue  can 
be  founded  on  them.  The  second  also  is  false,  because  the 
practical  connection  of  causes  and  effects  in  the  world  as  the 
result  of  the  determination  of  the  will  does  not  depend 
upon  the  moral  disposition  of  the  will,  but  on  the  knowledge 
of  the  laws  of  nature  and  the  physical  power  to  use  them 
for  one's  purposes.  The  solution  of  the  antinomy  is  con- 
tained in  the  possibility  that  morality  of  mind  should  have  a 
connection  as  cause  with  happiness  (as  an  effect  in  the  sen- 
sible world),  if  not  immediate,  yet  mediate  (viz.,  through 
an  intelligent  author  of  nature),  and  moreover  necessary. 
Necessary  to  the  realization  of  the  summum  bonum  in  the 
world  is  a  perfect  accordance  of  the  mind  with  the  moral 
law  —  holiness  (=  worthiness  to  be  happy) ,  but  holiness  can 
be  attained  by  a  rational  sensible  being  only  in  a  progressus 
in  infinitum,  which  presupposes  endless  duration  of  the 
existence  and  personality  of  the  same  rational  being  (which 
is  called  the  immortality  of  the  soul) .  The  summum  bonum, 
then,  practically  is  only  possible  on  the  supposition  of  the 
immortality  of  the  soul :  consequently  immortality,  being 
inseparably  connected  with  the  moral  law,  is  a  Postulate  of 
pure  practical  reason  (by  which  is  meant  a  theoretical  prop- 
osition not  demonstrable  as  such,  but  yet  an  inseparable 
result  of  an  unconditioned  a  priori  practical  law) .  The 
moral  law  must  also  lead  to  the  supposition  of  the  existence 
of  a  cause  adequate  to  the  production  of  happiness  (as  the 
second  element  of  the  summum  bonum},  i.  <?.,  to  the  postu- 
lation  of  the  existence  of  God  as  the  necessary  condition  of 
the  possibility  of  the  summum  bonum.  Happiness,  being 
the  condition  of  a  rational  being  in  the  world  with  whom 


342        A  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

everything  goes  according  to  his  wish  and  will,  depends  on 
the  harmony  of  physical  nature  with  his  whole  end,  and 
likewise  with  the  essential  determining  principle  of  his  will. 
There  is  in  the  moral  law  itself  not  the  least  ground  for 
connection  between  morality  and  proportionate  happiness. 
Such  connection,  however,  is  postulated  by  the  summum 
bonum.  Accordingly,  the  existence  of  a  cause  of  all  nature 
distinct  from  nature  itself  and  containing  the  principle  of 
this  connection  is  also  postulated.  This  supreme  cause 
must  contain  the  principle  of  the  harmony  of  nature,  not 
merely  with  a  law  of  the  will  of  rational  beings,  but  with  the 
conception  of  this  law  in  so  far  as  they  make  it  the  supreme 
determining  principle  of  the  will,  and  consequently  not 
merely  with  the  form  of  morals,  but  with  their  morality  as 
their  motive  ;  that  is,  with  their  moral  character.  Therefore 
the  summum  bonum  is  possible  in  the  world  only  on  the 
supposition  of  a  supreme  nature  having  a  causality  corre- 
sponding to  moral  character.  A  being  capable  of  acting 
on  the  conception  of  law  is  an  intelligence  (a  rational 
being),  and  the  causality  of  such  a  being  according  to  this 
conception  of  laws  is  his  will ;  therefore  the  supreme  cause 
of  nature,  which  must  be  presupposed  as  the  condition  of 
the  summum  bonum,  is  a  being  which  is  the  cause  of  nature 
by  intelligence  and  will,  consequently  its  author,  /'.  <?.,  God. 
The  postulates  of  the  practical  reason,  —  freedom,  immor- 
tality, and  God,  —  while  they  do  not  extend  our  speculative 
knowledge,  give  objective  reality  to  the  ideas  of  speculative 
reason  in  general,  and  give  it  a  right  to  notions,  the  possi- 
bility of  which  it  could  not  otherwise  venture  to  affirm. 
Nothing  is  added  to  the  content  of  the  notion  of  duty  as 
such  by  these  postulates.  It  alone  binds  me  in  the  most 
perfect  manner  to  act  in  unconditional  conformity  to  the 
law. 

Methodology  of  Pure  Practical  Reason.  —  By  the  method- 
ology of  the  pure  practical  reason  is  to  be  understood  the 
"  mode  in  which  we  can  give  the  laws  of  pure  practical  rea- 
son access  to  the  human  mind  and  influence  on  its  maxims, 


KANT.  343 

that  is,  by  which  we  can  make  the  objectively  practical 
reason  subjectively  practical  also."  Unquestionably  the 
only  proper  way  to  accomplish  this  important  end  is  to 
place  before  the  mind  the  purest  exhibitions  of  the  work- 
ing, in  historical  personages,  for  example,  of  the  pure  moral 
motive.  "  The  heart  is  freed  and  lightened  of  a  burden  that 
always  secretly  presses  on  it,  when  instances  of  pure  moral 
resolutions  reveal  to  the  man  an  inner  faculty  of  which 
otherwise  he  had  no  right  knowledge, —  the  inward  freedom 
to  release  himself  from  the  boisterous  importunity  of  in- 
clinations to  such  a  degree  that  none  of  them,  not  even  the 
dearest,  shall  have  any  influence  on  a  resolution  for  which 
we  are  now  to  employ  our  reason."  Were  it  not  the  case 
that  the  exhibition  of  pure  virtue  can  have  more  power  over 
the  human  mind,  and  supply  a  far  stronger  spring  even  for 
effecting  the  legality  of  actions,  and  can  produce  more 
powerful  resolutions  to  prefer  the  law  from  pure  respect  for 
it  to  every  other  consideration  than  all  the  deceptive  al- 
lurements of  pleasure  or  of  all  that  may  be  reckoned  hap- 
piness, or  even  all  threatenings  of  pain  and  misfortune,  no 
mode  of  presenting  the  law  by  roundabout  ways  and  indi- 
rect recommendations  would  produce  anything  but  mere 
hypocrisy  and  hatred  or  contempt  of  the  moral  law. 
Even  the  arousing  of  enthusiasm  for  a  noble  and  magnan- 
imous action  is  a  spurious  method  of  rendering  objectively 
practical  reason  subjectively  practical  as  well,  —  although  it 
and  other  like  inferior  means  may  properly  be  employed  to 
bring  an  "  uncultivated  or  degraded  mind  into  the  track 
of  moral  goodness." 

Critique  of  Judgment :  Introduction.  —  This  is  a  critical 
examination  of  the  faculty  which  forms  the  connecting  link 
between  Understanding  and  Reason.  It  treats  the  ques- 
tions :  Are  there  a  priori  principles  of  Judgment  ?  Does 
Judgment  give  rules  a  priori  to  the  feeling  of  pleasure  and 
pain,  as  Understanding  prescribes  laws  to  knowledge,  and 
reason  to  desire?  Critical  search  for  the  principle  of 
aesthetic  judgment  is  the  main  object  of  the  Critique  of 


. 
[j 


344        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Judgment.  It  lies  in  the  very  idea  of  freedom  to  realize 
in  the  world  of  sense  the  end  presented  in  its  laws,  and 
hence  nature  in  its  formal  aspect  as  conformable  to  law 
must  at  least  be  capable  of  harmonizing  with  that  end. 
There  must,  then,  be  a  principle  which  unites  the  super- 
sensible substrate  of  nature  with  the  supersensible  con- 
tained practically  in  the  notion  of  freedom.  And  although 
that  principle  does  not  lead  to  a  knowledge  of  the  super- 
sensible, and  hence  has  no  realm  peculiarly  its  own,  it  yet 
enables  the  mind  to  make  the  transition  to  the  practical 
point  of  view.  There  are  three  faculties  of  mind,  — 
knowledge,  feeling,  and  desire.  Feeling-stands  between 
knowledge  and  desire,  just  as  judgment  (transcendental 
imagination)  mediates  between  understanding  and  reason. 
Judgment  is  the  general  faculty  of  thinking  the  particular 
as  contained  under  the  universal.  If  the  universal  (the 
rule,  principle,  law)  is  given,  then  the  judgment  which 
subsumes  the  particular  under  it  is  determining.  But  if 
only  the  particular  is  given  for  which  the  universal  is  to 
be  found,  the  judgment  is  merely  reflective.  There  are  in 
nature  many  forms  or  modifications  of  the  universal  trans- 
cendental notions  that  are  unaffected  by  the  a  priori  laws 
of  the  understanding.  There  must  be  laws  for  those  forms, 
and  such  laws,  as  empirical,  may  be  contingent  so  far  as 
our  intelligence  is  concerned,  and  may  yet  be  regarded  as 
following  necessarily  from  a  principle  which  is  the  condition 
of  the  unity  of  the  multifarious  forms  of  nature,  although  it 
is  unknown  to  us.  The  reflective  judgment,  which  is  com- 
pelled to  ascend  from  the  particular  to  the  universal,  there- 
fore, requires  a  principle  of  its  own  ;  and  that  principle  it 
cannot  borrow  from  experience  because  it  is  to  unite  all 
empirical  principles  under  higher  ones,  and  so  make  their 
systematic  connection  possible.  The  principle  of  judg- 
ment as  reflective  must  therefore  be  conceived  as  if  it  were 
a  unity  imposed  on  nature  by  an  intelligence  different  from 
ours,  to  enable  us  to  reduce  our  knowledge  of  nature  to  a 
system  of  particular  laws.  We  cannot,  however,  assert  that 


KANT.  345 

there  actually  is  an  intelligence  of  this  kind,  for  judgment 
does  not  give  a  law  to  nature,  but  only  to  itself.  -'The  prin- 
ciple of  judgment  in  its  relation  to  the  forms  of  things 
which  come  under  empirical  laws  in  general  is  the  adapta- 
tion of  nature  in  its  manifold  variety  to  an  end."  (  Nature  is 
here  conceived  as  if  its  manifold  empirical  laws  were  due 
to  an  intelligence.)  The  principle  of  nature's  adaptation 
to  an  end  is  a  transcendental  principle,  not  a  principle  of 
knowledge  of  objects  as  such ;  the  notion  of  objects  so  far 
as  they  are  thought  as  standing  under  this  principle  is  mere- 
ly the  pure  notion  of  objects  of  possible  experience  in  general. 
(It  is  therefore  a  necessary  law  of  the  reflective  judg- 
ment.) It  is  a  subjective  principle  or  maxim  of  judgment, 
since  the  notion  of  adaptation  is  not  a  notion  either  of 
nature  or  of  freedom,  but  merely  represents  the  way  in 
which  we  must  necessarily  proceed  in  reflecting  on  natural 
objects  with  a  view  to  a  thoroughly  connected  experience. 
With  the  attainment  by  reflective  judgment  of  its  end,  — 
the  reduction  of  the  special  laws  of  nature  to  unity  of 
principle,  —  there  arises  a  feeling  of  pleasure  which  is  de- 
termined by  a  ground  a  priori  for  every  one,  and  indeed 
from  the  mere  adaptation  of  the  object  to  our  faculty  of 
knowledge.  In  the  apprehension  of  a  sensible  object 
are  implied  two  relations, —  a  subjective  and  an  objective: 
a  relation  of  adaptation  of  the  representation  of  the  object 
directly  to  our  mere  faculty  of  perception,  and  a  relation  of 
adaptation  of  the  form  of  an  object  as  given  in  a  notion  to 
the  object  itself  in  its  possibility.  The  former  is  not  es- 
sential to  knowledge,  it  being  the  mere  feeling  of  pleasure 
or  pain  accompanying  our  knowledge  of  sensible  objects. 
Adaptation  here  is  purely  aesthetic.  In  the  other  case  it 
is  logical.  When  the  imagination,  as  the  faculty  of  percep- 
tion a  priori,  is  found  to  be  in  harmony  with  the  under- 
standing, and  a  feeling  of  pleasure  is  thereby  awakened,  the 
object  must  be  regarded  as  adapted  for  the  reflective  judg- 
ment. The  object  is  then  said  to  be  beautiful,  and  the 
faculty  which  judges  it  to  be  so  is  called  Taste.  From  the 


346         A    HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

adaptation  of  the  form  or  even  formlessness  of  objects  to 
the  notion  of  freedom  in  the  subject,  arises  the  emotion  of 
the  sublime.  Hence  two  main  divisions  of  the  Critique  of 
Esthetic  Judgment.  When  the  notion  of  an  object  is 
given,  the  work  of  the  judgment  lies  in  the  presentation  of 
a  perception  corresponding  to  it.  And  we  may  either,  as  in 
art,  endeavor  to  realize  in  a  perception  a  notion  set  up  by 
our  imagination  as  an  end,  or  we  may  make  use  of  our  no- 
tion of  end  in  judging  of  certain  natural  objects  (e.  g.,  or- 
ganized bodies) .  In  the  latter  case,  not  merely  the  form  of 
a  thing  implies  adaptation,  but  the  thing  itself  is  regarded 
as  a  natural  end.  Now,  although  subjective  adaptation 
does  not  imply  any  notion  of  an  object,  we  may  still,  by 
analogy  with  the  notion  of  an  end,  attribute  to  nature  as  it 
were  a  regard  for  our  faculty  of  knowledge ;  hence  we  may 
look  upon  natural  beauty  as  the  presentation  of  the  notion 
of  a  formal  or  subjective  adaptation,  and  end  in  nature  as 
the  presentation  of  a  real  or  objective  adaptation  :  the  for- 
mer being  the  object  of  aesthetic  judgment  or  taste,  the 
latter  being  judged  logically  by  understanding  and  reason 
through  notions.  The  Critique  of  Judgment  has  two  parts, — 
Critique  of  /Esthetical  Judgment ;  Critique  of  Teleological 
Judgment. 

Critique  of  /Esthetical  Judgment :  Analytic.  —  The 
judgment  that  an  object  is  beautiful  is,  like  all  other  judg- 
ments, a  judgment  with  reference  to  quality,  quantity, 
relation,  and  modality.  As  regards  quality,  an  object  is 
beautiful  when  it  is  a  source  of  disinterested  satisfaction 
in  us.  As  such  it  is  to  be  distinguished  from  an  object  that 
is  merely  agreeable  by  the  fact  that  the  latter  excites  in  us 
an  interest  in  the  existence  of  the  object  and  a  desire 
for  the  possession  of  it.  It  is  to  be  distinguished  from 
that  which  is  good  by  the  fact  that  the  latter  involves  an 
interest  in  an  object  in  relation  to  a  preconceived  end. 
In  framing  a  judgment  of  taste,  a  judgment  having  refer- 
ence to  beauty,  concerning  an  object,  the  mind  is  occu- 
pied solely  with  the  effect  of  the  object  upon  it  in  a  con- 


KANT.  347 

templative  attitude.  In  quantity,  the  judgment  of  taste 
is  universal,  —  a  judgment  which  every  one  must  make,  or 
which,  though  subjective  in  the  sense  that  beauty  is  a  mat- 
ter of  feeling,  does  not  depend  upon  private  conditions 
or  individual  subjectivity.  The  idea  of  a  beautiful  object, 
in  other  words,  is  such  as  to  give  rise  to  that  "  free  play 
of  the  faculties  out  of  which  knowledge  arises,  and  thus 
the  feeling  produced  by  it  possesses  a"  universality  for  mind 
as  such."  The  relation  expressed  in  the  judgments  of  taste 
is  one  of  adaptation  to  an  end,  yet  without  reference  to 
any  definite  design ;  or  one  of  "  purposiveness  without 
purpose." 1  The  pleasure  excited  by  a  beautiful  object 
as  beautiful  "  has  in  itself  a  causality  to  maintain  the  state 
of  contemplation  in  the  subject ;  "  /.  e.,  to  keep  the  facul- 
ties engaged  upon  the  object  without  any  further  end.  We 
linger  over  the  contemplation  of  the  beautiful  because  this 
contemplation  strengthens  and  reproduces  itself.  This 
pleasure  "  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  idea  of  the  power 
of  the  object  over  us,  or  its  objective  perfection  as  a  speci- 
men of  its  kind."  As  regards  modality,  the  judgment  of 
taste  is  necessary,  though  this  necessity  is  of  course  not 
a  necessity  either  of  the  theoretical  or  of  the  practical  rea- 
son, but  of  common  feeling,  or  of  a  certain  sensus  communis. 
In  general,  then,  the  beautiful  is  a  sense  of  a  free  agree- 
ment, in  the  imagination,  with  law,  or  a  conception  of  the 
understanding.  A  sense  of  agreement  in  the  imagination 
with  an  idea  of  the  reason  —  God,  freedom,  immortality  — 
is  a  sense  of  the  sublime.  "  The  sense  of  the  sublime  is 
further  characterized  by  being  only  indirectly  pleasurable, 
since  it  involves  the  feeling  of  a  momentary  check  upon 
the  forces  of  life  within  us,  followed  by  a  more  vehement 
outflow  of  those  forces."  It  is  above  all  especially  charac- 
terized by  the  fact  that,  instead  of  being  a  feeling  of  har- 
mony between  an  object  and  our  faculty,  it  is  the  oppo- 
site, and  this  because  an  idea  of  reason  can  never  be 

1  See  Caird's  "  Critical  Philosophy  of  Kant,"  vol.  ii.,  from  which 
this  account  of  the  /Esthetic  Judgment  has  been  drawn. 


348         A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

objectively  realized  by  the  sensuous  imagination.  While 
the  beautiful  makes  us  rest  in  nature  with  the  anticipation 
of  finding  purpose  or  design  in  it,  by  "  widening,  not  in- 
deed our  actual  knowledge  of  natural  objects,  but  our  con- 
ceptions of  nature,  so  that  we  regard  it  not  as  a  mere 
mechanism,  but  as  a  kind  of  art,"  —  the  sublime  makes 
us  regard  nature  as  incomplete  and  aimless  in  itself,  but 
yet  as  presenting  to  us  certain  phenomena  which  "  may  be 
used  to  awake  the  feeling  of  a  higher  design  in  ourselves 
that  is  quite  independent  of  nature."  The  idea  of  the 
sublime  may  be  connected  with  our  notions  of  quantity 
or  of  the  forces  of  nature  ;  the  sublime  is  either  the  mathe- 
matically or  the  dynamically  sublime.  Magnitudes  too 
great  to  be  realized  in  imagination  arouse  in  us  a  sense 
of  the  infinite,  or  of  that  which  transcends  all  positive  con- 
ditions. The  reason,  checked  by  the  weakness  of  the 
imagination,  reacts  violently,  and  throws  into  conscious- 
ness the  idea  of  the  unconditioned,  exciting  a  feeling 
of  reverence,  which  we  illogically  transfer  to  an  object 
of  nature.  The  forces  of  nature  are  regarded  as  sublime 
"  when  we  feel  their  greatness,  and  yet  feel  that  they  can- 
not overpower  us ;  "  that  is,  when  the  physical  feeling 
of  force  is  counteracted  and  overpowered  in  our  minds 
by  the  idea  of  an  unconditioned  power.  The  feeling  of 
the  sublime  is  in  reality  a  feeling  of  the  superiority 
of  spirit  to  nature.  Technically  characterized,  the  sublime 
is  as  regards  quality  painful,  as  regards  quantity  the  abso- 
lutely great,  as  regards  relation  that  which  causes  us  to 
feel  our  essential  superiority  to  nature,  as  regards  modality 
a  necessary  condition.  As  beauty  is  apprehended  by  a 
faculty  of  feeling  only,  all  art-creation  is  the  work  of 
genius. 

Dialectic  of  the  Esthetic  Faculty,  —  The  antinomy  of 
the  sesthetic  faculty  is  as  follows :  The  judgment  of  Taste 
is  not  based  on  conceptions,  for  otherwise  it  would  be 
a  matter  of  controversy  which  might  be  decided  by  such 
conceptions  (thesis)  ;  the  judgment  of  Taste  is  based  upon 


KANT.  349 

conceptions,  for  otherwise  we  could  not  contend  about 
it  as  we  do  when  we  claim  that  others  should  necessarily 
agree  with  us  (antithesis).  The  solution  of  the  antinomy 
is  contained  in  the  notion  of  the  indefinite  conception, 
or  conception  of  reason  (not  of  the  understanding).  That 
is,  the  ideas  of  the  beautiful  and  sublime  are  of  merely 
subjective  origin  and  validity,  and  have  their  explanation 
in  the  supersensible.  —  The  propaedeutic  to  fine  art  — • 
there  is  no  "method"  of  the  aesthetic  faculty — lies  in 
a  culture  of  the  higher,  the  characteristically  human, 
faculties. 

Critique  of  Teleological  Judgment:  Analytic  of  Teleo- 
logical  Judgment,  —  We  may  distinguish  adaptation  as 
formal  and  as  real.  The  use  to  which  a  geometrical 
figure  may  be  put  as  not  being  the  condition  of  its  very 
existence  in  thought  is  an  illustration  of  formal  adapta- 
tion. The  adaptation  displayed  by  a  number  of  things 
presented  as  without  me  and  as  enclosed  within  definite 
limits,  —  <?.  g.,  trees,  flowers,  and  walks  disposed  in  regular 
order  in  a  garden  —  is  real,  and  presupposes  necessarily 
the  notion  of  an  end.  These  things  are  actually  existing 
things  which  must  be  known  empirically,  and  not  merely 
by  an  idea  of  my  own  "  determined  a  prion  according  to 
principle."  —  Adaptation  may  also  be  distinguished  as  inter- 
nal (as  in  a  work  of  art)  or  relative  (as  when  the  effect  pro- 
duced is  regarded  merely  as  material  for  the  art  of  other 
possible  natural  beings).  Adaptation  of  the  latter  kind 
is  called  utility  in  relation  to  man,  advantage  when  we  are 
speaking  of  other  creatures.  Relative  adaptation,  though 
it  points  hypothetically  to  natural  ends,  does  not  of  itself 
justify  an  absolute  ideological  judgment  (since  everything 
may  be  regarded  as  a  means  to  something  else,  on  the 
principle  of  external  adaptation).  A  thing  is  known  as 
a  natural  end  when  it  is  known  as  capable  of  being 
explained  non-mechanically  only ;  /.  e.,  through  a  notion 
of  reason.  A  thing  exists  as  a  natural  end  only  when 
it  is  (in  a  double  sense)  its  own  cause  and  its  own  effect. 


350        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

A  tree  produces  another  tree  according  to  a  well-known 
law.  The  tree  so  produced  is  of  the  same  species  :  hence 
a  tree,  as  continually  self-produced,  is,  on  the  one  hand, 
its  own  effect,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  its  own  cause ;  and 
by  such  continual  self-production  it  perpetuates  itself  as 
a  species.  Again,  the  tree  is  self-productive  even  as  an 
individual.  The  matter  which  the  tree  incorporates  it 
previously  works  up  into  a  specifically  peculiar  quality, 
which  is  not  due  to  any  mechanism  outside  of  it;  and 
thus  it  develops  itself  by  means  of  a  material  which  as 
assimilated  is  its  own  product.  Thirdly,  each  part  of  the 
tree  is  self- productive,  so  that  the  preservation  of  one 
part  is  dependent  on  the  preservation  of  all  the  rest. 
Leaves  of  a  tree  are  products  of  the  tree,  and  the  tree 
is  in  turn  dependent  for  its  growth  upon  their  effect  on 
the  stem ;  for  if  it  is  repeatedly  denuded  of  its  leaves,  it 
dies.  For  a  thing  to  be  a  natural  end,  its  parts  must  be  pos- 
sible only  in  relation  to  the  whole.  As  an  end,  the  thing 
itself  is  comprehended  under  a  notion  or  idea  which  must 
determine  a  priori  all  that  is  to  be  contained  it.  A  natural 
end  must  — as  distinguished  from  an  artificial  product  —  im- 
ply, in  its  self  or  its  inner  possibility,  relation  to  an  end  : 
must  be  possible  as  a  natural  end,  irrespective  of  any  intel- 
ligent cause  external  to  it.  Accordingly,  the  parts  of  such 
a  natural  product,  which  combine  in  the  unity  of  a  whole, 
must  be  "  reciprocally  cause  and  effect  of  each  other's 
form.  Only  an  organized  and  ^^"-organizing  product  is 
a  natural  end.  Organized  beings  are  the  only  things  in 
nature  which  in  themselves  and  apart  altogether  from  their 
relation  to  other  things  can  be  conceived  to  exist  at  all 
only  as  ends.  The  notion  of  an  end  of  nature,  as  distin- 
guished from  a  practical  end,  first  obtains  objective  reality 
from  a  consideration  of  such  beings,  and  apart  from  them, 
the  teleological  consideration  of  nature  as  a  special  prin- 
ciple of  judgment  would  have  no  justification  whatever." 
The  principle  and  definition  of  internal  adaptation  is : 
An  organized  product  of  nature  is  one  in  which  all  the  parts 


KANT.  351 

are  reciprocally  end  and  means.  Nothing  in  it  is  useless, 
purposeless,  or  ascribable  to  blind  mechanism.  This  prin- 
ciple finds  its  occasion  in  the  methodical  observation  of 
experience ;  but  as  it  affirms  the  adaptation  to  be  of  uni- 
versal necessity,  it  cannot  be  derived  from  experience,  but 
must  be  a  priori.  But  as  ends  exist  only  as  an  idea  in  the 
judging  subject,  not  in  any  efficient  cause,  it  is  merely  a 
regulative  principle  or  maxim  for  judging  of  the  internal 
adaptation  of  organized  beings.  A  natural  end  is  a  very 
different  thing  from  an  end  of  nature.  The  latter  pre- 
supposes an  ultimate  end  (scopus)  of  nature,  which  must 
be  sought  beyond  nature.  An  end  of  nature  is  not  a  mere 
natural  product.  The  notion  of  natural  end  is  necessarily 
demanded  by  organized  matter  only ;  but  when  once  ob- 
tained, it  necessarily  leads  to  the  idea  of  the  whole  of 
nature  as  a  system  of  ends,  and  to  this  idea  all  natural 
mechanism  must  be  subordinated  in  accordance  with  the 
principles  of  reason.  It  in  no  way  interferes  with  the 
principle  of  mechanical  causality,  nor  does  it  entitle  us 
to  regard  anything  whatever  as  a  purposive  end  of  nature. 
Even  the  beauty  of  nature,  /'.  e.,  its  harmony  with  the  free 
play  of  our  faculties  of  knowledge,  as  apprehending  and 
judging  of  its  appearance,  may  be  regarded  as  a  sort 
of  objective  adaptation  of  nature  as  a  systematic  whole, 
of  which  man  is  a  member,  after  the  Ideological  judg- 
ment by  natural  ends  as  applied  to  organized  beings 
has  brought  us  to  the  idea  of  a  great  system  of  ends  of 
nature. 

Dialectic  of  Teleological  Judgment.  —  It  may  very  well 
happen  that  judgment  in  its  reflection  proceeds  from  either 
of  two  principles,  viz.,  that  given  to  it  a  priori  by  the  under- 
standing, or  that  which  on  occasion  of  particular  experiences 
calls  reason  into  play  to  estimate  corporeal  nature  and  its 
laws  by  a  special  principle.  Hence  it  comes  that  these  two 
maxims  seem  to  be  mutually  exclusive,  and  there  arises  a 
Dialectic  which  leads  judgment  to  err  in  applying  the  prin- 
ciple of  reflection.  The  first  maxim  of  judgment  is  the  thesis  : 


,352 


A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 


All  production  of  material  things,  and  the  forms  of  material 
things,  must  be  judged  as  possible  on  purely  mechanical 
laws.  The  second  maxim  is  the  antithesis  :  Some  products 
of  material  nature  cannot  be  judged  as  possible  on  purely 
mechanical  laws  (but  require  a  quite  different  law  of  caus- 
ality, namely,  of  final  cause).  Now,  if  these  regulative 
principles  in  the  investigation  of  nature  are  converted  into 
constitutive  principles,  determining  the  possibility  of  objects 
themselves,  they  will  run  thus :  All  production  of  material 
things  is  possible  on  purely  mechanical  laws  (thesis).  Some 
production  of  material  things  is  not  possible  on  purely 
mechanical  laws  (antithesis).  These  last  propositions 
constitute  an  antinomy ;  not  so  the  first  two :  they  are  not 
necessarily  contradictory.  The  notion  of  natural  end  is 
merely  a  notion  of  the  reflective  judgment,  and  due  to  the 
peculiar  character  of  our  intelligence.  We  must  look  out 
for  a  certain  contingency  in  the  nature  of  our  intelligence  as 
related  to  its  faculty  of  judgment,  by  the  discovery  of  which 
we  may  learn  how  our  intelligence  differs  from  other  possi- 
ble intelligence.  This  contingency  is  readily  found  in  the 
particular  which  judgment  is  to  bring  under  the  universal 
supplied  by  notions  of  the  understanding ;  for  the  universal 
of  our  understanding  does  not  determine  the  particular,  and 
it  is  contingent  in  how  many  ways  different  things  which 
agree  in  a  common  mark  may  present  themselves  to  our 
observation.  For  a  perceptive  intelligence  there  would  not 
be  that  contingency  in  the  adaptation  of  particular  laws  of 
nature  to  understanding  which  makes  it  so  hard  for  us  to 
reduce  the  multiplicity  of  nature  to  the  unity  of  knowledge. 
In  order  to  think  the  possibility  of  an  adaptation  of  natural 
things  to  our  faculty  of  judgment,  we  must  at  the  same  time 
conceive  of  another  intelligence  by  reference  to  which,  and 
apart  from  any  end  attributed  to  it,  we  may  represent  as 
necessary  that  harmony  of  natural  laws  with  our  faculty  of 
judgment,  which  for  our  intelligence  can  be  thought  only 
through  the  medium  of  ends.  For  discursive  intelligence, 
like  ours,  the  idea  of  the  parts  does  not  necessarily  presup- 


KANT. 


353 


pose  the  whole,  but  rather  the  idea  of  the  whole  explains  the 
form  of  the  whole  and  the  connection  of  the  parts.  Now, 
such  a  whole  is  an  effect  or  product,  the  idea  of  which  is 
treated  as  the  cause  that  makes  it  possible,  and  such  a  pro- 
duct is  called  an  end.  It  therefore  arises  from  the  peculiar 
character  of  our  intelligence  that  we  regard  certain  natural 
products  as  due  to  a  different  sort  of  causality  from  that 
of  material  laws  of  nature,  namely,  that  of  ends  and  final 
causes.  This  principle,  therefore,  does  not  determine  the 
manner  in  which  things  themselves,  even  when  they  are 
regarded  as  phenomena,  are  capable  of  being  produced, 
but  merely  the  manner  in  which  our  intelligence  can  alone 
judge  them  to  be  produced.  If  we  make  a  distinction  be- 
tween phenomena  and  noumena,  the  principle  of  the  mechan- 
ical derivation  of  natural  products  exhibiting  adaptation  is 
quite  consistent  with  the  teleological,  but  by  no  means  ena- 
bles us  to  dispense  with  it.  "  In  the  investigation  of  a  thing 
which  we  are  forced  to  regard  as  a  natural  end  (an  organ- 
ized being),  we  may  try  all  the  known  and  yet  to  be  dis- 
covered laws  of  mechanical  production,  and  may  even  hope 
to  make  good  progress  in  that  direction,  but  we  need  never 
hope  to  get  rid  of  the  quite  different  principle  of  causation 
by  ends  in  our  explanation  of  natural  products.  No  human 
intelligence,  and  indeed  no  finite  intelligence,  however  it 
surpass  ours  in  degree,  need  expect  to  comprehend  the 
production  of  even  a  blade  of  grass  by  purely  mechanical 
causes.  The  teleological  connection  of  causes  and  effects  is 
absolutely  indispensable  in  judging  of  the  possibility  of  such 
an  object.  There  is  no  adequate  reason  for  regarding  ex- 
ternal phenomena  as  such  from  a  teleological  point  of  view ; 
the  reason  for  it  must  be  sought  in  the  supersensible  sub- 
strate of  phenomena.  But  as  we  are  shut  out  from  any  S 
possible  view  of  that  substrate,  it  is  impossible  to  find  in  j 
nature  grounds  for  an  explanation  of  nature,  and  we  are  j 
compelled  by  the  constitution  of  our  intellectual  faculty  to  j 
seek  for  the  supreme  ground  of  teleological  connection  in  an  J 
original  Intelligence  as  cause  of  the  world." 
VOL.  i.  —  23 


354        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Appendix  on  Method :  Moral  Proof  of  the  Existence 
of  God.  —  "  Moral  teleology  has  to  do  with  the  relation  of  our 
own  causality  to  ends,  and  even  to  an  ultimate  end  neces- 
sarily set  by  us  as  our  own  goal  in  the  world,  as  well  as  with 
the  possibility  of  realizing  that  end,  the  external  world  being 
what  it  is.  The  question  necessarily  arises  whether  reason 
compels  us  to  seek  in  a  supreme  intelligence  outside  of  the 
world  for  a  principle  which  shall  explain  to  us  even  the 
adaptation  of  nature  to  an  end  relatively  to  the  law  of  mor- 
ality within  us.  There  is,  therefore,  a  moral  teleology  which 
is  concerned  on  the  one  hand  with  the  no  mo  the  tic  of  free- 
dom, and  on  the  other  with  that  of  nature.  .  .  .  From  the 
teleological  point  of  view,  it  is  a  primary  proposition  admitted 
by  every  one  that  there  can  be  no  ultimate  end  at  all  pre- 
supposed by  reason  a  priori,  unless  that  end  be  man 
under  moral  laws.  A  world  consisting  of  mere  lifeless 
beings,  or  even  living  but  unintelligent  beings,  would  have 
no  meaning  or  value,  because  there  would  be  in  it  no  in- 
telligent being  to  appreciate  its  value.  Again,  suppose  that 
in  the  world  there  are  intelligent  beings  whose  reason  enables 
them  to  value  existing  things  for  the  pleasure  they  bring, 
but  who  have  not  themselves  any  power  of  imparting  a  value 
to  things  originally  by  means  of  freedom :  then,  there 
will  indeed  be  relative  ends,  but  no  absolute  or  ultimate 
end,  for  the  existence  in  the  world  of  such  intelligent  beings 
can  nt-ver  have  an  end.  Moral  laws,  however,  are  of  this 
peculiar  character  that  they  prescribe  for  reason  something 
as  an  end  without  any  condition,  and  therefore  exactly  as  the 
notion  of  an  ultimate  end  requires.  The  existence  of  a  reason 
which  may  be  for  itself  the  supreme  law  in  the  relation  of  ends, 
in  other  words,  the  existence  of  rational  beings  under  moral 
laws,  can  alone  be  conceived  as  the  ultimate  end  of  the 
existence  of  the  world.  On  any  other  supposition  its  exist- 
ence does  not  imply  a  cause  acting  from  any  end,  or  it  im- 
plies ends  but  no  ultimate  end."  Moral  law  prescribes  as 
goal  of  our  efforts  the  highest  good  possible  in  the  world 
through  freedom.  The  highest  good  possible  in  the  world 


KANT.  355 

is  happiness,  and  this  end  we  must  seek  to  advance  as  far  as 
in  us  lies,  but  always  under  the  objective  condition  of  the 
harmony  of  man  with  the  law  of  morality  as  worthiness  tb 
be  happy.  "  But  it  is  impossible,  in  consistency  with  all  the 
faculties  of  our  intelligence,  to  regard  the  two  requisites  of 
the  ultimate  end  presented  to  us  through  the  moral  laws  as 
connected  by  merely  natural  causes,  and  yet  as  conforming 
to  the  idea  of  that  ultimate  end.  We  must  therefore  sup- 
pose a  moral  cause  or  author  of  the  world  in  order  to  set 
before  ourselves  an  ultimate  end  conformable  to  the  moral 
law ;  and  in  so  far  as  the  latter  is  necessary,  so  far,  /.  <?.,  in 
the  same  degree  and  on  the  same  ground,  the  former  also 
must  necessarily  be  admitted ;  it  must,  in  other  words,  be 
admitted  that  there  is  a  God.  .  .  .  The  ultimate  end,  as 
merely  a  notion  of  our  practical  reason,  is  not  an  inference 
from  the  data  of  experience  for  the  theoretical  explanation 
of  nature,  nor  can  it  be  applied  in  the  knowledge  of  nature. 
Its  only  possible  use  is  for  practical  reason  in  relation  to 
moral  laws."  We  have  a  moral  ground  for  representing  in 
the  world  an  ultimate  end  of  creation,  but  we  cannot  "  as- 
sume that  in  an  ultimate  end  we  have  a  reason  for  admitting 
not  merely  a  moral  ground  or  ultimate  end  of  creation  (as 
effect),  but  also  a  moral  being  as  original  ground  of  creation. 
But  we  may  certainly  say  that  according  to  the  constittition 
of  our  reason  we  cannot  make  intelligible  to  ourselves  the 
possibility  of  an  adaptation  relative  to  the  moral  law,  and 
to  its  object  as  it  is  in  this  ultimate  end,  apart  from  an 
author  and  ruler  of  the  world,  who  is  also  a  moral  law- 
giver. ...  To  prevent  a  very  natural  misunderstanding,  these 
two  points  should  be  carefully  borne  in  mind.  In  the  first 
place,  we  can  think  the  attributes  of  the  Supreme  Being 
only  by  analogy.  How,  indeed,  should  we  attempt  to  in- 
vestigate directly  the  nature  of  a  Being  to  whom  nothing 
similar  is  given  in  experience?  Secondly,  in  thinking  the 
Supreme  Being  through  these  attributes,  we  do  not  thereby 
know  him,  nor  can  we  theoretically  predicate  them  of  him ; 
for  to  contemplate  that  Being  as  he  is  in  himself,  reason  as 
speculative  must  take  the  form  of  determining  judgment." 


356        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Metaphysics.  —  We  pass  now  to  Metaphysics,1    ( i )    of 
Nature,  (2)  of  Morals. 

'  The  Metaphysical  Foundation  of  Natural  Science?  In- 
troduction.—  The  science  of  nature,  or  the  sum  total  of 
phenomena,  has  two  main  divisions  corresponding  to  the 
divisions  of  sensibility  (/'.  e.,  outer  and  inner  sense)  ;  namely, 
the  doctrine  of  body  and  the  doctrine  of  soul.  It  is  either 
empirical  (dealing  with  mere  facts)  or  rational  (dealing 
with  laws),  the  latter  alone  being  science  in  the  proper 
sense  of  the  term.  Rational  science,  again,  has  two  parts 
corresponding  to  a  purely  a  priori  method  of  treating  its 
subject  and  to  a  treatment  of  it  according  to  empirical 
laws.  Rational  science  in  the  former  sense  is  the  meta- 
physics of  nature.  The  metaphysics  of  nature,  again,  has 
two  branches,  one  of  which  (the  transcendental  branch)  treats 
of  the  laws  rendering  possible  the  conception  of  nature  in 
general,  the  other  of  some  particular  empirical  conception, 
e.  g.,  the  empirical  conception  of  matter.  In  every  special 
natural  doctrine  only  so  much  science  proper  is  contained 
as  there  is  mathematics.  Chemistry  and  psychology  are,  for 
this  reason,  not  properly  natural  sciences.  A  pure  (transcen- 
dental) philosophy  of  nature  in  general  is  possible  without 
mathematics.  That  there  may  be  a  real  (/.  e.,  mathemati- 
cal) science  of  body  there  must  be  certain  "  principles  of 
the  construction  of  conceptions  belonging  to  the  possi- 
bility of  matter  in  general."  These  are  furnished  by  a 
pure  philosophy,  a  metaphysics  of  corporeal  nature.  The 
fundamental  attribute  of  a  thing  that  is  to  be  an  object 
of  external  sense  must  be  motion,  for  only  by  motion 
can  this  sense  be  affected,  and  natural  science  is  (there- 
fore) throughout  either  a  pure  or  an  applied  doctrine 
of  motion.  The  Metaphysical  Principles  of  Natural 
Science  may  therefore  be  brought  under  four  main  divi- 
sions, of  which  the  first,  "  treating  of  motion  considered 
as  pure  quantum  according  to  its  composition,  without  any 

1  See  above,  p.  317. 

2  See  the  translation  of  Kant's  "  Metaphysische   Anfangsgriinde 
der  Naturwissenschaft,"  by  Belfort  Bax. 


KANT.  357 

quality  of  the  movable,"  may  be  termed  Pkoronomy ;  the 
second,  "  regarding  motion  as  belonging  to  the  quality  of 
the  matter  under  the  name  of  an  original  moving  force," 
may  be  called  Dynamics;  the  third,  treating  of  "matter 
endowed  with  force,  conceived  as,  by  its  own  reciprocal 
motion,  in  relation"  is  Mechanics ;  and  the  fourth,  treating 
of  motion  (or  rest)  merely  in  reference  to  the  mode  of  pres- 
entation or  modality,  or,  in  other  words,  as  determined  as 
phenomenon  of  the  external  sense,  is  Phenomenology. 

Phoronomy.  —  Matter  is  the  movable  in  space.  Space 
which  is  movable  is  relative  ;  space  which  is  immovable  and 
a  condition  of  all  motion  is  absolute.  All  motion  that  is  an 
object  of  experience  is  relative.  Motion  is  change  of  external 
relations  to  space ;  rest  is  permanent  presence  in  the  same 
place.  Rest  cannot  be  regarded  as  motion,  which  is  zero  in 
value,  as  zero  does  not  admit  of  being  constructed.  Rest 
may  be  constructed  as  motion  of  infinitely  small  velocity 
throughout  a  finite  time.  Every  motion  as  an  object  of 
possible  experience  may  be  viewed  at  pleasure  as  motion  of 
a  body  in  a  space  that  is  at  rest,  or  as  rest  of  the  body  and 
motion  of  the  space  in  the  opposite  direction,  with  equal 
velocity,  etc. 

Dynamics.  —  Matter  fills  a  space,  not  by  its  mere  exist- 
ence, but  by  a  special  moving  force.  This  is  demonstrated 
as  follows  :  The  penetration  into  a  space  is  a  motion.  The 
resistance  to  motion  is  the  cause  of  its  diminution,  and  also 
its  change  into  rest.  Now,  nothing  can  be  connected  with 
any  motion  as  lessening  or  destroying  it  but  another  motion 
of  the  same  movable  in  the  opposite  direction.  Thus  the 
resistance  offered  by  matter  in  the  space  which  it  fills  to 
all  impressions  of  another  matter  is  a  cause  of  the  motion 
of  the  latter  in  the  opposite  direction ;  but  the  cause  of  a 
motion  is  called  moving  force.  Thus  matter  fills  space  by 
moving  force,  and  not  by  its  mere  existence.  Matter  can 
be  compressed  to  infinity,  but  can  never  be  penetrated  (or 
deprived  of  its  extension)  by  matter ;  since  for  the  pen- 
etration of  matter  a  compression  into  an  infinitely  small 


358        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

space,  and  therefore  an  infinitely  compressive  force,  is  re- 
quired, which  is  impossible.  Besides  the  special  moving 
force  by  which  matter  fills  space  (a  repulsive  force)  there 
is  required  in  matter  a  force  of  attraction.  Contact,  in  the 
physical  sense,  is  the  immediate  action  and  reaction  of  im- 
penetrability. Action  at  a  distance  is  possible  even  without 
intermediate  matter  or  through  empty  space ;  the  attrac- 
tion essential  to  all  matter  is  an  immediate  effect  on  other 
matter  through  empty  space.  The  repulsive  force  by  means 
of  which  matter  fills  a  space  is  merely  a  superficial  force. 
The  original  attractive  force  in  which  the  possibility  of 
matter  itself  rests,  extends  itself  directly  through  the 
universe  to  infinity  from  every  part  of  the  same  to  every 
other  part.  All  that  is  real  in  the  objects  of  our  external 
sense,  —  that,  namely,  which  is  not  mere  determination  of 
space  (as  place,  extension,  figure), —  must  be  regarded  as  a 
moving  force ;  there  is  no  mere  solid  or  absolute  impene- 
trability, no  empty  mediate  spaces  within  matter. 

Mechanics.  —  All  mechanical  laws  presuppose  dynamical. 
The  quantity  of  matter  may  be  estimated  in  comparison 
with  every  other  only  by  the  quantity  of  motion  at  a  given 
velocity.  No  difference  can  obtain  between  "  living  "  and 
"dead "force  (since  all  force  is  a  function  of  motion). 
The  first  law  of  motion. is,  "With  all  changes  of  corporeal 
nature  the  quantity  of  matter  remains  on  the  whole  the 
same."  The  demonstration  of  this  law  is  as  follows.  "In 
every  matter  the  movable  in  space  is  the  ultimate  subject 
of  all  accidents  inhering  in  matter,  and  the  mass  of  this 
movable  is  the  quantity  of  substance.  Thus  the  amount  of 
matter  as  a  substance  is  merely  the  mass  of  the  substances 
of  which  it  consists.  Hence  the  quantity  of  matter  is  there- 
by neither  increased  nor  diminished,  but  remains  the  same 
as  a  whole."  The  second  law  of  motion  is,  All  change  of 
matter  has  an  external  cause :  every  body  remains  in  its 
state  of  rest  or  motion  in  the  same  direction  and  with  the 
same  velocity,  if  not  compelled  by  an  external  cause  to  for- 
sake that  state.  This  is  true,  since  matter  has  no  abso- 


KANT.  359 

lutely  internal  determinations  and  grounds  of  determination 
(matter  as  such  is  lifeless).  The  third  law  of  Mechanics. 
In  all  communication  action  and  reaction  are  always  equal 
to  one  another.  This  appears  from  the  principle  of  "  uni- 
versal metaphysics,"  that  all  action  is  reciprocal  action. 
There  is  no  such  thing  as  a  vis  inertia :  motion  can  resist 
nothing  except  opposite  motion.  Inertia  of  matter,  or  mere 
incapacity  to  move  itself,  is  not  a  cause  of  resistance. 

Phenomenology.  —  The  rectilinear  motion  of  matter  is  in 
respect  to  an  empirical  space  (as  distinguished  from  an  op- 
posite motion  of  the  space),  a  merely  possible  predicate. 
The  circular  motion  of  a  matter,  as  distinguished  from  the 
opposite  motion  of  space,  is  a  real  predicate  of  the  same ; 
while,  on  the  other  hand,  if  the  opposite  of  a  relative  space 
be  taken  instead  of  the  motion  of  the  body,  there  is  no  real 
motion  of  the  latter,  but  a  mere  illusion.  In  every  motion 
of  a  body  whereby  it  is  moving  in  respect  of  another,  an 
opposite  and  equal  motion  of  the  latter  is  necessary. 

The  Metaphysics  of  Morals*  —  Man  is  presented  to  him- 
self in  two  (and  only  two)  ways,  —  by  outer  sense  and  by 
inner  sense.  In  the  former  aspect  he  is  a  subject  of  the  law 
of  right,  in  the  latter  of  the  law  of  morals ;  "  right "  having 
to  do  with  man's  actions,  "  morals  "  with  his  motives. 

Theory  of  Right.  —  Self-conscious  beings,  being  ends  in 
themselves,  and  not  mere  means,  may  come  into  seemingly 
irreconcilable  opposition.  The  great  problem  of  Right  is 
to  prevent  conflict  and  to  secure  for  all  individuals  the  free- 
dom to  which  they  lay  claim  as  ends  in  themselves.  To 
this  end  it  is  necessary  that  there  be  reciprocal  recogni- 
tion by  individuals  of  the  will  of  each.  "  Legal  right  is, 
therefore,  just  the  whole  compass  of  the  conditions  on 
which  the  independent  will  of  the  one  can  be  united  with 
the  independent  will  of  another  according  to  a  universal 
law  of  freedom."  The  idea  of  freedom  according  to  a 

1  See  Caird's  "  Critical  Philosophy  of  Kant  "  (vol.  ii  ),  from  which 
this  account  of  the  substance  of  Kant's  Metaphysics  of  Morals  is 
borrowed. 


360        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

universal  law  requires  that  when  a  particular  use  of  free- 
dom is  a  hindrance  to  a  freedom  according  to  universal 
law  it  be  counteracted  by  compulsion ;  and,  strictly  speak- 
ing, right  must  have  a  certain  basis  in  the  possibility  of  com- 
pulsion. "  Right  and  claim  to  apply  compulsion  are  one 
and  the  same  thing."  Right  inheres  in  persons,  and  in  all 
persons  equally.  The  right  to  things  comes  into  existence 
by  their  being  used  as  expressions  of  personality ;  thus  they 
become  parts  of  man's  "intelligible"  existence,  they  be- 
come an  "  intelligible  possession,"  the  interference  with 
which  is  a  violation  of  personality.  The  right  in  things  is 
therefore  an  exclusive  right.  A  right  acquired  by  an  act 
of  mine,  coupled  with  the  neglect  of  another,  is  a  "  right  in 
thing"  {jus  in  rem),  A  right  acquired  through  the  assent 
of  another  is  a  "  right  in  person  "  {jus  in  personairi),  which 
is  a  right,  not  against  all,  but  against  one  person.  This 
right  involves  as  condition  a  contract,  expressing  two  pre- 
paratory and  two  constitutive  acts  of  will,  viz.,  "  an  offer 
and  an  expression  of  willingness  to  receive  it,  and  a  promise 
and  an  acceptance  of  it."  A  third  sort  of  right,  viz.,  "  right 
in  person  as  thing "  (jus  realiter  personale)  occurs  in  the 
relation  of  husband  and  wife,  parent  and  offspring,  etc. 
Such  a  right  is  a  reciprocal  right.  The  foregoing  three 
rights  form  the  substance  of  natural  right  (jus  naturale) ,  or 
"  right  flowing  from  the  rational  principle  in  every  man." 
Natural  right  is  not  possible  to  men  outside  of  civil  society. 
There  is  required  for  its  establishment  and  maintenance  a 
collective  universal  will  possessing  the  power  of  compulsion. 
This  will  comes  into  being  by  the  formation  of  a  contract 
"  whereby  all  members  of  the  people  give  up  their  freedom, 
to  take  it  up  again  as  members  of  a  commonwealth,  i.  <?., 
of  a  people  regarded  as  a  State.  We  are  therefore  to  say 
that  a  man  in  the  State  has  sacrificed  a  part  of  his  innate 
external  freedom  to  secure  an  end ;  we  are  to  say  that  he 
has  surrendered  the  whole  of  his  wild  and  lawless  freedom 
in  order  to  find  it  all  gain,  undiminished,  in  a  dependence 
regulated  by  law."  The  act  of  forming  the  State  is  a  vol- 


KANT.  361 

untary  act  of  those  performing  it,  and  the  State  is  therefore 
merely  a  higher  expression  of  the  self-determination  of 
reason,  —  and  an  expression  to  be  recognized  by  those 
entering  into  the  State.  The  social  contract,  once  entered 
into,  is  holy  and  inviolable ;  the  dictum  that  "  all  powers 
be  ordained  of  God,"  though  not  meant  to  express  the  his- 
torical basis  of  the  civil  constitution,  expresses  an  idea 
which  is  a  principle  of  practical  reason,  that  we  ought  to 
obey  the  existing  legislative  power,  be  its  origin  what  it 
may.  Since  the  State  is  an  embodiment  of  the  principle 
of  self-determination,  its  legislative  power  must  rest  with 
the  people  ;  the  ideal  form  of  State  is,  therefore,  the  repub- 
lican form  of  State.  But  the  republic  must  be  a  repre- 
sentative system,  since  only  under  a  representative  system 
is  it  possible  to  separate  the  legislative  from  the  executive 
power,  —  a  union  of  which  powers  in  one  and  the  same  per- 
son or  persons  would  be  comparable  to  a  union  in  a  single 
proposition  of  the  major  premise,  which  expresses  the 
general  rule,  with  the  minor,  which  subsumes  the  particular 
under  it.  The  executive  power  should  be  ultimately  un- 
der the  control  of  the  legislative.  All  public  institutions 
should  be  directly  subordinate  to  the  State.  The  right  of 
free  speech  should  be  admitted  as  an  inviolable  right  of 
citizens.  "  To  deny  to  them  such  freedom  is  not  only  to 
take  away  from  them  all  claim  of  right  in  relation  to  the 
sovereign,  but  to  withdraw  from  the  sovereign  —  who  issues 
commands  to  his  subjects  as  citizens  only  because  he 
represents  the  universal  will  of  the  people  —  all  knowledge 
of  wrongs  which  he  would  redress  if  he  were  properly  in- 
formed, and  so  bring  him  into  contradiction  with  himself." 
The  sovereign  has  no  possessions  "  except  himself; "  for  if  he 
had  anything  of  his  own,  and  so  stood  alongside  of  others 
in  the  State,  a  dispute  between  him  and  them  would  be 
possible,  and  there  would  be  no  judge  who  could  be  called 
in  to  settle  it.  The  principle  that  the  individual  is  self- 
determining  and  responsible  for  his  own  deed  makes  it 
necessary  that  punishment  be  meted  out  according  to  the 


362        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

lex  talionis  ("  law  of  retaliation  "),  that,  e.g.,  in  the  case  of 
murder,  the  punishment  be  (except  in  very  few  classes  of 
instances)  death.  A  jus  gentium,  or  law  of  nations,  founded 
on  the  jus  civile,  is  not  a  wholly  impossible  ideal.  The 
whole  of  the  jus  gentium  is  contained  in  the  principle  to 
"  avoid  everything  which  could  make  the  state  of  nature, 
the  state  of  actual  or  possible  war,  permanent ;  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  to  act  even  in  the  state  of  nature  on  those 
maxims  out  of  which  a  lasting  peace  is  most  likely  to 
spring,  even  if  we  are  not  yet  able  definitively  to  secure 
it,"  though  in  place  of  the  positive  idea  of  a  World- 
Republic,  we  must  be  satisfied  with  the  negative  substitute 
of  a  continually  advancing  league  of  States  to  prevent  war. 
And  such  a  league  might  and  should  among  other  things 
make  possible  citizenship  of  the  world.  The  foundation- 
principle  in  all  political  philosophizing  should  be  that  the 
practicable  should  be  measured  by  the  right,  not  the  right 
by  the  practicable.  "  What  is  right  is  ascertainable,  what  is 
practicable  according  to  the  laws  of  nature  is  beyond  calcu- 
lation." Free  discussion  should  be  allowed  to  philoso- 
phers, in  order  that  the  State  may  be  able  to  profit  by 
their  wisdom. 

Theory  of  Virtue.  —  As  right  depends  on  public  compul- 
sion, so  morality  depends  on  private  compulsion,  or  self- 
compulsion.  I  am  bound  by  my  (peculiar)  nature  to  have 
an  end  or  ends  which  I  as  a  free  being  propose  for  myself. 
(Besides  this  end  or  these  ends,  there  are  others  given  me 
by  objects.  The  former  alone  are  moral  ends.)  Of  moral 
ends  there  are  two  classes,  contained  in  the  duty  of  per- 
fection of  self  and  that  of  seeking  the  happiness  of  others. 
(Towards  God  there  are  no  special  duties,  all  duties  being 
duties  towards  him ;  and  so-called  "  duties  towards  the 
lower  animals"  are  merely  forms  of  duty  towards  our- 
selves.) The  duty  of  promoting  the  happiness  of  others 
consists,  not  in  seeking  their  perfection  (for  no  one  can 
seek  the  perfection  of  another)  or  their  mere  pleasure,  but 
rather  in  avoiding  conduct  that  might  "  mislead  them  into 


KANT.  363 

actions  for  which  their  conscience  might  afterwards  give 
them  pain."  We  have  to  distinguish  "  obligations  of  right," 
or  obligations  to  do  or  not  to  do  certain  actions,  and  "  ob- 
ligations of  virtue,"  or  obligations  to  follow  certain  maxims  ; 
or  "  perfect  "  and  "  imperfect  "  duties.  Merit  attaches 
only  to  the  former.  Governing  the  estimate  of  duties  are 
three  special  rules :  ( i )  There  is  but  one  ground  of  obli- 
gation for  each  duty;  (2)  Vice  and  virtue  must  be  treated 
as  differing,  not  in  mere  degree,  but  in  kind ;  (3)  We 
must  not  estimate  duty  by  our  capacities,  but  our  capa- 
cities by  our  duties.  Duties  towards  self  may  be  classed 
as  "  positive,"  relating  to  "  preservation  of  moral  health," 
and  "  negative,"  relating  to  "  moral  improvement ;  "  or,  ac- 
cording to  a  different  principle,  as  duties  of  man  "  towards 
himself  as  an  animal  who  is  also  a  moral  being,  and  duties 
towards  himself  purely  as  a  moral  being."  The  negative 
duties  in  relation  to  our  animal  nature  are  the  duties  of 
self-preservation,  preservation  of  the  species,  the  "  main- 
tenance of  his  faculty  for  the  purposeful  use  of  his  powers, 
and  for  the  enjoyment  of  life."  The  negative  duties  to 
self  as  a  moral  being  are  veracity,  humility,  and  a  duty 
opposed  to  avarice.  The  positive  duties  of  man  to  himself 
are  comprehended  in  the  duty  of  physical,  intellectual,  and 
moral  self-development.  Our  duties  to  others  are  duties  of 
respect  and  of  love.  These  are  in  a  certain  sense  antago- 
nistic, since  by  means  of  the  principle  of  mutual  love  men 
are  called  on  reciprocally  to  approach  each  other,  while  they 
by  the  principle  of  respect  which  they  owe  to  each  other, 
are  called  on  to  preserve  a  certain  distance  from  each 
other.  The  duties  of  love  or  benevolence  are  beneficence, 
gratitude,  and  sympathy.  Respect  has  as  opposites  the 
vices  pride,  evil- speaking,  and  readiness  to  mock  and 
insult. 

Religion  within  the  Limits  of  Mere  Reason. 1  — The  doc- 
trine of  religion,  within  the  limits  of  mere  reason,  has  the 
four  principal  parts, —  (i)  Concerning  the  Radical  Evil  in 

1  See  Caird's  "  Critical  Philosophy  of  Kant." 


364        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Human  Nature;  (2)  The  Conflict  of  the  Good  Principle 
with  the  Evil  for  the  Mastery  in  Man;  (3)  The  Found- 
ing of  a  Kingdom  of  God  upon  Earth ;  (4)  True  and 
False  Religious  Service,  or  Religion  and  the  Priesthood, 
(i)  There  is  in  human  nature  a  natural  bias  towards  evil, 
and  a  consciousness  of  it  as  such.  This  bias  does  not  lie 
merely  in  the  sensuous  nature,  for  this  nature  "  contains 
too  little  "  for  such  a  bias ;  nor  in  the  rational  nature  of 
man,  for  this  makes  of  man  neither  more  nor  less  than  a 
devil.  "The  distinction  whether  a  man  is  good  or  bad 
cannot  lie  in  the  difference  of  the  motives  which  he  takes 
up  into  his  maxims  (i.  e.,  not  in  the  matter  of  such  mo- 
tives), but  only  in  their  relative  subordination  (/.  e.,  in 
their  form).  The  question  is  simply  which  of  the  two 
kinds  of  motives  he  makes  the  condition  of  the  other. 
Man,  even  the  best  man,  is  bad  only  because  he  perverts 
the  moral  order  of  the  motives  in  taking  them  up  with 
his  maxims,  makes  the  motives  of  selfism  the  condition  of 
obedience  to  the  moral  law,  whereas  the  latter  ought  to  be 
made  the  universal  maxim  of  will,  as  the  highest  condition 
of  the  satisfaction  of  the  former.  Under  this  perversion 
the  idea  of  happiness,  which  is  only  the  generalization  of 
the  ends  of  desire,  takes  that  central  place  which  properly 
belongs  to  the  moral  law  as  the  principle  of  unity  for  all  our 
maxims"  (Caird).  This  perversion  is  due  to  an  "intel- 
ligible act,  which  we  can  know  only  through  reason,  and  not 
as  empirically  given  in  sense  under  conditions  of  time." 
This  act  is  incomprehensible,  as  also  that  by  which  man 
turns  from  evil  to  good.  The  conversion  (in  the  will)  is 
an  instantaneous  act :  it  can  be  realized  in  the  phenomenal 
nature  only  by  a  progresses  in  infinitum.  (2)  The  evil 
principle  in  man  can  be  counteracted  only  by  the  spiritual 
power  within  us  from  which  it  originates,  but  in  the  form  of 
moral  perfection,  "  God-pleasing  Humanity,"  by  virtue  of 
which  man  is  a  Son  of  God,  or  Christ.  Inasmuch,  never- 
theless, as  man,  though  he  has  turned  from  evil,  suffers  the 
penalty  of  deeds  while  evil,  there  is  truth  in  the  Scripture 


KANT.  365 

representation  that  the  guiltless  Son  of  God  bears  as  a  sub- 
stitute the  guilt  of  sinful  humanity,  and  so  redeems  human- 
ity. All  the  dogmas  of  Christianity  may,  like  this  of  the 
Atonement,  be  interpreted  as  an  expression  of  the  moral 
revolution  whereby  the  bias  of  man  to  evil  is  overthrown ; 
and  if  so,  it  is  well  for  us  to  "  continue  to  pay  reverence  to 
the  outward  vesture,  that  has  served  to  bring  into  general 
acceptance  a  doctrine  which  rests  upon  an  authority  within 
the  soul  of  every  man,  and  which,  therefore,  needs  no 
miracle  to  commend  it  to  mankind."  Miracles  were  useful 
at  the  first  introduction  of  the  Christian  faith :  they  have 
no  importance  for  us.  (3)  That  the  good  principle  may 
permanently  triumph  over  the  evil,  there  is  required  "a 
union  of  men  to  guard  against  evil  and  to  further  good,  a 
permanent  ever-extending  society  for  the  maintenance  of 
morality."  As  it  was  the  duty  of  mankind  to  abandon  the 
legal  state  of  nature,  and  to  enter  into  a  political  union  for 
the  maintenance  of  justice,  so  we  may  say  that  it  is  their 
duty  to  leave  the  ethical  state  of  nature,  and  combine  into 
a  church  for  the  furtherance  of  moral  virtue.  And  as  it  is 
only  a  universal  republic  which  can  finally  put  an  end  to 
war  and  fully  realize  the  legal  unity  of  men,  so  it  is  only 
a  universal  church  which  can  realize  the  moral  unity  of 
men.  Such  a  universal  republic,  according  to  laws  of 
virtue,  however,  differs  from  the  civil  society  in  this,  that  no 
force  can  be  the  instrument  of  its  realization ;  for  violence 
can  do  nothing  to  secure  a  moral  end.  A  universal  church 
implies  a  union  of  men  which  is  (in  regard  to  the  cate- 
gory of  quantity)  universal  (independent  of  accidental 
differences)  ;  (as  regards  quality)  absolutely  pure  (as 
regards  the  motives  by  which  the  members  of  it  are 
actuated)  ;  (as  regards  relation)  free  both  in  the  relation 
of  the  members  to  each  other  and  to  the  community  as  a 
whole ;  and  (as  regards  modality)  unchangeable  (as  to  the 
principles  of  its  constitution).  Such  an  institution  can  only 
be  approximated.  The  history  of  religion  is  a  history  of 
the  conflict  between  the  religion  of  "divine  service  "  and  the 


366        A   HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

religion  of  "  morality,"  and  especially  the  progress  whereby 
the  latter  gains  more  and  more  the  mastery  of  the  former. 
"As  we  cannot  deny  the  possibility  of  the  divine  origin 
of  a  book  which  in  a  practical  point  of  view  contains 
nothing  but  divine  truth,  ...  as  it  seems  impossible  that 
without  a  sacred  book,  and  a  church-faith  grounded  on  it,  a 
religious  union  of  men  can  be  formed  and  maintained ;  and 
as  we  cannot  expect,  in  the  state  of  enlightenment  we  have 
now  reached,  that  a  new  revelation  should  be  introduced 
with  new  miracles, —  it  is  best  to  take  the  book  which  we  find 
generally  recognized  as  sacred,  and  make  it  the  foundation 
of  the  teaching  of  the  church."  —  The  Christian  mysteries 
are  all  merely  symbolic.  (4)  True  service  is  obedience  to 
the  moral  law;  false,  is  priestly  and  ritual  service.  False 
service  is  positive  and  arbitrary,  not  merely  in  form  (as  re- 
vealed religion  of  necessity  must  be),  but  also  in  matter. 
A  true  revealed  religion  is  identical  with  natural  religion  in 
matter,  though  not  in  form.  All  the  services  of  the  church 
may  be  of  use  as  means  of  piety,  —  baptism  and  the  Lord's 
Supper  have  a  relative  value  ;  all  means  of  grace  are  ways 
of  working,  not  upon  God,  but  upon  ourselves. 

Resitlt.  —  The  system  of  Kant  is,  on  the  very  face  of 
it,  a  synthetic  attempt,  —  an  attempt  of  the  sort  peculiarly 
characteristic  of  the  Third  Period  of  Modern  Philosophy. 
Kant  will  reconcile  (sceptical)  empiricism  with  (dogmatic) 
rationalism,  unite  object  and  subject  in  experience,  con- 
sciousness and  self-consciousness.  All  this  he  attempts 
gather  from  the  side  of  rationalism  than  of  empiricism,  as 
the  necessities  of  the  case  required.  As  regards  the  knowl- 
edge of  mere  phenomena,  Kant's  attempt  may  be  said  to 
have  been  successful  on  the  whole, —  Kant,  in  other  words, 
provided,  in  his  doctrine  of  sense  and  of  the  understanding, 
a  fairly  substantial  philosophic  basis  for  the  natural  sciences. 
As  regards  noumena,  Kant  certainly  has  the  credit  of  having 
first  really  brought  to  light  in  modern  philosophy  (perhaps 
we  may  as  well  say  in  the  whole  history  of  philosophy)  the 
fact  of  spiritual  freedom,  as  well  as  that  of  the  predomi- 


KANT.  367 

nance  of  self-consciousness  in  our  perception  of  beauty  and 
order  in  art  and  in  nature ;  but  it  is  nevertheless  true 
that  in  relation  to  the  noumenal  Kant's  system  is  (even 
avowedly)  little  else  than  a  pseudo-reconciliation  of  op- 
posites,  a  purely  subjective  reconciliation  of  them  in  moral 
and  aesthetic  intuition.  The  fact  that  Kant  does  not 
clearly  get  rid  of  the  thing- in-itself,  that  freedom,  immor- 
tality, God,  are  merely  postulates,  that  nature  and  art  are, 
only  for  our  intelligence,  manifestations  of  absolute  spirit, 
make  his  system  one  of  intuitionalistic  rationalism  (or,  in 
the  more  common  designation,  subjective  transcendental 
idealism).  In  a  purely  historical  regard,  at  least,  the  name 
of  Kant  (it  is  scarcely  necessary  to  say)  is  the  most  im- 
portant in  the  Third  Period  of  Modern  Philosophy.  The 
number  of  thinkers,  since  Kant  wrote,  who  have  not  been 
influenced  by  his  thought,  is  comparatively  small. 

§   114- 

The  Reception  of  the  Kantian  Philosophy*  —  Although 
the  Kantian  philosophy  was  hardly  of  a  character  to  be- 
come a  popular  doctrine,  it  gradually  obtained  a  very  wide 
audience,  and  before  the  end  of  the  last  century,  or  within 
about  twenty  years  after  its  first  promulgation,  was  not 
only  taught  in  most  of  the  German  universities,  but  was 
eagerly  studied  outside  the  universities,  even,  it  is  said,  by 
German  women ;  and  it  was  beginning  to  be  known  in  Hol- 
land, England,  and  France.  It  had  opponents  as  well  as 
disciples  (and  semi-disciples)  :  it  was  opposed  "  in  the 
name  of  revealed  religion,  of  older  schools  of  metaphysics, 
particularly  the  Leibnitzean  and  Wolffian,  of  empirical  and 
sceptical  schools  of  philosophy,  of  mere  sentiment."  We 
give  the  names  of  the  more  important  Kantians,  Semi- 
Kantians,  and  Anti-Kantians.  (i)  Kantians  were  Johann 
Schulz  (1739-1805),  professor  of  mathematics  and  "sec- 
ond court-preacher  "  at  Konigsberg ;  Karl  Leonhard  Rein- 
hold  (to  be  noticed  later)  ;  Karl  Christian  Ehrhard  Schmid 
(1761-1812),  professor  at  Giessen  and  Jena;  Christian 


368        A   HISTORY  OF  AIODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Gottfried  Schiitz  (1747-1832),  professor  at  Dederstedt 
and  Jena,  and  editor,  together  with  Hufeland,  of  the  Jena 
"  Allgemeine  Literaturzeitung,"  —  the  chief  literary  organ  of 
Kantism  in  Germany;  Jacob  Sigismund  Beck  (to  be 
spoken  of  later)  ;  and  the  poet  Schiller  (also  to  be  noticed 
hereafter).  (2)  Semi- Kantian  were:  Johann  Heinrich 
Abicht  (1762-1816),  professor  at  Erlangen  and  Wilna; 
August  Wilhelm  Rehberg  (1757-1836);  Christian  Jacob 
Kraus  (1753-1807),  professor  at  Konigsberg;  Wilhelm 
Traugott  Krug  (1770-1842),  Kant's  successor  at  Konigs- 
berg, and  professor  also  at  Leipzic, —  a  man  of  encyclopedic 
learning  rather  than  depth  of  thought,  who  exerted  a  very 
considerable  influence  for  the  spread  of  interest  in  philo- 
sophical studies;  Friedrich  Bouterwek  (1766-1828),  pro- 
fessor at  Gottingen;  Georg  Hermes  (1781-1848),  professor 
(of  theology)  at  Bonn;  Bernhard  Bolzano  (1781-1848), 
professor  in  Prague ;  Jacob  Friedrich  Fries  (to  be  noticed 
hereafter).  (3)  Anti-Kantian  were  :  Christian  Garve  (1742- 
1798),  a  litterateur ;  Johann  Heinrich  Feder  (1740-1821), 
professor  at  Gottingen  and  joint  author,  with  Garve,  of  the 
most  important  of  the  early  criticisms  of  Criticism ;  Cristoph 
Meiners  (1747-1810),  professor  at  Gottingen,  and  editor, 
with  Feder,  of  a  journal  (called  the  "  Philosophische  Bib- 
liothek  ")  established  to  oppose  Kantism ;  Johann  August 
Eberhard  (1739-1809),  professor  at  Halle,  and  editor  of  a 
"  Philosophisches  Magazin  "  (1787-1792),  conducted  for 
the  purpose  of  combating  Criticism ;  Johann  Christoph 
Schwab  (1743-1821),  professor  in  a  school  at  Stuttgart; 
Ernst  Plainer  (1744-1818),  professor  in  the  University  of 
Leipzic;  and  Gottlob  Ernst  Schulze,  Salomon  Maimon, 
Johann  Georg  Hamann,  Johann  Gottfried  Herder,  Fried- 
rich  Heinrich  Jacobi,  all  of  whom  will  be  spoken  of 
hereafter. 


END   OF   VOL.    I. 

-4-4J*. 


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